Льюис Штраусс

Льюис Штраусс
Штраус в 1962 году
Министр торговли США
В офисе 13 ноября 1958 г. - 30 июня 1959 г.
Президент	Дуайт Д. Эйзенхауэр
Preceded by	Sinclair Weeks
Succeeded by	Frederick H. Mueller
Chair of the United States Atomic Energy Commission
In office July 2, 1953 – June 30, 1958
President	Dwight D. Eisenhower
Preceded by	Gordon Dean
Succeeded by	John A. McCone
Member of the United States Atomic Energy Commission
In office November 12, 1946 – April 15, 1950
President	Harry S. Truman
Preceded by	Position established
Succeeded by	T. Keith Glennan
Personal details
Born	Lewis Lichtenstein Strauss (1896-01-31)January 31, 1896 Charleston, West Virginia, U.S.
Died	January 21, 1974(1974-01-21) (aged 77) Brandy Station, Virginia, U.S.
Resting place	Hebrew Cemetery
Political party	Republican
Spouse	Alice Hanauer
Children	2
Civilian awards	Medal of Freedom
Military service
Allegiance	United States
Branch/service	United States Navy
Years of service	1926–1945
Rank	Rear Admiral
Unit	Bureau of Ordnance
Military awards	Distinguished Service Medal Legion of Merit (4)

Льюис Лихтенштейн Штраус ( / ˈ s t r ɔː z / STRAWZ ; 31 января 1896 — 21 января 1974) — американский правительственный чиновник, бизнесмен, филантроп и военно-морской офицер. Он был одним из первых членов Комиссии по атомной энергии США (AEC) в 1946 году и занимал пост председателя комиссии в 1950-х годах. Штраус был важной фигурой в разработке ядерного оружия после Второй мировой войны , в политике ядерной энергетики и ядерной энергетике в Соединенных Штатах .

Выросший в Ричмонде, штат Вирджиния , Штраус стал помощником Герберта Гувера в Комиссии по оказанию помощи Бельгии во время Первой мировой войны , а после этого — в Американской администрации помощи . Затем Штраус работал инвестиционным банкиром в Kuhn, Loeb & Co. в 1920-х и 1930-х годах, где он накопил значительное состояние. Будучи членом исполнительного комитета Американского еврейского комитета и ряда других еврейских организаций в 1930-х годах, Штраус предпринял несколько попыток изменить политику США, чтобы принять больше беженцев из нацистской Германии, но безуспешно. Он также познакомился и профинансировал некоторые исследования беженца-физика-ядерщика Лео Силарда . Во время Второй мировой войны Штраус служил офицером резерва ВМС США и дослужился до звания контр-адмирала благодаря работе в Управлении артиллерийских вооружений по управлению и награждению заводов, занимающихся производством боеприпасов.

As a founding commissioner with the AEC during the early years of the Cold War, Strauss emphasized the need to protect U.S. atomic secrets and to monitor and stay ahead of atomic developments within the Soviet Union. Accordingly, he was a strong proponent of developing the hydrogen bomb. During his stint as chairman of the AEC, Strauss urged the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy and he predicted that atomic power would make electricity "too cheap to meter". At the same time he downplayed the possible health effects of radioactive fallout such as that experienced by Pacific Islanders following the Castle Bravo thermonuclear test.

Strauss was the driving force behind physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer's security clearance hearing, held in April and May 1954 before an AEC Personnel Security Board, in which Oppenheimer's security clearance was revoked. As a result, Strauss often has been regarded as a villain in American history. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's nomination of Strauss to become U.S. secretary of commerce resulted in a prolonged, public political battle in 1959 where Strauss was not confirmed by the U.S. Senate.

Early life

Strauss was born in Charleston, West Virginia, the son of Rosa (née Lichtenstein) and Lewis Strauss, a successful shoe wholesaler. Their parents were Jewish emigrants from Germany and Austria who came to the United States in the 1830s and 1840s and settled in Virginia. His family moved to Richmond, Virginia, and he grew up and attended public schools there. At the age of ten, he lost much of the vision in his right eye in a rock fight, which later disqualified him from normalmilitary service.

Having developed an amateur's knowledge from reading textbooks, Strauss planned to study physics. He was on track to be valedictorian of his class at John Marshall High School, which would have entitled him to a scholarship to the University of Virginia, but typhoid fever in his senior year made him unable to take final exams or graduate with his classmates.

By the time he finally graduated from high school, his family's business had experienced a downturn during the Recession of 1913–1914. In order to help out, Strauss decided to work as a traveling shoe salesman for his father's company. In his spare time, Strauss studied his Jewish heritage. He was quite successful in his sales efforts; over the next three years, he saved $20,000 (equivalent to $476,000 in 2023): enough money to cover college tuition now that the scholarship offer was no longer in effect.

Career

World War I

American food administrators in 1918: Hoover is on the far left, Strauss third from left

Strauss's mother encouraged him to perform public or humanitarian service. It was 1917; World War I was continuing to devastate parts of Europe and Herbert Hoover had become a symbol of humanitarian altruism by way of heading the Commission for Relief in Belgium. Accordingly, Strauss took the train to Washington, D.C., and talked his way into serving without pay as an assistant to Hoover. (Strauss and his biographer differ on whether this happened in February or May 1917, but the latter seems more likely.)

Hoover became chief of the United States Food Administration. Strauss worked well and soon was promoted to Hoover's private secretary and confidant. In that position he made powerful contacts that would serve him later on. One such contact he made was with attorney Harvey Hollister Bundy. Another was with Robert A. Taft, a counsel for the Food Administration.

Following the Armistice of 11 November 1918, Hoover became head of the post-war American Relief Administration, headquartered in Paris, and Strauss joined him there once more as his private secretary. Acting on behalf of a nearly destitute diplomatic representative of Finland, Rudolf Holsti, whom he met in Paris, Strauss persuaded Hoover to urge President Woodrow Wilson to recognize Finland's independence from Russia.

Besides the U.S. food relief organization, Strauss worked with the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) to relieve the suffering of Jewish refugees, who were often neglected by other bodies. Strauss acted as a liaison between Hoover's organization and JDC workers in a number of Central and Eastern European countries. Getting news in April 1919 of the Pinsk massacre, during the Polish–Soviet War, in which 35 Jews meeting to discuss the distribution of American relief aid were summarily executed by the Polish Army in the belief that they were Bolshevik conspirators, Strauss pressed the case to Hoover that a forceful response must be made to the Polish government. Hoover spoke to Polish Prime Minister Ignacy Jan Paderewski and demanded a fair investigation, but Strauss saw Paderewski as an anti-Semite who believed that all Jews were Bolsheviks and all Bolsheviks were Jews. After a while, the situation for Jews in Poland did (temporarily) improve.

Strauss had grown up in Virginia, in a culture that venerated Southern military heroes of the "War Between the States", but a tour he took in summer 1918 to the devastated battlefields of Château-Thierry and Belleau Wood disabused him of any romantic illusions about the glory of warfare. Similarly, his exposure to effects of Communism in 1919, as manifested in the Polish–Soviet War, led to a powerful and lifelong anti-Communist sentiment.

Investment banker, marriage and family

At the JDC, Strauss came to the attention of Felix M. Warburg, a JDC leader who was a partner in the investment bank Kuhn, Loeb & Co. in New York City, and Harriet Loewentstein, a JDC European head who was an accountant at the bank. In addition Hoover had introduced Strauss to Mortimer Schiff, another partner at Kuhn Loeb, who interviewed Strauss in Paris and offered him a job. In so doing, Strauss turned down an offer to become comptroller for the newly forming League of Nations.

Strauss returned to the United States and started at Kuhn Loeb in 1919. As a result, he never did attend college, a fact that may have led to the perfectionist and defensive personality traits that he exhibited later in life.

Kuhn Loeb's major customers were railroads, and by the mid-1920s, Strauss was helping to arrange financing for new railroad terminal buildings in Cincinnati and Richmond and for the reorganizations of the Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad and the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad. By 1926 his yearly compensation from the firm had reached $75,000 (equivalent to $1,291,000 in 2023) and by the next year, $120,000 (equivalent to $2,105,000 in 2023). Subsequently, Strauss arranged the firm's financing for steel companies such as Inland Steel, Republic Steel, and Great Lakes Steel. He became a full partner in 1929, at which point he was making a million dollars a year, and he endured the Wall Street Crash of 1929 without significant financial damage. With the firm he helped bring to market Kodachrome film for Eastman Kodak and the Polaroid camera for Edwin H. Land.

Strauss and his wife Alice, c. 1923–1926

On March 5, 1923, Strauss married Alice Hanauer in a ceremony at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in New York. Born in 1903, she was the daughter of Jerome J. Hanauer, who was one of the Kuhn Loeb partners. She was a New York native who had attended Vassar College and was a skilled equestrian and potter. The couple had two sons, one of whom did not survive early childhood. While in New York, they lived on Central Park West, then on the Upper East Side, and later on Central Park South.

Strauss had involvements in the New York City community. In particular, he was on the board of directors of the Metropolitan Opera Company and later the Metropolitan Opera Association and was also on the boards of the American Relief Administration and the American Children's Fund. He was a member of American Bankers Association and New York State Chamber of Commerce.

Hoover was a candidate for the Republican Party nomination in the United States presidential election, 1920; Strauss campaigned for him and attended the 1920 Republican National Convention on his behalf, but Hoover failed to gain significant support. Strauss again worked for the this-time-successful campaign of Hoover in the United States presidential election, 1928, and was a member from Virginia that year of the Republican National Committee. Over several years, Strauss engaged in activities designed to strengthen the Republican Party in Virginia and the South overall. He also was committed to protecting the reputation of President Hoover; in 1930, on behalf of the White House, he conspired with two naval intelligence officers to illegally break into the office of a Tammany Hall follower in New York who was thought to hold documents that would be damaging to Hoover.

During the 1930s, following Hoover's re-election defeat by Franklin D. Roosevelt in the United States presidential election, 1932, Strauss was a strong opponent of the New Deal. He shared this antipathy with Hoover, who increasingly adopted an ideologically conservative, anti-New Deal viewpoint in the years following his defeat.

Strauss was active in Kuhn Loeb until 1941, although he resented restrictions imposed on investment banking by regulators in the Roosevelt administration and derived less enjoyment from the business. Nonetheless, in his role as an investment banker Strauss had become vastly wealthy, and given his humble original circumstances he has been considered a self-made millionaire and a Horatio Alger tale. As one historian has written, Strauss's business success was the residue of "luck, pluck, hard work, and good contacts". Strauss's biographer reaches a similar conclusion: "Strauss reached the top because of his ability, ambition, choices of the right firm and the right wife, and the good luck to start out at a prosperous time." Due to his lack of higher education, Strauss has also been characterized as an autodidact.

Lay religious activities

A proudly religious man, Strauss became a leader in Jewish causes and organizations. In 1933 he was a member of the executive committee of the American Jewish Committee. He was active in the Jewish Agricultural Society, for whom by 1941 he was honorary president. By 1938 he was also active in the Palestine Development Council, the Baron de Hirsch Fund, and the Union of American Hebrew Congregations.

However, he was not a Zionist and opposed the establishment of a Jewish state in Mandatory Palestine. He did not view Jews as belonging to a nation or a race; he considered himself an American of Jewish religion, and consequently he advocated for the rights of Jews to live as equal and integral citizens of the nations in which they resided.

Strauss fully recognized the brutality of Nazi Germany. He first made his concern known in early 1933, writing to President Hoover during the final weeks of Hoover's time in office. Strauss attended a London conference of concerned Jews later that year on behalf of the American Jewish Committee, but the conference fell apart over the issue of Zionism.

Following the November 1938 Kristallnacht attacks on Jews in Germany, Strauss attempted to persuade prominent Republicans to support the Wagner–Rogers Bill that would legislatively allow the entry of 20,000 German refugee children into the United States. Long allied with both Hoover and Taft, he asked each of them to support the bill. Hoover did, but Taft did not, telling Strauss, "With millions of people out of work, I can't see the logic of admitting others." The bill had considerable popular support, but eventually failed to move forward in Congress due to opposition from the American Legion, the Daughters of the American Revolution, and other immigration restrictionists.

At the same time, Strauss joined with Hoover and Bernard Baruch in supporting the establishment of a refugee state in Africa as a safe haven for all persecuted people, not just Jews, and pledged ten percent of his wealth towards it. This effort too failed to materialize. Still another scheme that involved Strauss concerned an international corporation, the Coordinating Foundation, that would be set up to effectively pay Germany an immense ransom in exchange for their allowing Jews to emigrate; that too did not happen. Strauss received many individual requests for help, but often was unable to. Decades later, Strauss wrote in his memoir: "The years from 1933 to the outbreak of World War II will ever be a nightmare to me, and the puny efforts I made to alleviate the tragedies were utter failures, save in a few individual cases—pitifully few."

Strauss was president of Congregation Emanu-El of New York, the largest such in New York City, for a decade, from 1938 to 1948. He was named to the presidency to replace Judge Irving Lehman, after having previously been chair of the temple's finance committee. He had first joined the board of trustees of the temple in 1929, when the congregation was absorbing the merger of Temple Beth-El.

Strauss succeeded in Washington's social and political circles despite that environment being notoriously anti-Semitic at the time. Indeed, experiences with anti-Semitism may have contributed to the outsider perspective and fractious personality that became evident during his later career. He was proud of his Southern upbringing as well as his religion, and insisted his name be pronounced in Virginia fashion as "straws" rather than with the usual German pronunciation.

World War II

Despite his medical disqualification for regular military duty, Strauss applied to join the U.S. Navy Reserve in 1925, becoming effective 1926, and he received an officer's commission as a lieutenant intelligence officer. He remained in the reserve as a lieutenant commander. In 1939 and 1940, as World War II began overseas, he volunteered for active duty. He wanted to go into intelligence but was blocked, reportedly because the Director of Naval Intelligence, U.S. Navy was prejudiced against Jews and because Strauss's contributions to B'nai B'rith had aroused suspicion on the part of FBI director J. Edgar Hoover and others in the U.S. intelligence community. Instead, in February 1941, he was called to active duty, and was assigned as a Staff Assistant to the Chief at the Bureau of Ordnance, where he helped organize and manage Navy munitions work. Strauss and his wife moved to Washington, D.C., where they lived in an apartment at the prestigious Shoreham Hotel. She served as an operating room nurse's aide during this period.

During 1941, Strauss recommended actions to improve inspectors' abilities and consolidate field inspections into one General Inspectors' Office that was independent of the Navy's bureau system; these changes took hold by the following year. Strauss organized a morale-boosting effort to award "E for Excellence" awards to plants doing a good job of making war materials. The program proved popular and helped the United States ramp up production quickly in case it entered the war; by the end of 1941 the Bureau of Ordnance had given the "E" to 94 different defense contractors. It was adopted across all services in 1942 as the Army-Navy "E" Award, and over the course of the war over 4,000 of them were granted. (Strauss's biographer has depicted Strauss as also helping to investigate the notorious failures of U.S. torpedoes during the war and coordinate development of the very secret and highly successful anti-aircraft VT (proximity) fuse; however histories of these efforts do not indicate that Strauss played a significant role.)

When James V. Forrestal succeeded Frank Knox as Secretary of the Navy in May 1944, he employed Strauss as his special assistant. In conjunction with Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia, Strauss established the Office of Naval Research, which kept scientific research of naval matters under control of the Navy rather than civilian or academic organizations. Strauss's contributions were recognized by the Navy and by 1945 he was serving on the Army-Navy Munitions Board, a role that concluded by the following year. He was also on the Naval Reserve Policy Board starting in 1946.

Earlier during the war, Strauss was promoted to commander, then by November 1943 was a captain. He rose in rank and influence due to a combination of his intelligence, personal energy, and ability to find favor in higher places. Strauss's rigid manner managed to make enemies during the war as well, including significant disputes with E. N. Toland, chief counsel for the House Committee on Naval Affairs; Representative Carl Vinson, chair of that committee; and Admiral Ernest J. King, the Chief of Naval Operations. A proposed promotion for Strauss in 1944 to rear admiral did not happen at the time due to a variety of factors, including that President Franklin D. Roosevelt had disliked Strauss for years, going back to an incident at an Inner Circle event in 1932, and blocked the move. Roosevelt's death changed matters, as his successor, Harry S. Truman, had no negative feelings about Strauss. In July 1945 Strauss was promoted to commodore. Then in November 1945, after the war, Strauss was promoted to rear admiral by Truman.

The promotion to flag rank was unusual for a member of the reserve, and as such, he liked being addressed as "Admiral Strauss", even though use of the honorific perturbed some regular officers, who considered him a civilian. By this time, Strauss had taken advantage of his ties in both Washington and Wall Street to enter the post-war establishment in the capital. He also was learning how to get things accomplished in Washington via unofficial back channels, something at which he would become quite adept.

Introduction to atomic energy

Strauss's mother died of cancer in 1935, and his father of the same disease in 1937. That and his early interest in physics led Strauss to establish a fund in their names, the Lewis and Rosa Strauss Memorial Fund, for physics research that could lead to better radiation treatment for cancer patients. The fund supported the refugee German physicist Arno Brasch, who was working on producing artificial radioactive material with bursts of X-rays. Brasch's work was based on previous work with Leo Szilard, who saw in this work a possible means to developing an atomic chain reaction. Szilard already had foreseen that this could lead to an atomic bomb. Szilard persuaded Strauss to support him and Brasch in building a "surge generator". Strauss ultimately provided tens of thousands of dollars to this venture.

Through Szilard, Strauss met other nuclear physicists, such as Ernest Lawrence. Strauss talked to scientists who had left Nazi Germany and learned about atom-related experiments that had taken place there. Szilard kept him up to date on developments in the area, such as the discovery of nuclear fission and the use of neutrons. In February 1940, Szilard asked him to fund the acquisition of some radium, but Strauss refused, as he had already spent a large sum.

Strauss had no further direct involvement with atomic energy developments during the war. Indeed, he was frustrated by Harvey Hollister Bundy, his colleague from the Food Administration days, who kept Strauss away from information regarding the Manhattan Project. At the end of the war, when the first atomic bombs were ready for use, Strauss advocated to Forrestal dropping one on a symbolic target, such as a Japanese cedar grove near Nikkō, Tochigi, as a warning shot. In subsequent years Strauss would say in interviews, "I did my best to prevent it. The Japanese were defeated before the bomb was used."

After the war, Strauss was the Navy's representative on the Interdepartmental Committee on Atomic Energy. Strauss recommended a test of the atomic bomb against a number of modern warships, which he thought would refute the idea that the atomic bomb made the Navy obsolete. His recommendation contributed to the decision to hold the mid-1946 Operation Crossroads tests, the first since the war, at Bikini Atoll.

Atomic Energy Commission member

The five original commissioners of the AEC in 1947; Strauss is rightmost

In 1947, the United States transferred control of atomic research from the U.S. Army to civilian authority under the newly created Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). In October 1946, in advance of the commission actually coming into being, Strauss was named by President Truman as one of the first five Commissioners, with David E. Lilienthal as the chairman. Strauss had been recommended for a position on the body by Vice Admiral Paul Frederick Foster, a long-time friend for whom Strauss earlier had provided contacts in the business world (and who had subsequently helped Strauss get his active duty assignment). In their initial discussion about the appointment, Strauss noted to the New Deal-supporting Truman that "I am a black Hoover Republican." Truman said that was of no matter, since the commission was intended to be non-political. Strauss, who briefly had returned to work at Kuhn Loeb after the war, now exited the firm altogether in order to comply with AEC regulations.

Once there, Strauss became one of the first commissioners to speak in dissent from existing policy. In the first two years, there were a dozen instances, most having to do with information-security matters, in which Strauss was in a 1–4 minority on the commission; in the process, he increasingly was perceived as stubborn.

One of Strauss's first actions on the AEC was to urge his fellow commissioners to set up the capability to monitor foreign atomic activity via atmospheric testing. In particular, he saw that WB-29 Superfortress aircraft equipped with radiological tests could run regular "sniffer" flights to monitor the upper atmosphere and detect any atomic tests by the Soviet Union. Other people in government and science, including physicists J. Robert Oppenheimer and Edward Teller, argued that the radiological approach would not work, but Strauss and the newly formed United States Air Force continued regardless. Several days after the first atomic bomb test by the Soviet Union in August 1949, a WB-29 flight did, in fact, find evidence of the test. While Strauss was not the only person who had been urging long-range detection capabilities, it was largely due to his efforts that the United States was able to discover that the Soviet Union had become a nuclear power.

Strauss believed in a fundamental premise of the Cold War: that the Soviet Union was determined on a course of world domination. As such, he believed in having a more powerful nuclear force than the Soviets and in maintaining secrecy about U.S. nuclear activities. This extended to allies: Among the commissioners, he was the most skeptical about the value of the Modus Vivendi to which the United States, Britain, and Canada agreed in January 1948 that provided for limited sharing of technical information between the three nations (and that already was a stricter set of guidelines than those established by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the Quebec Agreement of the Manhattan Project era). During the U.S. presidential election of 1948, Strauss tried to convince the Republican Party nominee, Thomas E. Dewey, of the dangers of sharing atomic information with Britain, and, after Dewey lost, Strauss tried to convince President Truman of the same. Following the revelations about the British physicist Klaus Fuchs's espionage for the Soviet Union and the appointment of the former Marxist John Strachey as Secretary of State for War in the British Cabinet, Strauss argued that the Modus Vivendi should be suspended completely, but no other commissioner wanted to go to that extreme.

Strauss was known for his psychological rigidity; one of his fellow commissioners reportedly said, "If you disagree with Lewis about anything, he assumes you're just a fool at first. But if you go on disagreeing with him, he concludes you must be a traitor." Strauss was increasingly unhappy in his position, but President Truman indicated satisfaction with Strauss's work and the minority stances that he was taking on the commission.

Strauss (left) along with Senators Brien McMahon and John Bricker in early 1950

The first atomic-bomb test by the Soviet Union in August 1949 came earlier than expected by Americans, and, over the next several months, there was an intense debate within the U.S. government, military, and scientific communities regarding whether to proceed with development of the far more powerful hydrogen bomb, then known as "the Super". Strauss urged for the United States to move immediately to develop it, writing to his fellow commissioners on October 5 that "the time has come for a quantum jump in our planning ... we should make an intensive effort to get ahead with the super." In particular, Strauss was unswayed by moral arguments against going forward, seeing no real difference between using it and the atomic bomb or the boosted fission weapon that some opponents of the Super were advocating as an alternative. When Strauss was rebuffed by the other commissioners, he went to National Security Council executive secretary Sidney Souers in order to bring the matter to President Truman directly. It was as a consequence of this meeting that Truman first learned (when Souers informed him) that such a thing as a hydrogen bomb could exist. In a memorandum urging development of the Super that he sent to President Truman on November 25, 1949, the pious Strauss expressed no doubt about what the Soviets would do, writing that "a government of atheists is not likely to be dissuaded from producing the weapon on 'moral' grounds."

On January 31, 1950, Truman announced his decision to go forward with hydrogen-bomb development. A few narratives, including ones promoted by Strauss and that of Strauss's biographer, have placed Strauss as having had a central role in Truman's decision. However, by the time that the decision was made, Strauss was one of an increasingly large coalition of military and government figures, and a few scientists, who strongly felt that development of the new weapon was essential to U.S. security in the face of a hostile, nuclear-capable, ideological enemy. Thus, in the absence of Strauss's action, the same decision almost surely would have been reached. In any case, when the decision was announced, Strauss, considering that he had accomplished as much as he could in his role as commissioner, submitted his resignation that same day. Within the administration, there was some consideration given to Strauss being named chairman of the AEC to replace the departing Lilienthal, but Strauss was considered too polarizing a figure. The last day for Strauss during this first stint of his on the commission was April 15, 1950.

Financial analyst

Beginning in June 1950, Strauss became a financial adviser to the Rockefeller brothers, where his charter was to participate in decisions regarding projects, financing, and investing. For them, he assisted in the founding of, and served on the first board for, the Population Council. He was also involved in the negotiations with Columbia University that led to a sale and leasing back of real estate associated with part of Rockefeller Center. The relationship with the Rockefeller brothers would last until 1953. However, Strauss felt that the brothers treated him as a second-class asset and, in turn, he felt no loyalty towards them.

During this time, Strauss continued to take an interest in atomic affairs; as did other former members of the AEC, he had a consulting arrangement with the United States Congress Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and was active in making his opinion known on various matters. These included his dissatisfaction with the speed at which research and development into actually making a working hydrogen device was taking place.

In the 1952 U.S. presidential election, Strauss originally supported Robert A. Taft, his friend from the Hoover days, for the Republican Party nomination. Once Dwight D. Eisenhower secured the nomination, however, Strauss contributed substantial monies towards Eisenhower's campaign.

Atomic Energy Commission chairman

Strauss (left) taking the oath of office as chairman of the AEC in 1953

In January 1953, President Eisenhower named Strauss as presidential atomic energy advisor. Then in July 1953, Eisenhower named Strauss as chairman of the AEC.

While Strauss had initially opposed Eisenhower's push for Operation Candor, his view and the administration's goals both evolved, and he endorsed the "Atoms for Peace" program, which Eisenhower announced in December 1953. Strauss was now one of the best-known advocates of atomic energy for many purposes. In part, he celebrated the promise of peaceful use of atomic energy as part of a conscious effort to divert attention away from the dangers of nuclear warfare. Nevertheless, Strauss, like Eisenhower, did sincerely believe in and hope for the potential of peaceful uses. In 1955 Strauss helped arrange the U.S. participation in the first international conference on peaceful uses of atomic energy, held in Geneva. Strauss held Soviet capabilities in high regard, saying after the conference that "in the realm of pure science the Soviets had astonished us by their achievements ... [the Russians] could be described in no sense as technically backward."

Eisenhower signing a modification of the Atomic Energy Act in 1954; Strauss is seated on the far right

Strauss was involved in finding the site and industry partners for the start of construction, in 1954, of the first dedicated U.S. atomic electric power plant, the Shippingport Atomic Power Station in Pennsylvania; it would eventually go on-line in 1957. While Shippingport was a joint government-commercial collaboration, Strauss advocated for private industry taking on the development of nuclear power plants on its own. Strauss made public remarks in 1954 predicting that atomic power would make electricity "too cheap to meter". Regarded as fanciful even at the time, the quote is now seen as damaging to the industry's credibility. Strauss was possibly referring to Project Sherwood, a secret program to develop power from hydrogen fusion, rather the commonly-believed uranium fission reactors. Indeed, on the run-up to a 1958 Geneva conference on atomic power, Strauss offered substantial funding to three laboratories for fusion power research.

Following the unexpectedly large blast of the Castle Bravo thermonuclear test of March 1954 at Bikini Atoll, there was international concern over the radioactive fallout experienced by residents of nearby Rongelap Atoll and Utirik Atoll and by the Daigo Fukuryū Maru, a Japanese fishing vessel. The AEC initially tried to keep the contamination secret, and then tried to minimize the health dangers of fallout. Voices began to be heard advocating for a ban or limitation on atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. Strauss himself downplayed dangers from fallout and insisted that it was vital that a program of atmospheric blasts proceed unhindered; internally within the administration, Strauss was dismissive of the matter and even speculated that the Fukuryū Maru was part of a Communist scheme. However, Strauss also contributed to public fears when, during a March 1954 press conference, he made an impromptu remark that a single Soviet H-bomb could destroy the New York metropolitan area. The remark captured the immense destructiveness of the H-bomb and was featured in headlines in newspapers across the United States. This statement was heard overseas as well and served to add to what UK Minister of Defence Harold Macmillan termed a "panic" over the subject. The AEC had commissioned the Project SUNSHINE report in 1953 to ascertain the impact of radioactive fallout, generated from repeated nuclear detonations of greater and greater yield, on the world's population. The British asked the AEC for the report, but Strauss resisted giving them anything more than a heavily redacted version, leading to frustration on the part of Prime Minister Winston Churchill and other UK officials.

Eisenhower and Strauss discuss what happened with Castle Bravo, March 1954 ...

... and the following day hold the press conference at which Strauss says a single H-bomb could destroy the entire New York metropolitan area

Internal debate ensued over the next several years within the Eisenhower administration over the possibility of an atmospheric test ban with the Soviet Union, with some in favor of trying to arrange one, but Strauss was always one of those implacably opposed. Strauss would continue to minimize the dangers of Bravo fallout to the islanders of the atolls, insisting in his 1962 memoirs that they had been under "continuous and competent medical supervision" and that follow-up tests showed them to be in "excellent health [and] their blood counts were approximately normal". Others in the AEC were equally cavalier. In fact, AEC scientists had seen the islanders as a valuable laboratory case of human exposure. The Limited Test Ban Treaty banning atmospheric tests would not be arrived at until 1963, and the U.S. government engaged in a series of reevaluations of the health of the islanders, and relocation and economic packages to compensate them, over the next several decades. Strauss and others in the AEC were also dismissive of the dangers Americans faced who were downwind of the Nevada Test Site.

Regarding the prospect of nuclear proliferation, Strauss was skeptical that attempts to prevent it would accomplish anything, and Strauss and the AEC also doubted that the problem was as severe as some others in the administration maintained. During 1956, Harold Stassen, who had been chosen by Eisenhower to lead an effort on disarmanent policy, focused on making nonprofileration a key goal of the United States, including proposals to halt not just to testing but also the continued expansion of the U.S. fissionable material stockpile. Eisenhower was at least partially receptive to the proposals, but Strauss argued that nuclear materials production could not be stopped yet and that testing could never be halted completely.

The Sputnik crisis of 1957 led Eisenhower to create the President's Science Advisory Committee. Once that body was in place, Eisenhower began to directly receive a broader selection of scientific information; Strauss lost his ability to control scientists' access to the president and his influence within the administration began to recede. While Strauss had maintained his hostility towards Anglo-American cooperation on nuclear matters since becoming AEC chairman, Sputnik gave impetus to renewed cooperation on this front. Strauss visited Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to give a message from Eisenhower to this effect, and subsequent talks and hearings resulted in the 1958 US–UK Mutual Defence Agreement coming into place.

As AEC chairman, Strauss was informed regarding U.S. intelligence findings on the Dimona reactor in Israel. He met with Ernst David Bergmann, chairman of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission and a key early force in the Israeli nuclear program (and years later would help Bergmann get a visiting fellowship in the United States). While Strauss's thoughts on the Israeli effort to develop nuclear weapons are not documented, his wife later said that he would have been in favor of Israel being able to defend itself.

Strauss and Oppenheimer

See also: J. Robert Oppenheimer

During his terms as an AEC commissioner, Strauss became hostile to Oppenheimer, the physicist who had been director of the Los Alamos Laboratory during the Manhattan Project and who, after the war, became a celebrated public figure and remained in influential positions in atomic energy.

In 1947, Strauss, a trustee of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, presented Oppenheimer with the institute's offer to be its director. Strauss, who as one writer notes was a man of high intelligence and financial skills if not higher education, had also been considered for the job; he was the institute's faculty's fifth-ranked choice, while Oppenheimer was their first ranked. Strauss, a conservative Republican, had little in common with Oppenheimer, a liberal who had had Communist associations. Oppenheimer subsequently was a leading opponent of moving ahead with the hydrogen bomb and proposed a national security strategy based on atomic weapons and continental defense; Strauss wanted the development of thermonuclear weapons and a doctrine of deterrence. Oppenheimer supported a policy of openness regarding the numbers and capabilities of the atomic weapons in America's arsenal; Strauss believed that such unilateral frankness would benefit no one but Soviet military planners.

In addition, Strauss disliked Oppenheimer on a variety of personal grounds. Starting in 1947, Strauss had been in a dispute with the General Advisory Committee (GAC) of senior atomic scientists, which Oppenheimer chaired and which reported to the AEC, over whether exporting radioisotopes for medical purposes was a risk to U.S. security, from which the scientists on the GAC developed a poor image of Strauss. Then during a public hearing in 1949, Oppenheimer had given a mocking answer to a point Strauss had raised on the subject, a humiliation that Strauss did not forget. Strauss was also offended that Oppenheimer had engaged in adulterous relations. And Strauss did not like that Oppenheimer had seemingly left his Jewish heritage behind, whereas Strauss had become successful – despite the anti-Semitic environment of Washington – while still maintaining his prominent roles in Jewish organizations and his Temple Emanu-El presidency.

Strauss (center-left in rear) and Oppenheimer (alongside him, center-right in rear) in a group of scientists and engineers, c. 1953

When Eisenhower offered Strauss the AEC chairmanship, Strauss named one condition: Oppenheimer would be excluded from all classified atomic work. Oppenheimer held a highest-level Q clearance, and was one of the most respected figures in atomic science, briefing the President and the National Security Council on several occasions. Oppenheimer's AEC consultancy, and the clearance that went with it, had just been renewed for another year by Gordon Dean, the outgoing chairman of the AEC; it would extend through June 30, 1954.

Strauss's misgivings about Oppenheimer went beyond dislike and disagreement. He had become aware of Oppenheimer's former Communist affiliations before World War II and had begun to think that Oppenheimer might even be a Soviet spy. For instance, Strauss was suspicious of Oppenheimer's tendency to downplay Soviet capabilities. In 1953, Oppenheimer stated in the July edition of Foreign Affairs that he believed the Soviets were "about four years behind" in nuclear weapons development. The United States had exploded the first thermonuclear device the previous year; however, only a month after Oppenheimer made his proclamation, in August 1953, the Soviet Union declared that it had tested its own fusion-based bomb, which U.S. sensors identified as a boosted fission weapon. Strauss was not alone in having his doubts; a number of other officials in Washington also suspected that Oppenheimer might be a security risk.

In September 1953, Strauss, hoping to uncover evidence of Oppenheimer's disloyalty, asked FBI director J. Edgar Hoover to initiate surveillance to track Oppenheimer's movements. The director readily did so; the tracking uncovered no evidence of disloyalty but that Oppenheimer had lied to Strauss about his reason for taking a trip to Washington (Oppenheimer met a journalist but had told Strauss that he had visited the White House). Strauss's suspicions increased further with the discovery that in 1948 and 1949 Oppenheimer had tried to stop the long-range airborne detection system that Strauss had championed and that had worked in discovering the Soviet Union's first atomic weapon test. At first Strauss moved cautiously, even heading off an attack on Oppenheimer by Senator Joseph McCarthy, due to Strauss's belief that any case that McCarthy might make would be premature and lack a solid basis of evidence.

Oppenheimer security hearing

Main article: Oppenheimer security clearance hearing

In November 1953, William L. Borden, the former executive director of the United States Congress Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, wrote a letter to the FBI alleging that "more probably than not J. Robert Oppenheimer is an agent of the Soviet Union." According to the book American Prometheus, Strauss collaborated and aided Borden in making the allegations against Oppenheimer. This action set into motion a chain of events. On December 3, 1953, Eisenhower, after consulting with Strauss and others, ordered a "blank wall" between Oppenheimer and all areas of government. On December 21, Strauss told Oppenheimer that his security clearance had been suspended, pending resolution of a series of charges outlined in a letter from Kenneth D. Nichols, general manager of the AEC. Rather than resign, Oppenheimer requested a hearing. Upon Strauss's request, FBI director Hoover ordered full surveillance on Oppenheimer and his attorneys, including tapping of phones; these wiretaps were illegal.

The hearing was held in April and May 1954, before an AEC Personnel Security Board. Strauss selected the three-man board, headed by Gordon Gray. He also picked the person who would lead the case against Oppenheimer, the trial attorney Roger Robb. Strauss had access to the FBI's information on Oppenheimer, including his conversations with his lawyers, which was used to prepare counterarguments against those lawyers in advance. Strauss was not present at the hearings, instead reading daily transcripts.

At the hearing, many top scientists, as well as government and military figures, testified on Oppenheimer's behalf. Physicist Isidor Isaac Rabi stated that the suspension of the security clearance was unnecessary: "he is a consultant, and if you don't want to consult the guy, you don't consult him, period."

Oppenheimer, however, admitted that he had previously lied to a military counterintelligence officer about a conversation his friend Haakon Chevalier had had with him about passing nuclear secrets to the Soviets. He also admitted that he had stayed with Chevalier only the previous December. Leslie Groves, the former director of the Manhattan Project, testified that under the stricter security criteria in effect in 1954, he "would not clear Dr. Oppenheimer today".

At the conclusion of the hearings, Oppenheimer's clearance was revoked by a 2–1 vote of the board. They unanimously cleared Oppenheimer of disloyalty, but a majority found that 20 of the 24 charges were either true or substantially true and that Oppenheimer would represent a security risk. Then on June 29, 1954, the AEC upheld the findings of the Personnel Security Board, by a 4–1 decision, with Strauss writing the majority opinion. In that opinion, Strauss stressed Oppenheimer's "defects of character", "falsehoods, evasions and misrepresentations", and past associations with Communists and people close to Communists as the primary reasons for his determination. He did not comment on Oppenheimer's loyalty.

Oppenheimer was thus stripped of his clearance: one day before it would have expired, and seven months after it had been suspended on the orders of the president.

The successor agency to the AEC later ruled that the hearing was "a flawed process that violated the Commission's own regulations." The loss of his security clearance ended Oppenheimer's role in government and policy. Oppenheimer returned to his directorship at the Institute of Advanced Studies, but Strauss, who was still on the board of trustees there, attempted to have him dismissed. However, in October 1954, the board voted to keep Oppenheimer on. In the years that followed, Strauss still hoped to remove Oppenheimer, but never got the votes on the board he needed.

In the wake of the AEC decision, public opinion and most scientists were firmly against Strauss. Nearly 500 of the scientists at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory signed a petition saying "this poorly founded decision ... will make it increasingly difficult to obtain adequate scientific talent in our defense laboratories." Strauss responded by first sending a letter to the petitioners saying that they were not trying to quash the expression of professional opinions – "We certainly do not want 'yes men' in the employ of the Atomic Energy Commission" – and followed that with a July 1954 visit to the laboratory to try to mollify the scientists. An editorial in The New Mexican newspaper nicknamed Strauss's efforts as "Operation Butter-Up".

Secretary of Commerce nomination

Президент Эйзенхауэр закладывает краеугольный камень нового здания AEC в Джермантауне, штат Мэриленд, в 1957 году, председатель AEC Штраус (справа) наблюдает.

Срок полномочий Штрауса на посту председателя Комиссии по атомной энергии (AEC) завершился в конце июня 1958 года. Эйзенхауэр хотел переназначить его, но Штраус опасался, что Сенат отвергнет его или, по крайней мере, подвергнет жесткому допросу. Помимо дела Оппенгеймера, он конфликтовал с демократами в Сенате по нескольким важным вопросам, включая его автократический характер на посту председателя AEC и его секретное обращение с контрактом Диксона-Йейтса . Этот контракт предусматривал поставку электроэнергии в Теннесси без прохождения через администрацию долины Теннесси , и Штраус начал обсуждение этой идеи, не проинформировав своих коллег-членов комиссии. Сам план был спорным и в конечном итоге стал проигрышным вопросом для республиканцев на промежуточных выборах в США 1954 года. В конце 1954 года Штраус заявил в интервью интервьюеру: «Впервые в жизни у меня появились враги». К концу 1950-х годов Штраус заработал репутацию, как было сказано в профиле журнала Time , «одного из самых способных и самых терпеливых общественных деятелей страны».

Эйзенхауэр предложил ему пост главы администрации Белого дома вместо Шермана Адамса, но Штраус не думал, что это его устроит. Эйзенхауэр также спросил, рассмотрит ли Штраус возможность смены Джона Фостера Даллеса (который был болен) на посту государственного секретаря , но Штраус не хотел упреждать заместителя министра Кристиана Гертера , который был его хорошим другом.

Штраус, гр. 1959 год

Наконец, Эйзенхауэр предложил назначить Штрауса министром торговли , и Штраус согласился. Поскольку выборы в Сенат США 1958 года были неизбежны, Эйзенхауэр объявил о своем выборе 24 октября. Штраус вступил в должность в результате перерыва . вступил в силу 13 ноября 1958 г. Однако сопротивление Сената его выдвижению было столь же сильным, как и продление срока полномочий AEC. Это было удивительно, учитывая высокий уровень опыта Штрауса, относительную невыдаемость должности коммерции по сравнению с некоторыми другими должностями в кабинете министров и традицию Сената поручать президентам выбирать глав кабинета, которых они хотят. Действительно, в то время предыдущие тринадцать кандидатов на эту должность в кабинете министров получали утверждение в Сенате в среднем за восемь дней. Из-за давней вражды между ними, Сенатор Клинтон Андерсон от Нью-Мексико выступил за предотвращение утверждения Штрауса Сенатом. Андерсон нашел союзника в лице сенатора Гейла У. Макги из сенатского комитета по торговле , который имел юрисдикцию над утверждением Штрауса.

Во время и после слушаний в Сенате Макги обвинил Штрауса в «наглой попытке обмануть» комитет. Штраус также преувеличил свою роль в разработке водородной бомбы, подразумевая, что он убедил Трумэна поддержать ее. Трумэн был раздражен этим и отправил Андерсону письмо, опровергающее утверждения Штрауса, письмо, которое Андерсон сразу же просочился в прессу. Штраус попытался связаться с Трумэном через посредника, чтобы спасти ситуацию, но получил отказ и почувствовал горечь из-за отсутствия поддержки. Группа ученых, которые все еще были расстроены ролью Штрауса в слушаниях по делу Оппенгеймера, лоббировали подтверждение, играя на произношении имени своей цели, называя себя Комитетом последней соломинки. Физик Дэвид Л. Хилл , бывший председатель Федерации американских учёных , был одним из нескольких учёных, которые дали показания перед Комитетом по торговле против выдвижения Штрауса, заявив, что «большинство учёных в этой стране предпочли бы, чтобы г-н Штраус был полностью отстранен от должности». правительства».

После шестнадцати дней слушаний сенатский комитет по торговле рекомендовал утвердить Штрауса всему Сенату 9 голосами против 8. К этому моменту борьба оказалась в центре внимания национальных политических новостей. с статьей на обложке Time , назвавшей это «одним из крупнейших, самых ожесточенных и во многих отношениях самых неприличных боев за утверждение в истории Сената». При подготовке к дебатам по выдвижению кандидатуры основным аргументом демократического большинства против выдвижения было то, что заявления Штрауса перед комитетом содержали полуправду и явную ложь, и что при жестких допросах Штраус был склонен к двусмысленным ответам и прибегал к мелким аргументам. Несмотря на подавляющее демократическое большинство, 86-й Конгресс США не смог выполнить большую часть своей повестки дня, поскольку президент имел огромную популярность и право вето . С приближением выборов 1960 года демократы в Конгрессе искали вопросы, по которым они могли бы продемонстрировать свою институциональную силу в противостоянии Эйзенхауэру. 19 июня 1959 года, сразу после полуночи, кандидатура Штрауса была отклонена 46–49 голосами. За Штрауса проголосовали 15 демократов и 31 республиканец, против него проголосовали 47 демократов и 2 республиканца. Среди противников были будущие президенты США Джон Ф. Кеннеди и Линдон Б. Джонсон .

На тот момент это был лишь восьмой случай в истории США, когда кандидат от кабинета министров не был утвержден Сенатом. и это был первый раз после Чарльза Б. Уоррена в 1925 году. и будет последним до Джона Тауэра в 1989 году. Президент Эйзенхауэр, вложивший в выдвижение Штрауса как личный, так и профессиональный капитал, горько отозвался о действиях Сената, заявив, что «я теряю действительно ценного партнера в правительственных делах... именно американский народ оказывается в проигрыше из-за этого печального эпизода». 23 июня Штраус подал заявление об отставке после своего перерыва на посту министра торговли, и это заявление вступило в силу 30 июня 1959 года.

Последние годы

Штраус выступает на открытии Президентской библиотеки Герберта Гувера в 1962 году.

Поражение Коммерса фактически положило конец правительственной карьере Штрауса. Многочисленные враги, которых Штраус нажил за свою карьеру, получили некоторое удовольствие от такого поворота событий. Сам Штраус был задет отказом и, так и не оправившись от него, склонен размышлять о событиях прошлого.

Штраус опубликовал свои мемуары « Люди и решения » в 1962 году. В то время в обзоре журнала Time говорилось, что они «теперь могут напомнить читателям о многих реальных достижениях [Штрауса] до того, как они были затмеваемы политическими скандалами». Книга хорошо продавалась: пятнадцать недель она продержалась в списке литературы New York Times бестселлеров научно- популярной и поднялась на пятое место в этом списке. По общему мнению историков, мемуары носили корыстный характер.

Рукописный текст панегирика, зачитанного Штраусом по телевидению NBC после смерти бывшего президента Гувера в 1964 году.

Связь между Гербертом Гувером и Штраусом оставалась сильной на протяжении многих лет; в 1962 году Гувер написал в письме Штраусу: «Из всех мужчин, попавших на мою орбиту в жизни, именно вы испытываете мою самую большую привязанность, и я не буду пытаться указать многочисленные причины, доказательства или случаи». Штраус оказывал помощь в организации поддержки президентской кампании Барри Голдуотера 1964 года . Он также оставался в хороших отношениях с президентом Эйзенхауэром, и в течение нескольких лет в 1960-х годах Эйзенхауэр и Штраус выступали за строительство атомной региональной опреснительной установки на Ближнем Востоке, которая принесла бы пользу как Израилю, так и его арабским соседям, но этот план так и не нашел достаточного количества Конгресса. поддержка для движения вперед.

Выйдя на пенсию, Штраус посвятил время благотворительной деятельности. и Американскому еврейскому комитету , Еврейской теологической семинарии Америки и Вселенскому израильскому альянсу . Он помог получить беспроцентную ссуду для финансирования строительства здания еврейского центра Лос-Аламоса. Он жил на ферме площадью 2000 акров (800 га). где он занимался разведением крупного рогатого скота и вырастил ценного Черного Ангуса . Книга о Герберте Гувере, над которой он работал, так и не была завершена.

После борьбы с лимфосаркомой трехлетней Штраус умер от этого 21 января 1974 года в своем доме, на ферме Брэнди-Рок в Бренди-Стейшн, штат Вирджиния . прошла поминальная служба Его похороны прошли в Нью-Йорке в храме Эману-Эль, а также в столице Вашингтонской еврейской конгрегации . Он похоронен на еврейском кладбище Ричмонда вместе с более чем шестьюдесятью другими членами семьи.

Алиса Ханауэр Штраусс дожила до 2004 года, когда она умерла в возрасте 101 года на станции Бренди.

Наследие

Дело Оппенгеймера быстро стало знаменитым , и Штраус часто играл роль злодея. Этот образ сохранится как в ближайшем будущем, так и в ближайшем будущем. и долгосрочная перспектива. У Штрауса также были свои защитники, которые считали, что роли героя и злодея поменялись местами. Такие поляризованные оценки преследовали Штрауса на протяжении большей части его карьеры.

Даже такие вещи, как необычное, южное произношение его фамилии, могли быть восприняты как загадочная искусственность. В эссе 1997 года в New York Times Book Review, комментирующем дело Оппенгеймера, литературный критик Альфред Казин заявил, что Штраус «произносил свое имя «Соломинка», чтобы выглядеть менее еврейским». Однако Штраус на протяжении всей своей жизни играл видную роль в еврейских делах и организациях. и это обвинение было неправдоподобным. Действительно, документы Штрауса занимают семьдесят шесть ящиков в архивах Американского еврейского исторического общества ; исполнительный директор этой организации заметил: «Я не собираюсь говорить, что он является членом большего количества еврейских организаций, чем любая историческая личность, которую я когда-либо видел, но он там».

Личность Штрауса не была просто классифицирована; Интервьюер середины 1950-х годов, политолог Уорнер Р. Шиллинг , нашел его вежливым и вежливым на одном сеансе, но колючим и темпераментным на втором сеансе. Как Олдена Уитмена говорилось в некрологе Штрауса на первой полосе газеты « Нью-Йорк Таймс» :

В течение примерно дюжины лет в начале атомного века Льюис Штраус, учтивый, но порой вспыльчивый бывший банкир с одаренными любительскими познаниями в физике, был ключевой фигурой в формировании термоядерной политики Соединенных Штатов. ... В годы своего наибольшего влияния в Вашингтоне г-н Штраус с совиным лицом озадачивал большинство наблюдателей. С одной стороны, он был общительным человеком, любил званые обеды и был знатоком престижа; и, с другой стороны, он производил впечатление интеллектуального высокомерия. Он мог быть сердечным, но временами казался набивной рубашкой. Он мог заводить друзей, но при этом создавать антагонизмы.

В начале своих мемуаров 1962 года Штраус заявляет о своей убежденности в том, что «право жить в социальном порядке, установленном [при основании Америки], является настолько бесценной привилегией, что никакая жертва для его сохранения не может быть слишком велика». Это мнение легло в основу названия и интерпретационной основы « Нет слишком великой жертвы , написанной историком Рихардом Пфау в 1984 году. », официальной биографии Штрауса В нем Пфау критикует поведение Штрауса в деле Оппенгеймера, но представляет его как действия честного человека, который чувствовал себя обязанным сделать то, что было необходимо для защиты нации. Историк Бартон Дж. Бернштейн не согласен с этим подходом, заявляя, что рамки слишком щедры и что Пфау ошибается, «видя в Штраусе человека очень честного (собственное утверждение Штрауса), а не как человека, который использовал такие утверждения, чтобы скрыть неряшливое поведение. "

Спустя десятилетия после его смерти историки продолжают изучать записи и действия Штрауса. Ученый раннего периода холодной войны Кен Янг изучал историографию разработки водородной бомбы и тщательно изучал роль, которую Штраус сыграл в попытках сформировать эту историю в свою пользу. В частности, Янг обратил внимание на публикацию в 1953 и 1954 годах популярной журнальной статьи и книги, в которых пропагандировалось весьма искаженное представление о том, что проект водородной бомбы был необоснованно остановлен как до решения Трумэна, так и после него небольшой группой американских ученых, работавших против национальных интересов; также, что Штраус был одним из героев, преодолевших усилия этой клики. Янг указывает на косвенные архивные доказательства того, что Штраус стоял за обеими публикациями и вполне мог передать секретную информацию авторам книг ( Джеймсу Р. Шепли и Клэю Блэру-младшему ). Историк Присцилла Джонсон Макмиллан обнаружила архивные свидетельства, которые в некоторой степени позволяют предположить, что Штраус был в сговоре с Борденом, бывшим сотрудником Конгресса, чье письмо послужило толчком к слушанию по делу Оппенгеймера о безопасности. Макмиллан также утверждает, что после этого письма Штраус, вероятно, стоял за директивой Эйзенхауэра о «глухой стене» по отделению Оппенгеймера от ядерных секретов.

Биографы Оппенгеймера Кай Берд и Мартин Дж. Шервин заявляют, что решение Штрауса опубликовать стенограмму слушания по делу Оппенгеймера, несмотря на то, что свидетелям было обещано, что их показания останутся тайными, в конечном итоге обернулось против него, поскольку стенограмма показала, как проходило слушание. принял форму инквизиции. В 2022 году Дженнифер Грэнхольм , министр энергетики США – глава организации-преемницы AEC – отменила отзыв 1954 года допуска Оппенгеймера к секретной информации. Ее решение было основано не на пересмотре существа дела против Оппенгеймера, а, скорее, на ошибочных процессах слушаний, которые нарушили собственные правила AEC. Историк Алекс Веллерштейн утверждает, что Штраус был главным виновником этих нарушений процесса.

В 2023 году Бернштейн заявил, что доказательства, полученные за предыдущие два десятилетия, о том, что Оппенгеймер был тайным членом Коммунистической партии, частично подтвердили Штрауса. «Штраус был коварным, тонкокожим, подлым и даже злобным, когда помогал Роберту Оппенгеймеру. Но в некоторых важных вопросах — даже в некотором подозрении на политическое прошлое Оппенгеймера — Штраус не был неразумным».

Награды и почести

За свою работу по оказанию помощи Европе во время и после Первой мировой войны Штраус был награжден наградами шести стран. В число этих наград входили кавалер Бельгийского ордена Леопольда I , кавалер первой степени Белой розы Финляндии и кавалер Звезды Румынии . Аналогичную медаль он получил из Польши. Согласно биографическому отчету, представленному в протоколах Конгресса , он также был удостоен звания Великого офицера Ордена Почетного легиона Франции.

Штраус получает Медаль Свободы от президента Эйзенхауэра в 1958 году, рядом с ним находится его жена Алиса.

Штраус, имевший тогда звание капитана, был награжден Военно-морским флотом в сентябре 1944 года орденом Почетного легиона за работу над требованиями ВМФ, касающимися расторжения контрактов и распоряжения излишками имущества. В конце войны он получил кластер «Дубовый лист — армия» вместо второй такой награды за свою работу по координации процессов закупок. Золотая Звезда ВМФ вместо третьей награды была вручена в 1947 году за его работу во время и после войны в качестве специального помощника министра военно-морского флота и в совместных комиссиях по промышленной мобилизации армии и флота. Наконец, в 1959 году он получил Золотую звезду вместо четвертой награды, на этот раз за свою работу в области атомной энергии, поскольку она принесла пользу военно-морскому флоту как источник энергии и двигательной установки кораблей. Он также получил медаль «За выдающиеся заслуги» ВМФ . 14 июля 1958 года президент Эйзенхауэр вручил Штраусу Медаль Свободы — гражданскую награду. Награда была вручена за «исключительные заслуги» в интересах национальной безопасности в его усилиях по использованию ядерной энергии как в военных, так и в мирных целях.

Штраус при жизни получил ряд почетных степеней; действительно, его адвокаты во время слушаний по утверждению на пост министра торговли назвали двадцать три колледжа и университета, удостоивших его таких наград. К ним относятся, среди прочего, почетный доктор юридических наук. из Еврейской теологической семинарии Америки в 1944 году, доктор гуманитарных наук Технологического института Кейса в 1948 году. доктор права Технологического института Карнеги в 1956 году. доктор наук Университета Толедо в 1957 году. и доктор наук Юнион-колледжа в 1958 году.

Штраус входил в советы директоров нескольких корпораций, одной из которых была United States Rubber Company . Он был попечителем Хэмптонского института , исторически сложившегося университета для чернокожих в Вирджинии, а также Мемориальной больницы по лечению рака и сопутствующих заболеваний в Нью-Йорке. Благодаря пожертвованиям, сделанным Медицинскому колледжу Вирджинии , в его честь было названо исследовательское здание. Он был попечителем-основателем Колледжа Эйзенхауэра , для которого он помогал в планировании и сборе средств. В 1955 году Штраус получил серебряную медаль от Мужского клуба Храма Эману-Эль за «выдающиеся заслуги»; Президент Эйзенхауэр направил на церемонию послание, в котором заявил, что эта честь заслужена.

журнала На обложке Штраус Time дважды фигурировал. Первый раз это произошло в 1953 году, когда он был председателем АЭК и шла гонка ядерных вооружений. а второй был в 1959 году во время процесса утверждения его на должность министра торговли.

В СМИ

Штрауса играет Фил Браун в BBC мини-сериале «Оппенгеймер» 1980 года . и Роберта Дауни-младшего в Кристофера Нолана фильме «Оппенгеймер» 2023 года . За свою роль Дауни получил премию Оскар за лучшую мужскую роль второго плана .

См. также

• Неудачные номинации в Кабинет министров США

Сочинения

• Штраус, Льюис Л. Мужчины и решения (Гарден-Сити, Нью-Йорк: Doubleday & Company, 1962).

Библиография

• Бейкер, Ричард Аллан (весна 1987 г.). «Пощечина «президентству скрытой руки»: Сенат и дело Льюиса Штрауса» . Конгресс и президентство . 14 (1): 1–16. дои : 10.1080/07343468709507964 .
• Бернштейн, Бартон Дж. (весна 1986 г.). «Жертвы и решения: Льюис Л. Штраус». Публичный историк . 8 (2): 105–120. дои : 10.2307/3377436 . JSTOR   3377436 .
• Берд, Кай ; Шервин, Мартин Дж. (2005). Американский Прометей: Триумф и трагедия Дж. Роберта Оппенгеймера . Нью-Йорк: Альфред А. Кнопф. ISBN  978-0-375-41202-8 . OCLC   56753298 .
• Банди, Макджордж (1988). Опасность и выживание: выбор в отношении бомбы в первые пятьдесят лет . Нью-Йорк: Рэндом Хаус. ISBN  0-394-52278-8 .
• Фейнгольд, Генри Л. (1970). Политика спасения: администрация Рузвельта и Холокост, 1938–1945 гг . Нью-Брансуик, Нью-Джерси: Издательство Университета Рутгерса. ISBN  978-0-8135-0664-7 .
• Хьюлетт, Ричард Г .; Холл, Джек М. (1989). Атом для мира и войны, 1953–1961 гг. Эйзенхауэр и Комиссия по атомной энергии (PDF) . История Комиссии по атомной энергии США. Юниверсити-Парк, Пенсильвания: Издательство Пенсильванского государственного университета. ISBN  0-520-06018-0 . OCLC   82275622 .
• Холлоуэй, Дэвид (1994). Сталин и бомба: Советский Союз и атомная энергия, 1939–1956 гг . Нью-Хейвен, Коннектикут: Издательство Йельского университета. ISBN  0-300-06056-4 .
• Макмиллан, Присцилла Джонсон (2005). Гибель Дж. Роберта Оппенгеймера и рождение современной гонки вооружений . Нью-Йорк: Викинг. ISBN  0-670-03422-3 . OCLC   57342111 .
• Мэддок, Шейн (лето 1998 г.). «Четвертая страновая проблема: политика Эйзенхауэра по нераспространению ядерного оружия» . Ежеквартальный журнал президентских исследований . 28 (3): 553–572. JSTOR   27551901 .
• Махиджани, Арджун ; Шварц, Стивен И. (1998). «Жертвы бомбы». В Шварце, Стивен И. (ред.). Атомный аудит: цена и последствия ядерного оружия США с 1940 года . Вашингтон, округ Колумбия: Издательство Брукингского института. стр. 395–432. ISBN  0-8157-7773-6 .
• Пфау, Ричард (1984). Никаких слишком великих жертв: жизнь Льюиса Л. Штрауса . Шарлоттсвилл, Вирджиния: Университетское издательство Вирджинии. ISBN  978-0-8139-1038-3 .
• Роудс, Ричард (1986). Создание атомной бомбы . Нью-Йорк: Саймон и Шустер. ISBN  0-671-44133-7 .
• Роудс, Ричард (1995). Тёмное солнце: создание водородной бомбы . Нью-Йорк: Саймон и Шустер. ISBN  0-684-80400-Х .
• Роуленд, Буфорд; Бойд, Уильям Б. (1953). Управление артиллерийского вооружения ВМС США во Второй мировой войне . Вашингтон, округ Колумбия: Типография правительства США.
• Стерн, Филип М. (1969). Дело Оппенгеймера . Нью-Йорк: Харпер и Роу.
• Вентлинг, Соня П. (сентябрь 2000 г.). « Инженер и Штадланим»: Герберт Гувер и американские еврейские несионисты, 1917–28». Американская еврейская история . 88 (3): 377–406. дои : 10.1353/ajh.2000.0058 . JSTOR   23886392 . S2CID   161722695 .
• Янг, Кен (2013). «Водородная бомба, Льюис Л. Штраус и написание ядерной истории» . Журнал стратегических исследований . 36 (6): 815–840. дои : 10.1080/01402390.2012.726924 . S2CID   154257639 .
• Янг, Кен (2016). Американская бомба в Великобритании: стратегическое присутствие ВВС США, 1946–64 . Манчестер: Издательство Манчестерского университета. ISBN  978-0-7190-8675-5 .
• Янг, Кен; Шиллинг, Уорнер Р. (2019). Супербомба: организационный конфликт и разработка водородной бомбы . Итака, Нью-Йорк: Издательство Корнельского университета. ISBN  978-1-5017-4516-4 .

Внешние ссылки

• Документы Льюиса Л. Штрауса в Президентской библиотеке Гувера , ссылка больше не дается
  • Штраус, Льюис Л.: Документы, 1914–74. Архивировано 7 января 2010 года в Wayback Machine.
  • Документы Льюиса Л. Штрауса, примечание по объему и содержанию. Архивировано 7 сентября 2010 г. в Wayback Machine.
  • «Льюис Штраус и Роберт Оппенгеймер» , запись в блоге Библиотеки и музея Герберта Гувера.
• Аннотированная библиография Льюиса Штрауса из цифровой библиотеки по ядерным вопросам Алсос. Архивировано 28 августа 2006 г. в Wayback Machine.
• Путеводитель по бумагам адмирала Льюиса Лихтенштейна Штрауса (1896–1974) в Американском еврейском историческом обществе , Нью-Йорк.
• Полный текст речи «слишком дешево , чтобы измерять» на сайте Комиссии по ядерному регулированию.
• Дуайт Д. Эйзенхауэр, Замечания по поводу вручения Медали Свободы Льюису Л. Штраусу , на сайте проекта американского президентства