Treaty of Versailles

See also: Rue Nitot, Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920), and Diplomatic history of World War I

This article is about the Treaty of Versailles of 28 June 1919, at the end of World War I. For other uses, see Treaty of Versailles (disambiguation).

Treaty of Versailles

Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany
Cover of the English version
Signed	28 June 1919 (28 June 1919)
Location	Hall of Mirrors in the Palace of Versailles, Versailles, France
Effective	10 January 1920
Condition	Ratification by Germany and three Principal Allied and Associate Powers
Parties	show Principal Allied and Associated Powers United States British Empire  • United Kingdom  • Canada  • Australia  • South Africa  • New Zealand  • India France Italy Japan show Allied and Associated Powers Belgium Bolivia Brazil China Cuba Ecuador Greece Guatemala Haiti Hejaz Honduras Liberia Nicaragua Panama Peru Poland Portugal Romania Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes Siam Czechoslovakia Uruguay Germany
Depositary	French Government
Languages	French and English
Full text
Treaty of Versailles at Wikisource

The Treaty of Versailles was a peace treaty signed on 28 June 1919. As the most important treaty of World War I, it ended the state of war between Germany and most of the Allied Powers. It was signed in the Palace of Versailles, exactly five years after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, which led to the war. The other Central Powers on the German side signed separate treaties. Although the armistice of 11 November 1918 ended the actual fighting, and agreed certain principles and conditions including the payment of reparations, it took six months of Allied negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference to conclude the peace treaty. Germany was not allowed to participate in the negotiations before signing the treaty.

The treaty required Germany to disarm, make territorial concessions, respect Austrian independence, extradite alleged war criminals, agree to Kaiser Wilhelm being put on trial, agree to Allied Occupation of the Rhineland, be responsible with its allies for damages of the Allied and Associated sides in World War I, recognise the independence of states whose territory had previously been part of the German Empire, and pay reparations to the Entente powers. The most critical and controversial provision in the treaty was: "The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies." The other members of the Central Powers signed treaties containing similar articles. This article, Article 231, became known as the "War Guilt" clause.

Critics including John Maynard Keynes declared the treaty too harsh, styling it as a "Carthaginian peace", and saying the reparations were excessive and counterproductive. On the other hand, prominent Allied figures such as French Marshal Ferdinand Foch criticized the treaty for treating Germany too leniently. This is still the subject of ongoing debate by historians and economists.

The result of these competing and sometimes conflicting goals among the victors was a compromise that left no one satisfied. In particular, Germany was neither pacified nor conciliated, nor was it permanently weakened. The United States never ratified the Versailles treaty and made a separate peace treaty with Germany, albeit based on the Versailles treaty. The problems that arose from the treaty would lead to the Locarno Treaties, which improved relations between Germany and the other European powers. The reparation system was reorganized and payments reduced in the Dawes Plan and the Young Plan. Bitter resentment of the treaty combined with the Great Depression powered the rise of the Nazi Party, and eventually the outbreak of a second World War.

Although it is often referred to as the "Versailles Conference", only the actual signing of the treaty took place at the historic palace. Most of the negotiations were in Paris, with the "Big Four" meetings taking place generally at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Quai d'Orsay.

Background

First World War

Main article: World War I

Duration: 8 minutes and 19 seconds.8:19

Newsreel footage of the signing of the peace treaty at Versailles

War broke out following the July Crisis in 1914. Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, followed quickly by Germany declaring war on Russia on 1 August, and on Belgium and France on 3 August. The German invasion of Belgium on 3 August led to a declaration of war by Britain on Germany on 4 August, creating the conflict that became the First World War. Two alliances faced off, the Central Powers (led by Germany) and the Triple Entente (led by Britain, France and Russia). Other countries entered as fighting raged widely across Europe, as well as the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Having seen the overthrow of the Tsarist regime in the February Revolution and the Kerensky government in the October Revolution, the new Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic under Vladimir Lenin in March 1918 signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, amounting to a surrender that was highly favourable to Germany. Sensing victory before the American Expeditionary Forces could be ready, Germany now shifted forces to the Western Front and tried to overwhelm the Allies. It failed. Instead, the Allies won decisively on the battlefield, overwhelmed Germany's Turkish, Austro-Hungarian, and Bulgarian allies, and forced an armistice in November 1918 that resembled a surrender.

Role of the Fourteen Points

Main articles: American entry into World War I and Fourteen Points

The United States entered the war against the Central Powers in 1917 and President Woodrow Wilson played a significant role in shaping the peace terms. His expressed aim was to detach the war from nationalistic disputes and ambitions. On 8 January 1918, Wilson issued the Fourteen Points. They outlined a policy of free trade, open agreements, and democracy. While the term was not used, self-determination was assumed. It called for a negotiated end to the war, international disarmament, the withdrawal of the Central Powers from occupied territories, the creation of a Polish state, the redrawing of Europe's borders along ethnic lines, and the formation of a League of Nations to guarantee the political independence and territorial integrity of all states. It called for what it characterised as a just and democratic peace uncompromised by territorial annexation. The Fourteen Points were based on the research of the Inquiry, a team of about 150 advisors led by foreign-policy advisor Edward M. House, into the topics likely to arise in the expected peace conference.

Armistice

Main articles: Armistice of 11 November 1918 and Occupation of the Rhineland

Map showing the Western Front as it stood on 11 November 1918. The German frontier of 1914 had been crossed in the vicinities of Mulhouse, Château-Salins, and Marieulles in Alsace-Lorraine. The post-war bridgeheads over the Rhine are also shown.

During the autumn of 1918, the Central Powers began to collapse. Desertion rates within the German army began to increase, and civilian strikes drastically reduced war production. On the Western Front, the Allied forces launched the Hundred Days Offensive and decisively defeated the German western armies. Sailors of the Imperial German Navy at Kiel mutinied in response to the naval order of 24 October 1918, which prompted uprisings in Germany, which became known as the German Revolution. The German government tried to obtain a peace settlement based on the Fourteen Points, and maintained it was on this basis that they surrendered. Following negotiations, the Allied powers and Germany signed an armistice, which came into effect on 11 November while German forces were still positioned in France and Belgium.

Many aspects of the Versailles treaty that were later criticised were agreed first in the 11 November armistice agreement, whilst the war was still ongoing. These included the German evacuation of German-occupied France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Alsace-Lorraine, and the left bank of the Rhine (all of which were to be administered by the Allies under the armistice agreement), the surrender of a large quantity of war materiel, and the agreed payment of "reparation for damage done".

German forces evacuated occupied France, Belgium, and Luxembourg within the fifteen days required by the armistice agreement. By late 1918, Allied troops had entered Germany and began the occupation of the Rhineland under the agreement, in the process establishing bridgeheads across the Rhine in case of renewed fighting at Cologne, Koblenz, and Mainz. Allied and German forces were additionally to be separated by a 10 km-wide demilitarised zone.

Blockade

Main article: Blockade of Germany (1914–1919)

Both Germany and Great Britain were dependent on imports of food and raw materials, most of which had to be shipped across the Atlantic Ocean. The Blockade of Germany was a naval operation conducted by the Allied Powers to stop the supply of raw materials and foodstuffs reaching the Central Powers. The German Kaiserliche Marine was mainly restricted to the German Bight and used commerce raiders and unrestricted submarine warfare for a counter-blockade. The German Board of Public Health in December 1918 stated that 763,000 German civilians had died during the Allied blockade, although an academic study in 1928 put the death toll at 424,000 people.

The blockade was maintained for eight months after the Armistice in November 1918, into the following year of 1919. Foodstuffs imports into Germany were controlled by the Allies after the Armistice with Germany until Germany signed the Treaty of Versailles in June 1919. In March 1919, Churchill informed the House of Commons, that the ongoing blockade was a success and "Germany is very near starvation." From January 1919 to March 1919, Germany refused to agree to Allied demands that Germany surrender its merchant ships to Allied ports to transport food supplies. Some Germans considered the armistice to be a temporary cessation of the war and knew, if fighting broke out again, their ships would be seized. Over the winter of 1919, the situation became desperate and Germany finally agreed to surrender its fleet in March. The Allies then allowed for the import of 270,000 tons of foodstuffs.

Both German and non-German observers have argued that these were the most devastating months of the blockade for German civilians, though disagreement persists as to the extent and who is truly at fault. According to Max Rubner 100,000 German civilians died due to the continuation blockade after the armistice. In the UK, Labour Party member and anti-war activist Robert Smillie issued a statement in June 1919 condemning continuation of the blockade, claiming 100,000 German civilians had died as a result.

Negotiations

The heads of the "Big Four" nations at the Paris Peace Conference, 27 May 1919. From left to right: David Lloyd George, Vittorio Orlando, Georges Clemenceau, and Woodrow Wilson

Talks between the Allies to establish a common negotiating position started on 18 January 1919, in the Salle de l'Horloge (Clock Room) at the French Foreign Ministry on the Quai d'Orsay in Paris. Initially, 70 delegates from 27 nations participated in the negotiations. Russia was excluded due to their signing of a separate peace (the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk) and early withdrawal from the war. Furthermore, German negotiators were excluded to deny them an opportunity to divide the Allies diplomatically.

Initially, a "Council of Ten" (comprising two delegates each from Britain, France, the United States, Italy, and Japan) met officially to decide the peace terms. This council was replaced by the "Council of Five", formed from each country's foreign ministers, to discuss minor matters. French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, and United States President Woodrow Wilson formed the "Big Four" (at one point becoming the "Big Three" following the temporary withdrawal of Orlando). These four men met in 145 closed sessions to make all the major decisions, which were later ratified by the entire assembly. The minor powers attended a weekly "Plenary Conference" that discussed issues in a general forum but made no decisions. These members formed over 50 commissions that made various recommendations, many of which were incorporated into the final text of the treaty.

French aims

France had lost 1.3 million soldiers, including 25% of French men aged 18–30, as well as 400,000 civilians. France had also been more physically damaged than any other nation; the so-called zone rouge (Red Zone), the most industrialized region and the source of most coal and iron ore in the north-east, had been devastated, and in the final days of the war, mines had been flooded and railways, bridges and factories destroyed. Clemenceau intended to ensure the security of France, by weakening Germany economically, militarily, territorially and by supplanting Germany as the leading producer of steel in Europe. British economist and Versailles negotiator John Maynard Keynes summarized this position as attempting to "set the clock back and undo what, since 1870, the progress of Germany had accomplished."

Clemenceau told Wilson: "America is far away, protected by the ocean. Not even Napoleon himself could touch England. You are both sheltered; we are not". The French wanted a frontier on the Rhine, to protect France from a German invasion and compensate for French demographic and economic inferiority. American and British representatives refused the French claim and after two months of negotiations, the French accepted a British pledge to provide an immediate alliance with France if Germany attacked again, and Wilson agreed to put a similar proposal to the Senate. Clemenceau had told the Chamber of Deputies, in December 1918, that his goal was to maintain an alliance with both countries. Clemenceau accepted the offer, in return for an occupation of the Rhineland for fifteen years and that Germany would also demilitarise the Rhineland.

French negotiators required reparations, to make Germany pay for the destruction induced throughout the war and to decrease German strength. The French also wanted the iron ore and coal of the Saar Valley, by annexation to France. The French were willing to accept a smaller amount of World War I reparations than the Americans would concede and Clemenceau was willing to discuss German capacity to pay with the German delegation, before the final settlement was drafted. In April and May 1919, the French and Germans held separate talks, on mutually acceptable arrangements on issues like reparation, reconstruction and industrial collaboration. France, along with the British Dominions and Belgium, opposed League of Nations mandates and favored annexation of former German colonies.

The French, who had suffered significantly in the areas occupied by Germany during the war, were in favour of trying German war criminals, including the Kaiser. In the face of American objections that there was no applicable existing law under which the Kaiser could be tried, Clemenceau took the view that the "law of responsibility" overruled all other laws and that putting the Kaiser on trial offered the opportunity to establish this as an international precedent.

British aims

Further information: Heavenly Twins (Sumner and Cunliffe) and Fontainebleau Memorandum

British Prime Minister David Lloyd George

Britain had suffered heavy financial costs but suffered little physical devastation during the war. British public opinion wanted to make Germany pay for the War. Public opinion favoured a "just peace", which would force Germany to pay reparations and be unable to repeat the aggression of 1914, although those of a "liberal and advanced opinion" shared Wilson's ideal of a peace of reconciliation.

In private Lloyd George opposed revenge and attempted to compromise between Clemenceau's demands and the Fourteen Points, because Europe would eventually have to reconcile with Germany. Lloyd George wanted terms of reparation that would not cripple the German economy, so that Germany would remain a viable economic power and trading partner. By arguing that British war pensions and widows' allowances should be included in the German reparation sum, Lloyd George ensured that a large amount would go to the British Empire.

Lloyd George also intended to maintain a European balance of power to thwart a French attempt to establish itself as the dominant European power. A revived Germany would be a counterweight to France and a deterrent to Bolshevik Russia. Lloyd George also wanted to neutralize the German navy to keep the Royal Navy as the greatest naval power in the world; dismantle the German colonial empire with several of its territorial possessions ceded to Britain and others being established as League of Nations mandates, a position opposed by the Dominions.

Together with the French, the British favoured putting German war criminals on trial, and included the Kaiser in this. Already in 1916 Herbert Asquith had declared the intention "to bring to justice the criminals, whoever they be and whatever their station", and a resolution of the war cabinet in 1918 reaffirmed this intent. Lloyd George declared that the British people would not accept a treaty that did not include terms on this, though he wished to limit the charges solely to violation of the 1839 treaty guaranteeing Belgian neutrality. The British were also well aware that the Kaiser having sought refuge in the Netherlands meant that any trial was unlikely to take place and therefore any Article demanding it was likely to be a dead letter.

American aims

Before the American entry into the war, Wilson had talked of a "peace without victory". This position fluctuated following the US entry into the war. Wilson spoke of the German aggressors, with whom there could be no compromised peace. On 8 January 1918, however, Wilson delivered a speech (known as the Fourteen Points) that declared the American peace objectives: the rebuilding of the European economy, self-determination of European and Middle Eastern ethnic groups, the promotion of free trade, the creation of appropriate mandates for former colonies, and above all, the creation of a powerful League of Nations that would ensure the peace. The aim of the latter was to provide a forum to revise the peace treaties as needed, and deal with problems that arose as a result of the peace and the rise of new states.

Wilson brought along top intellectuals as advisors to the American peace delegation, and the overall American position echoed the Fourteen Points. Wilson firmly opposed harsh treatment on Germany. While the British and French wanted to largely annex the German colonial empire, Wilson saw that as a violation of the fundamental principles of justice and human rights of the native populations, and favored them having the right of self-determination via the creation of mandates. The promoted idea called for the major powers to act as disinterested trustees over a region, aiding the native populations until they could govern themselves. In spite of this position and in order to ensure that Japan did not refuse to join the League of Nations, Wilson favored turning over the former German colony of Shandong, in Eastern China, to the Japanese Empire rather than return the area to the Republic of China's control. Further confounding the Americans, was US internal partisan politics. In November 1918, the Republican Party won the Senate election by a slim margin. Wilson, a Democrat, refused to include prominent Republicans in the American delegation making his efforts seem partisan, and contributed to a risk of political defeat at home.

On the subject of war crimes, the Americans differed to the British and French in that Wilson's proposal was that any trial of the Kaiser should be solely a political and moral affair, and not one of criminal responsibility, meaning that the death penalty would be precluded. This was based on the American view, particularly those of Robert Lansing, that there was no applicable law under which the Kaiser could be tried. Additionally, the Americans favoured trying other German war criminals before military tribunals rather than an international court, with prosecutions being limited to "violation[s] of the laws and customs of war", and opposed any trials based on violations against what was called "laws of humanity".

Italian aims

Vittorio Emanuele Orlando and his foreign minister Sidney Sonnino, an Anglican of British origins, worked primarily to secure the partition of the Habsburg Empire and their attitude towards Germany was not as hostile. Generally speaking, Sonnino was in line with the British position while Orlando favored a compromise between Clemenceau and Wilson. Within the negotiations for the Treaty of Versailles, Orlando obtained certain results such as the permanent membership of Italy in the security council of the League of Nations and a promised transfer of British Jubaland and French Aozou strip to the Italian colonies of Somalia and Libya respectively. Italian nationalists, however, saw the War as a "mutilated victory" for what they considered to be little territorial gains achieved in the other treaties directly impacting Italy's borders. Orlando was ultimately forced to abandon the conference and resign. Orlando refused to see World War I as a mutilated victory, replying at nationalists calling for a greater expansion that "Italy today is a great state....on par with the great historic and contemporary states. This is, for me, our main and principal expansion." Francesco Saverio Nitti took Orlando's place in signing the treaty of Versailles.

The Italian leadership were divided on whether to try the Kaiser. Sonnino considered that putting the Kaiser on trial could result in him becoming a "patriotic martyr". Orlando, in contrast, stated that "the ex-Kaiser ought to pay like other criminals", but was less sure about whether the Kaiser should be tried as a criminal or merely have a political verdict cast against him. Orlando also considered that "[t]he question of the constitution of the Court presents almost insurmountable difficulties".

Treaty content and signing

German delegate Johannes Bell signing the Treaty of Versailles in the Hall of Mirrors, with various Allied delegations sitting and standing in front of him

In June 1919, the Allies declared that war would resume if the German government did not sign the treaty they had agreed to among themselves. The government headed by Philipp Scheidemann was unable to agree on a common position, and Scheidemann himself resigned rather than agree to sign the treaty. Gustav Bauer, the head of the new government, sent a telegram stating his intention to sign the treaty if certain articles were withdrawn, including Articles 227 to 231 (i.e., the Articles related to the extradition of the Kaiser for trial, the extradition of German war criminals for trial before Allied tribunals, the handing over of documents relevant for war crimes trials, and accepting liability for war reparations). In response, the Allies issued an ultimatum stating that Germany would have to accept the treaty or face an invasion of Allied forces across the Rhine within 24 hours. On 23 June, Bauer capitulated and sent a second telegram with a confirmation that a German delegation would arrive shortly to sign the treaty. On 28 June 1919, the fifth anniversary of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand (the immediate impetus for the war), the peace treaty was signed. The treaty had clauses ranging from war crimes, the prohibition on the merging of the Republic of German Austria with Germany without the consent of the League of Nations, freedom of navigation on major European rivers, to the returning of a Quran to the king of Hedjaz.

Territorial changes

Germany after Versailles:

  Administered by the League of Nations

  Annexed or transferred to neighbouring countries by the treaty, or later via plebiscite and League of Nations action

  Weimar Germany

The treaty stripped Germany of 65,000 km² (25,000 sq mi) of territory and 7 million people. It also required Germany to give up the gains made via the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and grant independence to the protectorates that had been established. In Western Europe, Germany was required to recognize Belgian sovereignty over Moresnet and cede control of the Eupen-Malmedy area. Within six months of the transfer, Belgium was required to conduct a plebiscite on whether the citizens of the region wanted to remain under Belgian sovereignty or return to German control, communicate the results to the League of Nations and abide by the League's decision. The Belgian transitional administration, under High Commissioner General Herman Baltia, was responsible for the organisation and control of this process, held between January and June 1920. The plebiscite itself was held without a secret ballot, and organized as a consultation in which all citizens who opposed the annexation had to formally register their protest. Ultimately, only 271 of 33,726 voters signed the protest list, of which 202 were German state servants. After the Belgian government reported this result, the League of Nations confirmed the change of status on 20 September 1920, with the line of the German-Belgian border finally fixed by a League of Nations commission in 1922. To compensate for the destruction of French coal mines, Germany was to cede the output of the Saar coalmines to France and control of the Saar to the League of Nations for 15 years; a plebiscite would then be held to decide sovereignty. The treaty restored the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine to France by rescinding the treaties of Versailles and Frankfurt of 1871 as they pertained to this issue. France was able to make the claim that the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine were indeed part of France and not part of Germany by disclosing a letter sent from the Prussian King to the Empress Eugénie that Eugénie provided, in which William I wrote that the territories of Alsace-Lorraine were requested by Germany for the sole purpose of national defense and not to expand the German territory. The sovereignty of Schleswig-Holstein was to be resolved by a plebiscite to be held at a future time (see Schleswig Plebiscites).

In Central Europe Germany was forbidden from absorbing Austria. Germany was also to recognize the independence of Czechoslovakia and cede parts of the province of Upper Silesia to them. Germany had to recognize the independence of Poland, which had regained its independence following a national revolution against the occupying Central Powers, and renounce "all rights and title" over Polish territory. Portions of Upper Silesia were to be ceded to Poland, with the future of the rest of the province to be decided by plebiscite. The border would be fixed with regard to the vote and to the geographical and economic conditions of each locality. The Province of Posen (now Poznań), which had come under Polish control during the Greater Poland Uprising, was also to be ceded to Poland. Pomerelia (Eastern Pomerania), on historical and ethnic grounds, was transferred to Poland so that the new state could have access to the sea and became known as the Polish Corridor. The sovereignty of part of southern East Prussia was to be decided via plebiscite while the East Prussian Soldau area, which was astride the rail line between Warsaw and Danzig, was transferred to Poland outright without plebiscite. An area of 51,800 square kilometres (20,000 square miles) was transferred to Poland under the agreement. Memel was to be ceded to the Allied and Associated powers, for disposal according to their wishes. Germany was to cede the city of Danzig and its hinterland, including the delta of the Vistula River on the Baltic Sea, for the League of Nations to establish the Free City of Danzig.

Mandates

Main article: League of Nations mandate

German colonies (light blue) were made into League of Nations mandates.

Article 119 of the treaty required Germany to renounce sovereignty over former colonies and Article 22 converted the territories into League of Nations mandates under the control of Allied states. Togoland and German Kamerun (Cameroon) were transferred to France, aside from portions given to Britain, British Togoland and British Cameroon. Ruanda and Urundi were allocated to Belgium, whereas German South-West Africa went to South Africa and Britain obtained German East Africa. As compensation for the German invasion of Portuguese Africa, Portugal was granted the Kionga Triangle, a sliver of German East Africa in northern Mozambique. Article 156 of the treaty transferred German concessions in Shandong, China, to Japan, not to China. Japan was granted all German possessions in the Pacific north of the equator and those south of the equator went to Australia, except for German Samoa, which was taken by New Zealand.

Military restrictions

The treaty was comprehensive and complex in the restrictions imposed upon the post-war German armed forces (the Reichswehr). The provisions were intended to make the Reichswehr incapable of offensive action and to encourage international disarmament. Germany was to demobilize sufficient soldiers by 31 March 1920 to leave an army of no more than 100,000 men in a maximum of seven infantry and three cavalry divisions. The treaty laid down the organisation of the divisions and support units, and the General Staff was to be dissolved. Military schools for officer training were limited to three, one school per arm, and conscription was abolished. Private soldiers and non-commissioned officers were to be retained for at least twelve years and officers for a minimum of 25 years, with former officers being forbidden to attend military exercises. To prevent Germany from building up a large cadre of trained men, the number of men allowed to leave early was limited.

Workmen decommissioning a heavy gun, to comply with the treaty

The number of civilian staff supporting the army was reduced and the police force was reduced to its pre-war size, with increases limited to population increases; paramilitary forces were forbidden. The Rhineland was to be demilitarized, all fortifications in the Rhineland and 50 kilometres (31 miles) east of the river were to be demolished and new construction was forbidden. Military structures and fortifications on the islands of Heligoland and Düne were to be destroyed. Germany was prohibited from the arms trade, limits were imposed on the type and quantity of weapons and prohibited from the manufacture or stockpile of chemical weapons, armoured cars, tanks and military aircraft. The German navy was allowed six pre-dreadnought battleships and was limited to a maximum of six light cruisers (not exceeding 6,000 long tons (6,100 t)), twelve destroyers (not exceeding 800 long tons (810 t)) and twelve torpedo boats (not exceeding 200 long tons (200 t)) and was forbidden submarines. The manpower of the navy was not to exceed 15,000 men, including manning for the fleet, coast defences, signal stations, administration, other land services, officers and men of all grades and corps. The number of officers and warrant officers was not allowed to exceed 1,500 men. Germany surrendered eight battleships, eight light cruisers, forty-two destroyers, and fifty torpedo boats for decommissioning. Thirty-two auxiliary ships were to be disarmed and converted to merchant use. Article 198 prohibited Germany from having an air force, including naval air forces, and required Germany to hand over all aerial related materials. In conjunction, Germany was forbidden to manufacture or import aircraft or related material for a period of six months following the signing of the treaty.

Reparations

Main article: World War I reparations

In Article 231 Germany accepted responsibility for the losses and damages caused by the war "as a consequence of the ... aggression of Germany and her allies." The treaty required Germany to compensate the Allied powers, and it also established an Allied "Reparation Commission" to determine the exact amount which Germany would pay and the form that such payment would take. The commission was required to "give to the German Government a just opportunity to be heard", and to submit its conclusions by 1 May 1921. In the interim, the treaty required Germany to pay an equivalent of 20 billion gold marks ($5 billion) in gold, commodities, ships, securities or other forms. The money would help to pay for Allied occupation costs and buy food and raw materials for Germany. As a consequence of the treaty, the 5 May 1921 London Schedule of Payments required the Central Powers to pay 132 billion gold marks (US$33 billion at the time) in reparations to cover civilian damage caused during the war. This figure was divided into three categories of bonds: A, B, and C. Of these, Germany was required to pay towards 'A' and 'B' bonds totaling 50 billion marks (US$12.5 billion) unconditionally. In the London ultimatum of that day, Germany was given six days to recognize the Schedule of Payments and to comply with the Treaty of Versailles' demands for disarmament and the extradition of German "war criminals". If it did not, the Allies threatened to occupy the Ruhr.

Guarantees

Location of the Rhineland (yellow)

To ensure compliance, the Rhineland and bridgeheads east of the Rhine were to be occupied by Allied troops for fifteen years. If Germany had not committed aggression, a staged withdrawal would take place; after five years, the Cologne bridgehead and the territory north of a line along the Ruhr would be evacuated. After ten years, the bridgehead at Coblenz and the territories to the north would be evacuated and after fifteen years remaining Allied forces would be withdrawn. If Germany reneged on the treaty obligations, the bridgeheads would be reoccupied immediately.

International organizations

Main articles: Covenant of the League of Nations and International Labour Organization § History

Part I of the treaty, in common with all the treaties signed during the Paris Peace Conference, was the Covenant of the League of Nations, which provided for the creation of the League, an organization for the arbitration of international disputes. Part XIII organized the establishment of the International Labour Office, to regulate hours of work, including a maximum working day and week; the regulation of the labour supply; the prevention of unemployment; the provision of a living wage; the protection of the worker against sickness, disease and injury arising out of his employment; the protection of children, young persons and women; provision for old age and injury; protection of the interests of workers when employed abroad; recognition of the principle of freedom of association; the organization of vocational and technical education and other measures. The treaty also called for the signatories to sign or ratify the International Opium Convention.

War Crimes

Article 227 of the Versailles treaty required the handing over of Kaiser Wilhelm for trial "for supreme offence against international treaties and the sanctity of treaties" before a bench of five allied judges – one British, one American, one French, one Italian, and one Japanese. If found guilty the judges were to "fix such punishment which it considers should be imposed". The death penalty was therefore not precluded. Article 228 allowed the Allies to demand the extradition of German war criminals, who could be tried before military tribunals for crimes against "the laws and customs of war" under Article 229. To provide an evidentiary basis for such trials, Article 230 required the German government to transfer information and documents relevant to such trials.

Reactions

Britain

A British news placard announcing the signing of the peace treaty

The delegates of the Commonwealth and British Government had mixed thoughts on the treaty, with some seeing the French policy as being greedy and vindictive. Lloyd George and his private secretary Philip Kerr believed in the treaty, although they also felt that the French would keep Europe in a constant state of turmoil by attempting to enforce the treaty. Delegate Harold Nicolson wrote "are we making a good peace?", while General Jan Smuts (a member of the South African delegation) wrote to Lloyd-George, before the signing, that the treaty was unstable and declared "Are we in our sober senses or suffering from shellshock? What has become of Wilson's 14 points?" He wanted the Germans not be made to sign at the "point of the bayonet". Smuts issued a statement condemning the treaty and regretting that the promises of "a new international order and a fairer, better world are not written in this treaty". Lord Robert Cecil said that many within the Foreign Office were disappointed by the treaty. The treaty received widespread approval from the general public. Bernadotte Schmitt wrote that the "average Englishman ... thought Germany got only what it deserved" as a result of the treaty, but public opinion changed as German complaints mounted.

Former wartime British Prime Minister H. H. Asquith and the Independent Liberal opposition in the British Parliament after the 1918 general election believed the treaty was too punitive. Asquith campaigned against it while running for another House of Commons seat in the 1920 Paisley by-election.

Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, following the German re-militarisation of the Rhineland in 1936, stated that he was "pleased" that the treaty was "vanishing", expressing his hope that the French had been taught a "severe lesson".

Status of British Dominions

The Treaty of Versailles was an important step in the status of the British Dominions under international law. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa had each made significant contributions to the British war effort, but as separate countries, rather than as British colonies. India also made a substantial troop contribution, although under direct British control, unlike the Dominions. The four Dominions and India all signed the Treaty separately from Britain, a clear recognition by the international community that the Dominions were no longer British colonies. "Their status defied exact analysis by both international and constitutional lawyers, but it was clear that they were no longer regarded simply as colonies of Britain." By signing the Treaty individually, the four Dominions and India also were founding members of the League of Nations in their own right, rather than simply as part of the British Empire.

France

The signing of the treaty was met with roars of approval, singing, and dancing from a crowd outside the Palace of Versailles. In Paris proper, people rejoiced at the official end of the war, the return of Alsace and Lorraine to France, and that Germany had agreed to pay reparations.

While France ratified the treaty and was active in the League, the jubilant mood soon gave way to a political backlash for Clemenceau. The French Right saw the treaty as being too lenient and saw it as failing to achieve all of France's demands. Left-wing politicians attacked the treaty and Clemenceau for being too harsh (the latter turning into a ritual condemnation of the treaty, for politicians remarking on French foreign affairs, as late as August 1939). Marshal Ferdinand Foch stated "this (treaty) is not peace. It is an armistice for twenty years."; a criticism over the failure to annex the Rhineland and for compromising French security for the benefit of the United States and Britain. When Clemenceau stood for election as President of France in January 1920, he was defeated.

Italy

Reaction in the Kingdom of Italy to the treaty was extremely negative. The country had suffered high casualties, yet failed to achieve most of its major war goals, notably gaining control of the Dalmatian coast and Fiume. President Wilson rejected Italy's claims on the basis of "national self-determination." For their part, Britain and France—who had been forced in the war's latter stages to divert their own troops to the Italian front to stave off collapse—were disinclined to support Italy's position at the peace conference. Differences in negotiating strategy between Premier Vittorio Orlando and Foreign Minister Sidney Sonnino further undermined Italy's position at the conference. A furious Vittorio Orlando suffered a nervous collapse and at one point walked out of the conference (though he later returned). He lost his position as prime minister just a week before the treaty was scheduled to be signed, effectively ending his active political career. Anger and dismay over the treaty's provisions helped pave the way for the establishment of Benito Mussolini's Fascist dictatorship three years later.

Portugal

Portugal entered the war on the Allied side in 1916 primarily to ensure the security of its African colonies, which were threatened with seizure by both Britain and Germany. To this extent, she succeeded in her war aims. The treaty recognized Portuguese sovereignty over these areas and awarded her small portions of Germany's bordering overseas colonies, including the Kionga Triangle. Otherwise, Portugal gained little at the peace conference. Her promised share of German reparations never materialized, and a seat she coveted on the executive council of the new League of Nations went instead to Spain—which had remained neutral in the war. In the end, Portugal ratified the treaty, but got little out of the war, which cost more than 8,000 Portuguese Armed Forces troops and as many as 100,000 of her African colonial subjects their lives.

United States

Senator Borah, Lodge and Johnson refuse Lady Peace a seat, referring to efforts by Republican isolationists to block ratification of Treaty of Versailles establishing the League of Nations.

After the Versailles conference, Democratic President Woodrow Wilson claimed that "at last the world knows America as the savior of the world!" However, Wilson had refused to bring any leading members of the Republican party, led by Henry Cabot Lodge, into the talks. The Republicans controlled the United States Senate after the election of 1918, and were outraged by Wilson's refusal to discuss the war with them. The senators were divided into multiple positions on the Versailles question. It proved possible to build a majority coalition, but impossible to build a two-thirds coalition that was needed to pass a treaty.

A discontent bloc of 12–18 "Irreconcilables", mostly Republicans but also representatives of the Irish and German Democrats, fiercely opposed the treaty. One bloc of Democrats strongly supported the Versailles Treaty, even with reservations added by Lodge. A second group of Democrats supported the treaty but followed Wilson in opposing any amendments or reservations. The largest bloc, led by Senator Lodge, comprised a majority of the Republicans. They wanted a treaty with "reservations", especially on Article 10, so that the League of Nations could not draw the US into war without the of the US Congress. All of the Irreconcilables were bitter enemies of President Wilson, and he launched a nationwide speaking tour in the summer of 1919 to refute them. But Wilson collapsed midway with a serious stroke that effectively ruined his leadership skills.

The closest the treaty came to passage was on 19 November 1919, as Lodge and his Republicans formed a coalition with the pro-treaty Democrats, and were close to a two-thirds majority for a Treaty with reservations, but Wilson rejected this compromise and enough Democrats followed his lead to end the chances of ratification permanently. Among the American public as a whole, the Irish Catholics and the German Americans were intensely opposed to the treaty, saying it favored the British.

After Wilson's presidency, his successor Republican President Warren G. Harding continued American opposition to the formation of the League of Nations. Congress subsequently passed the Knox–Porter Resolution bringing a formal end to hostilities between the United States and the Central Powers. It was signed into law by President Harding on 2 July 1921. Soon after, the US–German Peace Treaty of 1921 was signed in Berlin on 25 August 1921. Article 1 of this treaty obliged the German government to grant to the U.S. government all rights and privileges that were enjoyed by the other Allies that had ratified the Versailles treaty. Two similar treaties were signed with Austria and Hungary on 24 and 29 August 1921, in Vienna and Budapest respectively.

Edward House's views

Wilson's former friend Edward Mandell House, present at the negotiations, wrote in his diary on 29 June 1919:

I am leaving Paris, after eight fateful months, with conflicting emotions. Looking at the conference in retrospect, there is much to approve and yet much to regret. It is easy to say what should have been done, but more difficult to have found a way of doing it. To those who are saying that the treaty is bad and should never have been made and that it will involve Europe in infinite difficulties in its enforcement, I feel like admitting it. But I would also say in reply that empires cannot be shattered, and new states raised upon their ruins without disturbance. To create new boundaries is to create new troubles. The one follows the other. While I should have preferred a different peace, I doubt very much whether it could have been made, for the ingredients required for such a peace as I would have were lacking at Paris.

China

Many in China felt betrayed as the German territory in China was handed to Japan. Wellington Koo refused to sign the treaty and the Chinese delegation at the Paris Peace Conference was the only nation that did not sign the Treaty of Versailles at the signing ceremony. The sense of betrayal led to great demonstrations in China such as the May 4th movement. There was immense dissatisfaction with Duan Qirui's government, which had secretly negotiated with the Japanese in order to secure loans to fund their military campaigns against the south. On 12 June 1919, the Chinese cabinet was forced to resign and the government instructed its delegation at Versailles not to sign the treaty. As a result, relations with the Western world deteriorated.

Germany

See also: Stab-in-the-back legend

German delegates in Versailles: Professor Walther Schücking, Reichspostminister Johannes Giesberts, Justice Minister Otto Landsberg, Foreign Minister Ulrich Graf von Brockdorff-Rantzau, Prussian State President Robert Leinert, and financial advisor Carl Melchior

On 29 April, the German delegation under the leadership of the Foreign Minister Ulrich Graf von Brockdorff-Rantzau arrived in Versailles. On 7 May, when faced with the conditions dictated by the victors, including the so-called "War Guilt Clause", von Brockdorff-Rantzau replied to Clemenceau, Wilson and Lloyd George: "We can sense the full force of hatred that confronts us here. ... You demand from us to confess we were the only guilty party of war; such a confession in my mouth would be a lie." Because Germany was not allowed to take part in the negotiations, the German government issued a protest against what it considered to be unfair demands, and a "violation of honour", soon afterwards withdrawing from the proceedings of the peace conference.

Germans of all political shades denounced the treaty. The so-called "War Guilt Clause" that they saw as blaming Germany for starting the war was seen as an insult to the nation's honour. The clauses calling on the Germans to hand over alleged war criminals also caused deep offence, as many of those accused were seen as heroes, and also because the Allies were seen as applying one-sided justice. They referred to the treaty as "the Diktat" since its terms were presented to Germany on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Germany's first democratically elected head of government, Philipp Scheidemann, resigned rather than sign the treaty. In an emotional and polemical address to the Weimar National Assembly on 12 May 1919, he called the treaty a "horrific and murderous witch's hammer", and exclaimed:

Which hand would not shrivel, that shackled itself and us in such a way?

At the end of his speech, Scheidemann stated that, in the government's opinion, the treaty was unacceptable.

Demonstration against the treaty in front of the Reichstag

After Scheidemann's resignation, a new coalition government was formed under Gustav Bauer. President Friedrich Ebert knew that Germany was in an impossible situation. Although he shared his countrymen's disgust with the treaty, he was sober enough to consider the possibility that the government would not be in a position to reject it. He believed that if Germany refused to sign the treaty, the Allies would invade Germany from the west—and there was no guarantee that the army would be able to make a stand in the event of an invasion. With this in mind, he asked Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg if the army was capable of any meaningful resistance in the event the Allies resumed the war. If there was even the slightest chance that the army could hold out, Ebert intended to recommend against ratifying the treaty. Hindenburg—after prodding from his chief of staff, Wilhelm Groener—concluded the army could not resume the war even on a limited scale. But rather than inform Ebert himself, he had Groener inform the government that the army would be in an untenable position in the event of renewed hostilities.

Upon receiving Hindenburg's answer, the Bauer government recommended signing the treaty with the proviso that the "war-guilt" clause and the articles that required the extradition of war criminals and of the former Emperor be excluded. After the Allies refused anything other than full acceptance of the treaty, the National Assembly voted in favour of signing it by 237 to 138, with five abstentions (there were 421 delegates in total). The result was wired to Clemenceau just hours before the deadline. The Bauer government included the following statement with the acceptance:

The honour of the German people will not be affected by an act of violence. After the appalling suffering of the last four years, the German people lack any means to defend it externally. Therefore, yielding to overwhelming force and without abandoning its view of the outrageous injustice of the peace terms, the Government of the German Republic declares that it is prepared to accept and sign the peace terms imposed by the Allied and Associated Governments.

Foreign minister Hermann Müller and colonial minister Johannes Bell travelled to Versailles to sign the treaty on behalf of Germany. The treaty was signed on 28 June 1919 and ratified by the National Assembly on 9 July by a vote of 209 to 116.

Japan

Medal issued by the Japanese authorities in 1919, commemorating the Treaty of Versailles. Obv: Flags of the five allies of World War I. Rev: Peace standing in Oriental attire with the Palace of Versailles in the background

The disenfranchised and often colonized "non-white" world held high expectations that a new order would open up an unheralded opportunity to have a principle of racial equality recognized by the leading global powers. Japanese diplomacy had bitter memories of the rhetoric of the Yellow Peril, and the arrogance, underwritten by the assumptions about a White Man's Burden, memories aggravated by the rise of racial discrimination against their business men, severe immigration restrictions on Asiatics, and court judgments hostile to Japanese interests, which characterized Western states' treatment of their nationals. Japan's delegation, among whose plenipotentiaries figured Baron Makino and Ambassador Chinda Sutemi, was led by its elder statesman Saionji Kinmochi.

Versailles represented a chance to overturn this imposed inferiority, whose tensions were strengthened particularly in Japan's relationship with the United States during WW1. Confidence in their growing industrial strength, and conquest of Germany's Far East possessions, together with their proven fidelity to the Entente would, it was thought, allow them finally to take their rightful place among the victorious Great Powers. They solicited support especially from the American delegation to obtain recognition for the principle of racial equality at the League of Nations Commission. Their proposals to this end were consistently rebuffed by British, French, American and Australian diplomats, who were all sensitive to their respective countries' internal pressures. Wilson himself was an enactor of segregationist policies in the United States, Clemenceau openly ridiculed them, Arthur Balfour considered Africans inferior to Europeans – equality was only true of people within particular nations – while William Hughes, adopting a "slap the Jap" attitude, was a vocal defender of a White Australia policy.

Japan's attempt, buttressed by the Chinese emissary Wellington Koo among others, to incorporate a Racial Equality Proposal in the treaty, had broad support, but was effectively declined when it was rejected by the United States, Great Britain and Australia, despite a powerfully persuasive speech delivered by Makino.

Japan itself both prior to and during WW1 had embarked on a vigorous expansion of continental colonialism, whose aims were justified in terms of uniting Asians, such as Koreans and Chinese, who were seen as belonging to the same race and culture as the Japanese (dōbun dōshǖ: 同文同種), though it was geared to subordinating them to Japan's interests in a paternalistic manner. Aspiring to be accepted as a world actor with similar status to the traditional Western powers, Japan envisaged an Asian Monroe Doctrine, where Japan's proper sphere of geostrategic interests in Asia would be recognized. Some years earlier, Japan secured both British and French support for its claims to inherit rights that Germany had exercised both in China and in the Pacific Ocean north of the Equator. American policy experts, unaware of these secret agreements, nonetheless suggested that Japan had adopted a Prussian model that would imperil China's own search for autonomy, and these considerations influenced Wilson.

Nonetheless Japan emerged from the Treaty with territorial gains, including the Kiautschou Bay Leased Territory and all the territories of German New Guinea north of the Equator, forming the South Seas Mandate.

Implementation

Further information: Aftermath of World War I

Reparations

Main article: World War I reparations

On 5 May 1921, the reparation Commission established the London Schedule of Payments and a final reparation sum of 132 billion gold marks to be demanded of all the Central Powers. This was the public assessment of what the Central Powers combined could pay, and was also a compromise among Belgian, British, and French demands and assessments. Furthermore, the Commission recognized that the Central Powers could pay little and that the burden would fall upon Germany. As a result, the sum was split into different categories, of which Germany was only required to pay 50 billion gold marks (US$12.5 billion); this being the genuine assessment of the commission on what Germany could pay, and allowed the Allied powers to save face with the public by presenting a higher figure. Furthermore, payments made between 1919 and 1921 of roughly 8 billion marks, most of it credit for state assets (e.g., German state railways in the Danzig corridor) transferred to Allied countries were taken into account reducing the sum to 41 billion gold marks.

In order to meet this sum, Germany could pay in cash or kind: coal, timber, chemical dyes, pharmaceuticals, livestock, agricultural machines, construction materials, and factory machinery. Germany's assistance with the restoration of the university library of Leuven, which was destroyed by the Germans on 25 August 1914, was also credited towards the sum. Territorial changes imposed by the treaty were also factored in. The payment schedule required US$250 million within twenty-five days and then US$500 million annually, plus 26 per cent of the value of German exports. The German Government was to issue bonds at five per cent interest and set up a sinking fund of one per cent to support the payment of reparations.

Territorial changes

A crowd awaits the plebiscite results in Oppeln

In February and March 1920, the Schleswig Plebiscites were held. The people of Schleswig were presented with only two choices: Danish or German sovereignty. The northern Danish-speaking area voted for Denmark while the southern German-speaking area voted for Germany, resulting in the province being partitioned. The East Prussia plebiscite was held on 11 July 1920. There was a 90% turn out with 99.3% of the population wishing to remain with Germany. Further plebiscites were held in Eupen-Malmedy and Neutral Moresnet. On 20 September 1920, the League of Nations allotted these territories to Belgium. These latter plebiscites were followed by a boundary commission in 1922, followed by the new Belgian-German border being recognized by the German Government on 15 December 1923. The transfer of the Hultschin area, of Silesia, to Czechoslovakia was completed on 3 February 1921.

Following the implementation of the treaty, Upper Silesia was initially governed by Britain, France, and Italy. Between 1919 and 1921, three major outbreaks of violence took place between German and Polish civilians, resulting in German and Polish military forces also becoming involved. In March 1921, the Inter-Allied Commission held the Upper Silesia plebiscite, which was peaceful despite the previous violence. The plebiscite resulted in c. 60 per cent of the population voting for the province to remain part of Germany. Following the vote, the League of Nations debated the future of the province. In 1922, Upper Silesia was partitioned: Oppeln, in the north-west, remained with Germany while Silesia Province, in the south-east, was transferred to Poland.

Memel remained under the authority of the League of Nations, with a French Armed Forces garrison, until January 1923. On 9 January 1923, the Lithuanian Army invaded the territory during the Klaipėda Revolt. The French garrison withdrew, and in February the Allies agreed to attach Memel as an "autonomous territory" to Lithuania. On 8 May 1924, after negotiations between the Lithuanian Government and the Conference of Ambassadors and action by the League of Nations, the annexation of Memel was ratified. Lithuania accepted the Memel Statute, a power-sharing arrangement to protect non-Lithuanians in the territory and its autonomous status while responsibility for the territory remained with the great powers. The League of Nations mediated between the Germans and Lithuanians on a local level, helping the power-sharing arrangement last until 1939.

On 13 January 1935, 15 years after the Saar Basin had been placed under the protection of the League of Nations, a plebiscite was held to determine the future of the area. 528,105 votes were cast, with 477,119 votes (90 per cent of the ballot) in favour of union with Germany; 46,613 votes were cast for the status quo, and 2,124 votes for union with France. The region returned to German sovereignty on 1 March 1935. When the result was announced 4,100 people, including 800 refugees from Germany fled to France.

Rhineland occupation

Main article: Occupation of the Rhineland

French soldiers in the Ruhr, which resulted in the American withdrawal from the Rhineland

In late 1918, American, Belgian, British, and French troops entered the Rhineland to enforce the armistice. Before the treaty, the occupation force stood at roughly 740,000 men. Following the signing of the peace treaty, the numbers drastically decreased and by 1926 the occupation force numbered only 76,000 men. As part of the 1929 negotiations that would become the Young Plan, Gustav Stresemann, and Aristide Briand negotiated the early withdrawal of Allied forces from the Rhineland. On 30 June 1930, after speeches and the lowering of flags, the last troops of the Anglo-French-Belgian occupation force withdrew from Germany.

Belgium maintained an occupation force of roughly 10,000 troops throughout the initial years. This figure fell to 7,102 by 1926, and continued to fall as a result of diplomatic developments.

The British Second Army, with some 275,000 veteran soldiers, entered Germany in late 1918. In March 1919, this force became the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR). The total number of troops committed to the occupation rapidly dwindled as veteran soldiers were demobilized, and were replaced by inexperienced men who had finished basic training following the cessation of hostilities. By 1920, the BAOR consisted of only 40,594 men and the following year had been further reduced to 12,421. The size of the BAOR fluctuated over the following years, but never rose above 9,000 men. The British did not adhere to all obligated territorial withdrawals as dictated by Versailles, on account of Germany not meeting her own treaty obligations. A complete withdrawal was considered, but rejected in order to maintain a presence to continue acting as a check on French ambitions and prevent the establishment of an autonomous Rhineland Republic.

The French Army of the Rhine was initially 250,000 men strong, including at a peak 40,000 African colonial troops (Troupes coloniales). By 1923, the French occupation force had decreased to roughly 130,000 men, including 27,126 African troops. The troop numbers peaked again at 250,000 during the occupation of the Ruhr, before decreasing to 60,000 men by 1926. Germans viewed the use of French colonial troops as a deliberate act of humiliation, and used their presence to create a propaganda campaign dubbed the Black Shame. This campaign lasted throughout the 1920s and 30s, although peaked in 1920 and 1921. For example, a 1921 German Government memo detailed 300 acts of violence from colonial troops, which included 65 murders and 170 sexual offenses. Historical consensus is that the charges were exaggerated for political and propaganda purposes, and that the colonial troops behaved far better than their white counterparts. An estimated 500–800 Rhineland Bastards were born as a result of fraternization between colonial troops and German women, and who would later be persecuted.

The United States Third Army entered Germany with 200,000 men. In June 1919, the Third Army demobilized and by 1920 the US occupation force had been reduced to 15,000 men. Wilson further reduced the garrison to 6,500 men, before Warren G. Harding's inauguration in 1921. On 7 January 1923, after the Franco–Belgian occupation of the Ruhr, the US senate legislated the withdrawal of the remaining force. On 24 January, the American garrison started their withdrawal from the Rhineland, with the final troops leaving in early February.

Violations

Reparations

Adolf Hitler announcing the Anschluß in violation of Art. 80 on the Heldenplatz, Vienna, 15 March 1938

In June 1921 Germany made the first cash payment of 1 billion gold marks due under the London Schedule of Payments. However, this was the only full payment of cash made under the unamended schedule, and from then until the Dawes plan began operation in late 1924 only small cash payments were made. Whilst in-kind payments of goods such as coal and timber were made throughout 1922, these were never paid in full, and in December 1922 Germany was declared in default of timber deliveries by a 3-to-1 vote of the Reparations Commission, the British representative casting the sole opposing vote. On 9 January of the following year, after Germany had defaulted either partially or wholly on coal deliveries for the thirty-fourth time in thirty-six months, the Reparations Commission also declared Germany in default of coal reparations and authorised the occupation of the Ruhr coalfields in order to secure the deliveries, again with the British representative casting the sole opposing vote and all other votes being in favour.

In a move that was condemned by the British, French, Belgian, and Italian engineers supported by French and Belgian forces occupied the Ruhr area on 11 January 1923. The German government answered with "passive resistance", which meant that coal miners and railway workers refused to obey any instructions by the occupation forces. Production and transportation came to a standstill, but the financial consequences, including the payment in paper currency of striking workers by the German government, contributed to German hyperinflation in the period from late 1921 to 1924. Consequently, passive resistance was called off in late 1923. The end of passive resistance in the Ruhr allowed Germany to undertake a currency reform and to negotiate the Dawes Plan, which led to the withdrawal of French and Belgian troops from the Ruhr Area in 1925. The agreement of the Dawes plan in late 1924 also led to a resumption of reparations payments in hard cash and gold. Total receipts from the Ruhr occupation summed to 900 million gold marks.

From the agreement of the Dawes Plan in late 1924 until July 1931 when payment was suspended under a proposal by Herbert Hoover as a result of the Great Depression, reparations payments were made regularly and on time both in cash and in-kind, though always slightly less than was required under the plan. The one year suspension of payments under the Hoover Moratorium was to be converted into a permanent moratorium according to a proposal created at the Lausanne Conference of 1932, however the agreement was never ratified. The government of Adolf Hitler declared all further payments cancelled in 1933, and no further reparations payments were made until after the defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War. Germany finally paid off its debts under the Versailles treaty, which had been reduced by 50% at the 1953 London Debt Conference, in 2010.

Military

In 1920, the head of the Reichswehr Hans von Seeckt clandestinely re-established the General Staff, by expanding the Truppenamt (Troop Office); purportedly a human resources section of the army. In March, 18,000 German troops entered the Rhineland under the guise of attempting to quell possible unrest by the Communist Party of Germany and in doing so violated the demilitarized zone. In response, French troops advanced farther into Germany until the German troops withdrew.

German officials conspired systematically to evade the clauses of the treaty, by failing to meet disarmament deadlines, refusing Allied officials access to military facilities, and maintaining and hiding weapon production. As the treaty did not ban German companies from producing war material outside of Germany, companies moved to the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Sweden. Bofors was bought by Krupp, and in 1921 German troops were sent to Sweden to test weapons. The establishment of diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, via the Genoa Conference and Treaty of Rapallo, was also used to circumvent the Treaty of Versailles. Publicly, these diplomatic exchanges were largely in regards to trade and future economic cooperation. But secret military clauses were included that allowed for Germany to develop weapons inside the Soviet Union. Furthermore, it allowed for Germany to establish three training areas for aviation, chemical and tank warfare. In 1923, the British newspaper The Times made several claims about the state of the German Armed Forces: that it had equipment for 800,000 men, was transferring army staff to civilian positions in order to obscure their real duties, and warned of the militarization of the German police force by the exploitation the Krümper system.

The Weimar Government also funded domestic rearmament programs, which were covertly funded with the money camouflaged in "X-budgets", worth up to an additional 10% of the disclosed military budget. By 1925, German companies had begun to design tanks and modern artillery. During the year, over half of Chinese arms imports were German and worth 13 million Reichsmarks. In January 1927, following the withdrawal of the Allied disarmament committee, Krupps ramped up production of armor plate and artillery. Production increased so that by 1937, military exports had increased to 82,788,604 Reichsmarks. Production was not the only violation: "Volunteers" were rapidly passed through the army to make a pool of trained reserves, and paramilitary organizations were encouraged with the illegally militarized police. Non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were not limited by the treaty, thus this loophole was exploited and as such the number of NCOs were vastly in excess to the number needed by the Reichswehr.

In December 1931, the Reichswehr finalized a second rearmament plan that called for 480 million Reichsmarks to be spent over the following five years: this program sought to provide Germany the capability of creating and supplying a defensive force of 21 divisions supported by aircraft, artillery, and tanks. This coincided with a 1 billion Reichsmark programme that planned for additional industrial infrastructure that would be able to permanently maintain this force. As these programs did not require an expansion of the military, they were nominally legal. On 7 November 1932, the Reich Minister of Defense Kurt von Schleicher authorized the illegal Umbau Plan for a standing army of 21 divisions based on 147,000 professional soldiers and a large militia. Later in the year at the World Disarmament Conference, Germany withdrew to force France and Britain to accept German equality of status. London attempted to get Germany to return with the promise of all nations maintaining an equality in armaments and security. The British later proposed and agreed to an increase in the Reichswehr to 200,000 men, and for Germany to have an air force half the size of the French. It was also negotiated for the French Army to be reduced.

In October 1933, following the rise of Adolf Hitler and the founding of the Nazi regime, Germany withdrew from the League of Nations and the World Disarmament Conference. In March 1935, Germany reintroduced conscription followed by an open rearmament programme and the official unveiling of the Luftwaffe (air force), and signed the Anglo-German Naval Agreement that allowed a surface fleet 35% of the size of the Royal Navy. The resulting rearmament programmes were allotted 35 billion Reichsmarks over an eight-year period.

Territorial

On 7 March 1936, German troops entered and remilitarized the Rhineland. On 12 March 1938, following German pressure to the collapse of the Austrian Government, German troops crossed into Austria and the following day Hitler announced the Anschluss: the annexation of Austria by Germany. The following year, on 23 March 1939, Germany annexed Memel from Lithuania.

War criminals

Main article: Leipzig war crimes trials

Front cover of a book of sheet music entitled "We're Going To Hang The Kaiser Under The Linden Tree"

Despite "hang the Kaiser" being a popular slogan of the time, particularly in Britain, the proposed trial of the Kaiser under Article 227 of the Versailles treaty never took place. Defying popular British anger at the Kaiser, and the fact that putting the Kaiser on trial was originally a British proposal, Lloyd George refused to support French calls for the Kaiser to be extradited from the Netherlands where he was living in exile. The Dutch authorities refused extradition, and the former Kaiser died there in 1941.

Article 228 allowed for the extradition of German war criminals to stand trial before Allied tribunals. Originally a list of as many of 20,000 alleged criminals was prepared by the Allies, however this was later reduced. Following the ratification of the treaty in January 1920, the Allies submitted a request that 890 (or 895) alleged war criminals be extradited for trial. France and Belgium each requested the extradition of 334 individuals including von Hindenburg and Ludendorff for the damages they had inflicted on Belgium and the mass deportations they had overseen from both France and Belgium. Britain submitted a list of 94 names, including von Tirpitz for the sinkings of civilian shipping by German U-boats. Italy's request included 29 names divided between those accused of mistreating prisoners of war and those responsible for U-Boat sinkings. Romania requested the extradition of 41 individuals including von Mackensen. Poland requested 51 people be extradited, and Yugoslavia (successor to wartime Serbia) four. Germany refused extradition, however, claiming that carrying out such a request to extradite people widely regarded as heroes in Germany would likely result in the fall of the government, but made a counter-offer of holding trials at Leipzig, an offer that was ultimately accepted by the Allies.

After subsequent negotiation, the list of alleged war criminals submitted by the Allies for trial at Leipzig was reduced to 45, however, this ultimately also ended up being too many for the German authorities, and in the end only 12 officers were put on trial – six from the British list, five from the French one, and one from the Belgian list. The British list included only low-level officers and enlisted men, including a prison-guard accused of beating prisoners of war and two U-Boat commanders who sank hospital ships (the Dover Castle and the Llandovery Castle). In contrast the French list were all high-ranking officials, including Lieutenant-General Karl Stenger, who was accused of massacring French prisoners of war. The Belgian case involved a man accused of mistreating and imprisoning Belgian children. However, when the Germans announced that the trial would be under German law, with the German prosecutor being able to exercise prosecutorial discretion, the French and Belgians withdrew from the process in protest. Only half of the cases led to conviction, with superior orders being allowed as a defence in the Dover Castle case, and in mitigation in the Llandovery Castle case where the officer responsible had massacred seamen in lifeboats. All but one of the people put forward by the French were acquitted, including Karl Stenger, who was showered with flowers by German spectators. The Belgian case was also acquitted.

The Commission of Allied Jurists responded to these proceedings on 22 January 1922 by declaring that the Leipzig court had failed to carry out its mandate by failing to convict accused who should have been convicted, and by showing excessive leniency even where people had been convicted. The Allied Jurists recommended that extradition of war criminals be requested under Article 228. However, no further extradition request was made, though trials were held in France and Belgium of German war criminals in absentia.

Historical assessments

John Maynard Keynes, the principal representative of the British Treasury, denounced the Treaty as a "Carthaginian peace".

Historians are split on the impact of the treaty. Some saw it as a good solution in a difficult time, others saw it as a disastrous measure that would anger the Germans to seek revenge. The actual impact of the treaty is also disputed.

In his book The Economic Consequences of the Peace, John Maynard Keynes referred to the Treaty of Versailles as a "Carthaginian peace", a misguided attempt to destroy Germany on behalf of French revanchism, rather than to follow the fairer principles for a lasting peace set out in Wilson's Fourteen Points, which Germany had accepted at the armistice. He stated: "I believe that the campaign for securing out of Germany the general costs of the war was one of the most serious acts of political unwisdom for which our statesmen have ever been responsible." Keynes had been the principal representative of the British Treasury at the Paris Peace Conference, and used in his passionate book arguments that he and others (including some US officials) had used at Paris. He believed the sums being asked of Germany in reparations were many times more than it was possible for Germany to pay, and that these would produce drastic instability.

Commemorative medal issued in 1929 in Germany on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Treaty of Versailles. The obverse depicts Georges Clemenceau presenting a bound treaty, decorated with skull and crossbones to Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau. Other members of the Conference are standing behind Clemenceau, including Lloyd-George, Wilson and Orlando.

French economist Étienne Mantoux disputed that analysis. During the 1940s, Mantoux wrote a posthumously published book titled The Carthaginian Peace, or the Economic Consequences of Mr. Keynes in an attempt to rebut Keynes' claims. More recently economists have argued that the restriction of Germany to a small army saved it so much money it could afford the reparations payments.

It has been argued—for instance by historian Gerhard Weinberg in his book A World at Arms—that the treaty was in fact quite advantageous to Germany. The Bismarckian Reich was maintained as a political unit instead of being broken up, and Germany largely escaped post-war military occupation (in contrast to the situation following World War II). In a 1995 essay, Weinberg noted that with the disappearance of Austria-Hungary and with Russia withdrawn from Europe, that Germany was now the dominant power in Eastern Europe.

The British military historian Correlli Barnett argued that the Treaty of Versailles was "extremely lenient in comparison with the peace terms that Germany herself, when she was expecting to win the war, had had in mind to impose on the Allies". Furthermore, he said, it was "hardly a slap on the wrist" when contrasted with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that Germany had imposed on a defeated Russian SFSR in March 1918, which had taken away a third of Russia's population (albeit mostly of non-Russian ethnicity), one-half of Russia's industrial undertakings and nine-tenths of Russia's coal mines, coupled with an indemnity of six billion marks. However the treaty was quickly nullified with Germany's armistice with the Allies on 11 November 1918. Eventually, even under the "cruel" terms of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany's economy had been restored to its pre-war status.

Barnett also argues that, in strategic terms, Germany was in fact in a superior position following the Treaty than she had been in 1914. Germany's eastern frontiers faced Russia and Austria, who had both in the past balanced German power. Barnett asserts that its post-war eastern borders were safer, because the former Austrian Empire fractured after the war into smaller, weaker states, Russia was wracked by revolution and civil war, and the newly restored Poland was no match for even a defeated Germany. In the West, Germany was balanced only by France and Belgium, both of which were smaller in population and less economically vibrant than Germany. Barnett concludes by saying that instead of weakening Germany, the treaty "much enhanced" German power. Britain and France should have (according to Barnett) "divided and permanently weakened" Germany by undoing Bismarck's work and partitioning Germany into smaller, weaker states so it could never have disrupted the peace of Europe again. By failing to do this and therefore not solving the problem of German power and restoring the equilibrium of Europe, Britain "had failed in her main purpose in taking part in the Great War".

Американский политический мультфильм, изображающий современный взгляд на немецкие репарации, 1921 г.

Британский историк современной Германии Ричард Дж. Эванс написал, что во время войны немецкое право было привержено аннексистской программе, которая была направлена ​​на то, чтобы Германия аннексировала большую часть Европы и Африки. Следовательно, любой мирный договор, который не покинул Германию, поскольку завоеватель был бы неприемлем для них. Через немецкую Германию сохранить все завоевания договора Бреста-Литовска, Эванс утверждал, что ничего не могло быть сделано, чтобы убедить немецкое право принять Версаль. Эванс также отметил, что партии коалиции Веймара , а именно Социал -демократическая партия Германии (СПД), социальная либеральная немецкая демократическая партия (ДДП) и партия христианского демократического центра , были одинаково против Версаля, и это неверно Скажем, поскольку у некоторых историков есть такая оппозиция Версаля, также равнялась оппозиции республике Веймар . Наконец, Эванс утверждал, что не соответствует действительности, что Версаль вызвал преждевременный конец республики, вместо этого утверждая, что именно Великая депрессия начала 1930 -х годов положила конец немецкой демократии. Он также утверждал, что Версаль не был «основной причиной» национального социализма , и немецкая экономика «лишь незначительно повлиял на воздействие репараций».

Эва Томпсон указывает, что договор позволил многочисленным странам в центральной и восточной Европе освободиться от репрессивного немецкого правления, факт, которым часто пренебрегают западной историографией, более заинтересованной в понимании немецкой точки зрения. В народах, которые оказались свободными в результате договора, таких как поляки или чехи , - это рассматривается как символ признания ошибок, совершенных против небольших наций их гораздо большими агрессивными соседями.

Обида, вызванная договором, сеяющим плодородным психологическим основанием для возможного роста нацистской партии , Но австралийский историк, родившийся в немецком языке Юрген Тампке, утверждал, что это «вероактивное искажение истории» утверждать, что термины предотвращали рост демократии в Германии и помогали росту нацистской партии; Сказав, что его условия не были такими карательными, как часто удерживаемые и что немецкая гипер-инфляция в 1920-х годах была частично преднамеренной политикой для минимизации стоимости репараций. В качестве примера аргументов против Versaillerdiktat он цитирует Элизабет Уискеманн, которая слышала вдова два офицера в Висбадене, жалуясь, что «с их запасами льна истощались, они должны были вымывать льнь раз в две недели (каждые две недели) вместо месяца! "

Немецкий историк Детлев Пеукерт писал, что Версаль был далеко от невозможного мира, который большинство немцев утверждали, что это было в межвоенный период , и, хотя не без недостатков на самом деле был совершенно разумным для Германии. Скорее, Пеукерт утверждал, что в Германии широко распространено мнение, что Версаль был совершенно необоснованным договором, и именно это «восприятие», а не «реальность» Версальского договора, который имел значение. Peukert отметил, что из -за « тысячелетних надежд », созданных в Германии во время Первой мировой войны, когда какое -то время казалось, что Германия была на грани победы в любой Европе, любой мирный договор, союзники мировой войны, я навязал на побежденного немецкого рейха были обязаны создать националистическую негативную реакцию, и не было ничего, что союзники не могли бы сделать, чтобы избежать этой негативной реакции. Отметив это много, Пеукерт прокомментировал, что политика сближения с западными державами, которую Густав Страреманн осуществлял между 1923 и 1929 годами, была конструктивной политикой, которая могла позволить Германии сыграть более позитивную роль в Европе, и что это неправда, что немецкий Демократия была обречена на смерть в 1919 году из -за Версаля. Наконец, Пеукерт утверждал, что это была Великая депрессия и поворот националистической политике Автородя в Германии, в то же время, которая завершила Республику Веймар, а не в Версальский договор.

Французский историк Рэймонд Картье заявляет, что миллионы этнических немцев в Судетенленде и в Позен-Западной Пруссии были размещены под иностранным правлением в враждебной среде, где домогательство и нарушение прав властей задокументированы. Картье утверждает, что из 1 058 000 немцев в Posen-West Prussia в 1921 году 758 867 сбежали от своей родины в течение пяти лет из-за польского преследования. Эти обострение этнических конфликтов приведут к общественным требованиям привлечь к аннексированной территории в 1938 году и станут предлогом аннексии Гитлера Чехословакии и частей Польши .

По словам Дэвида Стивенсона , с момента открытия французских архивов, большинство комментаторов отметили французскую сдержанность и разумность на конференции, хотя Стивенсон отмечает, что «[t] жюри все еще отсутствует» и что «были признаки того, что маятник суждения возвращается в другую сторону ".

Территориальные изменения

Карта территориальных изменений в Европе после Первой мировой войны (по состоянию на 1923 г.)

Версальский договор привел к созданию нескольких тысяч миль новых границ, и карты играли центральную роль в переговорах в Париже. Плебисциты, инициированные из -за договора, привлекли много комментариев. Историк Роберт Пекхэм писал, что проблема Шлезвига «была основана на грубых упрощениях истории региона ... Версаль проигнорировал любую вероятность того, что существует третий путь: тип компакта, представленного швейцарской федерацией; двуязычный или даже триязычный Шлезвиг-Гольштейнское государство "или другие варианты, такие как« государство Шлезвигского в свободной конфедерации с Данией или Германией, или автономный регион под защитой Лиги наций ». Что касается плебисцита Восточной Пруссии, историк Ричард Бланке писал, что «ни одна другая оспариваемая этническая группа никогда не в условиях не зарегистрировалась, настолько одностороннее заявление о своем национальном предпочтении». Ричард Дебо написал: «И Берлин, и Варшава полагали, что вторжение советского вторжения в Польшу повлияло на восточные плебисциты. Польша казалась настолько близкой к краху, что даже польские избиратели проголосовали за Германию».

Что касается силезийского плебисцита, то Бланке заметил, что «учитывая, что электорат был не менее 60% по польскому говорящему, это означает, что примерно на один« полюс »в трех проголосовал за Германию» и «большинство польских наблюдателей и историков» пришли к выводу, что результат плебисцита был связан с «несправедливыми немецкими преимуществами обязательства и социально-экономической позиции». Бланке утверждал, что «принуждение различных видов даже перед лицом режима оккупации союзников» произошло, и что Германия дала голоса тем, кто родился в Верхней Силезии, но больше не проживала там ». Бланке пришел к выводу, что, несмотря на эти протесты «существует множество других доказательств, в том числе результаты выборов в Рейхстаге как до, так и после 1921 года и крупномасштабную эмиграцию польских верхних силезийцев в Германию после 1945 года, что их идентификация с Германией в 1921 году не была ни исключительным Ни временный «и« здесь была большая популяция немцев и поляков, а не случайно, той же католической религии, которая не только разделяла одно и то же жилое пространство, но и во многих случаях рассматривала себя как членов того же национального сообщества ». Принц Эустахи Сапиха , польский министр иностранных дел , утверждал, что Советская Россия «по-видимому, намеренно откладывает переговоры« чтобы положить конец польской войне »с целью влияния верхнего силезийского плебисцита». После того, как регион был разделен, и «Германия и Польша попытались« очистить »свои доли Верхней Силезии» через угнетение, что приводит к тому, что немцы мигрируют в Германию, а поляки мигрируют в Польшу. Несмотря на угнетение и миграцию, Ополе Силезия «оставалась этнически смешанной».

Фрэнк Рассел писал, что в отношении плебисцита Саара жители «не были терроризированы на выборах», а «тоталитарный [нацистский] немецкий режим не был неприятным для большинства жителей Саара, и что они предпочитают его даже эффективному, Экономичное и доброжелательное международное правило ». Когда стал известен результат голосования, 4100 (в том числе 800 беженцев, которые ранее бежали из Германии) жители бежали над границей во Францию.

Военные термины и нарушения

Во время формулировки договора англичане хотели, чтобы Германия отменила призыв, но им разрешено поддерживать армию добровольцев. Французы хотели, чтобы Германия поддерживала армию призывников до 200 000 человек, чтобы оправдать их собственное обслуживание аналогичной силы. Таким образом, пособие договора в 100 000 добровольцев было компромиссом между британскими и французскими позициями. Германия, с другой стороны, считала термины, оставляя их беззащитными против любого потенциального врага. Бернадот Эверли Шмитт писал, что «нет никаких оснований полагать, что союзные правительства были неискренными, когда они заявили в начале части V договора ... что для облегчения общего сокращения вооружения всех наций, Германия была быть необходимым для сначала разоружение ". Отсутствие американской ратификации договора или вступления в Лигу Наций заставило Францию ​​не желать разоружить, что привело к тому, что немецкий желание переехать. Шмитт утверждал, что «если бы четыре союзника остались объединенными, они могли бы заставить Германию действительно разоружить, и немецкая воля и способность противостоять другим положениям договора, соответственно, уменьшится».

Макс Хантке и Марк Спорер написали: «Военные и экономические историки [[]] обнаружили, что немецкие военные только незначительно превышали пределы» договора до 1933 года. Адам Туз согласился и написал «Чтобы представить это в перспективе, ежегодные военные расходы в Республике Веймар были рассчитывались не в миллиардах, а в сотнях миллионов рейхсмарков »; Например, программа Республики Веймарской Республики в 1931 году в 480 миллионов рейхсмарков за пять лет по сравнению с планом нацистского правительства 1933 года потратить 4,4 миллиарда рейхсмарков в год. PMH Bell утверждал, что британское правительство знало о более позднем восстановлении Веймара и предоставил общественность респектабельности немецким усилиям, не противостоящим им. мнение, разделяемое Черчиллом. Норман Дэвис писал, что «любопытный надзор» военных ограничений заключался в том, что они «не включали ракеты в свой список запрещенного оружия», что предоставило Вернеру фон Брауну область для исследования в конечном итоге, что привело к «его перерыв» [который] вошел 1943 «Ведущий к развитию ракеты V-2 .

Подъем нацистов

Договор создал много обиды в Германии, которая была эксплуатирована Адольфом Гитлером в его подъеме к власти у руля нацистской Германии. Центральным в этом была вера в миф о ударе , который постановил, что немецкая армия не проиграла войну и была предана республикой Веймара, которая договорилась о ненужной сдаче. Великая депрессия усугубила проблему и привела к краху немецкой экономики. Хотя договор, возможно, не вызвал аварию, это был удобный козлы отпущения. Немцы рассматривали договор как унижение и с нетерпением слушали ораторское искусство Гитлера, которое обвинило в договоре о болезнях Германии. Гитлер пообещал отменить разрушения союзных держав и восстановить потерянную территорию и гордость Германии, что привело к тому, что договор был назван причиной Второй мировой войны .

Герман Гёринг впервые встретился с Адольфом Гитлером в речи, которую Гитлер выступил на митинге против французских требований об экстрадиции предполагаемых немецких военных преступников в соответствии с Версальским договором.

Смотрите также

• Последствия Первой мировой войны
• Маленький договор Версаля
• Договоры меньшинства
• Сентябрьская программа

Примечания

Цитаты

Следующие цитаты являются прямыми связями с первичными источниками, проводимыми на викисурсе . Если не указано иное, ссылки относятся к Версальскому договору.

Источники

• Альбрехт-Карри, Рене (1940). «Версаль через двадцать лет после». Политология ежеквартально . 55 (1): 1–24. doi : 10.2307/2143777 . ISSN   0032-3195 . JSTOR   2143772 .
• Альтика, Мирела (2016). «Мирный договор Версаля: роль карт в изменении Балкан после Первой мировой войны». В Либенберге, Эльри; Demhardt, Imre & Vervust, Soetkin (Eds.). История военной картографии . Чам: Спрингер. С. 179–198. ISBN  978-3-319-25244-5 .
• Аппия, Энтони и Гейтс, Генри Луи , ред. (2005). Африка: Энциклопедия африканского и афроамериканского опыта (2 -е изд.). Издательство Оксфордского университета. п. 781. ISBN  978-0-19-517055-9 .
• Арнандер, Кристофер и Вуд, Фрэнсис (2016). "Введение". Преданный союзник, Китай в Великой войне . Ручка и меч. ISBN  978-1-4738-7501-2 .
• Бейли, Томас А. (1945). «Вудро Уилсон и великое предательство» . Нью -Йорк: Компания Macmillan - через интернет -архив .
• Бейкер, Анни (2004). Американские солдаты за рубежом: глобальное военное присутствие . Перспективы двадцатого века (первое изд.). Праегер. ISBN  978-0-275-97354-4 - через интернет -архив .
• Бэйн, SL (1942). Блокада Германии после перемирия . Издательство Стэнфордского университета. п. 791.
• Барнс, Александр и Эбертовски, Джеймс (апрель 2011 г.). «Мир в опасности в мае-июнь 1919» . Оборонный транспортный журнал . 67 (2): 12–26. JSTOR   44123331 .
• Барнетт, Коррелли (1986). Крысок британской власти . Прометея книги. ISBN  978-039103-439-6 .
• Барнетт, Коррелли (2002). Крысок британской власти . Последовательность "Pride and Fall". Лондон: Пан. п. 392. ISBN  978-0-330-49181-5 .
• Bartov, Omer & Weitz, Eric D. , eds. (2013). Шаттерзона империй: сосуществование и насилие на немецком, Габсбурге, России и Османском пограничном . Издательство Университета Индианы. ISBN  978-0-253-00635-6 .
• Bassiouni, M. Cherif (январь 2002 г.). «Первая мировая война: война, чтобы положить конец всем войнам и рождение международной системы уголовного правосудия с ограниченными возможностями» . Денвер Журнал международного права и политики . 30 (3): 244–291.
• Bell, PMH (1997) [впервые опубликовано 1986]. Происхождение Второй мировой войны в Европе (2 -е изд.). Пирсон. ISBN  978-058230-470-3 - через интернет -архив .
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• Там, Philipp & Siljak, Ana , eds. (2001). Перерисовывающие страны: этническая чистка в Восточной Центральной Европе, 1944–1948 . Гарвардская серия книг «Исследования холодной войны». Rowman & Littlefield s. ISBN  978-0-7425-1094-4 .
• Томпсон, Эва (ND). «Суррогатный гегемон в польском постколониальном дискурсе» (PDF) . Райсский университет. Архивировано из оригинала (PDF) 29 октября 2013 года . Получено 10 октября 2020 года .
• Томсон, Дэвид (1970). Европа со времен Наполеона . Книги пингвинов. п. 605.
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• «Договор Версаля, 1919» . Шато де Версаль . 22 ноября 2016 года. Архивировано с оригинала 6 ноября 2020 года . Получено 2 марта 2021 года .
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• Вайнберг, Герхард Л. (1994). Мир в оружии: глобальная история Второй мировой войны . Издательство Кембриджского университета. ISBN  0-52144-317-2 - через интернет -архив .
• Вайнберг, Герхард Л. (2008) [впервые опубликовано 1995]. Германия, Гитлер и Вторая мировая война: эссе в современной немецкой и мировой истории . Издательство Кембриджского университета. п. 16. ISBN  978-0-521-56626-1 .
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• Уайльд, Роберт (29 января 2020 года). «Как Версальский договор способствовал росту Гитлера» . Мыслить . Получено 5 октября 2020 года .
• Уильямсон, Дэвид Дж . (2017). Британцы в Интервоне Германии: неохотные оккупанты, 1918–30 (2 -е изд.). Нью -Йорк: Bloomsbury Academic. с. 19, 245. ISBN  978-1-4725-9582-9 .
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• Годвуд, Питер Дж. (2009). Гарантия мира: Лига Наций в британской политике 1914–1925 . Издательство Оксфордского университета. ISBN  978-019922-673-3 .
• Залога, Стивен (2002). Польша 1939: Рождение Блицкрига . Кампания. Иллюстрирован Говардом Джеррардом. Osprey Publishing. ISBN  978-1-84176-408-5 .

Дальнейшее чтение

• Андельман, Дэвид А. (2008). Разрушенный мир: Версаль 1919 и цена, которую мы платим сегодня . Нью -Йорк/Лондон: Дж. Уайли. ISBN  978-0-471-78898-0 .
• Birdsall, Paul (1941). Версаль двадцать лет спустя . Аллен и Unwin.
• Купер, Джон Милтон (2010). Разрушение сердца мира: Вудро Уилсон и борьба за Лигу Наций . Издательство Кембриджского университета. ISBN  978-0-521-14765-1 .
• Демарко, Нил (1987). Мир в этом столетии . Лондон: Коллинз Образовательный. ISBN  0-00-322217-9 .
• Гребнер, Норман А. и Беннетт, Эдвард М. (2011). Версальский договор и его наследие: неспособность Вильсонского видения . Нью -Йорк: издательство Кембриджского университета. ISBN  978-1-107-00821-2 .
• Геррон, Джордж Д. (2015) [Первое издание опубликовано 1921]. Поражение в победе (воспроизводство изд.). Бостон: Palala Press; Первоначально опубликовано Сесилом Палмером. ISBN  978-1-343-46520-6 .
• Ллойд Джордж, Дэвид (1938). Правда о мирных договорах (2 тома) . Лондон: Виктор Голланц.
  • Опубликовано в США как мемуары о мирной конференции
• McKercher, BJC, и Эрик Гольдштейн, ред. Аспекты британской политики и договора Версаля (Routledge, 2020) онлайн

• Macmillan, Margaret (2001). Миротворцы . Лондон: Джон Мюррей. ISBN  0-7195-5939-1 .
  • Также опубликовано как Macmillan, Margaret (2001). Париж 1919: шесть месяцев, которые изменили мир . Нью -Йорк: Рэндом Хаус. ISBN  0-375-76052-0 - через интернет -архив .
• Паркер, RAC (апрель 1956 г.). «Первая капитуляция: Франция и Кризис Рейнлены 1936 года». Мировая политика . 8 (3): 355–373. doi : 10.2307/2008855 . JSTOR   2008855 . S2CID   155654607 .
• Шарп, Алан (2018). Версальское урегулирование: миротворчество после Первой мировой войны 1919–1923 гг. (Третье изд.). Пальгрейв. ISBN  978-1-137-61139-0 .
• Вебстер, Эндрю (2018). «Версальский договор (1919)». В Мартеле, Гордон (ред.). Энциклопедия дипломатии . Тол. 4. Wiley-Blackwell. С. 1–15. ISBN  978-1-118-88791-2 .
• Уилер-Беннетт, сэр Джон (1972). Поручение репараций, являющихся политическим опытом Соглашения о Лозанне, 1932 . Нью -Йорк: Х. Фертиг.

Историография и память

• Baranyi, Tamás Peter (2019). «Поиск мирового порядка: к новой историографии Парижской мирной конференции» . Corvinus Journal of International . 4 (2–4): 1–32. doi : 10.14267/cojourn.2019v4n2a1 . S2CID   213836404 .
• Boemeke, Manfred F.; и др., ред. (1998). Версаль: переоценка через 75 лет . Издательство Кембриджского университета. ISBN  978-0-521-62132-8 .
• Брезина, Корона (2006). Версальский договор, 1919 год: первичное исходное исследование договора, которое закончило Первую мировую войну . Rosen Publishing Group. ISBN  978-1-4042-0442-3 .
• Cornelissen, Christoph & Weinrich, Arndt, eds. (2020). Написание Великой войны: историография Первой мировой войны с 1918 года по настоящее время . Berghahn Books. ISBN  978-1-78920-454-4 .
• Кокс, Майкл (2020). «Создание шедевра: Джон Мейнард Кейнс и экономические последствия мира» (PDF) . Глобальные перспективы . 1 (1): 12103. DOI : 10.1525/gp.2020.12103 . S2CID   216506161 .
• Ferrari, Paolo (2015). «Память и историография Первой мировой войны в Италии» . Comillas Journal of International Relations . 2 (2): 117–126. doi : 10.14422/cir.i02.y2015.009 .
• Герварт, Роберт (2021). «Небо за пределами Версаля: Парижские мирные договоры в недавней историографии». Журнал современной истории . 93 (4): 896–930. doi : 10.1086/716966 . S2CID   244955175 .
• Маркс, Салли (2013). «Ошибки и мифы: союзники, Германия и Версальский договор, 1918–1921». Журнал современной истории . 85 (3): 632–659. doi : 10.1086/670825 . S2CID   154166326 .
• Sampaio, Guilherme (2020). « Это больше не книга, это политическое событие» Французский прием экономических последствий мира Джона Мейнарда Кейнса (1919–1920) ». Французские исторические исследования . 43 : 451–482. doi : 10.1215/00161071-8278486 . S2CID   225470429 .
• Шарп, Алан (2011). Последствия мира: Версальское урегулирование: последствия и наследие 1919–2010 . Haus Publishing. ISBN  978-1-905791-74-3 .
• Шарп, Алан (2018). Версаль 1919: Столетняя перспектива . Haus Publishing. ISBN  978-1-912208-09-8 .
• Штайнер, Зара (2001). «Версальский договор повторно». В Dockrill, M. & Fisher, J. (Eds.). Парижская мирная конференция, 1919 . Исследования по военной и стратегической истории. Palgrave Macmillan. С. 13–33. ISBN  978-0-333-77630-8 .
• Зима, Jay & Prost, Antoine (2020). Великая война в истории: дебаты и противоречия, 1914 г. до настоящего времени . Исследования в социальной и культурной истории современной войны (2 -е изд.). Издательство Кембриджского университета. ISBN  978-1-108-84316-4 .

Внешние ссылки

• Документы, касающиеся договора из парламентских коллекций
• Руководство по ресурсам Версальского договора из Библиотеки Конгресса
• Фотографии документа
• Последствия Версальского договора для сегодняшнего мира
• Текст протеста Германии и принятие договора о справедливом мире
• Мой 1919 год - фильм с китайской точки зрения, единственная страна, которая не подписала договор
• «Versailles Revisted» (обзор Манфреда Бомаке, Джеральда Фельдмана и Элизабет Глазер, Версальский договор: переоценка через 75 лет . Кембридж, Великобритания: Германский исторический институт , Вашингтон и издательство Кембриджского университета, 1998), стратегические исследования 9: 2. (Весна 2000), 191–205
• Карта Европы и влияние Версальского договора архивировали 16 марта 2015 года на машине Wayback на Omniatlas.com
• Подписание мирного договора, Silent Film (YouTube Premium): ссылка