Jump to content

Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity
Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca
AbbreviationURNG-MAIZ
General SecretaryGregorio Chay
Founded8 February 1982[1]
Legalised18 December 1998
Merger ofEGP
FAR
ORPA
PGT
PGT-NDN
HeadquartersGuatemala City
Membership (2024)25,633[2]
Ideology
Political positionFar-left[8]
Regional affiliationSão Paulo Forum
ColorsRed, Green, Yellow (logo)
Blue, White (flag)
Congress
0 / 160
Party flag
Website
www.urng-maiz.org.gt Edit this at Wikidata

The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (in Spanish: Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, URNG-MAIZ or most commonly URNG) is a Guatemalan political party that started as a guerrilla movement but laid down its arms in 1996 and became a legal political party in 1998 after the peace process which ended the Guatemalan Civil War.

History

[edit]

Background

[edit]

PBSUCCESS and early insurgency

[edit]

Since the CIA-backed coup in 1954, opposition groups were continuously forming in an attempt to fight against the repression that the military and wealthy landowners in Guatemala had created.[9] The ensuing military dictatorship of Carlos Castillo Armas immediately on 28 June 1954 banned the Guatemalan Party of Labour (PGT) and shortly later other labor unions and left-wing parties with suspected communist sympathies via Decree 4880.[10][11][12] After the assassination of Castillo Armas by a left-wing member of the presidential guard, Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes prevailed in the ensuing power struggle.[13] The continued repression, coupled with an ever closer alignment of the Guatemalan government with the United States government, as well as rampant corruption and favoritism led to a rebellion by a group of dissident officers, which later named themselves Revolutionary Movement 13th November (MR-13), in reference to the incident.[14] The failed coup d'état on 13 November 1960 usually marks the beginning of the Guatemalan Civil War, a bloody affair that lasted 36 years and claimed the lives of an estimated 200,000 people.[11] With United States military assistance, the guerrilla were uprooted from eastern Guatemala and had to flee to neighboring Honduras.[15] Remnants of the MR-13 returned in 1962 and established the first guerrilla group, the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR).[11][16] After barely any preparation the FAR launched its first attacks against remote military installations and properties of the United Fruit Company on 6 February 1962.[17] The failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion in April 1961 and his purported erratic behavior convinced part of the military and the United States to rid themselves of Ydígoras Fuentes, which finally succeeded after several attempts in March 1963.[18][19] This putsch, led by his Minister of Defense Alfredo Enrique Peralta Azurdia, denoted the beginning of Guatemala's first authentic military regime.[20] In 1966, the law professor Julio César Méndez Montenegro was elected to the presidency, but was only allowed to take up the position under the condition, that he would not interfere in matters of internal security or the military.[21][22] The year also saw the creation of Mano Blanca, a right-wing paramilitary group associated with the MLN, founded to prohibit Méndez Montenegro from taking office and to counter left-wing activism.[23][24] The subsequent "white terror" coupled with the Zacapa program, severely crippled the guerrilla force based in eastern Guatemala, which in turn tried to avoid detection by hiding in cities.[25] The FAR responded by resorting to various assassinations and abductions during the late 1960s to early 1970's, like those of John Gordon Mein and Karl von Spreti.[26][27] The tense security situation led both right-wing military factions, namely the MLN and PID to unify for the elections in 1970, to counter the reforms initiated under Méndez Montenegro, which the army perceived as infringing on their autonomy.[28] The incoming government of Carlos Manuel Arana Osorio initiated another counterinsurgency to stifle the FAR and began to entrench the military in the Guatemalan economy, chiefly by establishing the Army Bank, which handed out loans to the officer corps.[29]

FAR splinters and government pressure

[edit]

As a consequence of the repression, a large contingent of the FAR came to the conclusion that they needed to change their strategy.[30] Instead of continuing with the foco strategy of confronting the army in the countryside, which inflicted heavy losses on them, they saw the need to expand their social base to indigenous communities and middle class intellectuals and professionals.[31] This perception gave rise to the Organization of People in Arms (ORPA) and Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) in the early 1970s.[31] The former was formed in 1971 as the Organización Regional de Occidente, as a branch of the FAR in western Guatemala, before splitting outright in mid 1972.[32] The split was effectuated by their differences regarding organizational and ideological questions, particularly the role of ethnicity in the economic exclusion of indigenous people.[33] The group underwent a gestation period of 8 years, operating clandestinely, mainly recruiting soldiers and accruing arms, before committing their first operation in September 1979.[34] The group would soon grow famous for acts of armed propaganda in this mold, wherein they disarmed the local police and military forces and read out revolutionary statements, while handing out propaganda leaflets.[35] Similarly the Guerrilla Army of the Poor was established in 1972, as a splinter of the FAR, caused by ideological and tactical differences akin to ORPA, in that they saw the greatest revolutionary potential in indigenous people.[36][37] This group was heavily influenced by liberation theology and build a large indigenous and Ladino following in El Quiché.[38] In the midst of this situation the MLN-PID alliance broke down and the protégé of Arana Osorio, Fernando Romeo Lucas García of the PID was elected to the presidency.[39][40] Lucas García tried to solidify his hold on power by integrating the Mano Blanca into the regular military, while establishing the Ejercito Secreto Anti-Comunista, a paramilitary group beholden to himself.[41][42] This group committed various human rights abuses, among them torture, public threats to prominent political adversaries and massacres, like the infamous Panzós massacre.[43][41] In response to these massacres, sections of the FAR and a PGT splinter group also rejoined the armed struggle by the late 1970s, creating a volatile atmosphere in Guatemala.[36]

Guerrilla offensive and pre-unification measures

[edit]

The repression of the late 1970s failed to quell the rebellion and likely had the unintentional consequence of growing the ranks of the guerrilla factions between 1980 and 1981, who by that time were in charge of 9 departments in Guatemala.[44][45] Another pivotal incident was the Spanish Embassy Fire in January 1980, in which the Guatemalan military firebombed the embassy to evict a protest group of indigenous peasant farmers and student activist inside the embassy, which also backfired at the military, leading to even more momentum for the guerrilla mobilization effort.[46] By early 1981, the guerrilla forces were so strong that they mounted a major offensive on government forces, leaving rural areas in the West and South firmly in their hands and enabling them to mount occasional assaults in the capital.[47] The military responded with a widespread counter-insurgency campaign, linked with a divide and conquer strategy, by organizing the recruitment of indigenous people into, so-called "self-defense patrols" (Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil (PAC)), to control their communities.[48][49] The increasing oppression brought the divided groups back together, which had in 1978 already established a Tripartite cooperation agreement between EGP, FAR and PGT-ND.[50] Geopolitical circumstances at the end of 1980 led the Cuban and Nicaraguan government, which supported the guerrilla, to ultimately press for a more thorough merger.[50]

Formation

[edit]

In the backdrop of these civil war circumstances the URNG formed as a leftist umbrella organization consisting of four groups: the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Revolutionary Organization of People in Arms (ORPA), the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) and the National Directing Nucleus of PGT (PGT-NDN) on 8 February 1982.[31] The unification process was mediated by the Cuban government, who only wanted to support a unitary and forceful insurgency.[51][52] In consequence, the group became the public face of the long-running insurgency against the Guatemalan government throughout the Guatemalan Civil War.[53]

Later on, the URNG led the leftist opposition in peace negotiations with the conservative Guatemalan government.[53] These negotiations began in 1986 and brought the end of the civil war when negotiations finished in December 1996, by signing the Firm and Lasting Agreement.[54] The conclusion of the peace talks led the URNG to pursue the registration as a legal party inside the Guatemalan political system in June 1997.[31] The group was formally registered as a political party in December 1998.[31]

Civil war era

[edit]

Military regimes and suppression of the guerrilla

[edit]

In March 1982, only one month after their formation, the URNG experienced an attack ordered by then president, retired General Efraín Ríos Montt. Backed by the CIA, Ríos Montt led a "scorched-earth" counter-insurgency campaign against the URNG and its supporters until he was toppled the following year.[31] During his rule, Rios Montt tried to eradicate the insurgency by banning the activities of political parties and committing various massacres against the population in the Guatemalan highlands, thereby removing the recruitment pool of the URNG.[55] He and his associates ascribed critique on their measures to an "international communist conspiracy" of which Amnesty International and the Catholic Church were also a part of.[55] Ríos Montt's eventual downfall from power followed a similar path as his ascension, with a coup by his Minister of Defence Óscar Humberto Mejía Víctores in August 1983.[39] His overthrow ended the bloodiest episode of the civil war and the Guatemalan genocide, in which approximately 150,000 civilians were killed between mid 1981 and 1983 and which led to widespread displacement of another 1.5 million people.[56][57][58] The Victoria 82 campaign, as it was called by Ríos Montt, proved to be highly successful against the guerrilla though, which had to retreat to remote rural zones, while its leadership fled to Mexico City.[59] It also hampered the merging process of the divergent groups considerably, as streamlined and unified logistics could only be arranged by 1986.[60] Additionally devastating for the guerrilla was the renewed support from the USA to the Guatemalan military upon the Reagan administration taking office in January 1981.[61]

The militant PGT splinter groups saw their base wiped-out, following the capture and coerced conversion of Carlos Quinteros, an important commander in their ranks.[62][63] The political wing of the PGT also faced a major crisis, after unsuccessfully trying to reorganize itself in its former northern strongholds of Alta Verapaz, as this plan was thwarted by the military.[63] The social disarticulation and continuous assassinations of its members eventually led to its exhaustion by 1986, which prompted them to mend their relationship with the URNG.[64] These events led the URNG to eventually substitute the PGT-NDN for the PGT in its leadership by 1987.

The URNG employed ambushes and raids on government security forces as their main tactic, and also performed bombings and assassinations. They attacked the military, government officials, as well as foreign diplomats and foreign businesses. The government responded with undercover death-squads, supported by the police and military, who undertook the mission to take down prominent leftists.[53]

Return to civilian rule

[edit]

After the election of Vinicio Cerezo in 1985, the truncated civil society in Guatemala revitalized to some degree, which convinced a significant part of mid-level cadres to abandon armed struggle, subsequently reducing the organisations leverage during the peace negotiations.[65] Already during his election campaign, Vinicio Cerezo emphasized national unity, which he combined with critique of the armies conduct and expressed willingness to negotioate with the URNG.[66] Still his presidency achieved very little to rein in on political violence and he made only token efforts to prosecute human rights abuses committed by the army.[67] According to the FAR commander Pablo Monsanto, the guerilla entered the first negotiations with the Cerezo administration to reorganize and rearm itself and only later reached a point, where a political solution to the conflict seemed beneficial and unavoidable.[68] By the time a civilian government returned to office in 1986, the URNG recognized that coming to power through armed struggle was out of the question, and they took initiatives to negotiate a political solution.[citation needed]

According to a report in NACLA's Report on the Americas (May/June 1997),

The government and army maintained that since they had "defeated" the URNG, they had no need to negotiate until the guerrillas had laid down their arms. The subsequent settlements ending the wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador stiffened the elites' resolve "never" to permit such an outcome in Guatemala.[69]

The URNG functioned as an umbrella organization to represent the leftist beliefs amongst the Guatemalan people, particularly the Guatemalan poor. Although they were involved in attacks, their primary function was at the negotiation table with the Guatemalan government.[citation needed]

Peace process

[edit]

From 1986 to 1996, the army and government were drawn into a peace process moderated and verified by the United Nations and including other international actors as key players. During the negotiations both sides made major concessions. The UN mediated Oslo Agreement provided an arrangement for direct negotiation between the belligerent groups. This open negotiation led to the signing of the "Agreement on Procedures in Search of Peace by Political Means" in Mexico in 1991. The United Nations presided over these changes meant to create a long-lasting peace.[70] Obligations were imposed on the government, including significant constitutional reforms, which were internationally binding and would be verified by the UN. After 9 years of negotiations in 1995, the leadership of the URNG came to a preliminary agreement with the government to sign a peace deal in 1996.[71]

[edit]

On 29 December 1996, a peace agreement was signed by the government and the URNG in the presence of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, officially ending the 36-year civil war.[71] The signing ceremony was held in front of the National Palace of Culture on the Plaza de la Constición in the presence of about 50,000 people.[71] Among a cheerful crowd, a flame of peace was lit by the signatories inmidst the place to symbolize the end of armed conflict.[71] The Secretary-General of the URNG, Comandante Rolando Morán and president Álvaro Arzú jointly received the UNESCO Peace Prize for their efforts to end the civil war and attain the peace agreement.[72]

The UNRG has since apologized for the atrocities that occurred during the Guatemalan Civil War, asking forgiveness from all victims, families and other who experienced any kind of excesses. This apology came two days after President Clinton admitted the role of the United States in a "dark and painful period" during the civil war in Guatemala.[73] After Rolando Moran died in September 1998, Pablo Monsanto (nom de guerre Jorge Soto) was elected to succeed him as Secretary General of the party.[74] In May 1999, as a provision of the peace agreement, a constitutional referendum was held to amend the constitution.[75] The URNG was part of the Front for Yes, advocating for an affirmative vote during the election campaign.[76] All 4 provisions failed to win a majority, albeit amid a low voter turnout of 18.5%.[75][76]

The party made its national electoral debut during the elections in 1999, joining forces with 2 minor left-wing parties, the Authentic Integral Development and Unidad de la Izquierda Democrática to contest the elections as the New Nation Alliance.[77][78] The alliance, which was finalized on 12 February 1999, nominated the moderate Álvaro Colom, who in 2011 eventually was successful in seeking the presidential office inside the National Unity of Hope, as their presidential candidate.[78][79] He came in third with about 12.4% of the vote. The alliance also achieved the third place in the legislative election with 11% of the national vote, thereby electing 9 Congress members. The party drew significant support from part of their former strongholds and majority indigenous departments Huehuetenango, Quetzaltenango and El Quiché, where in each the alliance was able to win an electoral district seat.[80]

In August 2001, with the support of Rodrigo Asturias (nom de guerre Gaspar Ilom)), Alba Estela Maldonado Guevara (nom de guerre Capitán Lola) was elected to replace Soto as Secretary General and subsequently developed a cosier relationship with the ruling FRG, which was founded by its former archenemy Rios Montt.[81][74] The new party line was met with significant opposition from within the party, leading first to the resignation of Arnoldo Noriega, a former leader inside the EGP and critique from Soto, who rejected cooperation with the FRG.[74] Later in May 2002, Soto also left the party to found the New Nation Alternative, taking fewer than 200 members with him.[74][82]

In the legislative election, held on 9 November 2003, the severely fractured party saw their vote share decrease to 4.2% of the popular vote, returning 2 out of 158 seats to Congress.[83] Elected were Maldonado Guevara via the party list and Viktor Manuel Sales for a seat in the Huehuetenango delegation.[84] In the presidential election held the same day, its candidate Rodrigo Asturias won 2.6% of the popular vote.

After the elections party leaders cited, among other factors, their lack of knowledge about the political system and electoral campaigning as reasons for their limited electoral success.[85] After Rodrigo Asturias passed away in June 2005, Héctor Nuila was selected to succeed him as Secretary General.[86] In the preparation phase for the next election, Movimiento Amplio de Izquierdas (MAIZ) was founded as a leftist platform, representing various leftist organizations.[87][88]

At the 2007 elections the party captured 2 seats, one in Huehuetenango and one via the national list, with 3.7% of the nationwide vote in the congressional elections.[89] In the presidential election of the same day, its candidate Miguel Ángel Sandoval won 2.1% of the popular vote.

For the elections in 2011 the party entered into a political alliance with Winaq, MNR, the URNG splinter ANN and 60 civil society groups to form the Broad Front of the Left.[90] Broadly seen as a positive development inside the left, the coalition only yielded limited electoral success, returning only two seats, one each for San Marcos and Huehuetenango, to the legislature with approximately 3.3% in the congressional elections and 3.2% for the presidential candidate and Winaq founder Rigoberta Menchú.[89]

At the national party convention in March 2013, a new executive committee was elected, including Ángel Sánchez as the successor of Héctor Nuila as new General Secretary.[91]

The coalition was maintained for the 2015 elections and was able to increase their vote share to almost 4.4%, but the party only maintained their single legislator in Congress via winning a congressional district. In the presidential elections the Broad Front of the Left unified behind the presidential candidacy of Miguel Ángel Sandoval, who received about 2.1% of the vote.

In January 2019, the possibility of a united list with the successor party of the ANN, Convergence was explored.[92] In May 2019, in the run-up to the next elections, the party was one of 5 left leaning parties that declined to participate in a conference hosted by the Asociación la Familia Importa for a conservative pact concerning the "defense of family and life".[93][94]

The coaltition split up ahead of the elections in 2019, but the party was nonetheless able to reach 2.8% among the national electorate and even increased their number of elected deputies to 3. Before the start of the election campaign, the party committee held talks with Thelma Aldana, founder of Semilla, to discuss the possible support of her candidacy, but as she was barred from participating in the election by the Constitutional Court due to questionable accusations of corruption, the party ultimately nominated Pablo Ceto and Blanca Estela Colop.[95][96] Ceto, who had already been a vice presidential candidate for the party in 2003, campaigned on a reinvigorated peace process as well as the eradication of poverty and roughly maintained their last result with 2.2% of the vote.[4]

The party by and large opposed the government of Alejandro Giammattei after the election and particularly opposed the dismissal of Juan Francisco Sandoval as head prosecutor of the Special Prosecutor's Office against Impunity in July 2021.[97] In January 2022, Miguel Ángel Sandoval, the former presidential candidate for the party or alliance in 2007 and 2015, wrote an open letter to party leadership of his own party, the Movement for the Liberation of Peoples, Semilla and Winaq, calling for a fresh political and electoral alliance.[98][99] He cited the Historic Pact for Colombia and the Brazil of Hope coalitions as successful role models for cross ideological alliances.[98] On 29 January 2023, URNG and Winaq made their renewed alliance public and announced their plans to nominate Amílcar Pop and Mónica Enríquez as their presidential ticket for the upcoming elections.[100] Moreover, the parties aimed to cooperate with Semilla to win the mayorship of Guatemala City, which ultimately came to fruition when the coalition nominated Juan Francisco Solórzano Foppa, the former director of the Superintendency of the Tax Administration (SAT), for the position.[100][101]

Support base

[edit]

During the civil war the group received support from Guatemala's rural poor as well as from urban intellectuals.[53] The URNG enjoyed high support among indigenous communities, which was reflected in the fact that 82% of its demobilized armed combatants and 50% of its political activists came from an indigenous background.[102] After the conclusion of peace negotiations, the URNG was only partially able to maintain this constituency, as other sections organized inside the Democratic Front New Guatemala.[80]

The party is closely affiliated with the farmers' association Committee for Peasant Unity (CUC) since the civil war era. The union was officially founded on 15 April 1978 to organize peasant farmers and improve their economic conditions.[103] Some of its members later rose to prominent roles inside the URNG, like Secretary General Gregorio Chay and Pablo Ceto, the presidential candidate for the party in 2019.[104]

In contrast to many other parties in Guatemala, the party has a widespread and permanent organizational structure in place.[105]

Party platform and ideology

[edit]

A study from FLASCO Guatemala, released in 2006, analysing the coherence of the party ideology between secretaries general, rank-and-file members and party statutes in Guatemala, uncovered that only the URNG showed internal congruence.[106]

Foreign policy

[edit]

The URNG maintains an amicable relationship with the Cuban government and has condemned the economic, financial and political blockade of Cuba, exerted by the United States.[107]

Environmental policy

[edit]

The party is generally opposed to large mining projects, citing the adverse effects these have on rural communities and the local environment, while profits are usually siphoned off to multinational companies.[108]

Domestic policy

[edit]

CICIG

[edit]

The party supported the implementation of a UN sponsored Commission for the Investigation of Illegal Groups and Clandestine Security Organizations in Guatemala (CICIACS) reached in an agreement between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Human Rights Ombudsman in March 2003, but heavily criticized the Berger administration for its approach towards its translation into law, which it viewed as weak and inadequate and inhibited by delay tactics.[109][110][111]

In December 2006, a new agreement between the UN and the government led to the creation of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), which finally began to operate in September 2007, after being greenlit by the Constitutional Court and Congress in May and August 2007, respectively.[112]

Judicial appointment process

[edit]

In May 2009, the party supported a bill presented by Nineth Montenegro and the civil society group Pro Justicia, that would regulate the selection process of magistrates. According to proponents of the law, the appointment process should be held in public to prohibit nepotism and ensure transparency.[113]

Non-governmental organizations

[edit]

In February 2019, the party voiced its opposition to initiative 5257, a bill concerning the regulation of non-governmental organizations, that would grant the president the power to prohibit NGO's from operating in the country.[114]

Peace treaty implementation

[edit]

Party members have on multiple occasions complained that key aspects of the Firm and Lasting Accord have not been enacted in the aftermath of its signing.[115][4] A study by the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame found that 10 years after the peace treaty coming into force, still less than 70 % of the peace treaty provisions had been implemented.[116]

The party strongly objected to restitution payments to Ex-PAC fighters that were recruited to fight them during the civil war and dissolved during the peace negotiations in 1996.[117][118][119]

Press freedom

[edit]

In March 2023, the party condemned the intention of the government and judiciary to prosecute independent media outlets, particularly El Periódico and its journalists, which the party views as efforts to punish them for its investigations into the government.[120]

Security and military policy

[edit]

The party is opposed to the deployment of military police units to support the civil police in combating crime.[121] In early 2000, the alliance heavily criticized a bill passed by Congress, extending the operational area of the military police force, calling it a direct violation of the peace treaty that explicitly reserves matters of internal security to the civil police force.[121]

In April 2004, the party received the proposed cuts to the military budget by the Berger administration as a positive signal for the demilitarisation of the public sphere.[122]

Nuevos Horizontes

[edit]

In late 2006, the URNG opposed the approval of the US-military mission Nuevos Horizontes by Congress, entailing the stationing of US troops in San Marcos from January to August 2007.[123] The party later in January 2010, also voiced their opposition to the reopening of military barracks in San Marcos, which would cost the state at least Q100m.[124] Miguel Ángel Sandoval argued that this would just be another step to increase the militarisation of the department, arguing instead for an increased presence of civil police forces and an end to the impunity experienced by criminals.[124]

Economic policy

[edit]

CAFTA

[edit]

Stating that they are not principally opposed to open markets, the party nonetheless opposed the ratification of CAFTA in early 2005, because it favoured genetically modified agricultural products, that are cheaper than home-grown cereals, thereby depriving small farmers of their livelihood.[125]

Mesoamerica Project

[edit]

In connection to the hydro power development plans linked to the Mesoamerica Project, formerly known as the Plan Puebla Panamá, the URNG demanded that the local population has to be involved in the planning process of these projects.[126] Marcos Ramírez, the mayor of Playa Grande also stated that these projects should be built and maintained by the local and national governments instead of relinquishing control thereof to multinational corporations.[126]

Electoral history

[edit]

Presidential elections

[edit]
Election Candidates First round Second round Status
President Vice President Votes % Votes %
1999[a] Álvaro Colom Vitalino Similox Salazar 270,891 12.36 (#3) — — Lost Red XN
2003 Rodrigo Asturias Pablo Ceto 69,297 2.58 (#6) — — Lost Red XN
2007 Miguel Ángel Sandoval Walda Barrios Ruiz 70,208 2.14 (#10) — — Lost Red XN
2011[b] Rigoberta Menchú Aníbal García 145,080 3.26 (#6) — — Lost Red XN
2015[c] Miguel Ángel Sandoval Mario Ellintong 101,347 2.11 (#11) — — Lost Red XN
2019 Pablo Ceto Blanca Estela Colop 94,531 2.16 (#12) — — Lost Red XN
2023[c] Amílcar Pop Mónica Enríquez 87,676 2.09 (#10) — — Lost Red XN
  1. ^ Joint ticket of the New Nation Alliance.
  2. ^ Joint ticket of the Broad Front of the Left.
  3. ^ a b Joint ticket with Winaq.

Legislative elections

[edit]
Election Votes % Seats +/– Status
1999 [a] 233,870 11.04 (#3)
9 / 113
 New Opposition
2003 107,276 4.20 (#7)
2 / 158
 Decrease 7 Opposition
2007 112,249 2.78 (#10)
2 / 158
 Steady 0 Opposition
2011[b] 143,238 3.27 (#7)
2 / 158
 Steady 0 Opposition
2015[c] 198,715 4.36 (#9)
1 / 158
 Decrease 1 Opposition
2019 112,037 2.78 (#16)
3 / 160
 Increase 2 Opposition
2023[c] 133,694 3.21 (#9)
0 / 160
 Decrease 3[d] Extra-parliamentary
  1. ^ Run as part of the New Nation Alliance.
  2. ^ Run as part of the Broad Front of the Left.
  3. ^ a b Run in coalition with Winaq.
  4. ^ Although the Winaq-URNG coalition won one seat, it belongs to the Winaq party, leaving the URNG for the first time without representation in Congress.

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ Allison, Michael E. (2006). Leaving the past behind? A study of the FMLN and URNG transitions to political parties (PhD). The Florida State University. p. 62. Retrieved 29 January 2023.
  2. ^ https://tse.org.gt/index.php/sistema-de-estadisticas/estadisticas-de-organizaciones-politicas
  3. ^ a b "Treinta años de la Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG)". albedrío.org (in Spanish). 28 January 2012. Archived from the original on 26 October 2021. Retrieved 26 October 2021.
  4. ^ a b c Orozco, Andrea (3 May 2019). "Pablo Ceto: "Los programas sociales inhabilitan a la gente"". Prensa Libre (in Spanish). Prensa Libre, S.A. Retrieved 18 October 2022.
  5. ^ "Enfoque Electoral No. 22-Salieron a flote el 16 de junio los intereses económicos y políticos oligárquicos" (PDF). El Observador (in Spanish). June 2019. Osmundo Ponce es un viejo militante del Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP) que se convirtió en pastor posteriormente a la firma de la paz, de una denominación evangélica no relacionada con las iglesias neopentencostales.
  6. ^ a b "Nos unimos a rechazo por amenazas de intervención contra pueblo y Gobierno de Venezuela". 15 August 2017.
  7. ^ "Somos la Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca". 22 August 2014.
  8. ^ "El 69 aniversario del PGT y el compromiso con la Revolución Socialista". 26 September 2018.
  9. ^ "End of Spring". Archived from the original on 2016-10-01. Retrieved 2011-07-02.
  10. ^ Wilkinson, Daniel (2002). Silence on the Mountain: Stories of Terror, Betrayal, and Forgetting in Guatemala. Houghton Mifflin. p. 124. ISBN 978-0-618-22139-4.
  11. ^ a b c Allison 2006, p. 61.
  12. ^ "Capítulo Primero: Causas y Orìgenes Del Enfrentamiento Armado Interno". Guatemala Memoria del Silencio (PDF) (Report) (in Spanish). Guatemala City: Comisión para el Esclaramiento Histórico. June 1999. p. 111. Retrieved 23 March 2023.
  13. ^ Morrison & May 1994, p. 115.
  14. ^ McClintock, Michael (1985). "State Terror and Popular Resistance in Guatemala". The American Connection. Vol. 2. London, UK: Zed. pp. 49–50. ISBN 978-0-86232-259-5.
  15. ^ McClintock 1985, p. 50.
  16. ^ Batz, Giovanni (2013). "Military factionalism and the consolidation of power in 1960s Guatemala." (PDF). In Garrard-Burnett, Virginia; Lawrence, Mark Atwood; Moreno, Julia E (eds.). Beyond the Eagle's Shadow: New Histories of Latin America's Cold War. Vol. 2. Albuquerque, USA: University of New Mexico Press. p. 60. ISBN 978-0-8263-5368-9.[permanent dead link]
  17. ^ Fell, James S. (1996). "Chapter One: The Guerrilla Movement Begins in Guatemala". Rebellion and the quest for social revolution in Latin America: the case of Guatemala in the 1960's (Master). University of Calgary. p. 26.
  18. ^ May, Rachel (March 1999). ""Surviving All Changes is Your Destiny": Violence and Popular Movements in Guatemala". Latin American Perspectives. 26 (2): 72–73. doi:10.1177/0094582x9902600204. S2CID 143564997.
  19. ^ Batz 2013, p. 52-54.
  20. ^ Batz 2013, p. 54.
  21. ^ Batz 2013, p. 58.
  22. ^ McClintock 1985, p. 78.
  23. ^ Grandin, Greg; Klein, Naomi (30 July 2011). The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War. University of Chicago Press. pp. 87–89. ISBN 978-0-226-30690-2.
  24. ^ Batz 2013, p. 64.
  25. ^ Batz 2013, p. 63-65.
  26. ^ Blumenau, Bernhard (2014). The United Nations and Terrorism. Germany, Multilateralism, and Antiterrorism Efforts in the 1970s. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 41–45. ISBN 978-1-137-39196-4.
  27. ^ "Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to Secretary of State Rusk". Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968. XXXI, South and Central America. U.S. Dept. of State, Office of the Historian. August 29, 1968.
  28. ^ Batz 2013, p. 67.
  29. ^ Batz 2013, p. 67-68.
  30. ^ Jonas, Susanne (1991). The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power. Westview Press. p. 138. ISBN 978-0-8133-0614-8.
  31. ^ a b c d e f Allison 2006, p. 62.
  32. ^ Bibler, Jared S. (2007). The Ideological Underpinnings of the Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (Master). Ohio University. p. 22-23. Retrieved 13 February 2023.
  33. ^ Bibler 2007, p. 22.
  34. ^ Bibler 2007, p. 23.
  35. ^ Bibler 2007, p. 27.
  36. ^ a b Bibler 2007, p. 28.
  37. ^ Harnecker, Marta (2010). América Latina y el socialismo del siglo XXI. Ediciones de Intervención Cultural. p. 6. ISBN 978-84-92616-78-7.
  38. ^ Bibler 2007, p. 28-35.
  39. ^ a b Batz 2013, p. 68.
  40. ^ Morrison, Andrew R.; May, Rachel A. (1994). "Escape from terror: Violence and migration in post-revolutionary Guatemala". Latin American Research Review. 29 (2): 111–132. doi:10.1017/S0023879100024146.
  41. ^ a b Morrison & May 1994, p. 118-119.
  42. ^ Gutiérrez, Edgar (1999). Hacia un paradigma democrático del sistema de inteligencia en Guatemala. Fundación Myrna Mack. p. 68. ISBN 99922-773-2-7.
  43. ^ Gutiérrez 1999, p. 83.
  44. ^ Bibler 2007, p. 29.
  45. ^ Corum, James (2004). "Guatemala's Protracted War--The Role of the Guatemalan Air Force". Air & Space Power Journal.
  46. ^ Sand, Håvard (2019). Recipes for Insurgency: A Comparative Study of the Insurgencies Against Jacobo Árbenz (1954), Fidel Castro (1959-1964), and the Guatemalan State (1960-1983) (Master). University of Oslo. p. 57. Retrieved 19 February 2023.
  47. ^ Jonas, Susanne (2000). Of Centaurs and Doves: Guatemala's Peace Process. Boulder, USA: Westview Press. p. 17. ISBN 978-0-8133-0614-8.
  48. ^ Kruijt, Dirk (2017). "Cuba and the Latin American Left: 1959–present". Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe. 28 (2): 42.
  49. ^ Landau, Saul (1993). The Guerrilla Wars of Central America: Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala. New York, USA: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. p. 192. ISBN 978-0-312-10373-6.
  50. ^ a b "Capítulo segundo: Las violaciones de los derechos humanos y los hechos de violencia". Guatemala Memoria del Silencio (PDF) (Report) (in Spanish). Guatemala City: Comisión para el Esclaramiento Histórico. June 1999. p. 237. Retrieved 19 February 2023.
  51. ^ Allison 2006, p. 95-96.
  52. ^ Kruijt 2017, p. 40.
  53. ^ a b c d "Terrorist Organization Profile: Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG)". Archived from the original on 2013-12-21. Retrieved 2011-07-02.
  54. ^ Allison 2006, p. 35.
  55. ^ a b Black, George (2012). "Guatemala's conversion" (PDF). NACLA Report on the Americas. 45 (1): 95–97.
  56. ^ Allison 2006, p. 126.
  57. ^ Morrison & May 1994, p. 114.
  58. ^ Jonas 2000, p. 24.
  59. ^ Kruijt 2017, p. 42-43.
  60. ^ Kruijt 2017, p. 43.
  61. ^ Sand 2019, p. 44.
  62. ^ Gutiérrez 1999, p. 89.
  63. ^ a b "Capítulo segundo: Las violaciones de los derechos humanos y los hechos de violencia". Guatemala Memoria del Silencio (PDF) (Report) (in Spanish). Guatemala City: Comisión para el Esclaramiento Histórico. June 1999. p. 242-243. Retrieved 19 February 2023.
  64. ^ "Capítulo segundo: Las violaciones de los derechos humanos y los hechos de violencia". Guatemala Memoria del Silencio (PDF) (Report) (in Spanish). Guatemala City: Comisión para el Esclaramiento Histórico. June 1999. p. 239-243. Retrieved 19 February 2023.
  65. ^ Allison 2006, p. 96.
  66. ^ Langevin, Mark Steven (1989). "Chapter Three: Policies and Programs". Christian Democratic administrations confront the Central American caldron: Presidents Jose Napoleon Duarte of El Salvador and Marcos Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo of Guatemala (PDF) (Master). The University of Arizona. p. 77-78.
  67. ^ Langevin 1989, p. 81-82.
  68. ^ "Revolutionäres Jubiläum" (PDF). Fijáte (in German). Verein ¡Fijáte!. 11 February 2004. Retrieved 31 May 2023.
  69. ^ Jonas, Susanne (1997). "The Peace Accords: An". NACLA Report on the Americas. 30 (6): 6–10. doi:10.1080/10714839.1997.11722821.
  70. ^ Max Planck; Jochen Abr Frowein (23 October 1998). Yearbook of United Nations Law 1998. p. 251. ISBN 978-90-411-9665-1.
  71. ^ a b c d "Gobierno y URNG firman la paz en 1996". Prensa Libre (in Spanish). Prensa Libre, S.A. 29 December 2022. Retrieved 25 January 2023.
  72. ^ Summary List of Unesco Prizes (PDF) (Report). UNESCO. 23 March 1998. p. 28. Retrieved 26 March 2023.
  73. ^ "Article Collections: Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity". The New York Times.
  74. ^ a b c d Allison 2006, p. 97.
  75. ^ a b Allison 2006, p. 90.
  76. ^ a b Galicia, Néstor (5 May 2015). "1999: Rechazo a Reformas Constitucionales". Prensa Libre (in Spanish). Prensa Libre, S.A. Retrieved 3 April 2023.
  77. ^ Sarah Zukerman Daly (2022). Violent Victors: Why Bloodstained Parties Win Postwar Elections. Princeton University Press. p. 313. ISBN 978-0-691-23133-4.
  78. ^ a b Allison 2006, p. 63.
  79. ^ Allison 2006, p. 132.
  80. ^ a b Allison 2006, p. 127.
  81. ^ "URNG: Die Suche nach politischen Leitlinien". Fijáte (in German). Verein ¡Fijáte!. 5 September 2001. Retrieved 12 March 2023.
  82. ^ "Spaltung der URNG offiziell" (PDF). Fijáte (in German). Verein ¡Fijáte!. 25 April 2002. Retrieved 12 March 2023.
  83. ^ Allison 2006, p. 118.
  84. ^ "Die Linke nach den Wahlen" (PDF). Fijáte (in German). Verein ¡Fijáte!. 3 December 2003. Retrieved 23 March 2023.
  85. ^ Allison, Michael E. (2016). "The Guatemalan National Revolutionary unit: the long collapse". Democratization. 23 (6): 1050–1051. doi:10.1080/13510347.2016.1159557.
  86. ^ Bibler 2007, p. 11.
  87. ^ Lambert, Renaud (14 September 2007). "Die Oligarchen bitten zur Wahl". Le Monde diplomatique (in German). Translated from the French original by Herwig Engelmann. Le Monde Publicité S.A. Retrieved 13 February 2023.
  88. ^ Lopez Herrera, Rubén (7 January 2007). "Frieden in Guatemala bleibt eine Utopie" (PDF). Fijáte (in German). Verein ¡Fijáte!. Retrieved 5 April 2023.
  89. ^ a b Allison 2016, p. 1048-1050.
  90. ^ Löding, Torge (September 2011). "Wahlen in Guatemala 2011: Präsident Colom hat sich verrechnet" (PDF). Standpunkte (in German). Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. Retrieved 18 September 2022.
  91. ^ Barreto, Bill (3 March 2013). "URNG elige nuevo comité ejecutivo". Prensa Libre (in Spanish). Prensa Libre, S.A. Retrieved 15 February 2023.
  92. ^ "Partidos corren luego de la convocatoria a elecciones 2019". Prensa Libre (in Spanish). Prensa Libre, S.A. 18 January 2019. Retrieved 28 February 2023.
  93. ^ Toro, David (15 May 2019). "15 binomios presidenciales firman pacto conservador". Prensa Communitaria (in Spanish). Retrieved 20 January 2023.
  94. ^ Abbott, Jeff (11 June 2019). "Democracy in Crisis in Guatemala". NACLA. Retrieved 21 January 2023.
  95. ^ Austen, Thorben (12 June 2019). "Elections in Guatemala". Publication. Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. Retrieved 18 September 2022.
  96. ^ Castañeda, Miguel Barrientos (26 March 2019). "Binomio presidencial de URNG recibe credenciales en el TSE". Prensa Libre (in Spanish). Prensa Libre, S.A. Retrieved 5 October 2022.
  97. ^ Austen, Thorben (28 July 2021). "Chef der Anti-Korruptionsermittlung in Guatemala entlassen". amerika21 (in German). Mondial21 e. V. Retrieved 15 October 2022.
  98. ^ a b Austen, Thorben (25 June 2022). "Initiative für die Einheit der progressiven Parteien in Guatemala". amerika21 (in German). Mondial21 e. V. Retrieved 15 October 2022.
  99. ^ Ángel Sandoval, Miguel (9 February 2022). "Carta fraterna a los representantes de los partidos progresistas". Prensa Communitaria (in Spanish). Retrieved 28 February 2023.
  100. ^ a b "URNG y Winaq confirman coalición y proclaman a su binomio presidencial para las Elecciones Generales 2023". Prensa Libre (in Spanish). Prensa Libre, S.A. 29 January 2023. Retrieved 31 January 2023.
  101. ^ Calles, Juan (29 March 2023). "De los 14 candidatos a la alcaldía de la ciudad capital, varios están ligados a gobiernos recientes o enfrentan procesos legales". Prensa Communitaria (in Spanish). Retrieved 3 April 2023.
  102. ^ Luciak, Ilja A. (2001). After the revolution: Gender and democracy in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. Baltimore, USA: JHU Press. p. 50. ISBN 0-8018-6780-0.
  103. ^ Sigüenza Ramírez, Pablo Francisco (May 2013). "Capitulo I". Fundamentos culturales, sociales y políticos de la agroecología en Guatemala, CA, diagnóstico y servicios, realizado en el Comité De Unidad Campesina, Guatemala, CA dirigido al fortalecimiento de los ejes: acceso, uso, tenencia y respeto a la madre tierra; desarrollo comunitario y productivo (PDF) (PhD) (in Spanish). Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala. p. 2. Retrieved 30 March 2023.
  104. ^ "CUC feiert 25-jähriges Bestehen" (PDF). Fijáte (in German). Verein ¡Fijáte!. 16 July 2003. Retrieved 30 March 2023.
  105. ^ Allison 2016, p. 1055.
  106. ^ Sánchez, Omar (2008). "Guatemala's party universe: a case study in underinstitutionalization". Latin American Politics and Society. 50 (1): 141. doi:10.1111/j.1548-2456.2008.00006.x.
  107. ^ "URNG-MAIZ condemns US blockade and disinformation about Cuba". Prensa Latina. Latin American News Agency. 21 June 2022. Retrieved 25 February 2023.
  108. ^ Austen, Thorben (12 June 2019). "«Gerechtigkeit, Entwicklung und Sicherheit» -Interview mit Carlos Barrios, URNG-Kandidat für Quetzaltenango" (PDF). Fijáte (in German). Verein ¡Fijáte!. Retrieved 7 March 2023.
  109. ^ "Stolpersteine für die CICIACS" (PDF). Fijáte (in German). Verein ¡Fijáte!. 7 April 2004. Retrieved 19 May 2023.
  110. ^ "Polemik um neuen CICIACS-Vorschlag" (PDF). Fijáte (in German). Verein ¡Fijáte!. 15 February 2006. Retrieved 19 May 2023.
  111. ^ United Nations (U.N.) (2004). "Guatemala: Agreement for the Establishment of a Commission for the Investigation of Illegal Groups and Clandestine Security Organizations in Guatemala (CICIACS)". International Legal Materials. 43 (3): 515–521. doi:10.1017/S0020782900026954.
  112. ^ Antonia Tilly (July 2020). Der Letzte löscht das Licht - Düstere Aussichten für die Korruptionsbekämpfung in Zentralamerika nach dem Ende von CICIG und MACCIH (PDF) (Report). Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. p. 2. Retrieved 19 May 2023.
  113. ^ "Anstelle von Transparenz: "Verpflichtungen anderer Art"" (PDF). Fijáte (in German). Verein ¡Fijáte!. 6 May 2009. Retrieved 5 April 2023.
  114. ^ "Die erste parlamentarische Falle ist zugeschnappt: NGO-Gesetz verabschiedet" (PDF). Fijáte (in German). Verein ¡Fijáte!. 19 February 2019. Retrieved 7 March 2023.
  115. ^ "Die sozialen Bewegungen und die Wahlen" (PDF). Fijáte (in German). Verein ¡Fijáte!. 26 February 2003. Retrieved 20 May 2023.
  116. ^ Joshi, Madhav; Quinn, Jason Michael; Regan, Patrick M. (2015). "Annualized implementation data on comprehensive intrastate peace accords, 1989–2012". Journal of Peace Research. 52 (4): 551–562. doi:10.1177/0022343314567486.
  117. ^ "Ex-PAC: Mit Gewalt zum "Erfolg"" (PDF). Fijáte (in German). Verein ¡Fijáte!. 17 November 2004. Retrieved 31 March 2023.
  118. ^ "Kongress bewilligt Zahlungen an Ex-PAC" (PDF). Fijáte (in German). Verein ¡Fijáte!. 25 August 2004. Retrieved 31 March 2023.
  119. ^ "1996: desmovilización de las Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil". Prensa Libre (in Spanish). Prensa Libre, S.A. 8 August 2017. Retrieved 31 March 2023.
  120. ^ "URNG-Maíz condena decisión de juez de investigar a periodistas". Prensa Libre (in Spanish). Prensa Libre, S.A. 3 March 2023. Retrieved 30 March 2023.
  121. ^ a b "Wer sichert die Sicherheit?" (PDF). Fijáte (in German). Verein ¡Fijáte!. 15 March 2000. Retrieved 30 March 2023.
  122. ^ "Kürzungspläne für´s Militär" (PDF). Fijáte (in German). Verein ¡Fijáte!. 21 April 2004. Retrieved 25 April 2023.
  123. ^ "Kongress bewilligt US-Militärpräsenz in San Marcos" (PDF). Fijáte (in German). Verein ¡Fijáte!. 27 December 2006. Retrieved 23 March 2023.
  124. ^ a b "Plan zur Militarisierung von San Marcos" (PDF). Fijáte (in German). Verein ¡Fijáte!. 3 February 2010. Retrieved 27 March 2023.
  125. ^ "Freihandelsabkommen mit den USA: ,,Weder Himmel noch Hölle"". Fijáte (in German). Verein ¡Fijáte!. 2 March 2005. Retrieved 12 March 2023.
  126. ^ a b "Strom - um jeden Preis?". Fijáte (in German). Verein ¡Fijáte!. 21 June 2006. Retrieved 19 May 2023.
[edit]
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Guatemalan_National_Revolutionary_Unity&oldid=1231233202"