Pooling equilibrium
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A pooling equilibrium in game theory is an equilibrium outcome of a signaling game.[1][2]
In a signaling game, players send actions called "signals" to other players. These signals are based on privately held information, which is not known to others in the game.[3] These actions do not reveal a player's "type" to other players, who then choose their strategies accordingly. In a pooling equilibrium, all types of a given sender send the same signal. Some senders represent their true type, while others correctly mimic the type of others, having no incentive to differentiate themselves. As a result, the receiver acts as if they have received no information, maximizing their utility according to their prior beliefs.[4]
See also
[edit]References
[edit]- ^ Ellison, Glenn. "Game Theory 14.122: Handout #l Finding PBE in Signaling Games", Microeconomic Theory II. MIT OpenCourseWare.
- ^ pooling equilibrium. Oxford Reference. Retrieved 6 Feb. 2024.
- ^ Bergstrom, Carl T.; Számadó, Szabolcs; Lachmann, Michael (2002-11-29). Johnstone, R. A.; Dall, S. R. X. (eds.). "Separating equilibria in continuous signalling games". Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences. 357 (1427): 1595–1606. doi:10.1098/rstb.2002.1068. ISSN 0962-8436. PMC 1693066. PMID 12495516.
- ^ Sobel, Joel (2020), Sotomayor, Marilda; Pérez-Castrillo, David; Castiglione, Filippo (eds.), "Signaling Games", Complex Social and Behavioral Systems : Game Theory and Agent-Based Models, New York, NY: Springer US, pp. 251–268, doi:10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_481, ISBN 978-1-0716-0368-0, retrieved 2024-06-30
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