Киотский протокол

Эта статья о международном договоре. Чтобы узнать о рок-группе, см. Киотский протокол (группа) .

Киотский протокол

Киотский протокол к РКИК ООН
Стороны приложения B, имеющие обязательные цели во втором периоде   Стороны приложения B, имеющие обязательные цели в первом периоде, но не во втором   Стороны, не включенные в Приложение B, без обязательных целей   Стороны Приложения B, имеющие обязательные цели в первый период, но вышедшие из Протокола   Страны, подписавшие Протокол, но не ратифицировавшие его   Другие государства-члены ООН и наблюдатели, не являющиеся участниками Протокола.
Signed	11 December 1997
Location	Kyoto, Japan
Effective	16 February 2005
Condition	Ratification by at least 55 states to the Convention
Expiration	31 December 2012 (first commitment period) 31 December 2020 (second commitment period)
Signatories	84 (1998–1999 signing period)
Parties	192 (the European Union, Cook Islands, Niue, and all UN member states except Andorra, Canada, South Sudan, and the United States as of 2022)
Depositary	Secretary-General of the United Nations
Languages	Arabic, Mandarin, English, French, Russian, and Spanish
Full text
Kyoto Protocol at Wikisource

Kyoto Protocol Extension (2012–2020)

Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol
Acceptance of the Doha Amendment   States that ratified   Kyoto protocol parties that did not ratify   Non-parties to the Kyoto Protocol
Type	Amendment to international agreement
Drafted	8 December 2012
Location	Doha, Qatar
Effective	31 December 2020
Condition	Ratification by 144 state parties required
Expiration	31 December 2020
Ratifiers	147
Full text
Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol at Wikisource

Киотский протокол ( японский : 京都議定書 , Хепберн : Киото Гитейсё ) — международный договор , продливший действие Рамочной конвенции ООН об изменении климата 1992 года (РКИК ООН), которая обязывает государства-участники сокращать выбросы парниковых газов , основываясь на научном консенсусе о том, что глобальное потепление происходит, и что причиной этого являются антропогенные CO ₂ выбросы . Киотский протокол был принят в Киото , Япония, 11 декабря 1997 года и вступил в силу 16 февраля 2005 года. Всего было 192 стороны ( Канада вышла из протокола с декабря 2012 года). к Протоколу в 2020 году.

The Kyoto Protocol implemented the objective of the UNFCCC to reduce the onset of global warming by reducing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere to "a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system" (Article 2). The Kyoto Protocol applied to the seven greenhouse gases listed in Annex A: carbon dioxide (CO₂), methane (CH₄), nitrous oxide (N₂O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), sulfur hexafluoride (SF₆), nitrogen trifluoride (NF₃). Nitrogen trifluoride was added for the second compliance period during the Doha Round.

The Protocol was based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities: it acknowledged that individual countries have different capabilities in combating climate change, owing to economic development, and therefore placed the obligation to reduce current emissions on developed countries on the basis that they are historically responsible for the current levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.

The Protocol's first commitment period started in 2008 and ended in 2012. All 36 countries that fully participated in the first commitment period complied with the Protocol. However, nine countries had to resort to the flexibility mechanisms by funding emission reductions in other countries because their national emissions were slightly greater than their targets. The financial crisis of 2007–08 reduced emissions. The greatest emission reductions were seen in the former Eastern Bloc countries because the dissolution of the Soviet Union reduced their emissions in the early 1990s. Even though the 36 developed countries reduced their emissions, the global emissions increased by 32% from 1990 to 2010.

A second commitment period was agreed to in 2012 to extend the agreement to 2020, known as the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, in which 37 countries had binding targets: Australia, the European Union (and its then 28 member states, now 27), Belarus, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, and Ukraine. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine stated that they may withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol or not put into legal force the Amendment with second round targets. Japan, New Zealand, and Russia had participated in Kyoto's first-round but did not take on new targets in the second commitment period. Other developed countries without second-round targets were Canada (which withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2012) and the United States (which did not ratify). If they were to remain as a part of the protocol, Canada would be hit with a $14 billion fine, which would be devastating to their economy, hence the reluctant decision to exit. As of October 2020, 147 states had accepted the Doha Amendment. It entered into force on 31 December 2020, following its acceptance by the mandated minimum of at least 144 states, although the second commitment period ended on the same day. Of the 37 parties with binding commitments, 34 had ratified.

Negotiations were held in the framework of the yearly UNFCCC Climate Change Conferences on measures to be taken after the second commitment period ended in 2020. This resulted in the 2015 adoption of the Paris Agreement, which is a separate instrument under the UNFCCC rather than an amendment of the Kyoto Protocol.

Chronology

See also: History of climate change policy and politics and United Nations Climate Change conference

1992 – The UN Conference on the Environment and Development is held in Rio de Janeiro. It results in the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) among other agreements.

1995 – Parties to the UNFCCC meet in Berlin (the 1st Conference of Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC) to outline specific targets on emissions.

1997 – In December the parties conclude the Kyoto Protocol in Kyoto, Japan, in which they agree to the broad outlines of emissions targets.

2004 – Russia and Canada ratify the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC bringing the treaty into effect on 16 February 2005.

2011 – Canada became the first signatory to announce its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol.

2012 – On 31 December 2012, the first commitment period under the Protocol expired.

The official meeting of all states party to the Kyoto Protocol is the annual Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The first conference was held in 1995 in Berlin (COP 1). The first Meeting of Parties of the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) was held in 2005 in conjunction with COP 11.

Objectives

Kyoto is intended to cut global emissions of greenhouse gases.

In order to stabilize the atmospheric concentration of CO₂, emissions worldwide would need to be dramatically reduced from their present level.

The main goal of the Kyoto Protocol was to control emissions of the main anthropogenic (human-emitted) greenhouse gases (GHGs) in ways that reflect underlying national differences in GHG emissions, wealth, and capacity to make the reductions. The treaty follows the main principles agreed in the original 1992 UN Framework Convention. According to the treaty, in 2012, Annex I Parties who have ratified the treaty must have fulfilled their obligations of greenhouse gas emissions limitations established for the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period (2008–2012). These emissions limitation commitments are listed in Annex B of the Protocol.

The Kyoto Protocol's first round commitments are the first detailed step taken within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. The Protocol establishes a structure of rolling emission reduction commitment periods. It set a timetable starting in 2006 for negotiations to establish emission reduction commitments for a second commitment period. The first period emission reduction commitments expired on 31 December 2012.

The first-round Kyoto emissions limitation commitments were not sufficient to stabilize the atmospheric concentration of GHGs. Stabilization of atmospheric GHG concentrations will require further emissions reductions after the end of the first-round Kyoto commitment period in 2012.

The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is the "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would stop dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system." Even if Annex I Parties succeed in meeting their first-round commitments, much greater emission reductions will be required in future to stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations.

For each of the different anthropogenic GHGs, different levels of emissions reductions would be required to meet the objective of stabilizing atmospheric concentrations. Carbon dioxide (CO₂) is the most important anthropogenic GHG. Stabilizing the concentration of CO₂ in the atmosphere would ultimately require the effective elimination of anthropogenic CO₂ emissions.

To achieve stabilization, global GHG emissions must peak, then decline. The lower the desired stabilization level, the sooner this peak and decline must occur. For a given stabilization level, larger emissions reductions in the near term allow for less stringent emissions reductions later. On the other hand, less stringent near term emissions reductions would, for a given stabilization level, require more stringent emissions reductions later on.

The first period Kyoto emissions limitations can be viewed as a first-step towards achieving atmospheric stabilization of GHGs. In this sense, the first period Kyoto commitments may affect what future atmospheric stabilization level can be achieved.

Principal concepts

Some of the principal concepts of the Kyoto Protocol are:

• Binding commitments for the Annex I Parties. The main feature of the Protocol is that it established legally binding commitments to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases for Annex I Parties. The commitments were based on the Berlin Mandate, which was a part of UNFCCC negotiations leading up to the Protocol.
• Implementation. In order to meet the objectives of the Protocol, Annex I Parties are required to prepare policies and measures for the reduction of greenhouse gases in their respective countries. In addition, they are required to increase the absorption of these gases and utilize all mechanisms available, such as joint implementation, the clean development mechanism and emissions trading, in order to be rewarded with credits that would allow more greenhouse gas emissions at home.
• Minimizing Impacts on Developing Countries by establishing an adaptation fund for climate change.
• Accounting, Reporting and Review in order to ensure the integrity of the Protocol.
• Compliance. Establishing a Compliance Committee to enforce compliance with the commitments under the Protocol.

Flexibility mechanisms

The Protocol defines three "flexibility mechanisms" that can be used by Annex I Parties in meeting their emission limitation commitments. The flexibility mechanisms are International Emissions Trading (IET), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and Joint Implementation (JI). IET allows Annex I Parties to "trade" their emissions (Assigned Amount Units, AAUs, or "allowances" for short).

The economic basis for providing this flexibility is that the marginal cost of reducing (or abating) emissions differs among countries. "Marginal cost" is the cost of abating the last tonne of CO₂-eq for an Annex I/non-Annex I Party. At the time of the original Kyoto targets, studies suggested that the flexibility mechanisms could reduce the overall (aggregate) cost of meeting the targets. Studies also showed that national losses in Annex I gross domestic product (GDP) could be reduced by the use of the flexibility mechanisms.

The CDM and JI are called "project-based mechanisms", in that they generate emission reductions from projects. The difference between IET and the project-based mechanisms is that IET is based on the setting of a quantitative restriction of emissions, while the CDM and JI are based on the idea of "production" of emission reductions. The CDM is designed to encourage production of emission reductions in non-Annex I Parties, while JI encourages production of emission reductions in Annex I Parties.

The production of emission reductions generated by the CDM and JI can be used by Annex I Parties in meeting their emission limitation commitments. The emission reductions produced by the CDM and JI are both measured against a hypothetical baseline of emissions that would have occurred in the absence of a particular emission reduction project. The emission reductions produced by the CDM are called Certified Emission Reductions (CERs); reductions produced by JI are called Emission Reduction Units (ERUs). The reductions are called "credits" because they are emission reductions credited against a hypothetical baseline of emissions.

Only emission reduction projects that do not involve using nuclear energy are eligible for accreditation under the CDM, in order to prevent nuclear technology exports from becoming the default route for obtaining credits under the CDM.

Each Annex I country is required to submit an annual report of inventories of all anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions from sources and removals from sinks under UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. These countries nominate a person (called a "designated national authority") to create and manage its greenhouse gas inventory. Virtually all of the non-Annex I countries have also established a designated national authority to manage their Kyoto obligations, specifically the "CDM process". This determines which GHG projects they wish to propose for accreditation by the CDM Executive Board.

International emissions trading

This section is an excerpt from Carbon emission trading.[edit]

Carbon emission trade allowance prices in all major emission trading schemes in Euro per ton of CO2 emitted (from 2008 until 5/2023)

Carbon emission trading (also called carbon market, emission trading scheme (ETS) or cap and trade) is a type of emissions trading scheme designed for carbon dioxide (CO₂) and other greenhouse gases (GHGs). It is a form of carbon pricing. Its purpose is to limit climate change by creating a market with limited allowances for emissions. This can reduce the competitiveness of fossil fuels, and instead accelerate investments into renewable energy, such as wind power and solar power. Fossil fuels are the main driver for climate change. They account for 89% of all CO₂ emissions and 68% of all GHG emissions.

Emissions trading sets a quantitative total limit on the emissions produced by all participating emitters. As a result, the price automatically adjusts to this target. This is the main advantage compared to a fixed carbon tax. Under emission trading, a polluter having more emissions than their quota has to purchase the right to emit more. The entity having fewer emissions sells the right to emit carbon to other entities. As a result, the most cost-effective carbon reduction methods would be exploited first. Carbon emissions trading and carbon taxes are a common method for countries in their attempts to meet their pledges under the Paris Agreement.

Carbon emissions trading schemes are in operation in China, the European Union, and other countries. However, they are usually not harmonized with any defined carbon budgets, which are required to maintain global warming below the critical thresholds of 1.5 °C or "well below" 2 °C. The existing schemes only cover a limited scope of emissions. The EU-ETS focuses on industry and large power generation, leaving the introduction of additional schemes for transport and private consumption to the member states. Though units are counted in tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent, other potent GHGs such as methane (CH₄) or nitrous oxide (N₂O) from agriculture are usually not part these schemes yet. Apart from that, an oversupply leads to low prices of allowances with almost no effect on fossil fuel combustion. In September 2021, emission trade allowances (ETAs) covered a wide price range from €7/tCO₂ in China's new national carbon market to €63/tCO₂ in the EU-ETS. Latest models of the social cost of carbon calculate a damage of more than $3000 per ton CO₂ as a result of economy feedbacks and falling global GDP growth rates, while policy recommendations range from about $50 to $200.

Intergovernmental emissions trading

The design of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) implicitly allows for trade of national Kyoto obligations to occur between participating countries. The Carbon Trust found that other than the trading that occurs as part of the EU ETS, no intergovernmental emissions trading had taken place.

One of the environmental problems with IET is the large surplus of allowances that are available. Russia, Ukraine, and the new EU-12 member states (the Kyoto Parties Annex I Economies-in-Transition, abbreviated "EIT": Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine) have a surplus of allowances, while many OECD countries have a deficit. Some of the EITs with a surplus regard it as potential compensation for the trauma of their economic restructuring. When the Kyoto treaty was negotiated, it was recognized that emissions targets for the EITs might lead to them having an excess number of allowances. This excess of allowances were viewed by the EITs as "headroom" to grow their economies. The surplus has, however, also been referred to by some as "hot air", a term which Russia (a country with an estimated surplus of 3.1 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent allowances) views as "quite offensive".

OECD countries with a deficit could meet their Kyoto commitments by buying allowances from transition countries with a surplus. Unless other commitments were made to reduce the total surplus in allowances, such trade would not actually result in emissions being reduced (see also the section below on the Green Investment Scheme).

"Green Investment Schemes"

The "Green Investment Scheme" (GIS) is a plan for achieving environmental benefits from trading surplus allowances (AAUs) under the Kyoto Protocol. The Green Investment Scheme (GIS), a mechanism in the framework of International Emissions Trading (IET), is designed to achieve greater flexibility in reaching the targets of the Kyoto Protocol while preserving environmental integrity of IET. However, using the GIS is not required under the Kyoto Protocol, and there is no official definition of the term.

Under the GIS a party to the protocol expecting that the development of its economy will not exhaust its Kyoto quota, can sell the excess of its Kyoto quota units (AAUs) to another party. The proceeds from the AAU sales should be "greened", i.e. channelled to the development and implementation of the projects either acquiring the greenhouse gases emission reductions (hard greening) or building up the necessary framework for this process (soft greening).

Trade in AAUs

Latvia was one of the front-runners of GISs. World Bank (2011) reported that Latvia has stopped offering AAU sales because of low AAU prices. In 2010, Estonia was the preferred source for AAU buyers, followed by the Czech Republic and Poland.

Japan's national policy to meet their Kyoto target includes the purchase of AAUs sold under GISs. In 2010, Japan and Japanese firms were the main buyers of AAUs. In terms of the international carbon market, trade in AAUs are a small proportion of overall market value. In 2010, 97% of trade in the international carbon market was driven by the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS).

Clean Development Mechanism

Between 2001, which was the first year Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects could be registered, and 2012, the end of the first Kyoto commitment period, the CDM is expected to produce some 1.5 billion tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO₂e) in emission reductions. Most of these reductions are through renewable energy commercialisation, energy efficiency, and fuel switching (World Bank, 2010, p. 262). By 2012, the largest potential for production of CERs are estimated in China (52% of total CERs) and India (16%). CERs produced in Latin America and the Caribbean make up 15% of the potential total, with Brazil as the largest producer in the region (7%).

Joint Implementation

The formal crediting period for Joint Implementation (JI) was aligned with the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, and did not start until January 2008 (Carbon Trust, 2009, p. 20). In November 2008, only 22 JI projects had been officially approved and registered. The total projected emission savings from JI by 2012 are about one tenth that of the CDM. Russia accounts for about two-thirds of these savings, with the remainder divided up roughly equally between Ukraine and the EU's New Member States. Emission savings include cuts in methane, HFC, and N₂O emissions.

Details of the agreement

The agreement is a protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) adopted at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, which did not set any legally binding limitations on emissions or enforcement mechanisms. Only Parties to the UNFCCC can become Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol was adopted at the third session of the Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC in 1997 in Kyoto, Japan.

National emission targets specified in the Kyoto Protocol exclude international aviation and shipping. Kyoto Parties can use land use, land use change, and forestry (LULUCF) in meeting their targets. LULUCF activities are also called "sink" activities. Changes in sinks and land use can have an effect on the climate, and indeed the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's Special Report on Land use, land-use change, and forestry estimates that since 1750 a third of global warming has been caused by land use change. Particular criteria apply to the definition of forestry under the Kyoto Protocol.

Forest management, cropland management, grazing land management, and revegetation are all eligible LULUCF activities under the Protocol. Annex I Parties use of forest management in meeting their targets is capped.

First commitment period: 2008–2012

Under the Kyoto Protocol, 37 industrialized countries and the European Community (the European Union-15, made up of 15 states at the time of the Kyoto negotiations) commit themselves to binding targets for GHG emissions. The targets apply to the four greenhouse gases carbon dioxide (CO₂), methane (CH₄), nitrous oxide (N₂O), sulphur hexafluoride (SF₆), and two groups of gases, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs). The six GHG are translated into CO₂ equivalents in determining reductions in emissions. These reduction targets are in addition to the industrial gases, chlorofluorocarbons, or CFCs, which are dealt with under the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.

Under the Protocol, only the Annex I Parties have committed themselves to national or joint reduction targets (formally called "quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives" (QELRO) – Article 4.1). Parties to the Kyoto Protocol not listed in Annex I of the convention (the non-Annex I Parties) are mostly low-income developing countries, and may participate in the Kyoto Protocol through the Clean Development Mechanism (explained below).

The emissions limitations of Annex I Parties varies between different Parties. Some Parties have emissions limitations reduce below the base year level, some have limitations at the base year level (no permitted increase above the base year level), while others have limitations above the base year level.

Emission limits do not include emissions by international aviation and shipping. Although Belarus and Turkey are listed in the convention's Annex I, they do not have emissions targets as they were not Annex I Parties when the Protocol was adopted. Kazakhstan does not have a target, but has declared that it wishes to become an Annex I Party to the convention.

show

Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol, their 2008–2012 commitments as % of base year, and 1990 emission levels (% of all Annex I countries)

Australia – 108% (2.1% of 1990 emissions) Austria – 87% Belarus – 95% (subject to acceptance by other parties) Belgium – 92.5% Bulgaria – 92% (0.6%) Canada – 94% (3.33%) (withdrew) Croatia – 95% () Czech Republic – 92% (1.24%) Denmark – 79% Estonia – 92% (0.28%)

Finland – 100% France – 100% Germany – 79% Greece – 125% Hungary – 94% (0.52%) Iceland – 110% (0.02%) Ireland – 113% Italy – 93.5% Japan – 94% (8.55%) Latvia – 92% (0.17%)

Liechtenstein – 92% (0.0015%) Lithuania – 92% Luxembourg – 72% Netherlands – 94% New Zealand – 100% (0.19%) Norway – 101% (0.26%) Poland – 94% (3.02%) Portugal – 92% Romania – 92% (1.24%)

Russian Federation – 100% (17.4%) Slovakia – 92% (0.42%) Slovenia – 92% Spain – 115% Sweden – 104% Switzerland – 92% (0.32%) Ukraine – 100% United Kingdom – 87.5% United States of America – 93% (36.1%) (non-party)

For most state parties, 1990 is the base year for the national GHG inventory and the calculation of the assigned amount. However, five state parties have an alternative base year:

• Bulgaria: 1988;
• Hungary: the average of the years 1985–1987;
• Poland: 1988;
• Romania: 1989;
• Slovenia: 1986.

Annex I Parties can use a range of sophisticated "flexibility" mechanisms (see below) to meet their targets. Annex I Parties can achieve their targets by allocating reduced annual allowances to major operators within their borders, or by allowing these operators to exceed their allocations by offsetting any excess through a mechanism that is agreed by all the parties to the UNFCCC, such as by buying emission allowances from other operators which have excess emissions credits.

Negotiations

See also: Views on the Kyoto Protocol § Commentaries on negotiations

Article 4.2 of the UNFCCC commits industrialized countries to "[take] the lead" in reducing emissions. The initial aim was for industrialized countries to stabilize their emissions at 1990 levels by 2000. The failure of key industrialized countries to move in this direction was a principal reason why Kyoto moved to binding commitments.

At the first UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in Berlin, the G77 was able to push for a mandate (the "Berlin mandate") where it was recognized that:

• developed nations had contributed most to the then-current concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere (see Greenhouse gas emissions).
• developing country emissions per-capita (i.e., average emissions per head of population) were still relatively low.
• and that the share of global emissions from developing countries would grow to meet their development needs.

During negotiations, the G-77 represented 133 developing countries. China was not a member of the group but an associate. It has since become a member.

The Berlin mandate was recognized in the Kyoto Protocol in that developing countries were not subject to emission reduction commitments in the first Kyoto commitment period. However, the large potential for growth in developing country emissions made negotiations on this issue tense. In the final agreement, the Clean Development Mechanism was designed to limit emissions in developing countries, but in such a way that developing countries do not bear the costs for limiting emissions. The general assumption was that developing countries would face quantitative commitments in later commitment periods, and at the same time, developed countries would meet their first round commitments.

Emissions cuts

Kyoto Parties with first period (2008–12) greenhouse gas emissions limitations targets, and the percentage change in their carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion between 1990 and 2009. For more detailed country/region information, see Kyoto Protocol and government action.

Overview map of states committed to greenhouse gas (GHG) limitations in the first Kyoto Protocol period (2008–12):

  Annex I Parties who have agreed to reduce their GHG emissions below their individual base year levels (see definition in this article)

  Annex I Parties who have agreed to cap their GHG emissions at their base year levels

  Non-Annex I Parties who are not obligated by caps or Annex I Parties with an emissions cap that allows their emissions to expand above their base year levels or countries that have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol

For specific emission reduction commitments of Annex I Parties, see the section of the article on 2012 emission targets and "flexible mechanisms".

The European Union as a whole has, in accordance with this treaty, committed itself to a reduction of 8%. However, many member states (such as Greece, Spain, Ireland and Sweden) have not committed themselves to any reduction while France has committed itself not to expand its emissions (0% reduction).

There were multiple emissions cuts proposed by UNFCCC parties during negotiations. The G77 and China were in favour of strong uniform emission cuts across the developed world. The US originally proposed for the second round of negotiations on Kyoto commitments to follow the negotiations of the first. In the end, negotiations on the second period were set to open no later than 2005. Countries over-achieving in their first period commitments can "bank" their unused allowances for use in the subsequent period.

The EU initially argued for only three GHGs to be included – CO₂, CH₄, and N₂O – with other gases such as HFCs regulated separately. The EU also wanted to have a "bubble" commitment, whereby it could make a collective commitment that allowed some EU members to increase their emissions, while others cut theirs.

The most vulnerable nations – the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) – pushed for deep uniform cuts by developed nations, with the goal of having emissions reduced to the greatest possible extent. Countries that had supported differentiation of targets had different ideas as to how it should be calculated, and many different indicators were proposed. Two examples include differentiation of targets based on gross domestic product (GDP), and differentiation based on energy intensity (energy use per unit of economic output).

The final targets negotiated in the Protocol are the result of last minute political compromises. The targets closely match those decided by Argentinian Raul Estrada, the diplomat who chaired the negotiations. The numbers given to each Party by Chairman Estrada were based on targets already pledged by Parties, information received on latest negotiating positions, and the goal of achieving the strongest possible environmental outcome. The final targets are weaker than those proposed by some Parties, e.g., the Alliance of Small Island States and the G-77 and China, but stronger than the targets proposed by others, e.g., Canada and the United States.

Relation to temperature targets

At the 16th Conference of the Parties held in 2010, Parties to the UNFCCC agreed that future global warming should be limited below 2°C relative to the pre-industrial temperature level. One of the stabilization levels discussed in relation to this temperature target is to hold atmospheric concentrations of GHGs at 450 parts per million (ppm) CO₂- eq. Stabilization at 450 ppm could be associated with a 26 to 78% risk of exceeding the 2 °C target.

Scenarios assessed by Gupta et al. (2007) suggest that Annex I emissions would need to be 25% to 40% below 1990 levels by 2020, and 80% to 95% below 1990 levels by 2050. The only Annex I Parties to have made voluntary pledges in line with this are Japan (25% below 1990 levels by 2020) and Norway (30–40% below 1990 levels by 2020).

Gupta et al. (2007) also looked at what 450 ppm scenarios projected for non-Annex I Parties. Projections indicated that by 2020, non-Annex I emissions in several regions (Latin America, the Middle East, East Asia, and centrally planned Asia) would need to be substantially reduced below "business-as-usual". "Business-as-usual" are projected non-Annex I emissions in the absence of any new policies to control emissions. Projections indicated that by 2050, emissions in all non-Annex I regions would need to be substantially reduced below "business-as-usual".

Financial commitments

The Protocol also reaffirms the principle that developed countries have to pay billions of dollars, and supply technology to other countries for climate-related studies and projects. The principle was originally agreed in UNFCCC. One such project is The Adaptation Fund, which has been established by the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change to finance concrete adaptation projects and programmes in developing countries that are Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.

Implementation provisions

The protocol left several issues open to be decided later by the sixth Conference of Parties COP6 of the UNFCCC, which attempted to resolve these issues at its meeting in the Hague in late 2000, but it was unable to reach an agreement due to disputes between the European Union (who favoured a tougher implementation) and the United States, Canada, Japan and Australia (who wanted the agreement to be less demanding and more flexible).

In 2001, a continuation of the previous meeting (COP6-bis) was held in Bonn, where the required decisions were adopted. After some concessions, the supporters of the protocol (led by the European Union) managed to secure the agreement of Japan and Russia by allowing more use of carbon dioxide sinks.

COP7 was held from 29 October 2001 through 9 November 2001 in Marrakech to establish the final details of the protocol.

The first Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (MOP1) was held in Montreal from 28 November to 9 December 2005, along with the 11th conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP11). See United Nations Climate Change Conference.

During COP13 in Bali, 36 developed Contact Group countries (plus the EU as a party in the European Union) agreed to a 10% emissions increase for Iceland; but, since the EU's member states each have individual obligations, much larger increases (up to 27%) are allowed for some of the less developed EU countries (see below § Increase in greenhouse gas emission since 1990). Reduction limitations expired in 2013.

Mechanism of compliance

The protocol defines a mechanism of "compliance" as a "monitoring compliance with the commitments and penalties for non-compliance." According to Grubb (2003), the explicit consequences of non-compliance of the treaty are weak compared to domestic law. Yet, the compliance section of the treaty was highly contested in the Marrakesh Accords.

Monitoring emissions

Monitoring emissions in international agreements is tough as in international law, there is no police power, creating the incentive for states to find 'ways around' monitoring. The Kyoto Protocol regulated six sinks and sources of Gases. Carbon dioxide, Methane, Nirous oxide, Hydroflurocarbons, Sulfur hexafluouride and Perfluorocarbons. Monitoring these gases can become quite a challenge. Methane can be monitored and measured from irrigated rice fields and can be measured by the seedling growing up to harvest. Future implications state that this can be affected by more cost effective ways to control emissions as changes in types of fertilizer can reduce emissions by 50%. In addition to this, many countries are unable to monitor certain ways of carbon absorption through trees and soils to an accurate level.

Enforcing emission cuts

If the enforcement branch determines that an Annex I country is not in compliance with its emissions limitation, then that country is required to make up the difference during the second commitment period plus an additional 30%. In addition, that country will be suspended from making transfers under an emissions trading program.

Ratification process

Countries that ratified the Protocol

The Protocol was adopted by COP 3 of UNFCCC on 11 December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan. It was opened on 16 March 1998 for signature during one year by parties to UNFCCC, when it was signed Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, the Maldives, Samoa, St. Lucia and Switzerland. At the end of the signature period, 82 countries and the European Community had signed. Ratification (which is required to become a party to the Protocol) started on 17 September with ratification by Fiji. Countries that did not sign acceded to the convention, which has the same legal effect.

Article 25 of the Protocol specifies that the Protocol enters into force "on the ninetieth day after the date on which not less than 55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating Parties included in Annex I which accounted in total for at least 55% of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Annex I countries, have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession."

The EU and its Member States ratified the Protocol in May 2002. Of the two conditions, the "55 parties" clause was reached on 23 May 2002 when Iceland ratified the Protocol. The ratification by Russia on 18 November 2004 satisfied the "55%" clause and brought the treaty into force, effective 16 February 2005, after the required lapse of 90 days.

As of May 2013, 191 countries and one regional economic organization (the EC) have ratified the agreement, representing over 61.6% of the 1990 emissions from Annex I countries. One of the 191 ratifying states—Canada—has renounced the protocol.

show

Convention Parties

Afghanistan Albania Algeria Angola Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Azerbaijan Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belgium Belize Benin Bhutan Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana Brazil Brunei Bulgaria Burkina Faso Myanmar Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Chile China Colombia Comoros Democratic Republic of the Congo Republic of the Congo Cook Islands Costa Rica Ivory Coast Croatia Cuba Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Djibouti Dominica

Dominican Republic Ecuador East Timor Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Estonia Eswatini Ethiopia European Union Fiji Finland France Gabon Gambia Georgia Germany Ghana Greece Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana Haiti Honduras Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Kiribati North Korea South Korea Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Laos Latvia Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libya

Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Marshall Islands Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Federated States of Micronesia Moldova Monaco Mongolia Montenegro Morocco Mozambique Namibia Nauru Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Niue North Macedonia Norway Oman Pakistan Palau Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Qatar Romania Russia Rwanda Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Samoa San Marino

São Tomé and Príncipe Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Slovakia Slovenia Solomon Islands Somalia (non-party to Kyoto) South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sudan Suriname Sweden Switzerland Syria Tajikistan Tanzania Thailand Togo Tonga Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Tuvalu Uganda Ukraine United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States (non-party to Kyoto) Uruguay Uzbekistan Vanuatu Venezuela Vietnam Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe Observers: Andorra (non-party to Kyoto) Holy See (non-party to Kyoto)

Non-ratification by the US

The US signed the Protocol on 12 November 1998, during the Clinton presidency. To become binding in the US, however, the treaty had to be ratified by the Senate, which had already passed the 1997 non-binding Byrd-Hagel Resolution, expressing disapproval of any international agreement that did not require developing countries to make emission reductions and "would seriously harm the economy of the United States". The resolution passed 95–0. Therefore, even though the Clinton administration signed the treaty, it was never submitted to the Senate for ratification.

At the outset of the Bush administration, Senators Chuck Hagel, Jesse Helms, Larry Craig, and Pat Roberts wrote a letter to President George W. Bush seeking to identify his position on the Kyoto Protocol and climate change policy. In a letter dated March 13, 2001, President Bush responded that his "Administration takes the issue of global climate change very seriously", but that "I oppose the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts 80 percent of the world, including major population centers such as China and India, from compliance, and would cause serious harm to the U.S. economy. The Senate's vote, 95-0, shows that there is a clear consensus that the Kyoto Protocol is an unfair and ineffective means of addressing global climate change concerns." The administration also questioned the scientific certainty around climate change and cited potential harms of emissions reduction to the US economy.

The Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research reported in 2001:

This policy reversal received a massive wave of criticism that was quickly picked up by the international media. Environmental groups blasted the White House, while Europeans and Japanese alike expressed deep concern and regret. ... Almost all world leaders (e.g. China, Japan, South Africa, Pacific Islands, etc.) expressed their disappointment at Bush's decision.

In response to this criticism, Bush stated: "I was responding to reality, and reality is the nation has got a real problem when it comes to energy". The Tyndall Centre called this "an overstatement used to cover up the big benefactors of this policy reversal, i.e., the US oil and coal industry, which has a powerful lobby with the administration and conservative Republican congressmen."

As of 2023, the US is the only signatory that has not ratified the Protocol. The US accounted for 36.1% of emissions in 1990. As such, for the treaty to go into legal effect without US ratification, it would require a coalition including the EU, Russia, Japan, and small parties. A deal, without the US Administration, was reached in the Bonn climate talks (COP-6.5), held in 2001.

Withdrawal of Canada

Main article: Kyoto Protocol and government action § Withdrawal of Canada

See also: Canada and the Kyoto Protocol

In 2011, Canada, Japan and Russia stated that they would not take on further Kyoto targets. The Canadian government announced its withdrawal—possible at any time three years after ratification—from the Kyoto Protocol on 12 December 2011, effective 15 December 2012. Canada was committed to cutting its greenhouse emissions to 6% below 1990 levels by 2012, but in 2009 emissions were 17% higher than in 1990. The Harper government prioritized oil sands development in Alberta, and deprioritized the reduction of greenhouse emissions. Environment minister Peter Kent cited Canada's liability to "enormous financial penalties" under the treaty unless it withdrew. He also suggested that the recently signed Durban agreement may provide an alternative way forward. The Harper government claimed it would find a "Made in Canada" solution. Canada's decision received a generally negative response from representatives of other ratifying countries.

Other states and territories where the treaty was not applicable

Andorra, Palestine, South Sudan, the United States and, following their withdrawal on 15 December 2012, Canada are the only UNFCCC Parties that are not party to the Protocol. Furthermore, the Protocol is not applied to UNFCCC observer the Holy See. Although the Kingdom of the Netherlands approved the protocol for the whole Kingdom, it did not deposit an instrument of ratification for Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten or the Caribbean Netherlands.

Country types and their emissions

See also: List of countries by carbon dioxide emissions per capita, List of countries by carbon dioxide emissions, and GHG Protocol Corporate Standard

Annex I countries

Total aggregate GHG emissions excluding emissions/removals from land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF, i.e., carbon storage in forests and soils) for all Annex I Parties (see list below) including the United States taken together decreased from 19.0 to 17.8 thousand teragrams (Tg, which is equal to 10⁹ kg) CO₂ equivalent, a decline of 6.0% during the 1990–2008 period. Several factors have contributed to this decline. The first is due to the economic restructuring in the Annex I Economies in Transition (the EITs – see Intergovernmental Emissions Trading for the list of EITs). Over the period 1990–1999, emissions fell by 40% in the EITs following the collapse of central planning in the former Soviet Union and east European countries. This led to a massive contraction of their heavy industry-based economies, with associated reductions in their fossil fuel consumption and emissions.

Emissions growth in Annex I Parties have also been limited due to policies and measures (PaMs). In particular, PaMs were strengthened after 2000, helping to enhance energy efficiency and develop renewable energy sources. Energy use also decreased during the economic crisis in 2007–2008.

Annex I parties with targets

Percentage changes in emissions from the base year (1990 for most countries) for Annex I Parties with Kyoto targets

Country	Kyoto target 2008–2012	Kyoto target 2013–2020	GHG emissions 2008–2012 including LULUCF	GHG emissions 2008–2012 excluding LULUCF
Australia	+8	−0.5	+3.2	+30.3
Austria	−13	−20	+3.2	+4.9
Belgium	−8	−20	−13.9	−14.0
Bulgaria	−8	−20	−53.4	−52.8
Canada (withdrew)	−6	N/A	+18.5	+18.5
Croatia	−5	−20	−10.8	−7.5
Czech Republic	−8	−20	−30.6	−30.0
Denmark	−21	−20	−17.3	−14.8
Estonia	−8	−20	−54.2	−55.3
Finland	0	−20	−5.5	−4.7
France	0	−20	−10.5	−10.0
Germany	−21	−20	−24.3	−23.6
Greece	+25	−20	+11.5	+11.9
Hungary	−6	−20	−43.7	−41.8
Iceland	+10	−20	+10.2	+19.4
Ireland	+13	−20	+11.0	+5.1
Italy	−6	−20	−7.0	−4.0
Japan	−6	N/A	−2.5	+1.4
Latvia	−8	−20	−61.2	−56.4
Liechtenstein	−8	−16	+4.1	+2.4
Lithuania	−8	−20	−57.9	−55.6
Luxembourg	−28	−20	−9.3	−8.7
Monaco	−8	−22	−12.5	−12.5
Netherlands	−6	−20	−6.2	−6.4
New Zealand	0	N/A	−2.7	+20.4
Norway	+1	−16	+4.6	+7.5
Poland	−6	−20	−29.7	−28.8
Portugal	+27	−20	+5.5	+22.4
Romania	−8	−20	−57.0	−55.7
Russia	0	N/A	−36.3	−32.7
Slovakia	−8	−20	−37.2	−36.8
Slovenia	−8	−20	−9.7	−3.2
Spain	+15	−20	+20.0	+23.7
Sweden	+4	−20	−18.2	−15.3
Switzerland	−8	−15.8	−3.9	−0.8
Ukraine	0	−24	−57.1	−56.6
United Kingdom	−13	−20	−23.0	−22.6
United States (did not ratify)	−7	N/A	+9.5	+9.5

CO₂ emissions from fuel combustion of Annex I Kyoto Protocol (KP) Parties, 1990–2009. Total Annex I KP emissions are shown, along with emissions of Annex II KP and Annex I EITs.

Collectively the group of industrialized countries committed to a Kyoto target, i.e., the Annex I countries excluding the US, had a target of reducing their GHG emissions by 4.2% on average for the period 2008–2012 relative to the base year, which in most cases is 1990.

As noted in the preceding section, between 1990 and 1999, there was a large reduction in the emissions of the EITs. The reduction in the EITs is largely responsible for the total (aggregate) reduction (excluding LULUCF) in emissions of the Annex I countries, excluding the US. Emissions of the Annex II countries (Annex I minus the EIT countries) have experienced a limited increase in emissions from 1990 to 2006, followed by stabilization and a more marked decrease from 2007 onwards. The emissions reductions in the early nineties by the 12 EIT countries who have since joined the EU, assist the present EU-27 in meeting its collective Kyoto target.

В декабре 2011 года министр окружающей среды Канады Питер Кент официально объявил, что Канада выйдет из Киотского соглашения на следующий день после окончания Конференции ООН по изменению климата 2011 года (см. раздел о выходе Канады ).

без целей

Беларусь, Мальта и Турция являются Сторонами Приложения I, но не имеют целей первого раунда Киотского протокола. У США была цель Киотского протокола по сокращению выбросов на 7% по сравнению с уровнем 1990 года, но они не ратифицировали договор. Если бы США ратифицировали Киотский протокол, среднее процентное сокращение общих выбросов парниковых газов для группы Приложения I составило бы сокращение на 5,2% по сравнению с базовым годом.

Не входящие в Приложение I

Годовые выбросы углекислого газа на душу населения (т.е. средние выбросы на человека) от сжигания топлива в период с 1990 по 2009 год для Сторон, входящих и не входящих в Приложение I Киотского протокола.

Годовые выбросы углекислого газа в результате сжигания топлива в период с 1990 по 2009 год для Сторон, входящих и не входящих в Приложение I Киотского протокола.

РКИК ООН (2005 г.) собрала и обобщила информацию, предоставленную ей Сторонами, не включенными в Приложение I. Большинство Сторон, не включенных в приложение I, относятся к группе с низкими доходами, и очень немногие из них относятся к странам со средним уровнем дохода. Большинство Сторон включили информацию о политике, касающейся устойчивого развития . Приоритеты устойчивого развития, упомянутые Сторонами, не включенными в Приложение I, включают борьбу с бедностью и доступ к базовому образованию и здравоохранению. Многие Стороны, не включенные в Приложение I, прилагают усилия по внесению поправок и обновлений в свое экологическое законодательство , чтобы включить в него глобальные проблемы, такие как изменение климата.

Несколько Сторон, например, Южная Африка и Иран , заявили о своей обеспокоенности по поводу того, как усилия по сокращению выбросов Сторон, включенных в Приложение I, могут отрицательно повлиять на их экономику. Экономика этих стран сильно зависит от доходов, получаемых от добычи, переработки и экспорта ископаемого топлива .

Выбросы парниковых газов, за исключением изменений в землепользовании и лесном хозяйстве (ИЗЛХ), о которых сообщили 122 Стороны, не включенные в Приложение I, за 1994 год или ближайший к ним отчетный год составили в общей сложности 11,7 миллиардов тонн (миллиард = 1 000 000 000) CO ₂ -экв. CO ₂ составлял наибольшую долю выбросов (63%), за ним следовали метан (26%) и закись азота (N ₂ O) (11%).

Энергетический сектор был крупнейшим источником выбросов для 70 Сторон, тогда как для 45 Сторон крупнейшим источником выбросов был сельскохозяйственный сектор. Выбросы на душу населения (в тоннах эквивалента CO ₂ , исключая ЗИЗЛХ) в среднем составили 2,8 тонны для 122 Сторон, не включенных в приложение I.

• выбросы в африканском регионе Совокупные составили 1,6 миллиарда тонн, при этом выбросы на душу населения составили 2,4 тонны.
• Совокупные выбросы в Азиатско-Тихоокеанском регионе составили 7,9 миллиарда тонн, при этом выбросы на душу населения составили 2,6 тонны.
• Совокупные выбросы в регионе Латинской Америки и Карибского бассейна составили 2 миллиарда тонн, при этом выбросы на душу населения составили 4,6 тонны.
• «Другой» регион включает Албанию , Армению, Азербайджан , Грузию, Мальту, Молдову и Северную Македонию . Их совокупные выбросы составили 0,1 миллиарда тонн, при этом выбросы на душу населения составили 5,1 тонны.

Стороны сообщили о высоком уровне неопределенности в отношении выбросов ИЗЛХ, но в целом разница, как представляется, составляет лишь небольшую величину в 1,7% с учетом и без ИЗЛХ. При использовании ИЗЛХ выбросы составили 11,9 миллиардов тонн, без ИЗЛХ общие совокупные выбросы составили 11,7 миллиардов тонн.

Проблемные места

Протокола

Основные статьи: Взгляды на Киотский протокол и критика Киотского протокола

Гупта и др. (2007) провели оценку литературы по политике в области изменения климата. Они обнаружили, что ни одна авторитетная оценка РКИК ООН или Протокола к ней не утверждает, что эти соглашения смогли или будут успешными в решении климатической проблемы. В этих оценках предполагалось, что РКИК ООН или Протокол к ней не будут изменены. Рамочная конвенция и Протокол к ней включают положения о будущих политических мерах, которые необходимо предпринять.

Гупта и др. (2007) охарактеризовал обязательства первого раунда Киотского протокола как «скромные», заявив, что они ограничивают эффективность договора. Было высказано предположение, что последующие Киотские обязательства можно было бы сделать более эффективными за счет мер, направленных на достижение более глубокого сокращения выбросов, а также за счет политики, применимой к большей доле глобальных выбросов. В 2008 году на страны с ограничениями Киотского протокола приходилось менее одной трети ежегодных мировых выбросов углекислого газа в результате сжигания топлива .

Всемирный банк (2010 г.) прокомментировал, что Киотский протокол лишь незначительно повлиял на сдерживание глобального роста выбросов. Соглашение было заключено в 1997 году, но в 2006 году выбросы углекислого газа, связанные с энергетикой, выросли на 24%. Всемирный банк (2010) также заявил, что договор предоставил лишь ограниченную финансовую поддержку развивающимся странам, чтобы помочь им сократить выбросы и адаптироваться к изменению климата.

Некоторые защитники окружающей среды поддержали Киотский протокол, потому что это «единственная игра в городе», и, возможно, потому, что они ожидают, что будущие обязательства по сокращению выбросов могут потребовать более строгих сокращений выбросов (Aldy et al ., 2003, стр. 9). В 2001 году семнадцать национальных академий наук заявили, что ратификация Протокола представляет собой «небольшой, но важный первый шаг на пути к стабилизации концентрации парниковых газов в атмосфере». Некоторые экологи и ученые раскритиковали существующие обязательства как слишком слабые (Grubb, 2000, стр. 5).

США (при бывшем президенте Джордже Буше ) и Австралия (первоначально при бывшем премьер-министре Джоне Ховарде ) не ратифицировали Киотский договор. По словам Стерна (2006), их решение было основано на отсутствии количественных обязательств по выбросам для стран с развивающейся экономикой (см. также раздел , начиная с 2000 г. ). Австралия под руководством бывшего премьер-министра Кевина Радда с тех пор ратифицировала договор. который вступил в силу в марте 2008 года.

Соответствие

38 развитых стран обязались ограничить выбросы парниковых газов. Поскольку Соединенные Штаты не ратифицировали документ, а Канада вышла из него, ограничения на выбросы остались в силе для 36 стран. Все они соблюдали Протокол. Однако девять стран (Австрия, Дания, Исландия, Япония, Лихтенштейн, Люксембург, Норвегия, Испания и Швейцария) были вынуждены прибегнуть к гибким механизмам, поскольку их национальные выбросы были немного выше целевых показателей.

В общей сложности 36 стран, которые полностью участвовали в Протоколе, обязались сократить свои совокупные выбросы на 4% по сравнению с базовым 1990 годом. Их среднегодовые выбросы в 2008–2012 годах были на 24,2% ниже уровня 1990 года. Таким образом, они значительно превысили свои совокупные обязательства. Если включить США и Канаду, выбросы сократились на 11,8%. Значительное сокращение произошло главным образом благодаря распаду Советского Союза , который сократил выбросы Восточного блока на десятки процентов в начале 1990-х годов. Кроме того, финансовый кризис 2007–2008 годов значительно сократил выбросы в течение первого периода действия Киотских обязательств.

На долю 36 стран, которые взяли на себя обязательства по сокращению выбросов, пришлось лишь 24% мировых выбросов парниковых газов в 2010 году. Несмотря на то, что эти страны значительно сократили свои выбросы в период действия Киотских обязательств, другие страны увеличили свои выбросы настолько, что глобальные выбросы увеличились на 32% с 1990 по 2010 год.

Тенденции выбросов

В нескольких крупных развивающихся странах и быстрорастущих экономиках (Китай, Индия, Таиланд, Индонезия, Египет и Иран) выбросы парниковых газов быстро возросли (PBL, 2009). Например, выбросы в Китае резко возросли за период 1990–2005 годов, часто более чем на 10% в год. Выбросы на душу населения в странах, не включенных в Приложение I, по большей части все еще намного ниже, чем в промышленно развитых странах. Страны, не включенные в Приложение I, не имеют количественных обязательств по сокращению выбросов, но они привержены действиям по смягчению последствий. В Китае, например, существует национальная политическая программа по сокращению роста выбросов, которая включает закрытие старых, менее эффективных угольных электростанций.

механизмы

Дополнительная информация: Гибкие механизмы § Взгляды на механизмы гибкости и торговлю выбросами углерода.

Еще одна область, которая была прокомментирована, - это роль механизмов гибкости Киотского протокола - торговля выбросами углерода , совместное осуществление и Механизм чистого развития (МЧР). Гибкие механизмы вызвали как положительные, так и отрицательные отзывы.

Один из аргументов в пользу гибких механизмов заключается в том, что они могут снизить затраты, понесенные Сторонами Приложения I при выполнении своих обязательств по Киотскому протоколу. Критика гибкости, например, включала неэффективность торговли выбросами в стимулировании инвестиций в неископаемые источники энергии, и неблагоприятное воздействие проектов МЧР на местные сообщества в развивающихся странах.

Китай, Индия, Индонезия и Бразилия не были обязаны сокращать _{выбросы CO2} . Остальные подписавшие страны не были обязаны внедрять общие рамки или конкретные меры, но должны были достичь цели по сокращению выбросов, для достижения которой они могли бы воспользоваться вторичным рынком углеродных квот, обмениваемых друг с другом в многостороннем порядке. Схема торговли выбросами (ETS) позволяла странам размещать загрязняющие предприятия и покупать у других стран собственность, основанную на их экологических достоинствах и добродетельных моделях.

В обзоре 2021 года будут рассмотрены как институциональная структура, так и политические стратегии, которые повлияли на принятие Киотского протокола. В нем делается вывод, что относительно небольшое влияние Киотского протокола на глобальные выбросы углекислого газа отражает ряд факторов, включая «преднамеренную политическую стратегию, неравную власть и отсутствие лидерства» среди стран и внутри них. Усилия представителей ископаемого топлива и консервативных аналитических центров по распространению дезинформации и отрицанию изменения климата повлияли на общественное мнение и политические действия как внутри Соединенных Штатов, так и за их пределами. Прямое лоббирование компаний, занимающихся ископаемым топливом, и финансирование ими политических игроков замедлили политические действия по решению проблемы изменения климата на региональном, национальном и международном уровнях.

и

Основная статья: Переговоры по пост-Киотскому протоколу о выбросах парниковых газов

В не имеющей обязательной силы « Вашингтонской декларации », согласованной 16 февраля 2007 года, главы правительств Канады, Франции, Германии, Италии, Японии, России, Великобритании, США, Бразилии, Китая, Индии, Мексики и Южной Африки согласились в принципе по образцу преемника Киотского протокола. Они предусматривали глобальную систему ограничения выбросов и торговли квотами, которая будет применяться как к промышленно развитым странам, так и к развивающимся странам , и первоначально надеялись, что она будет введена в действие к 2009 году.

Конференция ООН по изменению климата в Копенгагене в декабре 2009 года была одной из ежегодных встреч ООН, последовавших за Саммитом Земли 1992 года в Рио. В 1997 году переговоры привели к подписанию Киотского протокола, и конференция в Копенгагене рассматривалась как возможность договориться о преемнике Киотского протокола, который приведет к значительному сокращению выбросов углекислого газа.

Канкунские соглашения 2010 года включают добровольные обязательства 76 развитых и развивающихся стран контролировать выбросы парниковых газов. В 2010 году эти 76 стран несли коллективную ответственность за 85% ежегодных глобальных выбросов.

К маю 2012 года США, Япония, Россия и Канада заявили, что не подпишут второй период обязательств по Киотскому протоколу. В ноябре 2012 года Австралия подтвердила, что будет участвовать во втором периоде обязательств по Киотскому протоколу, а Новая Зеландия подтвердила, что не будет.

Министр климата Новой Зеландии Тим Грозер заявил, что Киотский протокол, действовавший 15 лет назад, устарел и что Новая Зеландия «опередила всех» в поисках замены, которая включала бы развивающиеся страны. Некоммерческие экологические организации, такие как Всемирный фонд дикой природы, раскритиковали решение Новой Зеландии выйти из проекта.

8 декабря 2012 года, по итогам Конференции ООН по изменению климата 2012 года , было достигнуто соглашение о продлении действия Протокола до 2020 года и установлении даты 2015 года для разработки документа-преемника, который будет реализован с 2020 года (см. для получения дополнительной информации). Итоги переговоров в Дохе вызвали неоднозначную реакцию: малые островные государства критиковали весь пакет мер. Второй период обязательств по Киотскому протоколу распространяется примерно на 11% ежегодных глобальных выбросов парниковых газов. Другие результаты конференции включают график принятия глобального соглашения, которое будет принято к 2015 году и охватывающего все страны. На встрече сторон РКИК ООН в Дохе 8 декабря 2012 года главный переговорщик по климату Европейского Союза Артур Рунге-Мецгер пообещал продлить договор, обязательный для 27 европейских государств-членов, до 2020 года в ожидании внутренней ратификации. процедура.

Пан Ги Мун , генеральный секретарь ООН , призвал мировых лидеров прийти к соглашению по прекращению глобального потепления в ходе 69-й сессии Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН. 23 сентября 2014 года в Нью-Йорке. Следующий климатический саммит состоялся в Париже в 2015 году , в результате чего появилось Парижское соглашение , преемник Киотского протокола.

См. также

• Механизм чистого развития
• Копенгагенское соглашение
• Киотский протокол и действия правительства
• Список инициатив по изменению климата
• Дополнительность

Ссылки

Источники

• Carbon Trust (март 2009 г.), Глобальные углеродные механизмы: новые уроки и последствия (CTC748) , Carbon Trust, заархивировано из оригинала 4 мая 2013 г. , получено 24 июля 2012 г.
• Депледж, Дж. (25 ноября 2000 г.), Рамочная конвенция Организации Объединенных Наций об изменении климата (РКИК ООН) Технический документ: Прослеживание истоков Киотского протокола: постатейная текстовая история (PDF) , Рамочная конвенция Организации Объединенных Наций об изменении климата , заархивировано (PDF) из оригинала 7 августа 2009 г. , получено 11 августа 2009 г.
• Дессаи, С. (декабрь 2001 г.), Рабочий документ 12 Центра Тиндаля: Климатический режим от Гааги до Марракеша: спасти или потопить Киотский протокол? , Норидж, Великобритания: Центр Тиндалла, архивировано с оригинала 31 октября 2012 г.
• G-77 (22 ноября 2011 г.), Группа 77 - государства-члены , Группа 77, заархивировано из оригинала 2 ноября 2012 г. , получено 22 октября 2012 г. {{citation}}: CS1 maint: числовые имена: список авторов ( ссылка )
• Грабб, М. (июль – сентябрь 2003 г.), «Экономика Киотского протокола», World Economics , 4 (3), CiteSeerX   10.1.1.163.1719
• Грабб, М.; Депледж, Дж. (2001), «Семь мифов Киото» (PDF) , Climate Policy , 1 (2): 269–272, Бибкод : 2001CliPo...1..269G , doi : 10.3763/cpol.2001.0126 , S2CID   219597384 , заархивировано из оригинала (PDF) 3 декабря 2011 г.
• МГЭИК ТДО WG3 (2001), Мец, Б.; Дэвидсон, О.; Сварт, Р.; Пан, Дж.; и др. (ред.), Изменение климата 2001: смягчение последствий , Вклад Рабочей группы III в третий оценочный отчет Межправительственной группы экспертов по изменению климата, Cambridge University Press, ISBN  978-0-521-80769-2 , заархивировано из оригинала 27 февраля 2017 г. {{citation}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link) (pb: 0-521-01502-2 ).
• МГЭИК ТАР САР (2001), Уотсон, RT; Основная группа авторов (ред.), Изменение климата 2001: Обобщающий отчет (SYR) , Вклад рабочих групп I, II и III в Третий оценочный отчет (TAR) Межправительственной группы экспертов по изменению климата (IPCC), Cambridge University Press , ISBN  978-0-521-80770-8 , заархивировано из оригинала 3 ноября 2018 года , получено 17 июля 2012 года (стр.: 0-521-01507-3 ).
• IPCC AR4 WG3 (2007), Мец, Б.; Дэвидсон, Орегон; Бош, PR; Дэйв, Р.; Мейер, Л.А. (ред.), Изменение климата, 2007 г.: Смягчение последствий изменения климата , Вклад Рабочей группы III (WG3) в Четвертый оценочный отчет (AR4) Межправительственной группы экспертов по изменению климата (IPCC), Cambridge University Press, ISBN  978-0-521-88011-4 , архивировано из оригинала 12 октября 2014 года , получено 17 июля 2012 года. {{citation}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link) (pb: 978-0-521-70598-1 ).
• IPCC AR4 SYR (2007), Основная группа авторов; Пачаури, РК; Райзингер, А. (ред.), Изменение климата 2007: Обобщающий отчет (SYR) , Вклад рабочих групп I, II и III в Четвертый оценочный отчет (AR4) Межправительственной группы экспертов по изменению климата (IPCC), Женева , Швейцария : МГЭИК, ISBN  978-92-9169-122-7 , архивировано из оригинала 3 ноября 2018 года , получено 17 июля 2012 года. {{citation}}: CS1 maint: числовые имена: список авторов ( ссылка ) .
• Ливерман, Д. М. (2009), «Конвенции об изменении климата: конструкции опасности и лишение атмосферы» (PDF) , Журнал исторической географии , 35 (2): 279–296, doi : 10.1016/j.jhg.2008.08 .008 , заархивировано из оригинала (PDF) 12 сентября 2014 г.
• Спэш, CL (2010), «Дивный новый мир торговли выбросами углерода» (PDF) , Новая политическая экономия , 15 (2): 169–195, doi : 10.1080/13563460903556049 , S2CID   44071002 , заархивировано из оригинала (PDF) на 10 мая 2013 г.
• Стерн, Н. (2006), Обзорный отчет Стерна по экономике изменения климата (предварительное издание) , Лондон, Великобритания: Казначейство Ее Величества, архивировано с оригинала 7 апреля 2010 г.
• Всемирный банк (2010), «Доклад о мировом развитии 2010: Развитие и изменение климата» , Климат и развитие , 2 (3), Вашингтон, округ Колумбия, США: Международный банк реконструкции и развития / Всемирный банк: 299, Bibcode : 2010CliDe. ..2..299M , doi : 10.3763/cdev.2010.0046 , S2CID   154615933 , заархивировано из оригинала 9 марта 2012 г. , получено 10 апреля 2012 г.

Внешние ссылки

• Текст протокола ( HTML, архивировано 25 августа 2009 г. на Wayback Machine и PDF, архивировано 5 октября 2011 г. на Wayback Machine ), 2007 г. Архивировано 17 июня 2013 г. на Wayback Machine , с поправками 2012 г.
• Список стран, которые ратифицировали, приняли, утвердили Киотский протокол или получили к нему доступ. Архивировано 17 апреля 2021 г. на Wayback Machine Wayback Machine , его первая поправка. Архивировано 17 апреля 2021 г. на Wayback Machine (Цели для Беларуси) и вторая поправка. Архивировано 1 июня 2023 г. на сайте . Wayback Machine (период продления 2012–2020 гг.)
• Киотский протокол к Рамочной конвенции Организации Объединенных Наций об изменении климата на Law-Ref.org - полностью проиндексирован и связан с другими документами.
• Путеводитель по Киотскому протоколу для непрофессионалов. Архивировано 14 августа 2009 г. в Wayback Machine.