Пакт Молотова-Риббентропа

«Германско-советский пакт» перенаправляется сюда. О советско-германском пакте о ненападении Веймарской эпохи см. Берлинский договор (1926 г.) .

Пакт Молотова-Риббентропа

Договор о ненападении между Германией и Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик.
Stalin and Ribbentrop shaking hands after the signing of the pact in the Kremlin
Signed	23 August 1939 (1939-08-23)
Location	Moscow, Soviet Union
Expiration	23 August 1949 (planned) 22 June 1941 (terminated) 30 July 1941 (officially declared null and void)
Signatories	Joachim von Ribbentrop Vyacheslav Molotov
Parties	Germany Soviet Union
Languages	German Russian
Full text
Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact at Wikisource

Пакт Молотова-Риббентропа , официально Договор о ненападении между Германией и Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик . Это был пакт о ненападении между нацистской Германией и Советским Союзом с секретным протоколом, который разделял между ними или управлял государств Центральной Финляндии и Восточной Европы : Польши , Литвы , Латвии , Эстонии , Румынии и суверенитетом . Пакт был подписан в Москве 23 августа 1939 года министром иностранных дел Германии Иоахимом фон Риббентропом и министром иностранных дел СССР Вячеславом Молотовым . Неофициально его также называют Пактом Гитлера-Сталина. и нацистско-советский пакт .

The treaty was the culmination of negotiations for an economic agreement between the USSR and Nazi Germany which the Soviets used to obtain a political agreement – see Nazi–Soviet economic relations (1934–1941) § 1938–1939 deal discussions. On 22 August, Ribbentrop flew to Moscow to finalize the treaty, which the Soviets had sought before with Britain and France. The Molotov–Ribbentrop pact, signed the next day, guaranteed peace between the parties and was a commitment neither government would aid or ally itself with an enemy of the other. In addition to the publicly announced stipulations of non-aggression for the next 10 years, the treaty included the Secret Protocol, which defined the borders of Soviet and German spheres of influence across Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland. The secret protocol also recognized the interest of Lithuania in the Vilnius region, and Germany declared its complete uninterest in Bessarabia. In the west, rumoured existence of the Secret Protocol was proven only when it was made public during the Nuremberg trials.

Soon after the pact, Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin ordered the Soviet invasion of Poland on 17 September, one day after a Soviet–Japanese ceasefire came into effect after the Battles of Khalkhin Gol, and one day after the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union approved the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. After the invasions, the new border between the two countries was confirmed by the supplementary protocol of the German–Soviet Frontier Treaty. In March 1940, parts of the Karelia and Salla regions in Finland were annexed by the Soviet Union following the Winter War. The Soviet annexation of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and parts of Romania (Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and the Hertsa region) followed. The Soviets used concern for ethnic Ukrainians and Belarusians as a pretext for their invasion of Poland. Stalin's invasion of Bukovina in 1940 violated the pact, since it went beyond the Soviet sphere of influence that had been agreed with the Axis.

The territories of Poland annexed by the Soviet Union following the 1939 Soviet invasion east of the Curzon line remained in the Soviet Union after the war and are now in Ukraine and Belarus. Vilnius was given to Lithuania. Only Podlaskie and a small part of Galicia east of the San River, around Przemyśl, were returned to Poland. Of all the other territories annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939–1940, those detached from Finland (Western Karelia, Petsamo), Estonia (Estonian Ingria and Petseri County) and Latvia (Abrene) remain part of Russia, the successor state to the Russian SFSR and the Soviet Union after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The territories annexed from Romania were also integrated into the Soviet Union (such as the Moldavian SSR, or oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR). The core of Bessarabia now forms Moldova. Northern Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and the Hertsa region now form the Chernivtsi Oblast of Ukraine. Southern Bessarabia is part of the Odessa Oblast, which is also now in Ukraine.

The pact was terminated on 22 June 1941, when Germany launched Operation Barbarossa and invaded the Soviet Union, in pursuit of the ideological goal of Lebensraum. The Anglo-Soviet Agreement succeeded it. After the war, Ribbentrop was convicted of war crimes at the Nuremberg trials and executed. Molotov died in 1986.

Background

Main articles: Soviet–German relations before 1941 and Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact negotiations

Territorial changes in Europe after World War I (as of 1923). Note that the creation of the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland is not shown.

The Second Polish Republic, 1937

The outcome of World War I was disastrous for both the German and the Russian empires. The Russian Civil War broke out in late 1917 after the Bolshevik Revolution and Vladimir Lenin, the first leader of the new Soviet Russia, recognised the independence of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Moreover, facing a German military advance, Lenin and Trotsky were forced to agree to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which ceded many western Russian territories to Germany. After the German collapse, a multinational Allied-led army intervened in the civil war (1917–1922).

On 16 April 1922, the German Weimar Republic and the Soviet Union agreed to the Treaty of Rapallo in which they renounced territorial and financial claims against each other. Each party also pledged neutrality in the event of an attack against the other with the Treaty of Berlin (1926). Trade between the two countries had fallen sharply after World War I, but trade agreements signed in the mid-1920s helped to increase trade to 433 million ℛ︁ℳ︁ per year by 1927.

At the beginning of the 1930s, the Nazi Party's rise to power increased tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union, along with other countries with ethnic Slavs, who were considered "Untermenschen" (subhuman) according to Nazi racial ideology. Moreover, the antisemitic Nazis associated ethnic Jews with both communism and financial capitalism, both of which they opposed. Nazi theory held that Slavs in the Soviet Union were being ruled by "Jewish Bolshevik" masters. Hitler had spoken of an inevitable battle for the acquisition of land for Germany in the east. The resulting manifestation of German anti-Bolshevism and an increase in Soviet foreign debts caused a dramatic decline in German–Soviet trade. Imports of Soviet goods to Germany fell to 223 million ℛ︁ℳ︁ in 1934 by the more isolationist Stalinist regime asserting power and by the abandonment of postwar Treaty of Versailles military controls, both of which decreased Germany's reliance on Soviet imports.

In 1935 Germany, after a previous German–Polish declaration of non-aggression, through Hermann Goring proposed a military alliance with Poland against the Soviet Union, but this was rejected.

In 1936, Germany and Fascist Italy supported the Spanish Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War, but the Soviets supported the Spanish Republic. Thus, the Spanish Civil War became a proxy war between Germany and the Soviet Union. In 1936, Germany and Japan entered the Anti-Comintern Pact. and they were joined a year later by Italy.

On 31 March 1939, Britain extended a guarantee to Poland that "if any action clearly threatened Polish independence, and if the Poles felt it vital to resist such action by force, Britain would come to their aid". Hitler was furious since that meant that the British were committed to political interests in Europe and that his land grabs such as the takeover of Czechoslovakia would no longer be taken lightly. His response to the political checkmate would later be heard at a rally in Wilhelmshaven: "No power on earth would be able to break German might, and if the Western Allies thought Germany would stand by while they marshalled their 'satellite states' to act in their interests, then they were sorely mistaken". Ultimately, Hitler's discontent with a British-Polish alliance led to a restructuring of strategy towards Moscow. Alfred Rosenberg wrote that he had spoken to Hermann Göring of the potential alliance with the Soviet Union: "When Germany's life is at stake, even a temporary alliance with Moscow must be contemplated". Sometime in early May 1939 at Berghof, Ribbentrop showed Hitler a film of Stalin viewing his military in a recent parade. Hitler became intrigued with the idea of allying with the Soviets and Ribbentrop recalled Hitler saying that Stalin "looked like a man he could do business with". Ribbentrop was then given the nod to pursue negotiations with Moscow.

Munich Conference

Hitler's fierce anti-Soviet rhetoric was one of the reasons that Britain and France decided that Soviet participation in the 1938 Munich Conference on Czechoslovakia would be both dangerous and useless. In the Munich Agreement that followed the conference agreed to a German annexation of part of Czechoslovakia in late 1938, but in early 1939 it had been completely dissolved. The policy of appeasement toward Germany was conducted by the governments of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier. The policy immediately raised the question of whether the Soviet Union could avoid being next on Hitler's list. The Soviet leadership believed that the West wanted to encourage German aggression in the East and to stay neutral in a war initiated by Germany in the hope that Germany and the Soviet Union would wear each other out and put an end to both regimes.

All territories taken from Czechoslovakia by its neighbours in October 1938 (Munich Agreement) and March 1939

For Germany, an autarkic economic approach and an alliance with Britain were impossible and so closer relations with the Soviet Union to obtain raw materials became necessary. Besides economic reasons, an expected British blockade during a war would also create massive shortages for Germany in a number of key raw materials. After the Munich Agreement, the resulting increase in German military supply needs and Soviet demands for military machinery made talks between the two countries occur from late 1938 to March 1939. Also, the third Soviet five-year plan required new infusions of technology and industrial equipment. German war planners had estimated serious shortfalls of raw materials if Germany entered a war without the Soviet supply.

On 31 March 1939, in response to Germany's defiance of the Munich Agreement and the creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Britain pledged its support and that of France to guarantee the independence of Poland, Belgium, Romania, Greece and Turkey. On 6 April, Poland and Britain agreed to formalise the guarantee as a military alliance, pending negotiations. On 28 April, Hitler denounced the 1934 German–Polish declaration of non-aggression and the 1935 Anglo–German Naval Agreement.

In mid-March 1939, attempting to contain Hitler's expansionism, the Soviet Union, Britain and France started to trade a flurry of suggestions and counterplans on a potential political and military agreement. Informal consultations started in April, but the main negotiations began only in May. Meanwhile, throughout early 1939, Germany had secretly hinted to Soviet diplomats that it could offer better terms for a political agreement than could Britain and France.

The Soviet Union, which feared Western powers and the possibility of "capitalist encirclements", had little hope either of preventing war and wanted nothing less than an ironclad military alliance with France and Britain to provide guaranteed support for a two-pronged attack on Germany. Stalin's adherence to the collective security line was thus purely conditional. Britain and France believed that war could still be avoided and that since the Soviet Union was so weakened by the Great Purge that it could not be a main military participant. Many military sources were at variance with the last point, especially after the Soviet victories over the Japanese Kwantung Army in the Manchuria. France was more anxious to find an agreement with the Soviet Union than Britain was. As a continental power, France was more willing to make concessions and more fearful of the dangers of an agreement between the Soviet Union and Germany. The contrasting attitudes partly explain why the Soviets have often been charged with playing a double game in 1939 of carrying on open negotiations for an alliance with Britain and France but secretly considering propositions from Germany.

By the end of May, drafts had been formally presented. In mid-June, the main tripartite negotiations started. Discussions were focused on potential guarantees to Central and Eastern Europe in the case of German aggression. The Soviets proposed to consider that a political turn towards Germany by the Baltic states would constitute an "indirect aggression" towards the Soviet Union. Britain opposed such proposals because they feared the Soviets' proposed language would justify a Soviet intervention in Finland and the Baltic states or push those countries to seek closer relations with Germany. The discussion of a definition of "indirect aggression" became one of the sticking points between the parties, and by mid-July, the tripartite political negotiations effectively stalled while the parties agreed to start negotiations on a military agreement, which the Soviets insisted had to be reached at the same time as any political agreement. One day before the military negotiations began, the Soviet Politburo pessimistically expected the coming negotiations to go nowhere and formally decided to consider German proposals seriously. The military negotiations began on 12 August in Moscow, with a British delegation headed by the retired admiral Sir Reginald Drax, French delegation headed by General Aimé Doumenc and the Soviet delegation headed by Kliment Voroshilov, the commissar of defence, and Boris Shaposhnikov, chief of the general staff. Without written credentials, Drax was not authorised to guarantee anything to the Soviet Union and had been instructed by the British government to prolong the discussions as long as possible and to avoid answering the question of whether Poland would agree to permit Soviet troops to enter the country if the Germans invaded.

Negotiations

Main article: Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact negotiations

Molotov (left) and Ribbentrop at the signing of the pact

"The Prussian Tribute in Moscow" in the Polish satirical newspaper Mucha of 8 September 1939

Beginning of secret talks

See also: Nazi–Soviet economic relations (1934–41)

From April to July, Soviet and German officials made statements on the potential for the beginning of political negotiations, but no actual negotiations took place. "The Soviet Union had wanted good relations with Germany for years and was happy to see that feeling finally reciprocated", wrote the historian Gerhard L. Weinberg. The ensuing discussion of a potential political deal between Germany and the Soviet Union had to be channeled into the framework of economic negotiations between the two countries, since close military and diplomatic connections that existed before the mid-1930s had been largely severed. In May, Stalin replaced his foreign minister from 1930 to 1939, Maxim Litvinov, who had advocated rapprochement with the West and was also Jewish, with Vyacheslav Molotov to allow the Soviet Union more latitude in discussions with more parties, instead of only Britain and France.

On 23 August 1939, two Focke-Wulf Condors, containing German diplomats, officials, and photographers (about 20 in each plane), headed by Ribbentrop, descended into Moscow. As the Nazi emissaries stepped off the plane, a Soviet military band played "Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles". The Nazi arrival was well planned, with all aesthetics in order. The classic hammer and sickle was propped up next to the swastika of the Nazi flag that had been used in a local film studio for Soviet propaganda films. After stepping off the plane and shaking hands, Ribbentrop and Gustav Hilger along with German ambassador Friedrich-Werner von der Schulenburg and Stalin's chief bodyguard, Nikolai Vlasik, entered a limousine operated by the NKVD to travel to Red Square. The limousine arrived close to Stalin's office and was greeted by Alexander Poskrebyshev, the chief of Stalin's personal chancellery. The Germans were led up a flight of stairs to a room with lavish furnishings. Stalin and Molotov greeted the visitors, much to the Nazis' surprise. It was well known that Stalin avoided meeting foreign visitors, and so his presence at the meeting showed how seriously that the Soviets were taking the negotiations.

In late July and early August 1939, Soviet and German officials agreed on most of the details of a planned economic agreement and specifically addressed a potential political agreement, which the Soviets stated could come only after an economic agreement.

The German presence in the Soviet capital during negotiations can be regarded as rather tense. German pilot Hans Baur recalled that Soviet secret police followed every move. Their job was to inform authorities when he left his residence and where he was headed. Baur's guide informed him: "Another car would tack itself onto us and follow us fifty or so yards in the rear, and wherever we went and whatever we did, the secret police would be on our heels." Baur also recalled trying to tip his Russian driver, which led to a harsh exchange of words: "He was furious. He wanted to know whether this was the thanks he got for having done his best for us to get him into prison. We knew perfectly well it was forbidden to take tips."

August negotiations

See also: German–Soviet Credit Agreement (1939)

In early August, Germany and the Soviet Union worked out the last details of their economic deal and started to discuss a political agreement. Both countries' diplomats explained to each other the reasons for the hostility in their foreign policy in the 1930s and found common ground in both countries' anticapitalism with Karl Schnurre stating: "there is one common element in the ideology of Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union: opposition to the capitalist democracies" or that "it seems to us rather unnatural that a socialist state would stand on the side of the western democracies".

At the same time, British, French, and Soviet negotiators scheduled three-party talks on military matters to occur in Moscow in August 1939 that aimed to define what the agreement would specify on the reaction of the three powers to a German attack. The tripartite military talks, started in mid-August, hit a sticking point on the passage of Soviet troops through Poland if Germans attacked, and the parties waited as British and French officials overseas pressured Polish officials to agree to such terms. Polish officials refused to allow Soviet troops into Polish territory if Germany attacked; Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck pointed out that the Polish government feared that if the Red Army entered Polish territory, it would never leave.

On 19 August, the 1939 German–Soviet Commercial Agreement was finally signed. On 21 August, the Soviets suspended the tripartite military talks and cited other reasons. The same day, Stalin received assurances that Germany would approve secret protocols to the proposed non-aggression pact that would place the half of Poland east of the Vistula River as well as Latvia, Estonia, Finland and Bessarabia in the Soviet sphere of influence. That night, Stalin replied that the Soviets were willing to sign the pact and that he would receive Ribbentrop on 23 August.

News leaks

The New York Times reported Nazi troop movement on 25 August 1939, soon before the Gleiwitz incident on 31 August 1939, led by Alfred Naujocks (pictured).

On 25 August 1939, the New York Times ran a front-page story by Otto D. Tolischus, "Nazi Talks Secret", whose subtitle included "Soviet and Reich Agree on East". On 26 August 1939, the New York Times reported Japanese anger and French communist surprise over the pact. The same day, however, Tolischus filed a story that noted Nazi troops on the move near Gleiwitz (now Gliwice), which led to the false flag Gleiwitz incident on 31 August 1939. On 28 August 1939, the New York Times was still reporting on fears of a Gleiwitz raid. On 29 August 1939, the New York Times reported that the Supreme Soviet had failed on its first day of convening to act on the pact. The same day, the New York Times also reported from Montreal, Canada, that American Professor Samuel N. Harper of the University of Chicago had stated publicly his belief that "the Russo-German non-aggression pact conceals an agreement whereby Russia and Germany may have planned spheres of influence for Eastern Europe". On 30 August 1939, the New York Times reported a Soviet buildup on its Western frontiers by moving 200,000 troops from the Far East.

Secret protocol

On 22 August, one day after talks broke down with France and Britain, Moscow revealed that Ribbentrop would visit Stalin the next day. The Soviets were still negotiating with the British and the French missions in Moscow. With the Western nations unwilling to accede to Soviet demands, Stalin instead entered a secret German–Soviet pact. On 23 August, a ten-year non-aggression pact was signed with provisions that included consultation, arbitration if either party disagreed, neutrality if either went to war against a third power and no membership of a group "which is directly or indirectly aimed at the other". The article "On Soviet–German Relations" in the Soviet newspaper Izvestia of 21 August 1939, stated:

Following completion of the Soviet–German trade and credit agreement, there has arisen the question of improving political links between Germany and the USSR.

The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (German copy)

Last page of the Additional Secret Protocol of the Pact (Russian copy)

There was also a secret protocol to the pact, which was revealed only after Germany's defeat in 1945 although hints about its provisions had been leaked much earlier, so as to influence Lithuania. According to the protocol, Poland, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland were divided into German and Soviet "spheres of influence". In the north, Finland, Estonia, and Latvia were assigned to the Soviet sphere. Poland was to be partitioned in the event of its "political rearrangement": the areas east of the Pisa, Narew, Vistula, and San rivers would go to the Soviet Union, and Germany would occupy the west. Lithuania, which was adjacent to East Prussia, was assigned to the German sphere of influence, but a second secret protocol, agreed to in September 1939, reassigned Lithuania to the Soviet Union. According to the protocol, Lithuania would be granted its historical capital, Vilnius, which was part of Poland during the interwar period. Another clause stipulated that Germany would not interfere with the Soviet Union's actions towards Bessarabia, which was then part of Romania. As a result, Bessarabia as well as the Northern Bukovina and Hertsa regions were occupied by the Soviets and integrated into the Soviet Union.

At the signing, Ribbentrop and Stalin enjoyed warm conversations, exchanged toasts and further addressed the prior hostilities between the countries in the 1930s. They characterised Britain as always attempting to disrupt Soviet–German relations and stated that the Anti-Comintern Pact was aimed not at the Soviet Union but actually at Western democracies and "frightened principally the City of London [British financiers] and the English shopkeepers."

Revelation

The agreement stunned the world. John Gunther, in Moscow in August 1939, recalled how the news of the 19 August commercial agreement surprised journalists and diplomats, who hoped for world peace. They did not expect the 21 August announcement of the non-aggression pact: "Nothing more unbelievable could be imagined. Astonishment and skepticism turned quickly to consternation and alarm". The news was met with utter shock and surprise by government leaders and media worldwide, most of whom were aware of only the British–French–Soviet negotiations, which had taken place for months; by Germany's allies, notably Japan; by the Comintern and foreign Communist parties; and Jewish communities all around the world.

On 24 August, Pravda and Izvestia carried news of the pact's public portions, complete with the now-famous front-page picture of Molotov signing the treaty with a smiling Stalin looking on. The same day, German diplomat Hans von Herwarth, whose grandmother was Jewish, informed Italian diplomat Guido Relli and American chargé d'affaires Charles Bohlen of the secret protocol on the vital interests in the countries' allotted "spheres of influence" but failed to reveal the annexation rights for "territorial and political rearrangement". The agreement's public terms so exceeded the terms of an ordinary non-aggression treaty—requiring that both parties consult with each other, and not aid a third party attacking either—that Gunther heard a joke that Stalin had joined the anti-Comintern pact. Time Magazine repeatedly referred to the Pact as the "Communazi Pact" and its participants as "communazis" until April 1941.

Soviet propaganda and representatives went to great lengths to minimize the importance of the fact that they had opposed and fought the Germans in various ways for a decade prior to signing the pact. Molotov tried to reassure the Germans of his good intentions by commenting to journalists that "fascism is a matter of taste". For its part, Germany also did a public volte-face regarding its virulent opposition to the Soviet Union, but Hitler still viewed an attack on the Soviet Union as "inevitable".

Concerns over the possible existence of a secret protocol were expressed first by the intelligence organizations of the Baltic states only days after the pact was signed. Speculation grew stronger when Soviet negotiators referred to its content during the negotiations for military bases in those countries (see occupation of the Baltic States).

The day after the pact was signed, the Franco-British military delegation urgently requested a meeting with Soviet military negotiator Kliment Voroshilov. On 25 August, Voroshilov told them that "in view of the changed political situation, no useful purpose can be served in continuing the conversation". The same day, Hitler told the British ambassador to Berlin that the pact with the Soviets prevented Germany from facing a two-front war, which changed the strategic situation from that in World War I, and that Britain should accept his demands on Poland.

On 25 August, Hitler was surprised when Britain joined a defense pact with Poland. Hitler postponed his plans for an invasion of Poland on 26 August to 1 September. In accordance with the defence pact, Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September.

Planned and actual territorial changes in Central Europe: 1939–1940

Consequences in Finland, Poland, the Baltic States and Romania

Nazis destroying border markers on the Polish-German border, 1939

Initial invasions

Main articles: Invasion of Poland and Soviet invasion of Poland

See also: German–Soviet military parade in Brest-Litovsk

On 1 September 1939, Germany invaded Poland from the west. Within a few days, Germany began conducting massacres of Polish and Jewish civilians and POWs, which took place in over 30 towns and villages in the first month of the German occupation. The Luftwaffe also took part by strafing fleeing civilian refugees on roads and by carrying out a bombing campaign. The Soviet Union assisted German air forces by allowing them to use signals broadcast by the Soviet radio station at Minsk, allegedly "for urgent aeronautical experiments". Hitler declared at Danzig:

Poland never will rise again in the form of the Versailles treaty. That is guaranteed not only by Germany, but also ... Russia.

Cartoon in the Evening Standard depicting Hitler greeting Stalin after the invasion of Poland, with the words: "The scum of the earth, I believe?" To which Stalin replies: "The bloody assassin of the workers, I presume?"; 20 September 1939.

Common parade of Wehrmacht and Red Army in Brest at the end of the invasion of Poland. At the centre are Major General Heinz Guderian and Brigadier Semyon Krivoshein.

In the opinion of Robert Service, Stalin did not move instantly but was waiting to see whether the Germans would halt within the agreed area, and the Soviet Union also needed to secure the frontier in the Soviet–Japanese Border Wars. On 17 September, the Red Army invaded Poland, violating the 1932 Soviet–Polish Non-Aggression Pact, and occupied the Polish territory assigned to it by the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. That was followed by co-ordination with German forces in Poland. Polish troops already fighting much stronger German forces on its west desperately tried to delay the capture of Warsaw. Consequently, Polish forces could not mount significant resistance against the Soviets. On 18 September, The New York Times published an editorial arguing that "Hitlerism is brown communism, Stalinism is red fascism...The world will now understand that the only real 'ideological' issue is one between democracy, liberty and peace on the one hand and despotism, terror and war on the other."

On 21 September, Marshal of the Soviet Union Voroshilov, German military attaché General Köstring, and other officers signed a formal agreement in Moscow co-ordinating military movements in Poland, including the "purging" of saboteurs and the Red Army assisting with destruction of the "enemy". Joint German–Soviet parades were held in Lviv and Brest-Litovsk, and the countries' military commanders met in the latter city. Stalin had decided in August that he was going to liquidate the Polish state, and a German–Soviet meeting in September addressed the future structure of the "Polish region". Soviet authorities immediately started a campaign of Sovietisation of the newly acquired areas. The Soviets organised staged elections, the result of which was to become a legitimisation of the Soviet annexation of eastern Poland.

Modification of secret protocols

Soviet and German soldiers in Lublin

"Second Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact" of 28 September 1939. Map of Poland signed by Stalin and Ribbentrop (focused on the Kresy) adjusting the German-Soviet border in the aftermath of German and Soviet invasion of Poland.

Eleven days after the Soviet invasion of the Polish Kresy, the secret protocol of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was modified by the German–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Demarcation, allotting Germany a larger part of Poland and transferring Lithuania, with the exception of the left bank of the River Scheschupe, the "Lithuanian Strip", from the envisioned German sphere to the Soviet sphere. On 28 September 1939, the Soviet Union and German Reich issued a joint declaration in which they declared:

After the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR have, by means of the treaty signed today, definitively settled the problems arising from the collapse of the Polish state and have thereby created a sure foundation for lasting peace in the region, they mutually express their conviction that it would serve the true interest of all peoples to put an end to the state of war existing at present between Germany on the one side and England and France on the other. Both Governments will, therefore, direct their common efforts, jointly with other friendly powers if the occasion arises, toward attaining this goal as soon as possible. Should, however, the efforts of the two Governments remain fruitless, this would demonstrate the fact that England and France are responsible for the continuation of the war, whereupon, in case of the continuation of the war, the Governments of Germany and of the USSR shall engage in mutual consultations with regard to necessary measures.

On 3 October, Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, the German ambassador in Moscow, informed Joachim Ribbentrop that the Soviet government was willing to cede the city of Vilnius and its environs. On 8 October 1939, a new Nazi-Soviet agreement was reached by an exchange of letters between Vyacheslav Molotov and the German ambassador.

The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were given no choice but to sign a so-called "Pact of Defence and Mutual Assistance", which permitted the Soviet Union to station troops in them.

Soviet war with Finland and Katyn massacre

Main articles: Winter War and Katyn massacre

Lithuania between 1939 and 1941. Germany had requested the territory west of the River Šešupė, the area in pink, in the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty but relinquished its claims for a compensation of $7.5 million.

After the Baltic states had been forced to accept treaties, Stalin turned his sights on Finland and was confident that its capitulation could be attained without great effort. The Soviets demanded territories on the Karelian Isthmus, the islands of the Gulf of Finland and a military base near the Finnish capital, Helsinki, which Finland rejected. The Soviets staged the shelling of Mainila on 26 November and used it as a pretext to withdraw from the Soviet–Finnish Non-Aggression Pact. On 30 November, the Red Army invaded Finland, launching the Winter War with the aim of annexing Finland into the Soviet Union. The Soviets formed the Finnish Democratic Republic to govern Finland after Soviet conquest. The leader of the Leningrad Military District, Andrei Zhdanov, commissioned a celebratory piece from Dmitri Shostakovich, Suite on Finnish Themes, to be performed as the marching bands of the Red Army would be parading through Helsinki. After Finnish defenses surprisingly held out for over three months and inflicted stiff losses on Soviet forces, under the command of Semyon Timoshenko, the Soviets settled for an interim peace. Finland ceded parts of Karelia and Salla (9% of Finnish territory), which resulted in approximately 422,000 Karelians (12% of Finland's population) losing their homes. Soviet official casualty counts in the war exceeded 200,000 although Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev later claimed that the casualties may have been one million.

Around that time, after several Gestapo–NKVD conferences, Soviet NKVD officers also conducted lengthy interrogations of 300,000 Polish POWs in camps that were a selection process to determine who would be killed. On 5 March 1940, in what would later be known as the Katyn massacre, 22,000 members of the military as well as intellectuals were executed, labelled "nationalists and counterrevolutionaries" or kept at camps and prisons in western Ukraine and Belarus.

Soviet Union occupies the Baltic states and part of Romania

Main articles: Soviet occupation of the Baltic states (1940) and Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina

Soviet expansion in 1939-1940

In mid-June 1940, while international attention focused on the German invasion of France, Soviet NKVD troops raided border posts in Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. State administrations were liquidated and replaced by Soviet cadres, who deported or killed 34,250 Latvians, 75,000 Lithuanians and almost 60,000 Estonians. Elections took place, with a single pro-Soviet candidate listed for many positions, and the resulting people's assemblies immediately requesting admission into the Soviet Union, which was granted. (The Soviets annexed the whole of Lithuania, including the Šešupė area, which had been earmarked for Germany.)

Finally, on 26 June, four days after the armistice between France and Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union issued an ultimatum that demanded Bessarabia and unexpectedly Northern Bukovina from Romania. Two days later, the Romanians acceded to the Soviet demands, and the Soviets occupied the territories. The Hertsa region was initially not requested by the Soviets but was later occupied by force after the Romanians had agreed to the initial Soviet demands. The subsequent waves of deportations began in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.

Beginnings of Operation Tannenberg and other Nazi atrocities

Main articles: Holocaust in Nazi-occupied Poland, Operation Tannenberg, and Nazi crimes against ethnic Poles

At the end of October 1939, Germany enacted the death penalty for disobedience to the German occupation. Germany began a campaign of "Germanization", which meant assimilating the occupied territories politically, culturally, socially and economically into the German Reich. 50,000–200,000 Polish children were kidnapped to be Germanised.

Polish hostages being blindfolded during preparations for their mass execution in Palmiry, 1940

The elimination of Polish elites and intelligentsia was part of Generalplan Ost. The Intelligenzaktion, a plan to eliminate the Polish intelligentsia, Poland's 'leadership class', took place soon after the German invasion of Poland and lasted from fall of 1939 to the spring of 1940. As the result of the operation, in ten regional actions, about 60,000 Polish nobles, teachers, social workers, priests, judges and political activists were killed. It was continued in May 1940, when Germany launched AB-Aktion, More than 16,000 members of the intelligentsia were murdered in Operation Tannenberg alone.

Germany also planned to incorporate all of the land into Nazi Germany. That effort resulted in the forced resettlement of two million Poles. Families were forced to travel in the severe winter of 1939–1940, leaving behind almost all of their possessions without compensation. As part of Operation Tannenberg alone, 750,000 Polish peasants were forced to leave, and their property was given to Germans. A further 330,000 were murdered. Germany planned the eventual move of ethnic Poles to Siberia.

Although Germany used forced labourers in most other occupied countries, Poles and other Slavs were viewed as inferior by Nazi propaganda and thus better suited for such duties. Between 1 and 2.5 million Polish citizens were transported to the Reich for forced labour. All Polish males were made to perform forced labour. While ethnic Poles were subject to selective persecution, all ethnic Jews were targeted by the Reich. In the winter of 1939–40, about 100,000 Jews were thus deported to Poland. They were initially gathered into massive urban ghettos, such as the 380,000 held in the Warsaw Ghetto, where large numbers died of starvation and diseases under their harsh conditions, including 43,000 in the Warsaw Ghetto alone. Poles and ethnic Jews were imprisoned in nearly every camp of the extensive concentration camp system in German-occupied Poland and the Reich. In Auschwitz, which began operating on 14 June 1940, 1.1 million people perished.

Romania and Soviet republics

Romania's territorial losses in the summer of 1940

Further information: Second Vienna Award, Population transfer in the Soviet Union, and Involuntary settlements in the Soviet Union

In the summer of 1940, fear of the Soviet Union, in conjunction with German support for the territorial demands of Romania's neighbours and the Romanian government's own miscalculations, resulted in more territorial losses for Romania. Between 28 June and 4 July, the Soviet Union occupied and annexed Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and the Hertsa region of Romania.

On 30 August, Ribbentrop and Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano issued the Second Vienna Award, giving Northern Transylvania to Hungary. On 7 September, Romania ceded Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria (Axis-sponsored Treaty of Craiova). After various events over the following months, Romania increasingly took on the aspect of a German-occupied country.

The Soviet-occupied territories were converted into republics of the Soviet Union. During the two years after the annexation, the Soviets arrested approximately 100,000 Polish citizens and deported between 350,000 and 1,500,000, of whom between 250,000 and 1,000,000 died, mostly civilians. Forced re-settlements into gulag labour camps and exile settlements in remote areas of the Soviet Union occurred. According to Norman Davies, almost half of them were dead by July 1940.

Further secret protocol modifications settling borders and immigration issues

Main article: German–Soviet Border and Commercial Agreement

On 10 January 1941, Germany and the Soviet Union signed an agreement settling several ongoing issues. Secret protocols in the new agreement modified the "Secret Additional Protocols" of the German–Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty, ceding the Lithuanian Strip to the Soviet Union in exchange for US$7.5 million (31.5 million ℛ︁ℳ︁). The agreement formally set the border between Germany and the Soviet Union between the Igorka River and the Baltic Sea. It also extended trade regulation of the 1940 German-Soviet Commercial Agreement until 1 August 1942, increased deliveries above the levels of the first year of that agreement, settled trading rights in the Baltics and Bessarabia, calculated the compensation for German property interests in the Baltic states that were now occupied by the Soviets and covered other issues. It also covered the migration to Germany within 2+1⁄2 months of ethnic Germans and German citizens in Soviet-held Baltic territories and the migration to the Soviet Union of Baltic and "White Russian" "nationals" in the German-held territories.

Soviet–German relations

German and Soviet soldiers meet in jointly-occupied Brest.

Early political issues

Before the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was announced, Western communists denied that such a treaty would be signed. Herbert Biberman, a future member of the Hollywood Ten, denounced rumours as "Fascist propaganda". Earl Browder, the head of the Communist Party USA, stated that "there is as much chance of agreement as of Earl Browder being elected president of the Chamber of Commerce." Gunther wrote, however, that some knew "communism and Fascism were more closely allied than was normally understood", and Ernst von Weizsäcker had told Nevile Henderson on 16 August that the Soviet Union would "join in sharing in the Polish spoils". In September 1939, the Comintern suspended all anti-Nazi and anti-fascist propaganda and explained that the war in Europe was a matter of capitalist states attacking one another for imperialist purposes. Western communists acted accordingly; although they had previously supported collective security, they now denounced Britain and France for going to war.

When anti-German demonstrations erupted in Prague, Czechoslovakia, the Comintern ordered the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to employ all of its strength to paralyse "chauvinist elements". Moscow soon forced the French Communist Party and the Communist Party of Great Britain to adopt anti-war positions. On 7 September, Stalin called Georgi Dimitrov, who sketched a new Comintern line on the war that stated that the war was unjust and imperialist, which was approved by the secretariat of the Comintern on 9 September. Thus, western communist parties now had to oppose the war and to vote against war credits. Although the French communists had unanimously voted in Parliament for war credits on 2 September and declared their "unshakeable will" to defend the country on 19 September, the Comintern formally instructed the party to condemn the war as imperialist on 27 September. By 1 October, the French communists advocated listening to German peace proposals, and leader Maurice Thorez deserted from the French Army on 4 October and fled to Russia. Other communists also deserted from the army.

The Communist Party of Germany featured similar attitudes. In Die Welt, a communist newspaper published in Stockholm the exiled communist leader Walter Ulbricht opposed the Allies, stated that Britain represented "the most reactionary force in the world", and argued, "The German government declared itself ready for friendly relations with the Soviet Union, whereas the English–French war bloc desires a war against the socialist Soviet Union. The Soviet people and the working people of Germany have an interest in preventing the English war plan".

Despite a warning by the Comintern, German tensions were raised when the Soviets stated in September that they must enter Poland to "protect" their ethnic Ukrainian and Belarusian brethren from Germany. Molotov later admitted to German officials that the excuse was necessary because the Kremlin could find no other pretext for the Soviet invasion.

During the early months of the Pact, the Soviet foreign policy became critical of the Allies and more pro-German in turn. During the Fifth Session of the Supreme Soviet on 31 October 1939, Molotov analyzed the international situation, thus giving the direction for communist propaganda. According to Molotov, Germany had a legitimate interest in regaining its position as a great power, and the Allies had started an aggressive war in order to maintain the Versailles system.

Expansion of raw materials and military trading

Main articles: German–Soviet Credit Agreement (1939) and German–Soviet Commercial Agreement (1940)

Germany and the Soviet Union entered an intricate trade pact on 11 February 1940 that was over four times larger than the one that the two countries had signed in August 1939. The new trade pact helped Germany surmount a British blockade. In the first year, Germany received one million tons of cereals, half-a-million tons of wheat, 900,000 tons of oil, 100,000 tons of cotton, 500,000 tons of phosphates and considerable amounts of other vital raw materials, along with the transit of one million tons of soybeans from Manchuria. Those and other supplies were being transported through Soviet and occupied Polish territories. The Soviets were to receive a naval cruiser, the plans to the battleship Bismarck, heavy naval guns, other naval gear and 30 of Germany's latest warplanes, including the Bf 109 and Bf 110 fighters and Ju 88 bomber. The Soviets would also receive oil and electric equipment, locomotives, turbines, generators, diesel engines, ships, machine tools, and samples of German artillery, tanks, explosives, chemical-warfare equipment, and other items.

The Soviets also helped Germany to avoid British naval blockades by providing a submarine base, Basis Nord, in the northern Soviet Union near Murmansk. That also provided a refueling and maintenance location and a takeoff point for raids and attacks on shipping. In addition, the Soviets provided Germany with access to the Northern Sea Route for both cargo ships and raiders though only the commerce raider Komet used the route before the German invasion, which forced Britain to protect sea lanes in both the Atlantic and the Pacific.

Summer deterioration of relations

The Finnish and Baltic invasions began a deterioration of relations between the Soviets and Germany. Stalin's invasions were a severe irritant to Berlin since the intent to accomplish them had not been communicated to the Germans beforehand, and they prompted concern that Stalin was seeking to form an anti-German bloc. Molotov's reassurances to the Germans only intensified the Germans' mistrust. On 16 June, as the Soviets invaded Lithuania but before they had invaded Latvia and Estonia, Ribbentrop instructed his staff "to submit a report as soon as possible as to whether in the Baltic States a tendency to seek support from the Reich can be observed or whether an attempt was made to form a bloc."

In August 1940, the Soviet Union briefly suspended its deliveries under its commercial agreement after relations were strained after disagreements over policy in Romania, the Soviet war with Finland, Germany's falling behind on its deliveries of goods under the pact and Stalin's worry that Hitler's war with the West might end quickly after France signed an armistice. The suspension created significant resource problems for Germany. By the end of August, relations had improved again, as the countries had redrawn the Hungarian and Romanian borders and settled some Bulgarian claims, and Stalin was again convinced that Germany would face a long war in the west with Britain's improvement in its air battle with Germany and the execution of an agreement between the United States and Britain regarding destroyers and bases.

In early September however, Germany arranged its own occupation of Romania, targeting its oil fields. That move raised tensions with the Soviets, who responded that Germany was supposed to have consulted with the Soviet Union under Article III of the pact.

Немецко-советские переговоры оси

Основная статья: Германо-советские переговоры Оси

Риббентроп прощается с Молотовым в Берлине, ноябрь 1940 года.

После того, как Германия в сентябре 1940 года заключила Тройственный пакт с Японией и Италией, Риббентроп написал Сталину, пригласив Молотова в Берлин для переговоров, направленных на создание «континентального блока» Германии, Италии, Японии и Советского Союза, который будет противостоять Великобритании и Советскому Союзу. Соединенные Штаты. Сталин отправил Молотова в Берлин, чтобы обсудить условия присоединения Советского Союза к Оси и, возможно, воспользоваться плодами пакта. После переговоров в ноябре 1940 года о том, где расширить советскую сферу влияния, Гитлер прервал переговоры и продолжил планирование возможных попыток вторжения в Советский Союз.

Поздние отношения

Ситуация в Европе к маю-июню 1941 года, непосредственно перед операцией «Барбаросса».

Стремясь продемонстрировать мирные намерения в отношении Германии, 13 апреля 1941 года Советы подписали пакт о нейтралитете с Японией, державой Оси. Хотя Сталин мало верил в приверженность Японии нейтралитету, он чувствовал, что пакт важен, поскольку его политическая символика укрепляет общественную привязанность к Германии. Сталин чувствовал, что в немецких кругах растет раскол по поводу того, следует ли Германии начинать войну с Советским Союзом. Сталин не знал, что Гитлер тайно обсуждал вторжение в Советский Союз с лета 1940 года. и что Гитлер приказал своим вооруженным силам в конце 1940 года подготовиться к войне на Востоке, несмотря на переговоры сторон о потенциальном вступлении Советского Союза в качестве четвертой державы Оси .

Прекращение действия

Новая граница между нацистской Германией и Советским Союзом с сентября 1939 по июнь 1941 года где-то на оккупированной территории Польши.

Германия в одностороннем порядке расторгла договор в 03:15 22 июня 1941 года, начав массированное нападение на Советский Союз в рамках операции «Барбаросса» . Сталин проигнорировал неоднократные предупреждения о возможном вторжении Германии. и приказал не проводить «полномасштабную» мобилизацию сил, хотя мобилизация продолжалась. После начала вторжения территории, полученные Советским Союзом в результате пакта, были потеряны в считанные недели. Юго-восточная часть была поглощена Великой Германии , Генерал-губернаторством а остальная часть была интегрирована с рейхскомиссариатами Остланд и Украина . За шесть месяцев советские военные потеряли 4,3 миллиона человек. и еще три миллиона были взяты в плен. Выгодный экспорт советского сырья в Германию в ходе экономических отношений продолжался непрерывно до начала военных действий. Советский экспорт в нескольких ключевых областях позволил Германии сохранить свои запасы каучука и зерна с первого дня вторжения до октября 1941 года.

Последствия

Серая зона: довоенная территория Польши к востоку от линии Керзона, аннексированная Советским Союзом после войны.

Советская экспансия, изменение границ Центральной Европы и создание Восточного блока после Второй мировой войны.

Открытие секретного протокола

Немецкий оригинал секретных протоколов предположительно был уничтожен во время бомбардировки Германии. но в конце 1943 года Риббентроп приказал микрофильмировать самые секретные записи министерства иностранных дел Германии, начиная с 1933 года, общим объемом около 9800 страниц. Когда в конце войны различные отделы Министерства иностранных дел в Берлине были эвакуированы в Тюрингию , Карлу фон Лешу, государственному служащему, работавшему у главного переводчика Пауля Отто Шмидта, было поручено копировать микрофильмы. В конце концов он получил приказ уничтожить секретные документы, но решил закопать металлический контейнер с микрофильмами в качестве личной страховки для своего будущего благополучия. В мае 1945 года фон Леш обратился к британскому подполковнику Роберту К. Томсону с просьбой передать личное письмо Дункану Сэндису , зятю Черчилля. В письме фон Леш сообщил, что ему было известно о местонахождении документов, но он ожидал взамен преференций. Томсон и его американский коллега Ральф Коллинз согласились перевести фон Леша в Марбург , в американскую зону, если он будет производить микрофильмы. Микрофильмы содержали копию Договора о ненападении, а также Секретного протокола. Оба документа были обнаружены как часть микрофильмированных записей в августе 1945 года сотрудником Госдепартамента США Венделлом Б. Бланке, главой специального подразделения под названием «Эксплуатация немецких архивов» (EGA).

Новости о секретных протоколах впервые появились во время Нюрнбергского процесса . Альфред Зайдль, адвокат подсудимого Ганса Франка , смог представить в качестве доказательства письменные показания, в которых они описывались. Его написал по памяти юрист нацистского министерства иностранных дел Фридрих Гаус , который написал текст и присутствовал при его подписании в Москве. Позже Зайдль получил текст секретных протоколов на немецком языке от анонимного источника среди союзников и попытался использовать их в качестве доказательства во время допроса свидетеля Эрнста фон Вайцзеккера , бывшего государственного секретаря Министерства иностранных дел. Прокуроры союзников возражали, и тексты не были приняты в качестве доказательств, но Вайцзеккеру было разрешено описать их по памяти, подтвердив тем самым показания Гауса. Наконец, по просьбе репортера St. Louis Post-Dispatch , американский заместитель прокурора Томас Дж. Додд получил копию секретных протоколов от Зейдля и перевел ее на английский язык. Впервые они были опубликованы 22 мая 1946 года на первой полосе этой газеты. Позже в Британии их опубликовало издание The Manchester Guardian .

Протоколы привлекли более широкое внимание средств массовой информации, когда они были включены в официальный сборник Государственного департамента « Нацистско-советские отношения 1939–1941 » под редакцией Рэймонда Дж. Зонтага и Джеймса С. Бедди и опубликованы 21 января 1948 года. Решение опубликовать ключевые документы по германо-советским отношениям, включая договор и протокол, был принят еще весной 1947 года. Зонтаг и Бедди готовили сборник все лето 1947 года. В ноябре 1947 года президент Гарри С. Трумэн лично одобрил публикацию, но она была отложена ввиду запланированной на декабрь конференции министров иностранных дел в Лондоне. Поскольку переговоры на этой конференции не оказались конструктивными с американской точки зрения, редакция документа была отправлена ​​в печать. Документы стали заголовками во всем мире. Чиновники Госдепартамента посчитали это успехом: «Советское правительство было застигнуто врасплох, получив первый эффективный удар с нашей стороны в явной пропагандистской войне».

Несмотря на публикацию восстановленной копии в западных СМИ , на протяжении десятилетий официальная политика Советского Союза заключалась в отрицании существования секретного протокола. Существование секретного протокола официально отрицалось до 1989 года. Один из его подписантов Вячеслав Молотов ушел в могилу, категорически отвергая его существование. Коммунистическая партия Франции не признавала существование секретного протокола до 1968 года, когда партия провела десталинизацию .

23 августа 1986 года десятки тысяч демонстрантов в 21 западном городе, включая Нью-Йорк, Лондон, Стокгольм, Торонто, Сиэтл и Перт, приняли участие в митингах в честь Дня Черной ленты , чтобы привлечь внимание к секретным протоколам.

Сталинские «фальсификаторы истории» и переговоры стран Оси

В ответ на публикацию секретных протоколов и других секретных документов о германо-советских отношениях в издании Государственного департамента «Нацистско-советские отношения» (1948 г.) Сталин опубликовал «Фальсификаторы истории» , в которых содержалось утверждение о том, что во время действия пакта Сталин отверг утверждение Гитлера. участвовать в разделе мира, не говоря уже о советском предложении присоединиться к Оси . Эта версия без исключения сохранялась в исторических исследованиях, официальных отчетах, мемуарах и учебниках, изданных в Советском Союзе вплоть до его распада .

В книге также утверждалось, что Мюнхенское соглашение было «секретным соглашением» между Германией и «Западом» и «чрезвычайно важным этапом в их политике, направленной на натравливание гитлеровских агрессоров на Советский Союз».

Отрицание секретного протокола

На протяжении десятилетий официальной политикой Советского Союза было отрицание существования секретного протокола к советско-германскому пакту. По указанию Михаила Горбачева Александр Николаевич Яковлев возглавил комиссию по расследованию существования такого протокола. В декабре 1989 года комиссия пришла к выводу, что протокол существовал, и представила свои выводы Съезду народных депутатов Советского Союза . В результате Конгресс принял декларацию, подтверждающую существование секретных протоколов и осуждающую их. Таким образом, советское правительство окончательно признало и денонсировало Секретный договор. и Михаил Горбачев , последний глава государства, осудил пакт. Владимир Путин осудил этот пакт как «аморальный», но также защитил его как « необходимое зло ». На пресс-конференции 19 декабря 2019 года Путин пошел еще дальше и заявил, что подписание пакта было не хуже, чем Мюнхенское соглашение 1938 года , которое привело к разделу Чехословакии.

Оба государства-правопреемника участников пакта объявили секретные протоколы недействительными с момента их подписания: Федеративная Республика Германия 1 сентября 1989 года и Советский Союз 24 декабря 1989 года. после изучения микрофильмированной копии немецких оригиналов.

Советская копия оригинального документа была рассекречена в 1992 году и опубликована в научном журнале в начале 1993 года.

В августе 2009 года в статье, написанной для польской газеты Gazeta Wyborcza , премьер-министр России Владимир Путин осудил Пакт Молотова-Риббентропа как «аморальный».

Новые русские националисты и ревизионисты , в том числе российский отрицатель Александр Дюков и Наталия Нарочницкая , чья книга содержала одобрительное предисловие министра иностранных дел России Сергея Лаврова , назвали пакт необходимой мерой из-за неспособности Великобритании и Франции заключить антифашистский пакт. .

Послевоенный комментарий о мотивах Сталина и Гитлера

Некоторые ученые полагают, что с самого начала трехсторонних переговоров между Советским Союзом, Великобританией и Францией Советы явно требовали от других сторон согласия на советскую оккупацию Эстонии, Латвии и Литвы. и чтобы Финляндия была включена в советскую сферу влияния.

Что касается времени сближения Германии, многие историки сходятся во мнении, что увольнение Максима Литвинова , еврейская национальность которого рассматривалась нацистской Германией неблагоприятно , устранило препятствие для переговоров с Германией. Сталин немедленно поручил Молотову «очистить министерство от евреев». Учитывая предыдущие попытки Литвинова создать антифашистскую коалицию, ассоциацию с доктриной коллективной безопасности с Францией и Великобританией и прозападную ориентацию по меркам Кремля его увольнение указывало на существование советского варианта сближения с Германией. Точно так же назначение Молотова послужило сигналом Германии о том, что Советский Союз открыт для предложений. Увольнение также стало сигналом Франции и Великобритании о существовании потенциального варианта переговоров с Германией. Один британский чиновник написал, что увольнение Литвинова также означало потерю замечательного техника или амортизатора, но что «образ действий» Молотова был «скорее большевистским, чем дипломатическим или космополитическим». Карр утверждал, что замена Литвинова Молотовым в Советском Союзе 3 мая 1939 года означала не необратимый сдвиг в сторону союза с Германией, а, скорее, была способом Сталина вести жесткие переговоры с британцами и французами, назначая пресловутого жесткого человека в комиссариат иностранных дел. . Историк Альберт Ресис заявил, что увольнение Литвинова дало Советам свободу проводить более быстрые переговоры с Германией, но они не отказались от британо-французских переговоров. Дерек Уотсон утверждал, что Молотов мог бы заключить наилучшую сделку с Великобританией и Францией, потому что он не был обременен багажом коллективной безопасности и мог вести переговоры с Германией. Джеффри Робертс утверждал, что увольнение Литвинова помогло Советам в британо-французских переговорах, потому что Литвинов сомневался или, возможно, даже выступал против таких обсуждений.

Э. Х. Карр , частый защитник советской политики, заявил: «В обмен на «невмешательство» Сталин обеспечил себе передышку иммунитета от немецкого нападения». По мнению Карра, «бастион», созданный посредством пакта, «был и мог быть только линией защиты от потенциального немецкого нападения». По мнению Карра, важным преимуществом было то, что «если бы Советской России в конечном итоге пришлось воевать с Гитлером, западные державы уже были бы в этом задействованы». Однако в последние десятилетия эта точка зрения оспаривается. Историк Вернер Мазер заявил, что «утверждение о том, что Советскому Союзу в то время угрожал Гитлер , как предполагал Сталин   ... является легендой, к создателям которой принадлежал сам Сталин. По мнению Мазера, «ни Германия, ни Япония не находились в ситуации [] вторжения в СССР, даже с малейшей перспективой [ sic ] успеха», что не должно было быть известно Сталину. Карр далее заявил, что долгое время основным мотивом внезапной смены курса Сталина считался страх перед агрессивными намерениями Германии. С другой стороны, австралийский писатель-историк советского происхождения Алекс Рывчин охарактеризовал этот пакт как «советскую сделку с дьяволом, которая содержала секретный протокол, предусматривающий, что оставшиеся независимые государства Восточной и Центральной Европы будут рассматриваться как курсы какой-то развратной дегустации». меню для двух величайших монстров в истории».

Многие польские газеты опубликовали многочисленные статьи, в которых утверждалось, что Россия должна извиниться перед Польшей за пакт.

Через две недели после того, как советские армии вошли в страны Балтии , Берлин обратился к Финляндии с просьбой разрешить транзит немецких войск, а пять недель спустя Гитлер издал секретную директиву «заниматься русской проблемой, думать о подготовке войны», войны, цель которой будет включать в себя создание Балтийской конфедерации.

Ряд немецких историков опровергли утверждение о том, что операция «Барбаросса» была упреждающим ударом, например Андреас Хиллгрубер , Рольф-Дитер Мюллер и Кристиан Хартманн , но они также признают, что Советы были агрессивны по отношению к своим соседям.

По словам дочери Сталина Светланы Аллилуевой , она «помнила, как ее отец сказал после [войны]: «Вместе с немцами мы были бы непобедимы».

Российский троцкист историк- Вадим Роговин утверждал, что Сталин уничтожил тысячи иностранных коммунистов, способных возглавить социалистические перемены в своих странах. Он упомянул тысячи немецких коммунистов, переданных Сталиным гестапо после подписания советско-германского пакта. Роговин также отметил, что шестнадцать членов ЦК . Компартии Германии жертвами сталинского террора стали Точно так же историк Эрик Д. Вайц обсуждал области сотрудничества между режимами, в которых сотни немецких граждан, большинство из которых были коммунистами, были переданы гестапо из-под администрации Сталина. Вайц также заявил, что в Советском Союзе погибло больше членов Политбюро КПГ, чем в нацистской Германии.

Память и ответ

Этот пакт был запретной темой в послевоенном Советском Союзе. В декабре 1989 года Съезд народных депутатов Советского Союза осудил пакт и секретный протокол к нему как «юридически несовершенный и недействительный». В современной России проправительственная пропаганда часто изображает пакт положительно или нейтрально; например, российские учебники склонны описывать пакт как защитную меру, а не как меру, направленную на территориальную экспансию. В 2009 году президент России Владимир Путин заявил, что «есть основания осудить Пакт». но в 2014 году назвал его «необходимым для выживания России». Обвинения, ставящие под сомнение позитивное изображение роли СССР во Второй мировой войне, рассматриваются как крайне проблематичные для современного российского государства, которое рассматривает победу России в войне как один из « наиболее почитаемых столпов государственной идеологии », что легитимизирует действующее правительство и его политика. В феврале 2021 года Государственная дума проголосовала за закон о наказании за распространение «фейковых новостей» о роли Советского Союза во Второй мировой войне, включая утверждение о том, что нацистская Германия и Советский Союз несут равную ответственность в соответствии с пактом.

В 2009 году Европейский парламент провозгласил 23 августа, годовщину Пакта Молотова-Риббентропа, Европейским днем ​​памяти жертв сталинизма и нацизма , который следует отмечать достойно и беспристрастно. В связи с Пактом Молотова-Риббентропа парламентская резолюция Организации по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе осудила как коммунизм , так и фашизм за начало Второй мировой войны и призвала провести 23 августа день памяти жертв сталинизма и нацизма. В ответ на резолюцию российские законодатели пригрозили ОБСЕ «жесткими последствиями». Аналогичная резолюция была принята Европейским парламентом десять лет спустя, в которой пакт Молотова-Риббентропа 1939 года был обвинен в развязывании войны в Европе и снова вызвал критику со стороны российских властей.

См. также

• Балтийский путь , акция протеста в честь 50-летия пакта Молотова-Риббентропа.
• Итало-советский пакт
• Переселение немецко-советского населения
• Национал-большевизм
• Красно-зелено-коричневый союз
• Советско-японский пакт о нейтралитете
• Речь Сталина от 19 августа 1939 г.
• Хронология пакта Молотова-Риббентропа
• Вальтер Кривицкий , советский перебежчик, раскрывший планы пакта о ненападении перед Второй мировой войной.

Источники

• Бендерский, Джозеф В. (2000). История нацистской Германии: 1919–1945 гг . Роуман и Литтлфилд. ISBN  0-8304-1567-Х .
• Бискупский, Мечислав Б.; Вандич, Петр Стефан (2003). Идеология, политика и дипломатия в Центрально-Восточной Европе . Бойделл и Брюэр. ISBN  1-58046-137-9 .
• Брэкман, Роман (2001). Секретное дело Иосифа Сталина: тайная жизнь . Фрэнк Касс. ISBN  0-7146-5050-1 .
• Карли, Майкл Дж. (1993). «Конец« низкого и нечестного десятилетия »: крах англо-франко-советского союза в 1939 году». Европа-Азиатские исследования . 45 (2): 303–341. дои : 10.1080/09668139308412091 . JSTOR   152863 .
• Карр, Эдвард Халлетт (1949a). «От Мюнхена до Москвы — я». Советские исследования . 1 (1). Тейлор и Фрэнсис: 3–17. дои : 10.1080/09668134908409726 . JSTOR   148803 .
• Карр, Эдвард Халлетт (1949b). «От Мюнхена до Москвы — II». Советские исследования . 1 (2): 93–105. дои : 10.1080/09668134908409737 . JSTOR   148585 .
• Карр, Эдвард Халлетт (1979) [1951]. Немецко-советские отношения между двумя мировыми войнами, 1919–1939 гг . Нью-Йорк, Нью-Йорк: Арно Пресс.
• Чубарян Александр О.; Шукман, Гарольд (2002). Сталин и советско-финская война 1939–40 . Лондон: Фрэнк Касс. ISBN  0-7146-5203-2 .
• Киприан, Тадеуш; Савицкий, Ежи (1961). Нацистское правление в Польше 1939–1945 гг . Полония.
• Датнер, Шимон (1962). Преступления, совершенные вермахтом в ходе сентябрьской кампании и в период военного правительства . Познань.
• Датнер, С; Гумковски, Дж; Лещинский, К. (1962). Геноцид 1939–1945 гг . Западное издательство.
• Дэвис, Н. (1986). Божья площадка . Том. II. Издательство Оксфордского университета. ISBN  0-19-821944-Х .
• Экерт, Астрид М (2012). Борьба за файлы: западные союзники и возвращение немецких архивов после Второй мировой войны . Издательство Кембриджского университета. ISBN  978-0-521-88018-3 .
• Эдвардс, Роберт (2006). Белая смерть: война России с Финляндией 1939–40 . Лондон: Вайденфельд и Николсон. ISBN  978-0-297-84630-7 .
• Энгл, Эдвардс; Паананен, Лаури (1985) [1973]. Зимняя война: русско-финляндский конфликт, 1939–40 . США: Вествью. ISBN  0-8133-0149-1 .
• Эриксон, Эдвард Э. (1999). Кормление немецкого орла: советская экономическая помощь нацистской Германии, 1933–1941 гг . Гринвуд. ISBN  0-275-96337-3 .
• Фест, Иоахим К. (2002). Гитлер . Хоутон Миффлин Харкорт. ISBN  0-15-602754-2 .
• Фишер, Дэвид ; Прочтите, Энтони (1999). Смертельные объятия: Гитлер, Сталин и советско-нацистский пакт 1939–1941 гг . WW Нортон и Ко.
• Гарлински, Юзеф (1987). Польша во Второй мировой войне . Гиппокреновые книги. ISBN  0-333-39258-2 .
• Гольдман, Стюарт Д. (2012). Номонган, 1939 год: Победа Красной Армии, определившая Вторую мировую войну . Издательство Военно-морского института. ISBN  978-1-61251-098-9 .
• Халецкий, О (1983). История Польши . Рутледж и Кеган. ISBN  0-7102-0050-1 .
• Хен, Пол Н. (2005). Десятилетие низкой нечестности: великие державы, Восточная Европа и экономические истоки Второй мировой войны, 1930–1941 гг . Международная издательская группа «Континуум». ISBN  0-8264-1761-2 .
• Кершоу, Ян (2001). Гитлер, 1936–1945: Немезида . WW Нортон . ISBN  978-0-393-32252-1 . OCLC   244169429 .
• Лескинен, Яри; Юутилайнен, Антти, ред. (1999). Маленький великан зимней войны (на финском языке). Общество с ограниченной ответственностью «Вернер Сёдерстрем». ISBN  951-0-23536-9 .
• Левкович, Николас (2018). Соединенные Штаты, Советский Союз и геополитические последствия начала холодной войны . Нью-Йорк: Гимн Пресс. ISBN  9781783087990 .
• Мазер, Вернер (1994). Разрыв слов: Гитлер, Сталин и Вторая мировая война . Мюнхен: Ольцог. ISBN  3-7892-8260-Х .
• Монтефиоре, Саймон Себаг (2005) [2003]. Сталин: Суд Красного царя (5-е изд.). Великобритания: Феникс. ISBN  0-7538-1766-7 .
• Мурхаус, Роджер (2014). Альянс дьяволов: пакт Гитлера со Сталиным, 1939–1941 гг . Голова Бодли. ISBN  978-1-84792-205-2 .
• Некрич Александр Моисеевич ; Улам, Адам Бруно; Фриз, Грегори Л. (1997). Парии, партнеры, хищники: немецко-советские отношения, 1922–1941 гг . Издательство Колумбийского университета. ISBN  0-231-10676-9 .
• Филбин, Тобиас Р. III (1994). Приманка Нептуна: немецко-советское военно-морское сотрудничество и амбиции, 1919–1941 гг . Издательство Университета Южной Каролины. ISBN  0-87249-992-8 .
• Пиотровский, Тадеуш (2007). Польский Холокост . МакФарланд. ISBN  978-0-7864-0371-4 .
• Ресис, Альберт (2000). «Падение Литвинова: предвестник советско-германского пакта о ненападении». Европа-Азиатские исследования . 52 (1). Тейлор и Фрэнсис: 33–56. дои : 10.1080/09668130098253 . JSTOR   153750 . S2CID   153557275 .
• Рибер, Альфред Джозеф (2000). Вынужденная миграция в Центральной и Восточной Европе: 1939–1950 гг . Лондон, Нью-Йорк: Рутледж . ISBN  0-7146-5132-Х .
• Робертс, Джеффри (1992a). «Советское решение о пакте с нацистской Германией». Советские исследования . 55 (2): 57–78. дои : 10.1080/09668139208411994 . JSTOR   152247 .
• Робертс, Джеффри (октябрь 1992b). «Падение Литвинова: ревизионистский взгляд». Журнал современной истории . 27 (4): 639–57. дои : 10.1177/002200949202700405 . JSTOR   260946 . S2CID   159859306 .
• Робертс, Джеффри (1992). «Печально известная встреча? Встреча Мерекалова и Вейцзеккера 17 апреля 1939 года». Исторический журнал . 35 (4): 921–6. дои : 10.1017/S0018246X00026224 . JSTOR   2639445 . S2CID   154228049 .
• Робертс, Джеффри (1995). «Советская политика и страны Балтии, 1939–1940: переоценка». Дипломатия и государственное управление . 6 (3): 695–722. дои : 10.1080/09592299508405982 .
• Робертс, Джеффри (2006). Сталинские войны: от мировой войны к холодной войне, 1939–1953 гг . Издательство Йельского университета. ISBN  0-300-11204-1 .
• Сервис, Роберт (2003) [1997]. История современной России . Книги о пингвинах. ISBN  978-0-14-101121-9 .
• Ширер, Уильям Л. (1990) [1959]. Взлет и падение Третьего рейха: история нацистской Германии . Саймон и Шустер. ISBN  0-671-72868-7 .
• Тейлор, AJP (1961). Истоки Второй мировой войны . Лондон: Саймон и Шустер. ISBN  978-0-684-82947-0 .
• Троттер, Уильям Р. (2002) [1991]. Зимняя война: Русско-финская война 1939–40 (5-е изд.). Лондон: Аурум Пресс. ISBN  978-1-85410-881-4 . Впервые опубликовано как Ледяной ад: Русско-финская зимняя война 1939–40 годов . Чапел-Хилл, Северная Каролина : Algonquin Books. 1991. ISBN  1-56512-249-6 . OCLC   58499386 .
• Туртола, Мартти (1999). «Международное развитие в Европе и Финляндии в 1930-е годы». Ин Лескинен, Яри; Юутилайнен, Антти (ред.). Маленький великан Зимней войны .
• Улам, Адам Бруно (1989). Сталин: Человек и его эпоха . Маяк Пресс. ISBN  0-8070-7005-Х .
• Визулис, Изидорс (1990). Пакт Молотова-Риббентропа 1939 года: случай Балтии . Прегер . ISBN  0-275-93456-Х .
• Вегнер, Бернд, изд. (1997). От мира к войне: Германия, Советская Россия и мир, 1939–1941 гг . Провиденс и Оксфорд: Berghahn Books . ISBN  978-1-57181-882-9 .
• Уотсон, Дерек (2000). «Ученичество Молотова во внешней политике: переговоры Тройственного союза в 1939 году». Европа-Азиатские исследования . 52 (4): 695–722. дои : 10.1080/713663077 . JSTOR   153322 . S2CID   144385167 .
• Ватт, округ Колумбия (1989). Как пришла война: непосредственные истоки Второй мировой войны 1938–1939 гг . Лондон. ISBN  978-0-394-57916-0 . {{cite book}}: CS1 maint: отсутствует местоположение издателя ( ссылка )
• Ватт, Ричард М. (1979). Горькая слава: Польша и ее судьба 1918–1939 гг . Нью-Йорк: Саймон и Шустер . ISBN  0-7818-0673-9 .

Внешние ссылки

• Оригиналы договора и протоколов из архива МИД России, опубликованные Фондом истории в России в мае 2019 г. Архивировано 3 октября 2022 г. в Wayback Machine.
• Нацистско-советские отношения 1939–1941 гг. Архивировано 11 февраля 2011 г. в Wayback Machine.
• Леонас Церкус. История литовского солдата
• Справочник по современной истории, собрание общедоступных и разрешенных к копированию текстов по современной европейской и мировой истории , сканированные фотокопии оригинальных документов.
• О значении советско-германского пакта о ненападении Речь Молотова перед Верховным Советом 31 августа 1939 г.
• Италия и советско-нацистский пакт от 23 августа 1939 г.
• Международная конференция и буклет о Пакте Молотова-Риббентропа.