✖


Jump to content

Аль-IIIHAAD AL-SLAAMIYA

(Перенаправлено из аль-Ихаада аль-Слаамия )
Для других видов использования см. AIAI (устранение неоднозначности) .

Аль-IIIHAAD AL-SLAAMIYA
Исламский союз
Лидеры Шейх Абдуллахи велел [ 1 ]
Абдулсалам Осман [ 2 ]
Хасан Дахир Аваис
Хасан Тюркие
Даты работы 1983 [ 3 ] –1997
Штаб -квартира Luuuuuq
Активные регионы Регион Гедо , Сомали и Сомалийский регион , Эфиопия
Противники Сомали USC
Сомали SSDF
Сомали SNF
Объединенные Нации UNOSOM II
 United States
 Эфиопия

Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya ( Aiai ; арабский язык : الاتحاد الإسلامي , Lit.   «Исламский союз») был исламистской политико-военной группой в Сомали . Организация, сформированная в 1983 году благодаря слиянию небольших исламистских групп, была самым мощным исламским движением в стране в конце 80 -х и начале 90 -х годов. У него также был самый распространенный клан после всех исламистских фракций по всей стране [ 4 ] и заявил цель создания сомалийского исламского государства . [ 5 ]

В ответ на крах Сомалийской Демократической Республики в 1991 году организация военизировалась и участвовала в нескольких войнах с иностранными войсками и сомалийскими фракциями. [ 4 ] После внутренних споров по поводу политики и нескольких военных поражений в конце 1990 -х годов AIAI отказался от использования насилия и эффективно распался в 1997 году на другие политические сущности. [ 6 ]

История

[ редактировать ]

Origins

[edit]

As the regime of Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre declined during the 1980s, Islamism began gaining strength throughout Somali society through various Islamic organizations. While many of the new Islamist groups had similar broad objectives, they often differed in approaches and methods. All the movements had initially agreed that propagating 'the Islamic Awakening' in Mosques and education centers was the best way to start transforming society. As the security situation across the country deteriorated the government of the Somali Democratic Republic saw these rapidly growing movements as a serious threat and issued bans; forcing them to continue work underground.[4]

Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI) had formed out of a merger of two Islamist groups during 1983.[3][4][7] Most members of the organization were students, teachers and professionals.[5] During 1980's, AIAI focused on providing welfare to refugee camps housing Somalis displaced from the Ogaden region following the 1977–1978 war with Ethiopia. While the organization had initially begun as a relief organization among Ogaden Somali populations, its ultimate goal was to free the Ogaden region from what Al-Itihaad and other Somali factions like the Western Somali Liberation Front and Ogaden National Liberation Front perceived to be Ethiopian colonial rule. AIAI opened Islamic schools across refugee camps and began covertly mobilizing youth. Consequently the organization had a significant following in the region.[3] Al-Itihaad extended its influence across various regions of Somalia and the Ogaden, exhibiting a wide spectrum of ideological inclinations ranging from moderate to more radical perspectives in different regions.[8]

As the decade went on, tensions between Islamist movements and the government began building in Somalia. Crackdowns and executions by government forces led many Islamic students and religious scholars to flee abroad, primarily to Arab states.[4] As the weakness of the Barre regime became apparent, Al-Itihaad went public for the first time during 1989.[5] Despite tensions with the government, Islamist organizations in the country relied on nonviolent methods and none took up arms until the total collapse of the Somali Democratic Republic at the start of 1991.[9]

Collapse of Somali state and militarization (1991– 1992)

[edit]

Members of the AIAI had not anticipated the collapse of the government and instead had expected for a democracy to take Barres place.[9] As all out civil war began in 1991, a faction within Al-Itihaad began pushing to take up arms against the factions that had overthrown the government. This led to significant debates within AIAI and other Islamist factions over what course of action to take.[9] Many members of AIAI believed that a protracted strategy of focusing on social programs should be emphasized instead of attempting to achieve their goals via armed struggle.[10] Numerous senior officers of the Somali National Army joined the AIAI post-1991, and consequently the organization had many informants in other Somali factions.[10] In June 1991, the first general conference was held in the Ogaden region, publicly establishing the organization and leadership in the territory. While AIAI had never renounced the use of violence, it first took a policy of cooperating with the directives of the newly formed post-Ethiopian Civil War government. In October 1991, Al-Itihaad formerly registered as an Ethiopian political party.[11] The organization also revealed the existence of its military wing to the government and delivered documents describing its political programme.[12]

On 11 August 1992, Ethiopian government forces ambushed AIAI, killing the organizations top leaders and two dozen other high ranking figures. Recent success in curbing the rise of organizations like the Oromo Liberation Front encouraged the Ethiopian government to eradicate Al-Itihaad before it had grown firm roots in the region. Following the killing AIAI quickly regrouped and elected Sheikh Abdulsalam Osman to replace Sheikh Abdulahi Bade, who had been assassinated in the ambush. This marked the beginning of a conflict lasting several months in 1992 that would see a total of nine battle between AIAI and the Ethiopian military, ending in a ceasefire by the end of the year. The ceasefire would hold in the region until 1994.[12]

AIAI–USC/SSDF conflict (1992)

[edit]

In 1992, AIAI entered the Somali Civil War when it fought against the forces of the United Somali Congress led by General Mohamed Farah Aidid during the Battle of Arare Bridge. AIAI forces were defeated and withdrew south to Ras Kamboni and north to Bosaso. That same year the organization would take control of the port city of Bosaso. For the short period that AIAI controlled the city, it reportedly left a generally positive impression on the general population due to being less corrupt in its administration than the SSDF.[9]

By 1992 the organization had become the most visible Islamist faction in Somalia. AIAI focused its recruiting effort urban and semi-educated youth, as opposed to other Islamist factions that emphasized focused on nomadic populations.[10]

UNOSOM war (1993)

[edit]
Main article: UNOSOM II

In September 1993, the Pan-Arab newspaper Al-Hayat reported that several Somali Islamic factions, including Al-Itihaad, who had previously remained neutral in the war, had tacitly allied with Aidid's Somali National Alliance against UNOSOM II and US forces.[13] When the conflict had begun in June 1993 AIAI and other Islamic factions had divided over whether not to fight foreign troops because Aidid had previously been a major threat to them.[14] As civilian casualties began mounting in July and August these groups, including AIAI, began to launch attacks on UNOSOM forces in Mogadishu after sunset. Independent sources in Mogadishu, corroborated by Al-Hayat, indicated that the majority of night military operations throughout 1993 were coordinated by a variety of Somali Islamic groups within the city, most prominently Al-Itihaad.[13][15] While Aidid did not overtly claim responsibility for these night operations, Al-Hayat noted that he was 'delighted' by AIAI's support and that he further sought to project the appearance of being the orchestrator for propaganda purposes.[16] Al-Itihaad fighters participated in the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu.[17]

Luuq administration and AIAI–SNF/Ethiopia conflict (1994 – 1997)

[edit]
Al Itihaad Al Islamiya fighters standing on top of a disabled ENDF tank in Luuq, Somalia on the 23 of May 1996

In 1994, Al-Itihaad effectively gained control of the Gedo region of Somalia and headquartered in the city of Luuq. The organization replaced the dysfunctional customary law with Sharia, resulting in a secure environment and stable administration. AIAI earned the respect of Luuqs population through their honesty to the public and openness towards international aid. The administrations anti-clanism policies provoked the Somali National Front (SNF), a secular faction representing segments of the regions dominant Marehan clan, who accused AIAI of being "foreign forces taking control"[18][9] The rising strength of AIAI led to military confrontations with the SNF, which was backed by the Ethiopian military. Ethiopia deployed troops and air power to assist the SNF against AIAI. This resulted in many Islamists who were not associated with Al-Itihaad to join the fight alongside them. Several Somali scholars produced fatwas calling on Somalis to fight the Ethiopian troops.[9]

Funded by wealthy Saudis, Al-Itihaad had extensive connections with the Somali expatriate community in Kenya, in particular the Eastleigh district of Nairobi and the predominantly Muslim coastal regions. At its height, the AIAI militia numbered over 1,000.[19]

Despite this initial widespread support for AIAI, the rank and file of the organization became mired in heated debates over the issue of taking up arms against other Somali factions. Some members of AIAI renounced the use of violence against Somalis all together and left the organization, and others who remained expressed unease over confrontations with other Somali factions. This debate forced Al-Itihaad to reconsider its strategy.[9]

By 1994, al-Itihaad had established itself in the Somali Region of Ethiopia. According to a report by the Emergency Unit for Ethiopia of the UNDP, al-Itihaad were most active in the area between Kebri Dahar, Danan, Kelafo and Degehabur. Some elements were reported to be active near Danot, Nusdariiq and 'Adow. Although they had support amongst the Ogaden, at the time their activities were not tolerated by the Isaaq and Dhulbahante clans.[20] An Ogaden wing of AIAI developed and registered itself as a political party in Ethiopia. The organization began fighting alongside the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) when Addis Ababa banned the party.[11]

Al-Itihaad sent a delegation to the Peace and Unity Conference of the Somali Nation, which was held February 1995 at Kebri Dehar, at which they made pledges which would cause the organisation to effectively cease to exist as a political and military force within the Ogaden.[21] Despite this promise al-Itihaad continued to engage in violent actions after this congress. One was the attempted assassination of then Minister of Transportation and Communications, Abdul Majid Hussein in 1996.[22] Another was in March of that year, when they raided areas in the Jigjiga Zone controlled by the Abskuul clan, apparently in collaboration with disaffected members of this clan. Established local security forces cleared al-Itihaad infiltrators from the Jigjiga Zone, and the defeated remnants retreated to disputed border areas between the Somali and Oromia regions, which has served as a refuge for them, as well as for Oromo fundamentalist rebel groups.[23]

Decline and War on Terror

[edit]

In 1997 Al-Itihaad collectively decided to abandon the idea of using force in order to change the status quo due to internal fissures and military setbacks. Despite this major policy shift the organization still endorsed fighting against Ethiopia due to its perceived colonization of the Ogaden region.[9] That same year the organization effectively became non-existent[11] and split into three distinct centres, Mogadishu, Bosaso and Haregisa.[6] Following the organizations renunciation of armed struggle in 1997, many former AIAI members joined civil society organizations dedicated to public health and education.[11]

On 7–8 March 1999, Ethiopia claimed it had made a cross-border incursion into Balanbale searching for members of AIAI who had reportedly kidnapped a person and stolen medical supplies, and denied reports of looting. Allegations from that time also claim Ethiopia was the supplier of various Somali warlords, while Eritrea was arming other warlords.[24][25]

Members

[edit]

The following individuals were considered to be members of AIAI:

[edit]

On 7 November 2001 the United States listed AIAI as a terrorist organization due to alleged connections with Al Qaeda. The United Kingdom[27] and New Zealand[28] would follow suit soon after. The Bush administration did not publicly offer evidence supporting its allegations, but some US officials asserted that links between AIAI and Al Qaeda date back to the U.S. presence in Somalia during UNOSOM in 1993.[29] According to Ted Dagne, an Africa specialist for the US Congressional Research Service:

...some observers are skeptical that Al-Itihaad is an international terror organization or that there is a strong link between Al Qaeda and Al-Itihaad. They argue that there are no credible reports that Al-Itihaad ever targeted innocent individuals, U.S. interests in Somalia or Africa. Some observers assert Al-Itihaad does not have regional reach let alone global reach.[11]

Kenneth Menkhaus noted that little evidence exists to support claims for ties between AIAI and Al Qaeda.[11] In the early 1990s, as Somalia fell into disorder following the collapse of the Siad Barre regime, Osama bin Laden reportedly took advantage of the chaos to fund al-Itihaad, later sending foreign militants who trained and fought alongside al-Itihaad members, with the goal of creating an Islamist state in the Horn of Africa.[30] AIAI was also active in setting up sharia courts. Despite its association with al-Qaeda, other analysts cautioned against overgeneralisation, noting that al-Itihaad had elements of a genuine social movement and that the characters of sub-factions throughout the country substantially differed from each other.[31]

On 24 September 2001, AIAI's finances were sanctioned by the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush under Executive Order 13224. Its then-head Hassan Dahir Aweys was also sanctioned under Executive Order 13224 in November of that year.[32] In June 2004, Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki, who had become leader of the organisation, was also sanctioned for his connections to bin Laden.[26]

US officials alleged that Al-Qaeda operatives utilized the AIAI base on Ras Kamboni island, south of Kismayo near the Kenyan border.[33] They further claimed that al-Qaeda established a training camp on Kamboni, while al-Itihaad set up another at Las Quoay near Bosaso's northeast port.[31] Investigations in 2001 into these assertions found the Kamboni camp to be abandoned.[34] After the September 11 attacks, US intelligence sources suggested that these camps were dismantled, with the militants relocating to tribal areas in Yemen. [31]

Al-Barakat

[edit]

An article published in the San Francisco Chronicle on 16 December 2001 quoted unnamed intelligence officials who claimed AIAI was extensively connected to al-Barakat.[31] The San Francisco Chronicle called al-Barakat a Somali-based business conglomerate and money transfer organisation. They quoted former U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul H. O'Neill who called al-Barakat as one of the "financiers of terrorism". The 9/11 Commission report subsequently cleared al-Barakat of involvement in financing the 9/11 hijackers, the 9/11 Commission determined that the 9/11 hijackers received their remote funds transfers through US financial institutions, not Islamic financial institutions.[35]

Ссылки

[ редактировать ]
  1. ^ Абди 2021 , с. 150: «Шейх Абдуллахи велели и шейх Абдуллахи Шейх Ахмед Касим были избраны председателем и заместителем председателя, соответственно».
  2. ^ Абди 2021 , с. 192: «Члены организации быстро перегруппировались и избрали шейха Абдулсалама Османа Абдулсалама в качестве нового лидера, чтобы заменить шейха Абдуллахи.
  3. ^ Подпрыгнуть до: а беременный в Абди 2021 , с. 149-150.
  4. ^ Подпрыгнуть до: а беременный в дюймовый и Scientific 2010 , с. 58-59.
  5. ^ Подпрыгнуть до: а беременный в Scientific 2010 , с. 77-78.
  6. ^ Подпрыгнуть до: а беременный Scientific 2010 , с. 70-71.
  7. ^ Алонсо, Грегори (2007). Африканский джихад бен Ладена к поиску рога Африки . Красное море Пресс. п. 48
  8. ^ Менхаус, Кен (15 февраля 2002 г.). Угрозы радикального ислама в Сомали: типология и оценка . Итальянский институт Африки и Востока .
  9. ^ Подпрыгнуть до: а беременный в дюймовый и фон глин час Scientific 2010 , с. 60-61.
  10. ^ Подпрыгнуть до: а беременный в De Waal 2004 , p. 125-126.
  11. ^ Подпрыгнуть до: а беременный в дюймовый и фон Scientific 2010 , с. 80-81.
  12. ^ Подпрыгнуть до: а беременный Абди 2021 , с. 192.
  13. ^ Подпрыгнуть до: а беременный «Исламисты, как сообщается, вступают в борьбу с ООН». Ежедневный отчет: Африка к югу от Сахары . 93 (173). Информационная служба иностранного вещания : 1. 3 сентября 1993 г. - через Readex .
  14. ^ Де Ваал, Александр; Абдель Салам, ах; Салих, Мохамед Абдель Рахим М.; Маршал, Роланд, ред. (2004). Исламизм и его враги в Африканском Роге . Блумингтон, Индиана: Индиана Univ. Нажимать. п. 131. ISBN  978-0-253-21679-3 .
  15. ^ Скахилл, Джереми (2013). Грязные войны: мир - это поле битвы . Интернет -архив. Лондон: хвост змея. С. 121–122. ISBN  978-1-84668-850-8 .
  16. ^ «Исламисты, как сообщается, вступают в борьбу с ООН». Ежедневный отчет: Африка к югу от Сахары . 93 (173). Информационная служба иностранного вещания : 1. 3 сентября 1993 г. - через Readex .
  17. ^ Woldemariam, Michael (15 февраля 2018 г.). Повстанческая фрагментация в Африке: восстание и его недовольство . Издательство Кембриджского университета. п. 233. ISBN  978-1-108-42325-0 .
  18. ^ Deforche, Robrecht. «Стабилизация и общая идентичность: размышления о союзе исламских судов и Аль-Ихааде» . Бильдхаан . 13 : 102–120.
  19. ^ "Контртерроризм в Сомали: потеря сердца и умы?" (PDF) . Кризисная группа Африка отчет (95). 11 июля 2005 года. Архивировано из оригинала (PDF) 13 июня 2007 года . Получено 26 июня 2007 года .
  20. ^ Брайден, Мэтт (20 ноября 1994 г.). Отчет о миссии в район Хауд, регион 5 (отчет). ПРООН чрезвычайные ситуации для Эфиопии . Получено 20 декабря 2008 года .
  21. ^ Брайден, Мэтт (март 1995 г.). Конференция мира и единства Сомалийской нации региона 5 (доклад). ПРООН чрезвычайные ситуации для Эфиопии . Получено 20 декабря 2008 года .
  22. ^ Фам, Дж. Питер (2007). «Региональные аспекты прав человека и гуманитарной ситуации в« Огадене », Сомали и за его пределами: показания перед Палатой представителей Соединенных Штатов, Комитет по иностранным делам, Подкомитет по Африке и глобальному здравоохранению, 2 октября 2007 г.» . Эфиопия и состояние демократии: влияние на права человека и гуманитарные условия в Огаден и Сомали: слушание перед подкомитетом по Африке и глобальному здоровью комитета по иностранным делам, Палата представителей, сто десятой конгресса, первая сессия, 2 октября. , 2007 . Тол. Сериал № 110–111. Вашингтон: Правительственная типография США. С. 74–94. ISBN  978-0-16-079776-7 Полем LCCN   2008354520 . Архивировано с оригинала 27 ноября 2012 года . Получено 5 июня 2009 года .
  23. ^ Фара, Ахмед Юсуф (3 апреля 1996 г.). Отчет о конференции по миру и развитию Джигджига, 10–13 марта 1996 г. (отчет). ПРООН чрезвычайные ситуации для Эфиопии . Получено 26 декабря 2008 года .
  24. ^ «Эфиопия отрицает грабеж сомалийского пограничного города» . Интегрированные региональные информационные сети . 10 марта 1999 . Получено 4 сентября 2007 года .
  25. ^ "Сомали - появляется третий фронт в войне в Эфиопии -Эритре?" Полем Stratfor . 7 апреля 1999 года. Архивировано с оригинала 10 июня 2020 года . Получено 12 сентября 2021 года . {{cite journal}}: CITE Journal требует |journal= ( помощь )
  26. ^ Подпрыгнуть до: а беременный Эрели, Адам (3 июня 2004 г.). «Обозначение Хасана Абдулла Херси аль-Турки в соответствии с исполнительным приказом 13224» (пресс-релиз). Государственный департамент США . Получено 4 сентября 2007 года .
  27. ^ Закон о терроризме 2000 (11, Приложение 2). 2000.
  28. ^ «Назначенные люди и организации» (PDF) . Новозеландская полиция . Получено 19 августа 2015 года .
  29. ^ Сомали: нынешние условия и перспективы для длительного мира (PDF) . Исследовательская служба Конгресса . 2011. С. 24–25.
  30. ^ Хаммер, Джошуа (23 декабря 2007 г.). «Африканский фронт» . New York Times . Получено 28 декабря 2007 года .
  31. ^ Подпрыгнуть до: а беременный в дюймовый Рив, Саймон (16 декабря 2001 г.). «Мы возвращаемся к кошмару под названием Сомали» . Сан -Франциско Хроника . Архивировано из оригинала 10 августа 2007 года . Получено 4 сентября 2007 года .
  32. ^ Гальвин, Уильям Фрэнсис (24 сентября 2001 г.). «Подозреваемый список террористов: для зарегистрированных инвестиционных консультантов штата Массачусетс» . Массачусетское отделение ценных бумаг . Получено 4 сентября 2007 года .
  33. ^ Шахзад, Сайед Салим (14 декабря 2001 г.). "Следующая остановка Сомали?" Полем Азия времена . Архивировано из оригинала 21 апреля 2005 года . Получено 4 сентября 2007 года . {{cite news}}: Cs1 maint: непредвзятый URL ( ссылка )
  34. ^ De Waal 2004 , p. 246-247.
  35. ^ «Мы заканчивают сомалийский банковский черный список» . Би -би -си . 28 августа 2006 года. Архивировано с оригинала 4 марта 2007 года . Получено 24 февраля 2007 года .

Библиография

[ редактировать ]
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Al-Itihaad_al-Islamiya&oldid=1244535583"
Arc.Ask3.Ru: конец переведенного документа.
Arc.Ask3.Ru
Номер скриншота №: 0d7cabb0e1f312ce6b152bd56100a86d__1725721020
URL1:https://arc.ask3.ru/arc/aa/0d/6d/0d7cabb0e1f312ce6b152bd56100a86d.html
Заголовок, (Title) документа по адресу, URL1:
Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya - Wikipedia
Данный printscreen веб страницы (снимок веб страницы, скриншот веб страницы), визуально-программная копия документа расположенного по адресу URL1 и сохраненная в файл, имеет: квалифицированную, усовершенствованную (подтверждены: метки времени, валидность сертификата), открепленную ЭЦП (приложена к данному файлу), что может быть использовано для подтверждения содержания и факта существования документа в этот момент времени. Права на данный скриншот принадлежат администрации Ask3.ru, использование в качестве доказательства только с письменного разрешения правообладателя скриншота. Администрация Ask3.ru не несет ответственности за информацию размещенную на данном скриншоте. Права на прочие зарегистрированные элементы любого права, изображенные на снимках принадлежат их владельцам. Качество перевода предоставляется как есть. Любые претензии, иски не могут быть предъявлены. Если вы не согласны с любым пунктом перечисленным выше, вы не можете использовать данный сайт и информация размещенную на нем (сайте/странице), немедленно покиньте данный сайт. В случае нарушения любого пункта перечисленного выше, штраф 55! (Пятьдесят пять факториал, Денежную единицу (имеющую самостоятельную стоимость) можете выбрать самостоятельно, выплаичвается товарами в течение 7 дней с момента нарушения.)