Битва при Сайпане

Битва при Сайпане
Часть на Марианских островах и Палау кампании Тихоокеанского театра военных действий ( Вторая мировая война ).
Морские пехотинцы укрываются за танком M4 Sherman во время зачистки японских войск на севере Сайпана, 8 июля 1944 года.
Дата 15 июня - 9 июля 1944 г. ( 15 июня 1944 г. - 09 июля 1944 г. ) (24 дня) Расположение Сайпан , Марианские острова Result American victory
Belligerents
United States	Japan
Commanders and leaders
Richmond K. Turner Holland Smith	Chūichi Nagumo † Yoshitsugu Saitō †
Units involved
V Amphibious Corps	31st Army
Strength
Assault: 71,034 Garrison: 23,616 Total: 94,650	Army: 25,469 Navy: 6,160 Total: 31,629
Casualties and losses
Land forces: 3,100–3,225 killed 326 missing 13,061–13,099 wounded Ships' personnel: 51+ killed 32+ missing 184+ wounded	25,144+ dead (buried as of 15 August) 1,810 prisoners (as of 10 August) Remaining ~5,000 committed suicide, killed/captured later, or holding out
8,000–10,000 civilian deaths

Битва при Сайпане — это десантное нападение, предпринятое Соединенными Штатами против Японской империи во время Тихоокеанской кампании с Второй мировой войны 15 июня по 9 июля 1944 года. Первоначальное вторжение спровоцировало битву в Филиппинском море , которая фактически уничтожила японский авианосец. базировалась авиация , и битва привела к захвату острова американцами. В результате оккупации крупные города японских островов оказались в пределах досягаемости бомбардировщиков B-29 , что сделало их уязвимыми для стратегических бомбардировок ВВС США . Это также ускорило отставку Хидеки Тодзё , премьер-министра Японии .

Сайпан был первой целью операции «Фураджер» , кампании по оккупации Марианских островов , которая началась в то же время, когда союзники вторглись во Францию ​​в рамках операции «Оверлорд» . После двухдневной морской бомбардировки 2-я дивизия морской пехоты США , 4-я дивизия морской пехоты армии США и 27-я пехотная дивизия под командованием генерал-лейтенанта Холланда Смита высадились на острове и разгромили 43-ю пехотную дивизию Императорской японской армии под командованием Генерал-лейтенант Ёсицугу Сайто . погибло не менее 3000 японских солдат Организованное сопротивление прекратилось, когда в последней атаке гёкусай , а после этого около 1000 мирных жителей покончили жизнь самоубийством.

The capture of Saipan pierced the Japanese inner defense perimeter and left Japan vulnerable to strategic bombing. It forced the Japanese government to inform its citizens for the first time that the war was not going well. The battle claimed more than 46,000 military casualties and at least 8,000 civilian deaths. The high percentage of casualties suffered during the battle influenced American planning for future assaults, including the projected invasion of Japan.

Background

American strategic objectives

Map showing strategic implication of Saipan's fall: Japanese Absolute National Defense Zone would be pierced and the Japanese home islands would be within the 1,600 mi (2,600 km) range of the B-29 bomber

Up to early 1944, Allied operations against the Japanese military in the Pacific were focused on securing the lines of communication between Australia and the United States. These operations had recaptured the Solomon Islands, eastern New Guinea, western New Britain, the Admiralty Islands, and the Gilbert and Marshall Islands.

To defeat Japan, Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, sought to execute War Plan Orange, which the Naval War College had been developing for four decades in the event of a war. The plan envisioned an offensive through the Central Pacific that originated from Hawaii, island-hopped through Micronesia and the Philippines, forced a decisive battle with the Japanese Navy, and brought about an economic collapse of Japan.

As early as the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, King presented the case to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for an amphibious offensive in the Central Pacific – including the Marshall Islands and Truk – that would capture the Mariana Islands. He stated that the occupation of the Marianas – specifically Saipan, Tinian and Guam – would cut the sea and air route from the Japanese home islands to the western Pacific, but the Combined Chiefs of Staff made no commitment at the time. General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, objected to King's proposed Central Pacific offensive. He argued that it would be costly and time-consuming and would pull resources away from his drive in the Southwest Pacific toward the Philippines.

At the Quebec Conference in August 1943, King continued to advocate for including the Marianas in a Central Pacific offensive. He suggested that the strategic importance of the Marianas could draw the main Japanese fleet out for a major naval battle. King's advocacy gained support from General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces, who wanted to use the newly-developed B-29 bomber. The Marianas could provide secure airfields to sustain a strategic bombing offensive as the islands put much of Japan's population centers and industrial areas within the B-29's 1,600 mi (1,400 nmi; 2,600 km) mile combat radius. At the Cairo Conference in November 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff supported both MacArthur's offensive in the Southwest Pacific and King's in the Central Pacific, adding the Marianas as an objective for the Central Pacific offensive and setting 1 October 1944 as the date for their invasion.

Map of Saipan showing the progress of the battle

Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas led the Central Pacific offensive. In January–February 1944, the Marshall Islands were quickly captured and a massive American carrier-based air attack on Truk demonstrated that it could be neutralized and bypassed. On 12 March 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff moved the date of the invasion up to 15 June with the goal of creating airfields for B-29s and developing secondary naval bases. Nimitz updated the plans for the Central Pacific offense, codenamed Granite II, and set the invasion of the Marianas, codenamed Forager, as its initial objective. Saipan would be the first assault.

Japanese strategic plan

The Japanese Imperial War Council established the "Absolute National Defense Zone", Zettai Kokubōken) in September 1943, which was bounded by the Kuril Islands, Bonin Islands, the Marianas, Western New Guinea, Malaya, and Burma. This line was to be held at all costs if Japan was to win the war. The Marianas were considered particularly important to protect as their capture would put Japan within bombing range of the B-29 bomber and allow the Americans to interdict the supply routes between the Japanese home islands and the western Pacific.

The Imperial Japanese Navy planned to hold the defense line by defeating the United States fleet in a single decisive battle, after which, the Americans were expected to negotiate for peace. The Japanese Submarine Fleet (6th Fleet), commanded by Vice Admiral Takeo Takagi whose headquarters was on Saipan, would screen the line. Any American attempt to breach this line was to serve as the trigger to start the battle. The defense forces in the attacked area would attempt to hold their positions while the Japanese Combined Fleet struck the Americans, sinking their carriers with land-based aircraft and finishing the fleet off with surface ships. As part of this plan the Japanese could deploy over 500 land-based planes – 147 of them immediately in the Marianas – that made up the 1st Air Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Kakuji Kakuta whose headquarters was on Tinian.

Geography

Panorama from Mount Tapotchau looking southwest, 2017: Aslito Field is on the left, Charan Kanoa and invasion beaches are left of center, and Garapan is on the right

Saipan and the other Mariana Islands were claimed as Spanish possessions by the conquistador Miguel López de Legazpi in 1565. After Spain's defeat in the Spanish-American War, Saipan was sold to Germany in 1899. The island was occupied by the Japanese in 1914 during World War I, who made it the administrative center for the Mariana Islands – Saipan, Tinian and Rota – that were part of Japan's South Seas Mandate.

Saipan has a tropical marine climate with a mean annual temperature of 85 °F (29 °C) in the lowlands and 78 °F (26 °C) in the highlands. Though the island has a mean rainfall between 81 and 91 inches per year, the rainy season does not begin until July. Unlike the small, flat coral atolls of the Gilberts and Marshalls, Saipan is a volcanic island with diverse terrain well suited for defense. It is approximately 47 sq mi (122 km²), and has a volcanic core surrounded by limestone. In the center of the island is Mount Tapotchau, which rises to 1,554 ft (474 m). From the mountain, a high ridge ran northward about seven miles to Mount Marpi. This area was filled with caves and ravines concealed by forest and brush, and the mountainous terrain would force tanks to stay on the island's few roads, which were poorly constructed.

The southern half of the island was where the principal airfield of the Marianas, Aslito Field, was located. It served as a repair stop and transit hub for Japanese aircraft headed toward other parts of the Pacific. This half of the island was flatter but covered with sugar cane fields because the island's economy became focused on sugar production after the Japanese government had taken over Saipan from Germany in 1914. Seventy percent of Saipan's acreage was dedicated to sugar cane. It was so plentiful that a narrow-gauge railway was built around the perimeter of the island to facilitate its transportation. These cane fields were an obstacle to attackers: they were difficult to maneuver in and provided concealment for the defenders.

Saipan was the first island during the Pacific War where the United States forces encountered a substantial Japanese civilian population, and the first where U. S. Marines fought around urban areas. Approximately 26,000 to 28,000 civilians lived on the island, primarily serving the sugar industry. The majority of them were Japanese subjects, most of whom were from Okinawa and Korea; a minority were Chamorro people. The largest towns on the island–the administrative center of Garapan with its population of 10,000, Charan Kanoa, and Tanapag–were on the western coast of the island, which was where the best landing beaches for an invasion were.

Opposing forces

Further information: Battle of Saipan order of battle and Central Marianas naval order of battle

American invasion force

LVTs heading for shore on 15 June. Birmingham in foreground; the cruiser firing in the distance is Indianapolis

Nimitz assigned Admiral Raymond Spruance, commander of the Fifth Fleet, to oversee the operation. Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner, Commander, Joint Amphibious Forces (Task Force 51) oversaw the overall organization of the amphibious landings of Forager; he also oversaw the tactical command of the landing on Saipan as Commander, Northern Attack Force (TF 52). Once the amphibious landings were completed, Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops (Task Force 56), would oversee the ground forces for all of Forager; he would also oversee the ground combat on Saipan as Commander, Northern Troops and Landing Force.

The Northern Troops and Landing Force was built around the V Amphibious Corps, which consisted of the 2nd Marine Division commanded by Major General Thomas E. Watson and 4th Marine Division commanded by Major General Harry Schmidt. Additionally, the 27th Infantry Division commanded by Major General Ralph C. Smith was held as the Expeditionary Troops reserve for use anywhere in the Marianas. Over 60,000 troops were assigned to the assault: Approximately 22,000 were in each Marine division and 16,500 in the 27th Infantry Division.

The invasion fleet, consisting of over 500 ships and 300,000 men, got underway days before the Allied forces in Europe invaded France in Operation Overlord on 6 June 1944. It was launched from Hawaii, briefly stopping at Eniwetok and Kwajalein before heading for Saipan. The Marine divisions left Pearl Harbor on 19–31 May and rendezvoused at Eniwetok on 7–8 June; the 27th Infantry Division left Pearl Harbor on 25 May and arrived at Kwajalein on 9 June. The fifteen aircraft carriers of the Fast Carrier Task Force (Task Force 58) commanded by Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, which would provide support for the invasion, left Majuro for Saipan on 6 June.

Japanese defense preparations

Japanese 6-inch (152 mm) coastal defense gun found on Saipan after the battle

American intelligence had estimated that there would be between 15,000 and 18,000 Japanese troops on Saipan at the time of the invasion. In actuality, there were double that number. Nearly 32,000 Japanese military personnel were on the island, including 6,000 naval troops. The two major army units defending the island were the 43rd Division commanded by Lieutenant General Yoshitsugu Saitō and the 47th Independent Mixed Brigade commanded by Colonel Yoshira Oka.

The Japanese hurriedly reinforced the island before the invasion, but many of the troop transports were sunk by U.S. submarines. For example, five of the seven ships transporting the 43rd Division were sunk. Most of the troops were saved, but the majority of their equipment–including hats and shoes–was lost, reducing their effectiveness. Many soldiers were the stranded survivors of sunken ships headed to other islands. There were about 80 tanks on the island, substantially more than the Americans had encountered in previous battles with the Japanese.

The Japanese defenses were set up to defeat an invading force on Saipan's beaches, where the invading troops were most vulnerable. These defenses focused on the most likely invasion locations, the western beaches south of Garapan. This made the defenses brittle. If an invading force broke through the beach defenses, there was no organized fallback position: the Japanese troops would have to rely on Saipan's rough terrain, especially its caves, for protection. The original plans called for a defense in depth that fortified the entire island if time allowed, but the Japanese were unable to complete their defenses by the time of the invasion. Much of the building material sent to Saipan, such as concrete and steel, had been sunk in transit by American submarines, and the timing of the invasion surprised the Japanese, who thought they had until November to complete their defense. As of June, many fortifications remained incomplete, available building materials were left unused, and many artillery guns were not properly deployed.

Japanese leadership on the island suffered from poor command coordination. Although Vice Admiral Chūichi Nagumo, Commander of the Central Pacific Area Fleet, had nominal oversight of the defenses in the Central Pacific, Obata refused to subordinate his army command to a naval officer. Because Obata was not on the island when the invasion started, command of Saipan's army units fell to Saitō, who was the senior army officer on the island. But Obata's chief of staff, Major General Keiji Igeta, maintained a separate headquarters that was often out of touch with Saitō.

Battle

11–14 June: Preparatory attacks

Inferno, a 1944 oil painting by William Franklin Draper of the destruction of the sugar mill at Charan Kanoa on 15 June (Navy Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command)

On 11 June, over 200 F6F Hellcats from the Fast Carrier Task Force launched a surprise attack on Japanese airfields in Saipan and Tinian, putting approximately 130 Japanese aircraft out of operation at the cost of 11 American aircraft. The attack took out most of the 1st Air Fleet's land-based planes that had been deployed to defend the Marianas, and gave the Americans air superiority over Saipan. Planes from the task force continued their attacks until 14 June, harassing fields, bombing military targets, and burning cane fields on the southern half of Saipan. By the end of the week, the 1st Air Fleet had been reduced to about 100 aircraft.

On 13 June, seven fast battleships and 11 destroyers under Vice Admiral Willis Lee began the naval bombardment of Saipan. Most of these battleships' crews had not been trained in shore bombardment and the ships fired from more than 5.5 mi (8.9 km) to avoid potential minefields. The bombardment damaged much of Garapan and Charan Kanoa, but it was relatively ineffective at destroying the island's defenses. The following day, seven older battleships, 11 cruisers, and 26 destroyers commanded by Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf continued the shelling. These crews were trained in shore bombardment, and moved closer to shore because the sea was found to be free of mines. This bombardment eliminated many emplaced anti-aircraft positions, but it too failed to destroy most of the beach defenses.

15 June: D-Day

Marines and equipment from the 2nd Marine Division on Red Beach at 13:00 on 15 June.

15 June was D-Day for the amphibious landing, which began around 08:40. Naval and aerial bombardments in preparation for the landings began earlier in the morning, disrupting the Japanese communications network. The guns of the warships would provide continuous supporting fire throughout the day.

The V Amphibious Corps landed on the southwest beaches of Saipan. The 2nd Marine Division landed on two beaches, named Red and Green, of Charan Kanoa, and the 4th Marine Division landed on the beaches named Blue and Yellow south of the town. Approximately 700 amphibious vehicles participated in the assault, including 393 amphibious tractors (LVTs) and 140 amphibious tanks. Within 20 minutes, there were 8000 men on the beaches.

The beaches were fortified by trenches and a few pillboxes, but the landings were mainly contested by constant and intensive fire by Japanese artillery, mortars, and machine guns. The Japanese had concentrated at least 50 large artillery pieces on the high ground—including at least 24 105-mm howitzers and 30 75-mm field pieces—around the invasion beaches. Many were deployed on reverse slopes, and pennants had been placed on the beach for accurate ranging. The Americans suffered over 2,000 casualties, the majority were due to the artillery and mortar fire. Additionally, 164 amphibious tractors and amphibious tanks, about 40% of those engaged during the day, had been destroyed or damaged.

American beachheads on Saipan at the end of 15 June

By the end of the day, the Marines managed to establish a bridgehead about 5.5 mi (9 km) along the beach and 0.5 mi (1 km) inland, and had unloaded artillery and tanks. But the bridgehead was only about two-thirds the size of the planned objective, the two Marine divisions were separated by a wide gap just north of Charan Kanoa, and the Japanese artillery remained intact on the high ground surrounding the beach.

When darkness fell, Saito launched a series of night attacks to push the Americans back into the sea. The Japanese launched repeated counterattacks during the night and the early hours of the following morning, mostly by poorly coordinated small units. All the attacks were repulsed, partly by the firepower provided by the tanks and artillery that had been unloaded during the day as well as by American warships that illuminated the combat areas with star shells.

16–20 June: Southern Saipan

Japanese Type 97 medium tank knocked out in 17 June attack

On 16 June, Holland Smith committed his reserves to reinforce the beachhead, ordering two of the three regiments of the 27th Infantry Division—the 165th and the 105th—to land. He proposed to indefinitely postpone the 18 June invasion of Guam. The two Marine divisions on Saipan spent most of the day consolidating the beachhead. The 2nd Marine Division began to close the gap between the two divisions north of Charan Kanoa, and the 4th Marine Division cleared the area around Aginan point on the southwest of the Island.

During the night, Saitō launched a tank assault on the flank of the beachhead just north of Charan Kanoa with approximately 30 Type 97 medium tanks and Type 95 light tanks and about 1,000 soldiers. The attack was poorly coordinated. Nagumo's naval troops, who were supposed to be part of the attack, did not cooperate. The attack was broken up by bazookas, 37 mm anti-tank guns, M4 Sherman tanks, and self-propelled 75 mm howitzers. Around 31 Japanese tanks were destroyed.

Soldiers of 27th Infantry Division moving inland after landing on 16 June

In the following days, the 2nd Marine Division on the northern half of the bridgehead cleared the area around Lake Susupe and reached the objectives for the first day of the invasion, and slowly moved north toward Garapan and Mount Tapotchou. In the southern half of the bridgehead, the 4th Marine Division began their advance on Aslito Field. On 18 June, the two regiments of the 27th Infantry Division, which was now fighting as a unit, captured the field as the Japanese withdrew to Nafutan Point in the southeast of the island. The 4th Marine Division had reached the island's eastern coast, cutting off the Japanese troops at Nafutan Point from the north. During this time, Saitō was falsely rumored to have been killed. Igeta erroneously reported Saitō's death to Tokyo, though he corrected the report later.

Holland Smith ordered the 27th Infantry Division to quickly capture Nafutan Point but it was unable to do so. Intelligence had estimated that there were no more than 300 Japanese soldiers in the area, but there were more than 1,000 defending the rough terrain. The battle for the point would continue for over a week.

By 19 June, the Japanese forces on the island had been reduced by about half. Saitō began withdrawing his troops to a new defensive line in the center of the island. By this time, the Americans had suffered over 6,000 casualties. The Marine divisions headed north toward the new Japanese defenses, and Holland Smith called for the final reserve of the Expeditionary Forces, ordering the last regiment of the 27th infantry Division, the 106th, to land on Saipan on 20 June.

Battle of Philippine Sea

Main article: Battle of Philippine Sea

TBF Avenger torpedo planes and SB2C Helldiver dive bombers from the Fast Carrier Task Force en route to attack the 1st Mobile Fleet, June 1944 during the Battle of the Philippine Sea

Once Admiral Soemu Toyoda, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, was certain that Saipan was the target of an invasion, he initiated his response. Less than a half hour after the start of the amphibious invasion, he announced the implementation of Operation A-Go, the Japanese Navy's current plan to destroy the American fleet. He then sent a message to the entire fleet that repeated Admiral Heihachirō Tōgō's speech before Japan's decisive naval battle against Russia at Tsushima in 1905, which in turn echoed Horatio Nelson's signal at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805: "The fate of the Empire rests upon this single battle. Every man is expected to do his utmost."

Originally, the Japanese Navy sought to have the battle take place in the Palaus or Western Carolines, and MacArthur's invasion of Biak had led them to believe that they could lure the American fleet there. After the preinvasion bombardment of Saipan, Toyoda guessed Saipan was the target and ordered Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki who commanded the super battleships Yamato and Musashi to rendezvous with Vice Admiral Jisaburō Ozawa, commander of the 1st Mobile Fleet and to rendezvous in the Philippine Sea to attack the American fleet around Saipan. The Japanese fleet, which had 9 aircraft carriers, 5 battleships, and nearly 500 airplanes was outnumbered by the American fleet, which had 16 aircraft carriers, 7 battleships, and almost 1,000 airplanes. The Japanese thought they had some advantages: the longer range of the Japanese planes would allow them the opportunity to strike the Americans without fear of immediate retaliation, the availability of airbases on the Marianas would give the carrier planes a place to land and quickly rearm for additional strikes, and Kakuta was incorrectly assumed to have 500 additional land-based planes available.

The American transports continued to unload supplies and reinforcements throughout 17 June. The following day, the transports sailed east toward safety while the warships set off for battle with the Japanese fleet. On 19–20 June, the fleets fought an aircraft carrier battle. The Japanese struck first, launching four large air attacks on the American fleet. However, the Japanese aviators were inexperienced and outnumbered: very few of the anticipated land-based planes were available, and those that were had little effect.

The Japanese lost almost 500 planes and almost all their aviators; their carrier forces were left with only 35 operable aircraft. The Americans lost about 130 planes and 76 aviators. An American counterstrike sank a Japanese carrier, and American submarines sank two others, including Ozawa's flagship Taihō. The Japanese submarine fleet failed to play a significant role as well. The invasion forced Takagi to move his headquarters from Garapan into the mountains of Saipan, making his command ineffective. Out of 25 submarines deployed for the battle, 17 were sunk. Though defenders on the island didn't know it at the time, the defeat of the Japanese fleet ensured that they would not be reinforced, resupplied or receive further military support. The Japanese command was determined to hold the island at all costs, but it would be fighting a losing battle of attrition.

21–24 June: Central Saipan, initial attack

Marines confronting rough terrain with a limestone cave typical of central and north Saipan, June 1944

Saitō's new defense line stretched from Garapan on the west coast to the southern slopes of Mount Tapatchou across to Magicienne Bay on the east coast. It held most of the island's high ground, which allowed the Japanese to observe American movements, and the rough terrain was filled with caves concealed by brush.

The American forces prepared for a frontal assault on Saitō's line using all three divisions. The attack began on 22 June. The 2nd Marine Division which was on the western coast moved toward Garapan and Mount Tapatchou; the 4th Marine Division advanced along the eastern coast, which created gaps in the lines in the hilly ground between the two divisions. That evening, the 27th Infantry Division, less the regiment left to reduce Nafutan point, was ordered to move up into the difficult terrain between the two Marine divisions.

The next day, the Marine divisions on the flanks made progress, but the 27th Infantry Division, which started its attack late, stalled in its assault on a valley surrounding a low lying ridge that was defended by about 4,000 Japanese soldiers. The battle around these features, which American soldiers nicknamed the "Death Valley" and "Purple Heart Ridge", began to bend the line of the American advance into a horseshoe, creating gaps in the Marine divisions flanks and forcing them to halt.

Frustrated by what he saw as lack of progress by the 27th Division, Holland Smith relieved its commander, Major General Ralph Smith, and temporarily replaced him another Army officer, Major General Sanderford Jarman. The debate over the appropriateness of Holland's Smith action–a Marine general dismissing an Army general–immediately created an inter-service controversy. Despite the replacement of the 27th Infantry Division's commander, it would take six more days for the valley to be captured.

25–30 June: Central Saipan, breakthrough

American firepower

IHC M–2–4 rocket trucks on Saipan firing a barrage, June 1944

The United States forces had built up substantial firepower to continue their northward drive. On 22 June, P-47s from the Seventh Air Force landed on Aslito Field and immediately began launching ground assault missions. On the same day, the XXIV Corps Artillery commanded by Brigadier General Arthur M. Harper moved 24 155 mm field guns and 24 155 mm howitzers into place to fire on Japanese positions. The Americans also used truck-launched rockets for saturation barrages. Spotters flying in L-4 Grasshoppers helped direct ground artillery, and Navajo code talkers relayed information about Japanese troop movements.

By 24 June, the American warships that had returned from the Battle of Philippine Sea were once more available to provide fire support. Ship fire was particularly feared by the Japanese because it could strike from almost any direction. Saitō singled out naval gunfire undermining the Japanese' ability to fight successfully against the Americans. The ships were also well supplied with star shells, providing illumination that disrupted Japanese night movements and counterattacks. This naval support was facilitated by joint assault signal companies that directed both naval and aerial firepower to where it was needed by the ground forces.

A "Satan", an M3 Stuart tank with a Ronson flamethrower, incinerates a Japanese pillbox on Saipan, June 1944

The Americans had other assets as well. Over 150 tanks–over 100 of which were M4 Sherman tanks–had been committed to the invasion. The M4 Sherman tank was superior to the Japanese Type 97 tank. It was primarily used to support infantry and was considered one of the most effective weapons for destroying enemy emplacements. Flame throwers were extensively used. Smith had seen the need for motorized flamethrowers and had requested that the Army's Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) in Hawaii install them in M3 Stuart tanks. Seabees with the CWS had 24 tanks, nicknamed "Satans", converted to flamethrowing in time for the invasion. They were very effective for destroying pillboxes, cave defenses, buildings, canefields, and brush. In the hills, soldiers relied on personal flamethrowers, particularly in locations where the motorized flamethrowers could not reach. The Americans gradually developed tactics for effectively reducing caves, using a combination of flamethrowers and demolition charges to clear them, or sometimes using demolitions to seal them off.

On 27 June, Igeta's 31st Army Headquarters sent a telegram from the island stating the Japanese would not be able to hold due to the American preponderance in artillery, sea and air power, as well of a lack of equipment and supplies, including food and water. The lack of water was particularly acute in the limestone caves the Japanese soldiers used for defense. Igeta reported that some soldiers hadn't had water for three days and were surviving on snails and tree leaves. Japanese communications were so disrupted that at one point during the week, Igeta could only account for 950 of the Japanese soldiers.

American advance and Japanese break out at Nafutan Point

American advance in central Saipan between 20–24 June

On 25 June, the 27th Infantry Division was not able to make much headway in their fight for Death Valley. But the 2nd Marine Division to the west gained control of Mount Tapotchau, the key artillery observation posts in Central Saipan. On the east coast, the 4th Marine Division quickly occupied most of the Kagman peninsula, meeting little organized resistance because the Japanese had evacuated the peninsula. Between 26 June and 30 June, the 2nd Marine Division and the 27th Infantry Division had made little progress. The second Marines remained south of Garapan and were slowly fighting their way north of Mount Tapotchau. The 4th Marine Division was able to advance up the eastern coast to a line just north of the village of Hashigoru.

About 500 Japanese soldiers broke out of Nafutan point on the night of 26 June. They headed toward Aslito Field, destroying one P-47 and damaging two others. They then ran into a unit of Marines who were in reserve and a unit of Marine artillery. Almost all the Japanese soldiers were killed in the ensuing firefight. The next day, the elements of the 27th Infantry Division that had been fighting at the point moved in to occupy the area, no survivors were found.

Army Major General George Griner, who had been sent for from Hawaii, took over from command of the 27th Infantry Division on 28 June. Jarman, whose command had been temporary, returned to his assign role as garrison commander of the island. On 30 June, the 27th Infantry Division captured Death Valley and Purple Heart Ridge, and advanced far enough to reestablish contact with the two Marine divisions on their flanks. Saitō's main line of defense in Central Saipan had been breached; and the Japanese began their retreat north to their final defensive line. To date, American casualties were about 11,000.

1–6 July: Pursuit into northern Saipan

Marines advancing through the ruins of Garapan on 3 July

Saitō intended to form a new line in northern Saipan that was anchored on Tanapag on the west, went southeast to a village called Tarahoho, through to the east coast. But his army's cohesion was disintegrating. Some of the remaining forces moved north, others holed up in whatever caves they could find and put up sporadic, disorganized resistance. During 2–4 July, the 2nd Marine Division took the ruins of Garapan and its harbor. The 4th Marine Division quickly moved north on the west coast in the face of light resistance. As Saitō's attempt to form the defense line collapsed, he eventually moved his final headquarters near Makunsha village on the west coast north of Tanapag.

On 4 July, the 27th Infantry Division and 4th Marine Division headed northwest. The 27th division reached the east coast at Flores Point, south of Tanapag, cutting off any Japanese retreating from Garapan. The 2nd Marine Division no longer faced organized resistance, and went into reserve. The 27th Infantry Division was to move up the east coast toward Tanapag, and the 4th Marine Division would advance northwest. On 5 July, the 27th Infantry Division encountered strong resistance in a narrow canyon on the east coast north of Tanapag that they dubbed "Harikari Gulch", which expanded into a two-day battle.

American advance between 30 June–6 July, showing the 7 July gyokusai assault

The 4th Marine Division continued to make rapid progress north during 4–5 July, and on 6 July, Holland Smith ordered them to head toward the eastern coast near Makunsha to cut off the Japanese forces fighting the 27th Infantry Division, then the Marines would complete the occupation of the rest of northern Saipan on their own. In the evening, the Marines had taken Mount Petosukara, one of the last mountains before reaching the northern tip of the island, but the units that turned toward Makunsha encountered too much resistance to reach the eastern coast.

Saitō realized he could not create a final defensive line. His headquarters, which had been under constant artillery attack for days, was now in the range of American machine guns. What was left of his command was trapped in a northern corner of the island, almost out of food and water, and slowly being destroyed by overwhelming American firepower. On 6 July, Saitō decided the situation was hopeless and sent out orders for the remainder of his forces to perform gyokusai, one final suicide attack to destroy as many of the enemy as possible. He set the attack for the following day to give the troops a chance to concentrate what was left of his forces and put his divisional chief of staff, Colonel Takuji Suzuki, in charge. That night, Saitō ate a last meal and committed seppuku, and Nagumo killed himself around the same time, Takagi stated he would die attacking the enemy.

7–9 July: Gyokusai attack and battle's end

Marines of the 2nd Marine Division advancing north on Tanapag Plain on 8 July after the gyokusai attack

At least 3,000 Japanese combatants participated in the gyokusai attack. They assembled near Makunsha. The force included naval personnel, support troops, civilians, and the walking wounded. It included three tanks, supporting mortars, and machine guns, but some troops were only armed with sticks with bayonets, knives, or grenades tied to poles. It would be the largest gyokusai attack of the Pacific War.

At around 04:00, Suzuki's force advanced south along the western coastal area, called the Tanapag plain, toward where his reconnaissance patrols had found a weak spot in the American line near Tanapag village: two battalions of the 105 Infantry Regiment of the 27th Infantry Division were isolated from the other American forces. The main force struck the two battalions at about 04:45, overrunning both and inflicting 80% casualties. The charge continued toward Tanapag village, overrunning two batteries of Marine artillery, but was halted in the late morning by a hastily-formed American line around the village. The fighting continued throughout the day, as American soldiers struggled against scattered elements of the gyokusai attack and recaptured lost ground.

On 8 July, most of the 27th Infantry Division, which had suffered high losses in the gyokusai attack, was placed into reserve. The 2nd Marine Division advanced up the Tanapag plain, looking for Japanese stragglers. The 4th Marine Division reached the Western coast north of Makunsha and headed toward Marpi point, near the island's northern-most tip. As they advanced, they saw hundreds of Japanese civilians die on inland and coastal cliffs. Some threw themselves off, others were thrown or pushed off. By the evening of 9 July, the 4th Marine Division had reached the northern end of the Island and Turner declared the island secure. On the second day of the battle, he had estimated that Saipan would be captured in a week; it had taken 24 days. On 11 July, the Americans found general Saitō's body. He was buried on 13 July with full military honors in a coffin draped with the Japanese flag.

Though the island was declared secured, the fighting and suicides would continue. Clearing the hundreds of scattered Japanese soldiers hiding in caves would take many more months, though the responsibilities were handed over to the Army Garrison Force. One group of about 50 Japanese men–soldiers and civilians–was led by Captain Sakae Ōba, who survived the last banzai charge. His group evaded capture and conducted guerrilla-style attacks, raiding American camps for supplies. Oba's resistance earned him the nickname "the Fox". His men held out for approximately 16 months before surrendering on 1 December 1945, three months after the official surrender of Japan.

Casualties

First Lieutenant Robert Sheeks talks a woman with children and a dog into leaving a hillside cave on 21 June

Almost the entire Japanese garrison–approximately 30,000 military personnel–were killed in the battle. Eventually 1700, about half of whom were Korean workers, were taken prisoner. American forces suffered about 16,500 casualties –3,100 killed and 13,000 wounded– out of 71,000 who were part of the assault force. The casualty rate was over 20%, which was comparable to Tarawa. It was the Americans' most costly battle in the Pacific up to that time. Approximately 40% of the civilians on Saipan were killed. Around 14,000 survived and were interned, but an estimated 8,000 to 10,000 died during the fighting or shortly afterwards. Many civilians died from the bombing, shelling and cross-fire. Others died because they hid in caves and shelters that were indistinguishable from Japanese combat positions, which the Marines typically destroyed with explosives, grenades and flamethrowers. Though many civilians were able to surrender early in the battle, surrender became more difficult as the battle moved into the northern mountains. Obscuring terrain made it hard to distinguish combatants and surrendering civilians, who risked being killed by both sides. Many refused to surrender because they believed rumors that the Japanese fleet was coming to rescue them. Others refused because of the fear spread by Japanese propaganda that Americans would rape, torture and kill them; others were coerced. Around 1,000 civilians committed suicide during the final days of the battle, some after 9 July when the island had been declared secure. Many died by throwing themselves off cliffs at places that would become known as "Suicide Cliff" and "Banzai Cliff".

Logistics

An LVT Comes Ashore, Saipan, a 1944 oil painting by William Franklin Draper.(Navy Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command)

The American forces brought their supplies with the invasion fleet, carrying over one ton of supplies per soldier: 32 days of rations, 30 days of medical supplies, 20 days of maintenance supplies, seven days of ammunition for ground weapons, and ten days of anti-aircraft ammunition. Mobile reserves and an ammunition resupply train, as well as regular resupply shipments came from depots at Eniwetok, which was 1,017 mi (1,637 km) from Saipan.

During the early days of the invasion, LVTs dumped boxes of rations, water and ammunition on the beaches. Heavy swells on the first days forced many of the supplies to be loaded on only one beach, and LVTs were required to get over reefs that restricted access. Constant Japanese mortar and artillery fire interfered with organizing these supplies for the first three days. Unloading became haphazard, and some units had difficulty finding their equipment. Additionally, the withdrawal of the transports for five days during the Battle of Philippine Sea slowed down the delivery of supplies.

The 27th Infantry Division particularly suffered from this initial disorganization. No plans had been made for its landing and it did not have an assigned unloading area. Its equipment was mixed up with the Marine divisions and its artillery ammunition was misplaced. Because it arrived on Saipan after the Marine divisions, the 27th Infantry Division had less time to unload its supplies before the transports temporarily headed east on 18 June. Initially, the division only had enough infantry ammunition for four days. Food and artillery ammunition had to be borrowed from the Marines, and water had to be supplemented from cisterns captured at Aslito Field.

Later in the campaign, mortar ammunition ran low as planners had underestimated how frequently they would be used, and there were shortages of motorized transportation, which was used for getting supplies from the beach to the frontline. Naval ships ran low on star shells due to their high demand, and their use had to be rationed. Despite these issues, the overall supply situation during the battle was good: the Americans had an abundance of materiel.

The Japanese troops had no chance of reinforcement. From January to June, the Japanese had tried to ship men and supplies to Saipan, but many ships around the island were torpedoed by American submarines. The Japanese government reported that one ship out of three sent to the Marianas were sunk and another was damaged. Though many of the men survived, almost all the materiel was lost. For example, on 25 May two freighters from Saipan to Palau were torpedoed, destroying 2,956 tons of food, 5,300 cans of aviation fuel, 2,500 cubic meters of ammunition, and 500 tons of cement.

At the beginning of the battle, the Americans had six times the tanks, five times the artillery, three times as many small arms, and two times as many machine guns available as the Japanese. Additionally, the Americans had much more ammunition. The U. S. Navy fired 11,000 tons of ordnance on Saipan, including over 14,000 rounds of 5-inch ammunition. Unlike the Americans, who could replenish their supplies, the Japanese could not. They had to fight with what was available when the invasion started, and when it ran out they were expected to die honorably, resisting until the end.

Aftermath

The invasion of Saipan and the invasion of France in Operation Overlord demonstrated the dominance of American industrial power. Both were massive amphibious invasions–the two largest up to that time–and they were launched almost simultaneously on separate halves of the globe. Together, they were the greatest deployment of military resources by the United States at one time. Because the Battle of Saipan began just over a week after the 6 June landings for Overlord, its importance has often been overlooked. But just as Overlord was a major step in contributing to the fall of the Third Reich, Saipan marked a major step in the collapse of the Empire of Japan.

Impact on American military strategy

Isely Field, filled with B-29 bombers, mid-1945

The availability of Saipan as an American airbase, along with the airbases already established in Chengdu, opened a new phase in the Pacific War, in which strategic bombing would play a major role. The 15 June invasion of the island had been synchronized with bombing of the Yawata Steel Works by B-29s in China. It was the first bombing of the Japan home islands by B-29s, signaling the beginning of a campaign that could strike deep into Japan's Absolute National Defense Zone.

The Army Air Force was confident that strategic bombing could destroy Japan's military production and that the Marianas provided excellent airbases for doing so because they were 1,200 mi (1,000 nmi; 1,900 km) miles from the Japanese home islands. This put almost all of Japan's industrial cities within striking distance of the B-29 bomber, and the airbases were easy to defend and supply.

Сайпан был первым островом, на котором базировались B-29. Строительство аэродрома для B-29 началось на Исели-Филд , переименованном в Аслито-Филд, 24 июня. до того, как остров был объявлен безопасным. Первая взлетно-посадочная полоса была завершена к 19 октября, а вторая - к 15 декабря. 73- е бомбардировочное авиаполк начал прибывать 12 октября. 24 ноября, 111 B-29 отправились в Токио для выполнения первой стратегической бомбардировки Японии с Марианских островов.

Потери на Сайпане использовались американскими планировщиками для прогнозирования американских потерь в будущих сражениях. Это «соотношение Сайпана» — один убитый американец и несколько раненых на каждые семь убитых японских солдат — стало одним из оправданий американских планов по увеличению призыва на военную службу , прогнозируя возросшую потребность в пополнениях в войне с Японией. Прогнозы высоких потерь были одной из причин того, что Объединенный комитет начальников штабов не одобрил вторжение на Тайвань . Коэффициент Сайпана определял первоначальную оценку того, что вторжение в Японию будет стоить до 2 000 000 американских жертв. в том числе 500 000 убитых. Хотя позже эти оценки будут пересмотрены в сторону понижения, они все равно будут влиять на взгляды политиков на войну вплоть до 1945 года.

Влияние на японскую политику и моральный дух

Женщина держит ребенка на руках, возвращаясь в лагерь для интернированных на Сайпане, июнь 1944 года.

Поражение Сайпана оказало на Японию большее влияние, чем все ее предыдущие поражения. Император Японии Хирохито признал , что американский контроль над островом приведет к бомбардировке Токио. После поражения японцев в битве в Филиппинском море он потребовал, чтобы японский генеральный штаб спланировал еще одну военно-морскую атаку, чтобы предотвратить его падение. Хирохито принял возможное падение Сайпана только 25 июня, когда его советники сказали ему, что все потеряно. Поражение привело к краху Хидеки Тодзё правительства . Разочарованный ходом войны, Хирохито отказался от поддержки Тодзё, который ушел с поста премьер-министра Японии 18 июля. Его сменил бывший генерал Куниаки Койсо . который был менее способным лидером.

японского правительства Падение Сайпана привело к тому, что в военных репортажах впервые было признано, что война идет плохо. В июле Имперский генеральный штаб опубликовал заявление с кратким изложением битвы и потери острова, а правительство разрешило к публикации перевод статьи журнала Time , в которой упоминались самоубийства мирных жителей в последние дни битвы. в The Asahi Shimbun , крупнейшей газете Японии, пока шла битва. Еще до окончания битвы японское правительство в июне опубликовало «План эвакуации школьников», предвидя бомбардировки городов Японии. Эта эвакуация , единственная принудительная, проводившаяся во время войны, разлучили более 350 000 учащихся третьего-шестого классов, живших в крупных городах, со своими семьями и отправили их в сельскую местность.

Захват Сайпана прорвал Абсолютную зону национальной обороны. побудив японское руководство пересмотреть результаты, которые они могли ожидать от войны. В июле начальник отдела военного руководства Имперского генерального штаба полковник Сей Мацутани, составил доклад, в котором говорилось, что завоевание Сайпана уничтожило всякую надежду на победу в войне. После войны многие японские военные и политические лидеры заявили, что Сайпан также стал поворотным моментом. Например, вице-адмирал Сигэёси Мива заявил: «Наша война была проиграна с потерей Сайпана». и адмирал флота Осами Нагано признал важность битвы, заявив: «Когда мы потеряли Сайпан, на нас настал ад».

Мемориалы

Утес Самоубийц и Утес Банзай, наряду с уцелевшими изолированными японскими укреплениями, признаны историческими объектами в Национальном реестре исторических мест США . Скалы являются частью Национального исторического района посадочных пляжей ; Аслито/Айсли Филд; & Марпи-Пойнт, остров Сайпан , который включает в себя американские пляжи для высадки, взлетно-посадочные полосы B-29 Айсли-Филд и сохранившуюся японскую инфраструктуру аэродромов Аслито и Марпи-Пойнт. Тропа морского наследия имеет ряд мест для дайвинга с затопленными кораблями, самолетами и танками, оставшимися в живых. Американский мемориальный парк увековечивает память американцев и жителей Марианских островов, погибших во время кампании на Марианских островах. Мемориал войны в Центральной части Тихого океана посвящен памяти погибших японских солдат и мирных жителей.

• 
  Американский мемориальный парк
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  Кенотафы возле скалы Банзай
• 
  Утес Банзай с кенотафами, видимыми в верхнем левом углу.

Ссылки

Смотрите также: Библиография битвы при Сайпане.

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• Мил, Джеральд А. (2012). Война одного морского пехотинца: поиски боевого переводчика человечества в Тихом океане . Издательство Военно-морского института. ISBN  9781612510927 . OCLC   811408315 .
• Миллер, Эдвард С. (1991). Военный план «Оранжевый»: стратегия США по разгрому Японии, 1897–1945 гг . Издательство Военно-морского института. ISBN  9780870217593 . OCLC   23463775 .
• Миллетт, Аллан Р. (1980). Семпер Фиделис: История морской пехоты США . Макмиллан. ISBN  9780029215906 . OCLC   1280706539 .
• Морисон, Сэмюэл Элиот (1981) [1953]. Новая Гвинея и Марианские острова, март 1944 г. – август 1944 г. История военно-морских операций США во Второй мировой войне. Том. 8. Маленький Браун. ISBN  9780316583084 . ОСЛК   10926173 .
• Мерфетт, Малкольм Х. (2008). Военно-морская война 1919–45: оперативная история нестабильной войны на море . Фрэнсис и Тейлор. дои : 10.4324/9780203889985 . ISBN  9781134048137 . OCLC   900424339 .
• Олсон, Джеймс С .; Мортенсен, Бернхардт Л. (1983) [1950]. «Марианские острова» . В Крейвене, Уэсли Ф.; Кейт, Джеймс Л. (ред.). Тихий океан: от Гуадалканала до Сайпана, с августа 1942 по июль 1944 года . Армейская авиация во Второй мировой войне. Том. 4. стр. 671–696. ISBN  9780912799032 . OCLC   9828710 .
• Рейнс, Эдгар Ф. младший (2000). Глаза артиллерии: истоки современной армейской авиации США во время Второй мировой войны (PDF) . Армейский исторический сериал. Центр военной истории армии США. OCLC   606557132 . КМХ Паб 70-31. Архивировано из оригинала (PDF) 20 сентября 2015 года.
• Шоу, Генри I. младший; Налти, Бернард К.; Тернблад, Эдвин Т. (1989) [1966]. Централ Пасифик Драйв . История операций морской пехоты США во Второй мировой войне. Том. 3. Историческое отделение, дивизия G–3, штаб-квартира Корпуса морской пехоты США. ISBN  9780898391947 . OCLC   927428034 .
• Смит, Дуглас В. (2006). Авианосные бои: решение командования во вред . Издательство Военно-морского института. ISBN  1591147948 . OCLC   1301788691 .
• Смит, Роберт Р. (1996) [1953]. Подход к Филиппинам . Армия США во Второй мировой войне: Война в Тихом океане. Центр военной истории армии США. ОСЛК   35911873 .
• Саймондс, Крейг Л. (2022). Нимиц на войне: командование от Перл-Харбора до Токийского залива . Издательство Оксфордского университета. ISBN  9780190062361 . OCLC   1268206579 .
• Танака, Юки (2023). «Азиатско-Тихоокеанская война». В Хейне, Лаура Э. (ред.). Современная японская нация и империя ок. 1868 - XXI век (электронная книга). Новая Кембриджская история Японии. Том. III. Издательство Кембриджского университета. стр. 138–167. дои : 10.1017/9781108164535.007 . ISBN  9781108164535 . OCLC   1382587192 .
• Толанд, Джон (2003) [1970]. Восходящее солнце: упадок и падение Японской империи 1936–1945 гг . Случайный дом. ISBN  9780812968583 . OCLC   52441692 .
• Толл, Ян В. (2015). Прилив завоеваний: Война на островах Тихого океана, 1942–1944 гг . WW Нортон. ISBN  978-0393080643 . OCLC   902661305 .
• Исторический отдел военного министерства США (1991) [1946]. «Бой на равнине Танапаг: 27-я дивизия, 6 июля 1944 года» . Действия небольших подразделений – Франция: 2-й батальон рейнджеров в Пуэнт-дю-Хо; Сайпан: 27-я дивизия на равнине Танапаг; Италия: 351-й пехотный полк в Санта-Мария-Инфанте; Франция: 4-я танковая дивизия в Синлинге . Военное ведомство, Исторический отдел. стр. 69–113. OCLC   519761473 .
• Влахос, Майкл (1980). Синий меч: Военно-морской колледж и американская миссия 1919–1941 гг . Военно-морское училище. OCLC   7577592 .
• Вецлер, Питер (2020). Имперская Япония и поражение во Второй мировой войне: крах империи . Академик Блумсбери. ISBN  9781350120815 . OCLC   1113926749 .
• Уиллоби, Чарльз А. , изд. (1994) [1950]. Отчеты генерала Макартура: Японские операции в юго-западной части Тихого океана . Том. II, Часть IUS Государственная типография. OCLC   1054369044 .
• Винтон, Джон (1993). Ультра в Тихом океане: как взлом японских кодов и шифров повлиял на военно-морские операции против Японии в 1941–1945 годах . Издательство Военно-морского института. ISBN  9781557508560 . ОСЛК   29918990 .
• И'Блад, Уильям Т. (1981). Заход красного солнца: битва в Филиппинском море . Издательство Военно-морского института. ISBN  9780870215322 . OCLC   7178031 .
• Залога, Стивен Дж. (2012). М4 Шерман против. Тип 97 Чи-Ха: Тихий океан, 1945 год . Скопа. ISBN  9781849086387 . OCLC   798085213 .

Журнальные статьи, отчеты и тезисы

• Аллен, Уильям Б. (2012). Уволен на Сайпане (Монография). Школа перспективных военных исследований, Колледж командования армии США и Генерального штаба – через Центр технической информации Министерства обороны .
• Клауд, Престон ; Шмидт, Роберт Г.; Берк, Гарольд В. (1956). Геология Сайпана: Марианские острова - Часть 1. Общая геология (PDF) (Отчет). Геологическая служба США. Архивировано из оригинала (PDF) 28 февраля 2017 года.
• Содружество Северных Марианских островов: окончательный план водораздела после стихийного бедствия (отчет). Инженерный корпус армии США. 2022. Архивировано из оригинала (PDF) 17 января 2024 года.
• Джангреко, DM (2003). «Два кровавых Окинавы и Иводзима: президент Трумэн и оценки потерь при вторжении в Японию». Тихоокеанский исторический обзор . 72 (1): 93–132. дои : 10.1525/фр.2003.72.1.93 . JSTOR   10.1525/фр.2003.72.1.93 .
• Гугелер, Рассел А. (1945). Армейские десантно-тракторные и танковые батальоны в битве за Сайпан (Отчет). Канцелярия начальника военной истории. 8–5,3 БА. Архивировано из оригинала 3 января 2008 года.
• Халлион, Ричард П. (1995). «Прелюдия к Армагеддону». История авиации . 42 (3): 38–54. JSTOR   26284340 .
• Хемлер, Кристофер К. (2021). Изучение трифибийной войны: американское управление огнем и координация в войне на Тихом океане (PDF) (докторская диссертация). Texas A&M. Архивировано из оригинала (PDF) 6 мая 2024 года.
• Хьюз, Мэтью (2010). «Когда солдаты убивают мирных жителей: битва за Сайпан, 1944 год» . История сегодня . 60 (2): 42–48. Архивировано из оригинала 27 января 2010 года.
• МакКинни, Леонард Л. (1949). Действия переносных огнеметов во Второй мировой войне (проект книги). Исторические исследования химического корпуса. Исторический офис, Управление химического корпуса.
• Маккиннон, Дженнифер Ф. (8–12 ноября 2011 г.). Включение и переговоры: интерпретация мест подводных сражений в Тихом океане (PDF) . Азиатско-Тихоокеанская региональная конференция по подводному культурному наследию. Манила, Филиппины. Архивировано из оригинала (PDF) 13 апреля 2015 года.
• Нориаки, Яширо (2009). Японская стратегия во второй фазе Тихоокеанской войны (PDF) . Международный форум по военной истории (Восьмой форум) – «Стратегия войны на Тихом океане» . Национальный институт оборонных исследований, Япония. Архивировано из оригинала (PDF) 3 октября 2017 года.
• О'Хара, Винсент (2019). «Повесть о двух нашествиях» . Журнал истории военно-морского флота . 33 (3). Архивировано из оригинала 4 июня 2019 года.
• Плунг, Дилан Дж. (2021). «Влияние городской эвакуации на Японию во время Второй мировой войны» . Азиатско-Тихоокеанский журнал: Япония в фокусе . 19 (19). Архивировано из оригинала 13 ноября 2021 года.
• Салливан, Марк П. (1995). «Решение Японии о капитуляции» . Механизм стратегического принуждения: отрицание или изменение второго порядка? (отчет). Издательство Воздушного университета. стр. 31–54. JSTOR   resrep13891.9 .
• Трефальт, Беатрис (2018). «Битва при Сайпане в мемуарах японских гражданских лиц: мирные жители, солдаты и сложности капитуляции» . Журнал тихоокеанской истории . 53 (3): 3. doi : 10.1080/00223344.2018.1491300 – через academia.edu.

Интернет-ресурсы

• «Американский мемориальный парк» . Фонд национальных парков . Архивировано из оригинала 1 октября 2022 года.
• «Американский мемориальный парк: Битва при Сайпане» . Служба национальных парков . Архивировано из оригинала 17 мая 2022 года.
• Бисно, Адам (2019). «Операция Фуражер: Битва за Сайпан, 15 июня – 9 июля 1944 г.» . Командование военно-морской истории и наследия . Архивировано из оригинала 6 декабря 2019 года.
• Гилхули, Роб (15 мая 2011 г.). «Японский герой-отступник дает Сайпану новую надежду» . Япония Таймс . Архивировано из оригинала 6 июля 2015 года.
• «Международный ракетный грузовик М–2–4» . Механизированный музей морской пехоты, Кэмп-Пендлтон, Калифорния . 2013. Архивировано из оригинала 6 февраля 2020 года.
• «Номинация НХЛ на пляжи приземления; Аслито / Айсли Филд; и Марпи-Пойнт, остров Сайпан» . Служба национальных парков. Архивировано из оригинала 25 декабря 2019 года.
• «Мемориальная служба на Сайпане» . Тихоокеанская ассоциация военных мемориалов, Inc. Архивировано из оригинала 30 декабря 2016 года.

Первичные источники

• Помощник начальника штаба авиации – разведка (1946). Миссия выполнена: допросы японских промышленных, военных и гражданских лидеров Второй мировой войны . Штаб Военно-воздушных сил.
• Крист, Дэвид Б., изд. (1973) [1943]. Конференция в Касабланке: январь 1943 г. (PDF) (Отчет). Объединенный комитет начальников штабов. ISBN  9780160938948 . Архивировано из оригинала (PDF) 7 декабря 2018 года.
• Крист, Дэвид Б., изд. (1973) [1943]. Конференция квадранта: август 1943 г. (PDF) (Отчет). Том. 1. Объединенный комитет начальников штабов. ISBN  9780160938832 . Архивировано из оригинала (PDF) 13 июня 2020 года.
• Объединенный экспедиционный корпус (TF 51), Управление командующего (1944 г.). Отчет о взятии Марианских островов (Отчет).
• Касе, Тошиказу (1950). Путешествие в Миссури: история японского дипломата о том, как его страна вела войну и мир . Издательство Йельского университета. OCLC   395571 .
• Шмидт, Гарри (1944). Отчет о этапе I операции на Марианских островах (Сайпан) (PDF) (Отчет). Академия морской пехоты. Архивировано из оригинала (PDF) 18 июня 2022 года.
• Шикс, Роберт Б. (1945). «Гражданские лица на Сайпане». Дальневосточное обследование . 14 (2): 109–113. дои : 10.2307/3022063 . JSTOR   3022063 .
• Смит, Холланд М .; Финч, Перси (1949). Коралл и латунь . Сыновья Чарльза Скрибнера. ОСЛК   367235 .
• Тойода, Соэму (1946) [3 мая 1944 г.]. «Приказ об сверхсекретной операции Объединенного флота № 76». В Обзоре стратегических бомбардировок США, Отдел военно-морского анализа (ред.). Кампании Тихоокеанской войны . Государственная типография. стр. 226–231. OCLC   1041650487 .
• Обзор стратегических бомбардировок США (1946 г.). Допросы японских чиновников . Том. 2. Типография правительства США. ISBN  9780598449320 . ОСЛК   3214951 . Архивировано из оригинала 17 ноября 2015 года.

Внешние ссылки

• Юнайтед Ньюс (1944). Союзники освобождают остров Эльба и т.д. Универсальная кинохроника . Вторжение на Сайпан начинается в 5:55 . Проверено 21 февраля 2012 г.
• Битва за Марианские острова на YouTube