Израильско-палестинский конфликт
| Израильско-палестинский конфликт | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Часть арабо-израильского конфликта | |||||||||
 Ситуация на оккупированных Израилем территориях по состоянию на декабрь 2011 г. [update], per the United Nations OCHA.[1] См . здесь более подробную и обновленную карту. | |||||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||||
 Israel |
Governance (PNA):  Fatah (West Bank) Hamas (Gaza Strip) | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
| 9,694–9,763 killed | 44,321–56,207 killed | ||||||||
More than 700,000 Palestinians displaced in 1948[2] with a further 413,000 Palestinians displaced in the Six-Day War.[3]; 2,000+ Jews displaced in 1948[4] | |||||||||
Израильско -палестинский конфликт — это продолжающийся военный и политический конфликт по поводу земли и самоопределения на территории бывшей Подмандатной Палестины . [19] [20] [21] Ключевые аспекты конфликта включают израильскую оккупацию Западного берега и сектора Газа , статус Иерусалима , израильские поселения , границы, безопасность, права на воду, [22] режим разрешений , свобода передвижения палестинцев , [23] и право палестинцев на возвращение .
Конфликт берет свое начало в подъеме сионизма в Европе и прибытии еврейских поселенцев в Османскую Палестину в конце 19 - начале 20 веков. [24] Местное арабское население выступало против сионизма, прежде всего из-за страха территориального перемещения и лишения собственности. [24] Сионистское движение заручилось поддержкой имперской державы в Декларации Бальфура, изданной Великобританией в 1917 году, которая обещала поддержать создание « еврейской родины в Палестине ». После британской оккупации бывшего османского региона во время мировой войны Первой подмандатная Палестина была создана в качестве британского мандата . Увеличение еврейской иммиграции привело к напряженности между евреями и арабами, которая переросла в межобщинный конфликт . [25][26] In 1936, an Arab revolt erupted demanding independence, which the British suppressed.[27][28]
The 1947 United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine triggered the 1948 Palestine war, which saw the expulsion and flight of most Palestinians, the establishment of Israel on most of the Mandate's territory, and the control of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank by Egypt and Jordan, respectively.[29][30] In the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (which became known as the Palestinian territories), which is now considered to be the longest military occupation in modern history, and has drawn international condemnation for violating the human rights of the Palestinians.[31]
The conflict has claimed many civilian casualties, mostly Palestinian, since its inception. Various attempts have been made to resolve the conflict as part of the Israeli–Palestinian peace process, alongside efforts to resolve the broader Arab–Israeli conflict.[32][33][34][35] Progress towards a negotiated solution between the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was made with the Oslo Accords of 1993–1995. The majority of recent peace efforts have been centred around the two-state solution, which involves the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. Public support for a two-state solution, which formerly enjoyed support from both Israeli Jews and Palestinians,[36][37] has dwindled in recent years.[38][39][40] Official negotiations are mediated by the Quartet on the Middle East, which consists of the United Nations, the United States, Russia, and the European Union. The Arab League, which has proposed the Arab Peace Initiative, is another important actor, along with Egypt and Jordan. Since 2006, the Palestinian side has been split between Fatah dominating the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas that gained control of the Gaza Strip.[41] Attempts to remedy this have been repeated and continuing. Since 2019, the Israeli side has also been experiencing political crisis.[42][43] The latest round of peace negotiations began in July 2013 but were suspended in 2014. Since 2006, Hamas and Israel have fought five wars, the most recent of which began in 2023 and is ongoing as of August 2024[update].[41]
History
The Israeli–Palestinian conflict began in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, with the development of political Zionism and the arrival of Zionist settlers to Palestine.[24][45] The modern political Zionist movement, with the goal of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine, grew out of the last two decades of the 19th century, largely in response to antisemitism in Europe. While Jewish colonization began during this period, it was not until the arrival of more ideologically Zionist immigrants in the decade preceding the First World War that the landscape of Ottoman Palestine would start to significantly change.[46] Land purchases, the eviction of tenant Arab peasants and armed confrontation with Jewish para-military units would all contribute to the Palestinian population's growing fear of territorial displacement and dispossession. This fear would gradually be replaced by a broader sense of Palestinian national expression which included the rejection of the Zionist goal of turning the mostly Arab populated land into a Jewish homeland.[30] From early on, the leadership of the Zionist movement had the idea of "transferring" (a euphemism for ethnic cleansing) the Arab Palestinian population out of the land for the purpose of establishing a Jewish demographic majority.[47][48][49][50][51] According to the Israeli historian Benny Morris the idea of transfer was "inevitable and inbuilt into Zionism".[52] The Arab population felt this threat as early as the 1880s with the arrival of the first aliyah.[30]
Chaim Weizmann's efforts to build British support for the Zionist movement would eventually secure the Balfour Declaration, a public statement issued by the British government in 1917 during the First World War announcing support for the establishment of a "national home for the Jewish people" in Palestine.[53] Weizmann would take on a maximalist interpretation of the declaration, in which negotiations on the future of the country were to happen directly between Britain and the Jews, excluding Arab representation. At the Paris Peace Conference, he would later famously share his interpretation of the declaration in his announcement of the goal "[t]o make Palestine as Jewish as England is English." Partially in response to the Zionist movement, a Palestinian national movement would develop more concretely in the interwar period. The years that followed would see Jewish-Palestinian relations deteriorate dramatically.[54]
1920s
With the commitment to establishing a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine, the creation of the British Mandate in Palestine after the end of the first world war would allow for large-scale Jewish immigration. This would be accompanied by the development of a separate Jewish controlled sector of the economy which was supported with large amounts of capital from abroad.[55] The more ardent Zionist ideologues of the Second Aliyah would become the leaders of the Yishuv starting in the 1920s and believed in the separation of Jewish and Arab economies and societies. During this period, the exclusionary nationalist ethos would grow to overpower the socialist ideals that the Second Aliyah had arrived with.[24]
Amin al-Husseini, the architect of the Palestinian Arab national movement, immediately marked Jewish national movement and Jewish immigration to Palestine as the sole enemy to his cause,[56] initiating large-scale riots against the Jews as early as 1920 in Jerusalem and in 1921 in Jaffa. Among the results of the violence was the establishment of the Jewish paramilitary force Haganah. In 1929, a series of violent riots resulted in the deaths of 133 Jews and 116 Arabs, with significant Jewish casualties in Hebron and Safed, and the evacuation of Jews from Hebron and Gaza.[57]
1936–1939 Arab revolt
In the early 1930s, the Arab national struggle in Palestine had drawn many Arab nationalist militants from across the Middle East, such as Sheikh Izaddin al-Qassam from Syria, who established the Black Hand militant group and had prepared the grounds for the 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine. Following the death of al-Qassam at the hands of the British in late 1935, tensions erupted in 1936 into the Arab general strike and general boycott. The strike soon deteriorated into violence, and the Arab revolt was bloodily repressed by the British assisted by the British armed forces of the Jewish Settlement Police, the Jewish Supernumerary Police, and Special Night Squads.[58] The suppression of the revolt would leave at least 10% of the adult male population killed, wounded, imprisoned or exiled.[59] In the first wave of organized violence, lasting until early 1937, most of the Arab groups were defeated by the British, and forced expulsion of much of the Arab leadership ensued. With much of the leadership in exile and the economy severely weakened, the Palestinians would struggle to confront the Zionist movement which was growing in strength, with the support of the British.[60]
The cost and risks associated with the revolt and the ongoing inter-communal conflict led to a shift in British policies in the region and the appointment of the Peel Commission which recommended the partitioning of Palestine.[citation needed] The two main Zionist leaders, Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion, accepted the recommendations on the basis that it would allow for further expansion, but some secondary Zionist leaders disapproved of it.[61][62][63] The subsequent publication of the White Paper of 1939, which sought to limit Jewish immigration to the region, was the breaking point in relations between British authorities and the Zionist movement.[64]
1940s
The renewed violence, which continued sporadically until the beginning of World War II, ended with around 5,000 causualties on the Arab side and 700 combined on the British and Jewish side total.[65][66][67] With the eruption of World War II, the situation in Mandatory Palestine calmed down. It allowed a shift towards a more moderate stance among Palestinian Arabs under the leadership of the Nashashibi clan and even the establishment of the Jewish–Arab Palestine Regiment under British command, fighting Germans in North Africa. The more radical exiled faction of al-Husseini, however, tended to cooperate with Nazi Germany, and participated in the establishment of a pro-Nazi propaganda machine throughout the Arab world. The defeat of Arab nationalists in Iraq and subsequent relocation of al-Husseini to Nazi-occupied Europe tied his hands regarding field operations in Palestine, though he regularly demanded that the Italians and the Germans bomb Tel Aviv. By the end of World War II, a crisis over the fate of Holocaust survivors from Europe led to renewed tensions between the Yishuv and Mandate authorities. Increased illegal immigration from Jewish refugees, along with a paramilitary campaign of resistance against British authorities by Zionist militias, would effectively overturn the White Paper and eventually lead to the withdrawal of the British.[57]
1947 United Nations partition plan
On 29 November 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted Resolution 181(II)[68] recommending the adoption and implementation of a plan to partition Palestine into an Arab state, a Jewish state and the City of Jerusalem.[69] Palestinian Arabs were opposed to the partition.[70] Zionists accepted the partition but planned to expand Israel's borders beyond what was allocated to it by the UN.[71] On the next day, Palestine was swept by violence. For four months, under continuous Arab provocation and attack, the Yishuv was usually on the defensive while occasionally retaliating.[72] The Arab League supported the Arab struggle by forming the volunteer-based Arab Liberation Army, supporting the Palestinian Arab Army of the Holy War, under the leadership of Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni and Hasan Salama. On the Jewish side, the civil war was managed by the major underground militias – the Haganah, Irgun and Lehi – strengthened by numerous Jewish veterans of World War II and foreign volunteers. By spring 1948, it was already clear that the Arab forces were nearing a total collapse, while Yishuv forces gained more and more territory, creating a large scale refugee problem of Palestinian Arabs.[57]
1948 Arab–Israeli War
Following the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel on 14 May 1948, the Arab League decided to intervene on behalf of Palestinian Arabs, marching their forces into former British Palestine, beginning the main phase of the 1948 Arab–Israeli War.[69] The overall fighting, leading to around 15,000 casualties, resulted in cease-fire and armistice agreements of 1949, with Israel holding much of the former Mandate territory, Jordan occupying and later annexing the West Bank and Egypt taking over the Gaza Strip, where the All-Palestine Government was declared by the Arab League on 22 September 1948.[58]
1956 Suez Crisis
Through the 1950s, Jordan and Egypt supported the Palestinian Fedayeen militants' cross-border attacks into Israel, while Israel carried out its own reprisal operations in the host countries. The 1956 Suez Crisis resulted in a short-term Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and exile of the All-Palestine Government, which was later restored with Israeli withdrawal. The All-Palestine Government was completely abandoned by Egypt in 1959 and was officially merged into the United Arab Republic, to the detriment of the Palestinian national movement. Gaza Strip then was put under the authority of the Egyptian military administrator, making it a de facto military occupation. In 1964, however, a new organization, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), was established by Yasser Arafat.[69] It immediately won the support of most Arab League governments and was granted a seat in the Arab League.
1967 Six-Day War
In the 1967 Arab-Israel War, Israel occupied the Palestinian West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza Strip, Egyptian Sinai, Syrian Golan Heights, and two islands in the Gulf of Aqaba. By the mid-1970s, the international community had converged on a framework to resolve the conflict. This included Israel's full withdrawal from the occupied territories in exchange for recognition by the Palestinians and other Arab nations, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and a "just resolution" of the Palestinian refugee question. These principles, known as "land for peace" and Palestinian self-determination through a two-state settlement, were endorsed by the International Court of Justice, the United Nations, and international human rights organizations.[73]
The June 1967 war exerted a significant effect upon Palestinian nationalism, as Israel gained military control of the West Bank from Jordan and the Gaza Strip from Egypt. Consequently, the PLO was unable to establish any control on the ground and established its headquarters in Jordan, home to hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, and supported the Jordanian army during the War of Attrition, which included the Battle of Karameh. However, the Palestinian base in Jordan collapsed with the Jordanian–Palestinian civil war in 1970. The PLO defeat by the Jordanians caused most of the Palestinian militants to relocate to South Lebanon, where they soon took over large areas, creating the so-called "Fatahland".
1973 Yom Kippur War
On October 6, 1973, a coalition of Arab forces consisting of mainly Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack against Israel on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur. Egyptian and Syria had crossed over the ceasefire lines that were agreed upon prior to 1973. Egypt had in particular tried to reoccupy much of the area surrounding the Suez Canal, whilst the frontline with Syria was mainly situated around the north in the Golan Heights. The war concluded with an Israeli victory, with both sides suffering tremendous casualties.
Following the end of the war, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 338, which confirmed the land-for-peace principle established in Resolution 242, initiating the Middle East peace process. The Arab defeat would play an important role in the PLO's willingness to pursue a negotiated settlement to the conflict.[74][75] Additionally, many Israelis began to believe that the area under Israeli occupation could not be held indefinitely by force.[76][77]
The Camp David Accords, agreed upon by Israel and Egypt in 1978, primarily aimed to establish a peace treaty between the two countries. The accords also proposed the creation of a "Self-Governing Authority" for the Arab population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, excluding Jerusalem. While it promised "full autonomy for the inhabitants," the land was to remain under Israeli control. A peace treaty based on these accords was signed in 1979, leading to Israel's withdrawal from the occupied Egyptian Sinai Peninsula by 1982. However, the specifics of the Palestinian-autonomy accords were disputed among the signatories and other Arab groups, and were never implemented.[78][79]
1982 Lebanon War
Palestinian insurgency in South Lebanon peaked in the early 1970s, as Lebanon was used as a base to launch attacks on northern Israel and airplane hijacking campaigns worldwide, which drew Israeli retaliation. During the Lebanese Civil War, Palestinian militants continued to launch attacks against Israel while also battling opponents within Lebanon. In 1978, the Coastal Road massacre led to the Israeli full-scale invasion known as Operation Litani. This operation sought to dislodge the PLO from Lebanon while expanding the area under the control of the Israeli allied Christian militias in southern Lebanon. The operation succeeded in leaving a large portion of the south in control of the Israeli proxy which would eventually form the South Lebanon Army. Under United States pressure, Israeli forces would eventually withdraw from Lebanon.[80][81][82][83]
In 1982, Israel, having secured its southern border with Egypt, sought to resolve the Palestinian issue by attempting to dismantle the military and political power of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon.[84] The goal was to establish a friendly regime in Lebanon and continue its policy of settlement and annexation in occupied Palestine.[85][86][87] The PLO had observed the latest ceasefire with Israel and shown a preference for negotiations over military operations. As a result, Israel sought to remove the PLO as a potential negotiating partner. [88][89][90] Most Palestinian militants were defeated within several weeks, Beirut was captured, and the PLO headquarters were evacuated to Tunisia in June by Yasser Arafat's decision.[58]
First Intifada (1987–1993)
The first Palestinian uprising began in 1987 as a response to escalating attacks and the endless occupation. By the early 1990s, international efforts to settle the conflict had begun, in light of the success of the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty of 1982. Eventually, the Israeli–Palestinian peace process led to the Oslo Accords of 1993, allowing the PLO to relocate from Tunisia and take ground in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, establishing the Palestinian National Authority. The peace process also had significant opposition among radical Islamic elements of Palestinian society, such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, who immediately initiated a campaign of attacks targeting Israelis. Following hundreds of casualties and a wave of radical anti-government propaganda, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated by an Israeli far-right extremist who objected to the peace initiative. This struck a serious blow to the peace process, from which the newly elected government of Israel in 1996 backed off.[57]
Second Intifada (2000–2005)
Following several years of unsuccessful negotiations, the conflict re-erupted as the Second Intifada in September 2000.[58] The violence, escalating into an open conflict between the Palestinian National Security Forces and the Israel Defense Forces, lasted until 2004/2005 and led to approximately 130 fatalities. In 2005, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon ordered the removal of Israeli settlers and soldiers from Gaza. Israel and its Supreme Court formally declared an end to occupation, saying it "had no effective control over what occurred" in Gaza.[91] However, the United Nations, Human Rights Watch and many other international bodies and NGOs continue to consider Israel to be the occupying power of the Gaza Strip as Israel controls Gaza Strip's airspace, territorial waters and controls the movement of people or goods in or out of Gaza by air or sea.[91][92][93]
Fatah–Hamas split (2006–2007)
In 2006, Hamas won a plurality of 44% in the Palestinian parliamentary election. Israel responded it would begin economic sanctions unless Hamas agreed to accept prior Israeli–Palestinian agreements, forswear violence, and recognize Israel's right to exist, all of which Hamas rejected.[94] After internal Palestinian political struggle between Fatah and Hamas erupted into the Battle of Gaza (2007), Hamas took full control of the area.[95] In 2007, Israel imposed a naval blockade on the Gaza Strip, and cooperation with Egypt allowed a ground blockade of the Egyptian border.
The tensions between Israel and Hamas escalated until late 2008, when Israel launched operation Cast Lead upon Gaza, resulting in thousands of civilian casualties and billions of dollars in damage. By February 2009, a ceasefire was signed with international mediation between the parties, though the occupation and small and sporadic eruptions of violence continued.[citation needed]
In 2011, a Palestinian Authority attempt to gain UN membership as a fully sovereign state failed. In Hamas-controlled Gaza, sporadic rocket attacks on Israel and Israeli air raids continued to occur.[96][97][98][99] In November 2012, Palestinian representation in the UN was upgraded to a non-member observer state, and its mission title was changed from "Palestine (represented by PLO)" to "State of Palestine". In 2014, another war broke out between Israel and Gaza, resulting in over 70 Israeli and over 2,000 Palestinian casualties.[100]
Israel–Hamas war (2023–present)
After the 2014 war and 2021 crisis, Hamas began planning an attack on Israel.[101] In 2022, Netanyahu returned to power while headlining a hardline far-right government,[102] which led to greater political strife in Israel[103] and clashes in the Palestinian territories.[104] This culminated in the 2023 Israel–Hamas war, when Hamas-led militant groups launched a surprise attack on southern Israel from the Gaza Strip, killing more than 1,200 Israeli civilians and military personnel and taking hostages.[105][106] The Israeli military retaliated by conducting an extensive aerial bombardment campaign on Gaza,[107] followed by a large-scale ground invasion with the stated goal of destroying Hamas and controlling security in Gaza afterwards.[108] Israel killed tens of thousands of Palestinians, including civilians and combatants and displaced almost two million people.[109] South Africa accused Israel of genocide at the International Court of Justice and called for an immediate ceasefire.[110] The Court issued an order requiring Israel to take all measures to prevent any acts contrary to the 1948 Genocide Convention,[111][112][113] but did not order Israel to suspend its military campaign.[114]
The war spilled over, with Israel engaging in clashes with local militias in the West Bank, Hezbollah in Lebanon and northern Israel, and other Iranian-backed militias in Syria.[115][116][117] Iranian-backed militias also engaged in clashes with the United States,[118] while the Houthis blockaded the Red Sea in protest,[119] to which the United States responded with airstrikes in Yemen,[120] Iraq, and Syria.[121]
Attempts to reach a peaceful settlement
The PLO's participation in diplomatic negotiations was dependent on its complete disavowal of terrorism and recognition of Israel's "right to exist." This stipulation required the PLO to abandon its objective of reclaiming all of historic Palestine and instead focus on the 22 percent which came under Israeli military control in 1967.[122] By the late 1970s, Palestinian leadership in the occupied territories and most Arab states supported a two-state settlement.[123] In 1981, Saudi Arabia put forward a plan based on a two-state settlement to the conflict with support from the Arab League.[124] Israeli analyst Avner Yaniv describes Arafat as ready to make a historic compromise at this time, while the Israeli cabinet continued to oppose the existence of a Palestinian state. Yaniv described Arafat's willingness to compromise as a "peace offensive" which Israel responded to by planning to remove the PLO as a potential negotiating partner in order to evade international diplomatic pressure.[125] Israel would invade Lebanon the following year in an attempt to undermine the PLO as a political organization, weakening Palestinian nationalism and facilitating the annexation of the West Bank into Greater Israel.[126]
While the PLO had adopted a program of pursuing a Palestinian state alongside Israel since the mid 1970s, the 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Independence formally consecrated this objective. This declaration, which was based on resolutions from the Palestine National Council sessions in the late 1970s and 1980s, advocated for the creation of a Palestinian state comprising the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, within the borders set by the 1949 armistice lines prior to June 5, 1967. Following the declaration, Arafat explicitly denounced all forms of terrorism and affirmed the PLO's acceptance of UN Resolutions 242 and 338, as well as the recognition of Israel's right to exist. All the conditions defined by Henry Kissinger for US negotiations with the PLO had now been met.[127]
Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Shamir stood behind the stance that the PLO was a terrorist organization. He maintained a strict stance against any concessions, including withdrawal from occupied Palestinian territories, recognition of or negotiations with the PLO, and especially the establishment of a Palestinian state. Shamir viewed the U.S. decision to engage in dialogue with the PLO as a mistake that threatened the existing territorial status quo. He argued that negotiating with the PLO meant accepting the existence of a Palestinian state and hence was unacceptable.[128]
The Peace Process
The term "peace-process" refers to the step-by-step approach to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Having originally entered into usage to describe the US mediated negotiations between Israel and surrounding Arab countries, notably Egypt, the term "peace-process" has grown to be associated with an emphasis on the negotiation process rather than on presenting a comprehensive solution to the conflict.[129][130][131] As part of this process, fundamental issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict such as borders, access to resources, and the Palestinian right of return, have been left to "final status" talks. Such "final status" negotiations along the lines discussed in Madrid in 1991 have never taken place.[131]
The Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995 built on the incremental framework put in place by the 1978 Camp David negotiations and the 1991 Madrid and Washington talks. The motivation behind the incremental approach towards a settlement was that it would "build confidence", but the eventual outcome was instead a dramatic decline in mutual confidence. At each incremental stage, Israel further entrenched its occupation of the Palestinian territories, despite the PA upholding its obligation to curbing violent attacks from extremist groups, in part by cooperating with Israeli forces.[132] At the same time, the PA repeatedly violated its obligations to curb incitement[133] and its record on curbing terrorism and other security obligations under the Wye River Memorandum was, at best, mixed.[134] Meron Benvinisti, former deputy mayor of Jerusalem, observed that life became harsher for Palestinians during this period as state violence increased and Palestinian land continued to be expropriated as settlements expanded.[135][136][137][138] Israeli foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami described the Oslo Accords as legitimizing "the transformation of the West Bank into what has been called a 'cartographic cheeseboard'."[139] Core to the Oslo Accords was the creation of the Palestinian Authority and the security cooperation it would enter into with the Israeli military authorities in what has been described as the "outsourcing" of the occupation to the PA.[122] Ben-Ami, who participated in the Camp David 2000 talks, described this process: "One of the meanings of Oslo was that the PLO was eventually Israel’s collaborator in the task of stifling the Intifada and cutting short what was clearly an authentically democratic struggle for Palestinian independence."[139]
Oslo Accords (1993, 1995)
In 1993, Israeli officials led by Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian leaders from the Palestine Liberation Organization led by Yasser Arafat strove to find a peaceful solution through what became known as the Oslo peace process. A crucial milestone in this process was Arafat's letter of recognition of Israel's right to exist. Emblematic of the asymmetry in the Oslo process, Israel was not required to, and did not, recognize the right of a Palestinian state to exist. In 1993, the Declaration of Principles (or Oslo I) was signed and set forward a framework for future Israeli–Palestinian negotiations, in which key issues would be left to "final status" talks. The stipulations of the Oslo agreements ran contrary to the international consensus for resolving the conflict; the agreements did not uphold Palestinian self-determination or statehood and repealed the internationally accepted interpretation of UN Resolution 242 that land cannot be acquired by war.[136] With respect to access to land and resources, Noam Chomsky described the Oslo agreements as allowing "Israel to do virtually what it likes."[140] The Oslo process was delicate and progressed in fits and starts.
The process took a turning point at the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 and the election of Netanyahu in 1996, finally unraveling when Arafat and Ehud Barak failed to reach an agreement at Camp David in July 2000 and later at Taba in 2001.[129][141] The interim period specified by Oslo had not built confidence between the two parties; Barak had failed to implement additional stages of the interim agreements and settlements expanded by 10% during his short term.[142] The disagreement between the two parties at Camp David was primarily on the acceptance (or rejection) of international consensus.[143][144] For Palestinian negotiators, the international consensus, as represented by the yearly vote in the UN General Assembly which passes almost unanimously, was the starting point for negotiations. The Israeli negotiators, supported by the American participants, did not accept the international consensus as the basis for a settlement.[145] Both sides eventually accepted the Clinton parameters "with reservations" but the talks at Taba were "called to a halt" by Barak, and the peace process itself came to a stand-still.[141] Ben-Ami, who participated in the talks at Camp David as Israel's foreign minister, would later describe the proposal on the table: "The Clinton parameters... are the best proof that Arafat was right to turn down the summit’s offers".[143]
Camp David Summit (2000)
In July 2000, US President Bill Clinton convened a peace summit between Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Barak reportedly put forward the following as "bases for negotiation", via the US to the Palestinian President: a non-militarized Palestinian state split into 3–4 parts containing 87–92% of the West Bank after having already given up 78% of historic Palestine.[A] Thus, an Israeli offer of 91 percent of the West Bank (5,538 km2 of the West Bank translates into only 86 percent from the Palestinian perspective),[146] including Arab parts of East Jerusalem and the entire Gaza Strip,[147][148] as well as a stipulation that 69 Jewish settlements (which comprise 85% of the West Bank's Jewish settlers) would be ceded to Israel, no right of return to Israel, no sovereignty over the Temple Mount or any core East Jerusalem neighbourhoods, and continued Israel control over the Jordan Valley.[149][150]
Arafat rejected this offer,[147] which Palestinian negotiators, Israeli analysts and Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami described as "unacceptable".[141][151] According to the Palestinian negotiators the offer did not remove many of the elements of the Israeli occupation regarding land, security, settlements, and Jerusalem.[152]
After the Camp David summit, a narrative emerged, supported by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and his foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, as well as US officials including Dennis Ross and Madeleine Albright, that Yasser Arafat had rejected a generous peace offer from Israel and instead incited a violent uprising. This narrative suggested that Arafat was not interested in a two-state solution, but rather aimed to destroy Israel and take over all of Palestine. This view was widely accepted in US and Israeli public opinion. Nearly all scholars and most Israeli and US officials involved in the negotiations have rejected this narrative. These individuals include prominent Israeli negotiators, the IDF chief of staff, the head of the IDF's intelligence bureau, the head of the Shin Bet as well as their advisors.[153]
No tenable solution was crafted which would satisfy both Israeli and Palestinian demands, even under intense US pressure. Clinton has long blamed Arafat for the collapse of the summit.[154] In the months following the summit, Clinton appointed former US Senator George J. Mitchell to lead a fact-finding committee aiming to identify strategies for restoring the peace process. The committee's findings were published in 2001 with the dismantlement of existing Israeli settlements and Palestinian crackdown on militant activity being one strategy.[155]
Developments following Camp David
Following the failed summit Palestinian and Israeli negotiators continued to meet in small groups through August and September 2000 to try to bridge the gaps between their respective positions. The United States prepared its own plan to resolve the outstanding issues. Clinton's presentation of the US proposals was delayed by the advent of the Second Intifada at the end of September.[152]
Clinton's plan, eventually presented on 23 December 2000, proposed the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and 94–96 percent of the West Bank plus the equivalent of 1–3 percent of the West Bank in land swaps from pre-1967 Israel. On Jerusalem, the plan stated that "the general principle is that Arab areas are Palestinian and that Jewish areas are Israeli." The holy sites were to be split on the basis that Palestinians would have sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Noble sanctuary, while the Israelis would have sovereignty over the Western Wall. On refugees the plan suggested a number of proposals including financial compensation, the right of return to the Palestinian state, and Israeli acknowledgment of suffering caused to the Palestinians in 1948. Security proposals referred to a "non-militarized" Palestinian state, and an international force for border security. Both sides accepted Clinton's plan[152][156][157] and it became the basis for the negotiations at the Taba Peace summit the following January.[152]
Taba Summit (2001)
The Israeli negotiation team presented a new map at the Taba Summit in Taba, Egypt, in January 2001. The proposition removed the "temporarily Israeli controlled" areas, and the Palestinian side accepted this as a basis for further negotiation. With Israeli elections looming the talks ended without an agreement but the two sides issued a joint statement attesting to the progress they had made: "The sides declare that they have never been closer to reaching an agreement and it is thus our shared belief that the remaining gaps could be bridged with the resumption of negotiations following the Israeli elections." The following month the Likud party candidate Ariel Sharon defeated Ehud Barak in the Israeli elections and was elected as Israeli prime minister on 7 February 2001. Sharon's new government chose not to resume the high-level talks.[152]
Roadmap for Peace (2002–2003)
One peace proposal, presented by the Quartet of the European Union, Russia, the United Nations and the United States on 17 September 2002, was the Road Map for Peace. This plan did not attempt to resolve difficult questions such as the fate of Jerusalem or Israeli settlements, but left that to be negotiated in later phases of the process. The proposal never made it beyond the first phase, whose goals called for a halt to both Israeli settlement construction and Israeli–Palestinian violence. Neither goal has been achieved as of November 2015.[158][159][160]
The Annapolis Conference was a Middle East peace conference held on 27 November 2007, at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, United States. The conference aimed to revive the Israeli–Palestinian peace process and implement the "Roadmap for peace".[161] The conference ended with the issuing of a joint statement from all parties. After the Annapolis Conference, the negotiations were continued. Both Mahmoud Abbas and Ehud Olmert presented each other with competing peace proposals. Ultimately no agreement was reached.[162][163]
Arab Peace Initiative (2002, 2007, 2017)
The Arab Peace Initiative (Arabic: مبادرة السلام العربية Mubādirat as-Salām al-ʿArabīyyah), also known as the Saudi Initiative, was first proposed by Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia at the Beirut Summit (2002). The peace initiative is a proposed solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict as a whole, and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in particular.[164] The initiative was initially published on 28 March 2002, at the Beirut Summit, and agreed upon again in 2007 in the Riyadh Summit. Unlike the Road Map for Peace, it spelled out "final-solution" borders based explicitly on the UN borders established before the 1967 Six-Day War. It offered full normalization of relations with Israel, in exchange for the withdrawal of its forces from all the occupied territories, including the Golan Heights, to recognize "an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital" in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as a "just solution" for the Palestinian refugees.[165]
The Palestinian Authority led by Yasser Arafat immediately embraced the initiative.[166] His successor Mahmoud Abbas also supported the plan and officially asked U.S. President Barack Obama to adopt it as part of his Middle East policy.[167] Islamist political party Hamas, the elected government of the Gaza Strip, was deeply divided,[168] with most factions rejecting the plan.[169] Palestinians have criticised the Israel–United Arab Emirates normalization agreement and another with Bahrain signed in September 2020, fearing the moves weaken the Arab Peace Initiative, regarding the UAE's move as "a betrayal."[170]
The Israeli government under Ariel Sharon rejected the initiative as a "non-starter"[171] because it required Israel to withdraw to pre-June 1967 borders.[172] After the renewed Arab League endorsement in 2007, then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert gave a cautious welcome to the plan.[173] In 2015, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed tentative support for the Initiative,[174] but in 2018, he rejected it as a basis for future negotiations with the Palestinians.[175]
Current status
In April 2021, Human Rights Watch released its report A Threshold Crossed, describing the policies of Israel towards Palestinians living in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza constituted the crime of apartheid.[176] A further report titled Israel's Apartheid Against Palestinians: Cruel System of Domination and Crime Against Humanity was released by Amnesty International on 1 February 2022.[177]
Israel's settlements policy
Israel has had its settlement growth and policies in the Palestinian territories harshly criticized by the European Union citing it as increasingly undermining the viability of the two-state solution and running in contrary to the Israeli-stated commitment to resume negotiations.[178][179] In December 2011, all the regional groupings on the UN Security Council named continued settlement construction and settler violence as disruptive to the resumption of talks, a call viewed by Russia as a "historic step".[180][181][182] In April 2012, international outrage followed Israeli steps to further entrench the Jewish settlements in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, which included the publishing of tenders for further settler homes and the plan to legalize settler outposts. Britain said that the move was a breach of Israeli commitments under the road map to freeze all settlement expansion in the land captured since 1967. The British Foreign Minister stated that the "Systematic, illegal Israeli settlement activity poses the most significant and live threat to the viability of the two state solution".[183]In May 2012 the 27 foreign ministers of the European Union issued a statement which condemned continued Israeli settler violence and incitement.[184] In a similar move, the Quartet "expressed its concern over ongoing settler violence and incitement in the West Bank," calling on Israel "to take effective measures, including bringing the perpetrators of such acts to justice."[185] The Palestinian Ma'an News agency reported the PA Cabinet's statement on the issue stated that the West, including East Jerusalem, were seeing "an escalation in incitement and settler violence against our people with a clear protection from the occupation military. The last of which was the thousands of settler march in East Jerusalem which included slogans inciting to kill, hate and supports violence".[186]
Separation of the Gaza Strip
Since 2006, Israel has enforced an official and explicit policy of enforcing "separation" between the West Bank and Gaza Strip.[187] This separation policy has involved strict restrictions on imports, exports and travel to and from the Gaza Strip.[188] This policy began to develop as early as the 1950s, but were further formalized with the implementation of an Israeli closure regime in 1991, where Israel began requiring Gazans to obtain permits to exit the Gaza Strip and to enter the West Bank (cancelling the "general exit permit"). By treating the Gaza Strip as a separate entity, Israel has aimed to increase it's control over the West Bank while avoiding a political resolution to the conflict.[189][190] The lack of territorial contiguity between Gaza and the West Bank and the absence of any "safe passage" explain the success of Israel's policy of separation.[191] Harvard political economist Sara Roy describes the separation policy as motivated by Israeli rejection of territorial compromise, fundamentally undermining Palestinian political and economic cohesion and weakening national unity among Palestinians.[192][193]
The severing of Gaza from the West Bank hinterland reflects a paradigm shift in the framing of the conflict. After Hamas assumed power in 2007, Israel declared Gaza a "hostile territory," preferring to frame its obligations towards Gaza in terms of the law of armed conflict, over what it presented as a border dispute, as opposed to those of military occupation[191][194] (this framing was rebuffed by the ICJ in 2024 when the court asserted that Israel continued to occupy the Gaza Strip even after the 2005 disengagement[195]). Indeed, the intensified blockade policy was presented by Israeli officials as "economic warware" intended to "keep the Gazan economy on the brink of collapse" at the "lowest possible level."[191] Roy cites an Israeli Supreme Court's decision approving fuel cuts to Gaza as emblematic of the disabling of Gaza; the court deemed the fuel cuts permissible on the basis that they would not harm the population's "essential humanitarian needs."
The executive director of the Israeli human rights organization Gisha described Israeli policy towards Gaza between 2007 and 2010 as "explicitly punitive," controlling the entry of food based on calculated calorie needs to limit economic activity and enforce "economic warfare." These restrictions included allowing only small packets of margarine to prevent local food production. Gaza's GDP dramatically declined during this period as a result of these measures.[196] Indeed, by April 2010 Israel restricted the entry of commercial items to Gaza to a list of 73 products, compared with 4,000 products which had previously been approved. The result was the virtual collapse of Gaza's private sector, which Roy describes as largely completed after the 2008 Israeli Operation Cast Lead in Gaza.[192] According to Gisha, travel restrictions from the Gaza Strip are not based on individual security concerns, rather, the general rule is that travel to Israel or the West Bank from Gaza is not permitted other than in "exceptional" cases.[197] Israeli imposed travel restrictions aim in particular to prevent Gazans from living in the West Bank. Indeed, Israeli policy treats the Gaza Strip as a "terminus" station, with family reunification between the West Bank and Gaza Strip only possible if the family agrees to permanently relocate to the Gaza Strip.[198] The Israeli officials described the blockade as serving limited security value, instead referring to these restrictions as motivated by "political-security."[199]
Israeli Military Police
In a report published in February 2014 covering incidents over the three-year period of 2011–2013, Amnesty International asserted that Israeli forces employed reckless violence in the West Bank, and in some instances appeared to engage in wilful killings which would be tantamount to war crimes. Besides the numerous fatalities, Amnesty said at least 261 Palestinians, including 67 children, had been gravely injured by Israeli use of live ammunition. In this same period, 45 Palestinians, including 6 children had been killed. Amnesty's review of 25 civilians deaths concluded that in no case was there evidence of the Palestinians posing an imminent threat. At the same time, over 8,000 Palestinians suffered serious injuries from other means, including rubber-coated metal bullets. Only one IDF soldier was convicted, killing a Palestinian attempting to enter Israel illegally. The soldier was demoted and given a 1-year sentence with a five-month suspension. The IDF answered the charges stating that its army held itself "to the highest of professional standards", adding that when there was suspicion of wrongdoing, it investigated and took action "where appropriate".[200][201]
United Nations and Recognition of Palestinian statehood
The PLO have campaigned for full member status for the state of Palestine at the UN and for recognition on the 1967 borders. This campaign has received widespread support.[202][203] The UN General Assembly votes every year almost unanimously in favor of a resolution calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders.[204] The US and Israel instead prefer to pursue bilateral negotiation rather than resolving the conflict on the basis of international law.[205][206] Netanyahu has criticized the Palestinians of purportedly trying to bypass direct talks,[207] whereas Abbas has argued that the continued construction of Israeli-Jewish settlements is "undermining the realistic potential" for the two-state solution.[208] Although Palestine has been denied full member status by the UN Security Council,[209] in late 2012 the UN General Assembly overwhelmingly approved the de facto recognition of sovereign Palestine by granting non-member state status.[210]
Incitement
Following the Oslo Accords, which was to set up regulative bodies to rein in frictions, Palestinian incitement against Israel, Jews, and Zionism continued, parallel with Israel's pursuance of settlements in the Palestinian territories,[211] though under Abu Mazen it has reportedly dwindled significantly.[212] Charges of incitement have been reciprocal,[213][214] both sides interpreting media statements in the Palestinian and Israeli press as constituting incitement.[212] Schoolbooks published for both Israeli and Palestinian schools have been found to have encouraged one-sided narrative and even hatred of the other side.[215][216][217][218][219][220]Perpetrators of murderous attacks, whether against Israelis or Palestinians, often find strong vocal support from sections of their communities despite varying levels of condemnation from politicians.[221][222][223]
Both parties to the conflict have been criticized by third-parties for teaching incitement to their children by downplaying each side's historical ties to the area, teaching propagandist maps, or indoctrinate their children to one day join the armed forces.[224][225]
Issues in dispute
The core issues of the conflict are borders, the status of settlements in the West Bank, the status of east Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugee right of return, and security.[226][136][130][227] With the PLO's recognition of Israel's right to exist in 1982,[140] the international community with the main exception of the United States and Israel[228][229] has been in consensus on a framework for resolving the conflict on the basis of international law.[230] Various UN bodies and the ICJ have supported this position;[230][130] every year, the UN General Assembly votes almost unamimously in favor of a resolution titled "Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine." This resolution consistently affirms the illegality of the Israeli settlements, the annexation of East Jerusalem, and the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. It also emphasizes the need for an Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967 and the need for a just resolution to the refugee question on the basis of UN resolution 194.[204]
Unilateral strategies and the rhetoric of hardline political factions, coupled with violence, have fostered mutual embitterment and hostility and a loss of faith in the possibility of reaching a peaceful settlement. Since the break down of negotiations, security has played a less important role in Israeli concerns, trailing behind employment, corruption, housing and other pressing issues.[231]Israeli policy had reoriented to focus on managing the conflict and the associated occupation of Palestinian territory, rather than reaching a negotiated solution.[231][232][233][234][235] The expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank has led the majority of Palestinians to believe that Israel is not committed to reaching an agreement, but rather to a pursuit of establishing permanent control over this territory in order to provide that security.[236]
Status of Jerusalem
In 1967, Israel unilaterally annexed East Jerusalem, in violation of international law. Israel seized a significant area further east of the city, eventually creating a barrier of Israeli settlements around the city, isolating Jerusalem's Palestinian population from the West Bank.[237] Israel's policy of constructing sprawling Jewish neighborhoods surrounding the Palestinian sections of the city were aimed at making a repartition of the city almost impossible. In a further effort to change the demography of Jerusalem in favor of a Jewish majority, Israel discouraged Palestinian presence in the city while encouraging Jewish presence, as a matter of policy. Specifically, Israel introduced policies restricting the space available for the construction of Palestinian neighborhoods, delaying or denying building permits and raising housing demolition orders.[238] Tensions in Jerusalem are primarily driven by provocations by Israeli authorities and Jewish extremists against Arabs in the city. [239]
The Israeli government, including the Knesset and Supreme Court, is located in the "new city" of West Jerusalem and has been since Israel's founding in 1948. After Israel annexed East Jerusalem in 1967, it assumed complete administrative control of East Jerusalem. Since then, various UN bodies have consistently denounced Israel's control over East Jerusalem as invalid.[238] In 1980, Israel passed the Jerusalem Law declaring "Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel."[240][better source needed]
Many countries do not recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital, with exceptions being the United States,[241] and Russia.[242] The majority of UN member states and most international organisations do not recognise Israel's claims to East Jerusalem which occurred after the 1967 Six-Day War, nor its 1980 Jerusalem Law proclamation.[243] The International Court of Justice in its 2004 Advisory opinion on the "Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory" described East Jerusalem as "occupied Palestinian territory".[244]
At the Camp David and Taba Summits in 2000–2001, the United States proposed a plan in which the Arab parts of Jerusalem would be given to the proposed Palestinian state while the Jewish parts of Jerusalem were given to Israel. All archaeological work under the Temple Mount would be jointly controlled by the Israeli and Palestinian governments. Both sides accepted the proposal in principle, but the summits ultimately failed.[238]
The three largest Abrahamic religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—hold Jerusalem as an important setting for their religious and historical narratives. Jerusalem is the holiest city for Judaism, being the former location of the Jewish temples on the Temple Mount and the capital of the ancient Israelite kingdom. For Muslims, Jerusalem is the third holiest site, being the location of Isra and Mi'raj event, and the Al-Aqsa Mosque. For Christians, Jerusalem is the site of Jesus' crucifixion and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.
Holy sites and Jerusalem's Temple Mount
Since the early 20th century, the issue of holy places and particularly the sacred places in Jerusalem has been employed by nationalist politicians.[245]
Israelis did not have unrestricted access to the holy places in East Jerusalem during the period of Jordanian occupation.[246] Since 1975, Israel has banned Muslims from worshiping at Joseph's Tomb, a shrine considered sacred by both Jews and Muslims. Settlers established a yeshiva, installed a Torah scroll and covered the mihrab. During the Second Intifada Palestinian protesters looted and burned the site.[247][248] Israeli security agencies routinely monitor and arrest Jewish extremists that plan attacks, though many serious incidents have still occurred.[249] Israel has allowed almost complete autonomy to the Muslim trust (Waqf) over the Temple Mount.[238]
Palestinians have voiced concerns regarding the welfare of Christian and Muslim holy places under Israeli control.[250] Additionally, some Palestinian advocates have made statements alleging that the Western Wall Tunnel was re-opened with the intent of causing the mosque's collapse.[251]
Palestinian refugees
Palestinian refugees are people who lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab–Israeli conflict[252] and the 1967 Six-Day War.[253] The number of Palestinians who were expelled or fled from Israel was estimated at 711,000 in 1949.[254] The descendants of all refugees (not just Palestinian refugees [255]) are considered by the UN to also be refugees. As of 2010 there are 4.7 million Palestinian refugees.[256] Between 350,000 and 400,000 Palestinians were displaced during the 1967 Arab–Israeli war.[253] A third of the refugees live in recognized refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The remainder live in and around the cities and towns of these host countries.[252] Most Palestinian refugees were born outside Israel and are not allowed to live in any part of historic Palestine.[252][257]
Israel has since 1948 prevented the return of Palestinian refugees and refused any settlement permitting their return except in limited cases.[140][258][259] On the basis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and UN General Assembly Resolution 194, Palestinians claim the right of refugees to return to the lands, homes and villages where they lived before being driven into exile in 1948 and 1967. Arafat himself repeatedly assured his American and Israeli interlocutors at Camp David that he primarily sought the principle of the right of return to be accepted, rather than the full right of return, in practice.[260]
Palestinian and international authors have justified the right of return of the Palestinian refugees on several grounds:[261][262][263]Several scholars included in the broader New Historians argue that the Palestinian refugees fled or were chased out or expelled by the actions of the Haganah, Lehi and Irgun, Zionist paramilitary groups.[264][265] A number have also characterized this as an ethnic cleansing.[266][267][268][269] The New Historians cite indications of Arab leaders' desire for the Palestinian Arab population to stay put.[270]
The Israeli Law of Return that grants citizenship to people of Jewish descent has been described as discriminatory against other ethnic groups, especially Palestinians that cannot apply for such citizenship under the law of return, to the territory which they were expelled from or fled during the course of the 1948 war.[271][272][273]
According to the UN Resolution 194, adopted in 1948, "the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible."[274] UN Resolution 3236 "reaffirms also the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return".[275] Resolution 242 from the UN affirms the necessity for "achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem"; however, Resolution 242 does not specify that the "just settlement" must or should be in the form of a literal Palestinian right of return.[276]
Historically, there has been debate over the relative impact of the causes of the 1948 Palestinian exodus, although there is a wide consensus that violent expulsions by Zionist and Israeli forces were the main factor. Other factors include psychological warfare and Arab sense of vulnerability. Notably, historian Benny Morris states that most of Palestine's 700,000 refugees fled because of the "flail of war" and expected to return home shortly after a successful Arab invasion. He documents instances in which Arab leaders advised the evacuation of entire communities as happened in Haifa although recognizes that these were isolated events.[277][278] In his later work, Morris considers the displacement the result of a national conflict initiated by the Arabs themselves.[278] In a 2004 interview with Haaretz, he described the exodus as largely resulting from an atmosphere of transfer that was promoted by Ben-Gurion and understood by the military leadership. He also claimed that there "are circumstances in history that justify ethnic cleansing".[279] He has been criticized by political scientist Norman Finkelstein for having seemingly changed his views for political, rather than historical, reasons.[280]
Although Israel accepts the right of the Palestinian Diaspora to return into a new Palestinian state, Israel insists that the return of this population into the current state of Israel would threaten the stability of the Jewish state; an influx of Palestinian refugees would lead to the end of the state of Israel as a Jewish state since a demographic majority of Jews would not be maintained.[281][282][283]
Israeli security concerns
Throughout the conflict, Palestinian violence has been a concern for Israelis. Security concerns have historically been a key driver in Israeli political decision making, often expanding in scope and taking precedence over other considerations such as international law and Palestinian human rights.[284][285][286] The occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem and the continued expansion of settlements in those areas have been justified on security grounds. [287]
Israel,[288] along with the United States[289][better source needed] and the European Union, refer to any use of force by Palestinian groups as terroristic and criminal. This is in contrast to the consensus in international law which allows for Palestinians, as a people under illegal military occupation, to use lethal force against Israeli military targets and installations.[290][291][page needed]
In Israel, Palestinian suicide bombers have targeted civilian buses, restaurants, shopping malls, hotels and marketplaces.[292] From 1993 to 2003, 303 Palestinian suicide bombers attacked Israel.[citation needed] In 1994, Hamas initiated their first lethal suicide attack in response to the cave of the Patriarchs massacre where American-Israeli physician Baruch Goldstein opened fire in a mosque, killing 29 people and injuring 125.[293]
The Israeli government initiated the construction of a security barrier following scores of suicide bombings and terrorist attacks in July 2003. Israel's coalition government approved the security barrier in the northern part of the green line between Israel and the West Bank. According to the IDF, since the erection of the fence, terrorist acts have declined by approximately 90%.[294] The decline in attacks can also be attributed to the permanent presence of Israeli troops inside and around Palestinian cities and increasing security cooperation between the IDF and the Palestinian Authority during this period.[295] The barrier followed a route that ran almost entirely through land occupied by Israel in June 1967, unilaterally seizing more than 10% of the West Bank, including whole neighborhoods and settlement blocs, while splitting Palestinian villages in half with immediate effects on Palestinian's freedom of movement. The barrier, in some areas, isolated farmers from their fields and children from their schools, while also restricting Palestinians from moving within the West Bank or pursuing employment in Israel.[296][page needed][297][298]
In 2004 the International Court of Justice ruled that the construction of the barrier violated the Palestinian right to self-determination, contravened the Fourth Geneva Convention, and could not be justified as a measure of Israeli self-defense.[299] The ICJ further expressed that the construction of the wall by Israel could become a permanent fixture, altering the status quo. Israel's High Court, however, disagreed with the ICJ's conclusions, stating that they lacked a factual basis. Several human rights organizations, including B'Tselem, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International, echoed the ICJ's concerns. They suggested that the wall's route was designed to perpetuate the existence of settlements and facilitate their future annexation into Israel, and that the wall was a means for Israel to consolidate control over land used for illegal settlements. The sophisticated structure of the wall also indicated its likely permanence.[300]
Since 2001, the threat of Qassam rockets fired from Palestinian territories into Israel continues to be of great concern for Israeli defense officials.[301] In 2006—the year following Israel's disengagement from the Gaza Strip—the Israeli government claimed to have recorded 1,726 such launches, more than four times the total rockets fired in 2005.[288][302] As of January 2009, over 8,600 rockets have been launched,[303][304] causing widespread psychological trauma and disruption of daily life.[305] As a result of these attacks, Israelis living in southern Israel have had to spend long periods in bomb shelters. The relatively small payload carried on these rockets, Israel's advanced early warning system, American-supplied anti-missile capabilities, and network of shelters made the rockets rarely lethal. In 2014, out of 4,000 rockets fired from the Gaza Strip, only six Israeli civilians were killed. For comparison, the payload carried on these rockets is smaller than Israeli tank shells, of which 49,000 where fired in Gaza in 2014.[306]
There is significant debate within Israel about how to deal with the country's security concerns. Options have included military action (including targeted killings and house demolitions of terrorist operatives), diplomacy, unilateral gestures toward peace, and increased security measures such as checkpoints, roadblocks and security barriers. The legality and the wisdom of all of the above tactics have been called into question by various commentators.[citation needed]
Since mid-June 2007, Israel's primary means of dealing with security concerns in the West Bank has been to cooperate with and permit United States-sponsored training, equipping, and funding of the Palestinian Authority's security forces, which with Israeli help have largely succeeded in quelling West Bank supporters of Hamas.[307]
Occupied Palestinian territory
Israel has occupied the Palestinian territories, which comprise the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip, since 1967 following the June War, making it the longest military occupation in modern history.[308] In 2024, the International Court of Justice determined that the Palestinian territories constitute one political unit and that Israel's occupation since 1967, and the subsequent creation of Israeli settlements and exploitation of natural resources, are illegal under international law. The court also ruled that Israel should pay full reparations to the Palestinian people for the damage the occupation has caused,[309][310] and determined that its policies violate the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.[311]
Some Palestinians say they are entitled to all of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. Israel says it is justified in not ceding all this land, because of security concerns, and also because the lack of any valid diplomatic agreement at the time means that ownership and boundaries of this land is open for discussion.[312] Palestinians claim any reduction of this claim is a severe deprivation of their rights. In negotiations, they claim that any moves to reduce the boundaries of this land is a hostile move against their key interests. Israel considers this land to be in dispute and feels the purpose of negotiations is to define what the final borders will be. In 2017 Hamas announced that it was ready to support a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders "without recognising Israel or ceding any rights".[313] Hamas has previously viewed the peace process "as religiously forbidden and politically inconceivable".[314]
Israeli settlements
According to the Arizona Department of Emergency and Military Affairs (DEMA), "In the years following the Six-Day War, and especially in the 1990s during the peace process, Israel re-established communities destroyed in 1929 and 1948 as well as established numerous new settlements in the West Bank."[315] These settlements were, as of 2009, home to about 301,000 people.[316] DEMA added, "Most of the settlements are in the western parts of the West Bank, while others are deep into Palestinian territory, overlooking Palestinian cities. These settlements have been the site of much inter-communal conflict."[315] The issue of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and, until 2005, the Gaza Strip, have been described by the UK[317] and the WEU[318] as an obstacle to the peace process.
The international community considers Israeli settlements to be illegal under international law,[319][320][321][322] but Israel disputes this.[40][323][38][216] Those who justify the legality of the settlements use arguments based upon Articles 2 and 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as well as UN Security Council Resolution 242.[324][better source needed] On a practical level, some objections voiced by Palestinians are that settlements divert resources needed by Palestinian towns, such as arable land, water, and other resources; and, that settlements reduce Palestinians' ability to travel freely via local roads, owing to security considerations.[325]
Former US President George W. Bush has stated that he does not expect Israel to return entirely to the 1949 armistice lines because of "new realities on the ground".[326] One of the main compromise plans put forth by the Clinton Administration would have allowed Israel to keep some settlements in the West Bank, especially those which were in large blocs near the pre-1967 borders of Israel. In return, Palestinians would have received some concessions of land in other parts of the country.[citation needed] The Obama administration viewed a complete freeze of construction in settlements on the West Bank as a critical step toward peace. In May and June 2009, President Barack Obama said, "The United States does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements",[327] and the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, stated that the President "wants to see a stop to settlements—not some settlements, not outposts, not 'natural growth' exceptions."[328] However, Obama has since declared that the United States will no longer press Israel to stop West Bank settlement construction as a precondition for continued peace-process negotiations with the Palestinian Authority.[329]
As of 2023, there were about 500,000 Israeli settlers living in the West Bank, with another 200,000 living in East Jerusalem.[330][331][332] In February 2023, Israel's Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich took charge of most of the Civil Administration, obtaining broad authority over civilian issues in the West Bank.[333][334] In the first six months of 2023, 13,000 housing units were built in settlements, which is almost three times more than in the whole of 2022.[335]
Blockade of the Gaza Strip
The Military Advocate General of Israel said that Israel is justified under international law to impose a blockade on an enemy for security reasons as Hamas "turned the territory under its de facto control into a launching pad of mortar and rocket attacks against Israeli towns and villages in southern Israel."[336] Media headlines have described a United Nations commission as ruling that Israel's blockade is "both legal and appropriate."[337][338] However, Amnesty International has stated that this is "completely false," and that the cited UN report made no such claim.[339] The Israeli Government's continued land, sea and air blockage is tantamount to collective punishment of the population, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.[340]
According to Oxfam, because of an import-export ban imposed on Gaza in 2007, 95% of Gaza's industrial operations were suspended. Out of 35,000 people employed by 3,900 factories in June 2005, only 1,750 people remained employed by 195 factories in June 2007.[341] By 2010, Gaza's unemployment rate had risen to 40% with 80% of the population living on less than 2 dollars a day.[342]
In January 2008, the Israeli government calculated how many calories per person were needed to prevent a humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, and then subtracted eight percent to adjust for the "culture and experience" of the Gazans. Details of the calculations were released following Israeli human rights organization Gisha's application to the high court. Israel's Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, who drafted the plan, stated that the scheme was never formally adopted, this was not accepted by Gisha.[343][344][345]
Starting in February 2008, the Israeli Government reduced the electricity it sells directly to Gaza. This follows the ruling of Israel's High Court of Justice's decision, which held, with respect to the amount of industrial fuel supplied to Gaza, that, "The clarification that we made indicates that the supply of industrial diesel fuel to the Gaza Strip in the winter months of last year was comparable to the amount that the Respondents now undertake to allow into the Gaza Strip. This fact also indicates that the amount is reasonable and sufficient to meet the vital humanitarian needs in the Gaza Strip." Palestinian militants killed two Israelis in the process of delivering fuel to the Nahal Oz fuel depot.[346]
With regard to Israel's plan, the Court stated that, "calls for a reduction of five percent of the power supply in three of the ten power lines that supply electricity from Israel to the Gaza Strip, to a level of 13.5 megawatts in two of the lines and 12.5 megawatts in the third line, we [the Court] were convinced that this reduction does not breach the humanitarian obligations imposed on the State of Israel in the framework of the armed conflict being waged between it and the Hamas organization that controls the Gaza Strip. Our conclusion is based, in part, on the affidavit of the Respondents indicating that the relevant Palestinian officials stated that they can reduce the load in the event limitations are placed on the power lines, and that they had used this capability in the past."
On 20 June 2010, Israel's Security Cabinet approved a new system governing the blockade that would allow practically all non-military or dual-use items to enter the Gaza Strip. According to a cabinet statement, Israel would "expand the transfer of construction materials designated for projects that have been approved by the Palestinian Authority, including schools, health institutions, water, sanitation and more – as well as (projects) that are under international supervision."[347] Despite the easing of the land blockade, Israel will continue to inspect all goods bound for Gaza by sea at the port of Ashdod.[348]
Prior to a Gaza visit, scheduled for April 2013, Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan explained to Turkish newspaper Hürriyet that the fulfilment of three conditions by Israel was necessary for friendly relations to resume between Turkey and Israel: an apology for the May 2010 Gaza flotilla raid (Prime Minister Netanyahu had delivered an apology to Erdogan by telephone on 22 March 2013), the awarding of compensation to the families affected by the raid, and the lifting of the Gaza blockade by Israel. The Turkish prime minister also explained in the Hürriyet interview, in relation to the April 2013 Gaza visit, "We will monitor the situation to see if the promises are kept or not."[349] At the same time, Netanyahu affirmed that Israel would only consider exploring the removal of the Gaza blockade if peace ("quiet") is achieved in the area.[350]
On 9 October 2023, Israel declared war on Hamas and tightened its blockade of the Gaza Strip.[351] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant declared, "There will be no electricity, no food, no fuel, everything is closed. We are fighting human animals and we are acting accordingly."[352][353]
Water resources
In the Middle East, water resources are of great political concern. Since Israel receives much of its water from two large underground aquifers which continue under the Green Line, the use of this water has been contentious in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Israel withdraws most water from these areas, but it also supplies the West Bank with approximately 40 million cubic metres annually, contributing to 77% of Palestinians' water supply in the West Bank, which is to be shared for a population of about 2.6 million.[354]
While Israel's consumption of this water has decreased since it began its occupation of the West Bank, it still consumes the majority of it: in the 1950s, Israel consumed 95% of the water output of the Western Aquifer, and 82% of that produced by the Northeastern Aquifer. Although this water was drawn entirely on Israel's own side of the pre-1967 border, the sources of the water are nevertheless from the shared groundwater basins located under both West Bank and Israel.[355]
In the Oslo II Accord, both sides agreed to maintain "existing quantities of utilization from the resources." In so doing, the Palestinian Authority established the legality of Israeli water production in the West Bank, subject to a Joint Water Committee (JWC). Moreover, Israel obligated itself in this agreement to provide water to supplement Palestinian production, and further agreed to allow additional Palestinian drilling in the Eastern Aquifer, also subject to the Joint Water Committee.[356][357] The water that Israel receives comes mainly from the Jordan River system, the Sea of Galilee and two underground sources. According to a 2003 BBC article the Palestinians lack access to the Jordan River system.[358]
According to a report of 2008 by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, water resources were confiscated for the benefit of the Israeli settlements in the Ghor. Palestinian irrigation pumps on the Jordan River were destroyed or confiscated after the 1967 war and Palestinians were not allowed to use water from the Jordan River system. Furthermore, the authorities did not allow any new irrigation wells to be drilled by Palestinian farmers, while it provided fresh water and allowed drilling wells for irrigation purposes at the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.[359]
A report was released by the UN in August 2012 and Max Gaylard, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in the occupied Palestinian territory, explained at the launch of the publication: "Gaza will have half a million more people by 2020 while its economy will grow only slowly. In consequence, the people of Gaza will have an even harder time getting enough drinking water and electricity, or sending their children to school". Gaylard present alongside Jean Gough, of the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and Robert Turner, of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). The report projects that Gaza's population will increase from 1.6 million people to 2.1 million people in 2020, leading to a density of more than 5,800 people per square kilometre.[360]
Future and financing
Numerous foreign nations and international organizations have established bilateral agreements with the Palestinian and Israeli water authorities. It was estimated that a future investment of about US$1.1bn for the West Bank and $0.8bn for the Gaza Strip Southern Governorates was needed for the planning period from 2003 to 2015.[361]
In late 2012, a donation of $21.6 million was announced by the Government of the Netherlands—the Dutch government stated that the funds would be provided to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), for the specific benefit of Palestinian children. An article, published by the UN News website, stated that: "Of the $21.6 million, $5.7 will be allocated to UNRWA's 2012 Emergency Appeal for the occupied Palestinian territory, which will support programmes in the West Bank and Gaza aiming to mitigate the effects on refugees of the deteriorating situation they face."[360]
Agricultural rights
Since the beginning of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the conflict has been about land.[362] When Israel became a state after the war in 1948, 77% of Palestine's land was used for the creation on the state.[363] The majority of those living in Palestine at the time became refugees in other countries and this first land crisis became the root of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.[364][page needed] Because the root of the conflict is with land, the disputes between Israel and Palestine are well-manifested in the agriculture of Palestine.
In Palestine, agriculture is a mainstay in the economy. The production of agricultural goods supports the population's sustenance needs and fuels Palestine's export economy.[365] According to the Council for European Palestinian Relations, the agricultural sector formally employs 13.4% of the population and informally employs 90% of the population.[365] Over the past 10 years[when?], unemployment rates in Palestine have increased and the agricultural sector became the most impoverished sector in Palestine. Unemployment rates peaked in 2008 when they reached 41% in Gaza.[366]
Palestinian agriculture suffers from numerous problems including Israeli military and civilian attacks on farms and farmers, blockades to exportation of produce and importation of necessary inputs, widespread confiscation of land for nature reserves as well as military and settler use, confiscation and destruction of wells, and physical barriers within the West Bank.[367]
Israel's West Bank barrier
With the construction of the separation barrier, the Israeli state promised free movement across regions. However, border closures, curfews, and checkpoints has significantly restricted Palestinian movement.[368] In 2012, there were 99 fixed check points and 310 flying checkpoints.[369][page needed] The border restrictions impacted the imports and exports in Palestine and weakened the industrial and agricultural sectors because of the constant Israeli control in the West Bank and Gaza.[370] In order for the Palestinian economy to be prosperous, the restrictions on Palestinian land must be removed.[367] According to The Guardian and a report for World Bank, the Palestinian economy lost $3.4bn (%35 of the annual GDP) to Israeli restrictions in the West Bank alone.[371]
Palestinian violence outside of Israel
Some Palestinians have committed violent acts over the globe on the pretext of a struggle against Israel.[372]
During the late 1960s, groups affiliated with the PLO became increasingly infamous for its use of international terror. In 1969 alone, these groups were responsible for hijacking 82 planes. El Al Airlines became a regular hijacking target.[373][374] The hijacking of Air France Flight 139 by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine culminated during a hostage-rescue mission, where Israeli special forces successfully rescued the majority of the hostages.
However, one of the most well-known and notorious terrorist acts was the capture and eventual murder of 11 Israeli athletes carried out by the Black September Organization during the 1972 Olympic Games.[375]
Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence
Fighting among rival Palestinian and Arab movements has played a crucial role in shaping Israel's security policy towards Palestinian militants, as well as in the Palestinian leadership's own policies.[citation needed] As early as the 1930s revolts in Palestine, Arab forces fought each other while also skirmishing with Zionist and British forces, and internal conflicts continue to the present day.
In the First Intifada, more than a thousand Palestinians were killed in a campaign initiated by the Palestine Liberation Organization to crack down on suspected Israeli security service informers and collaborators. The Palestinian Authority was strongly criticized for its treatment of alleged collaborators, rights groups complaining that those labeled collaborators were denied fair trials. According to a report released by the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group, less than 45 percent of those killed were actually guilty of informing for Israel.[376]
Overriding authority and international status
 |
As far as Israel is concerned, the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority is derived from the Oslo Accords, signed with the PLO, under which it acquired control over cities in the Palestinian territories (Area A) while the surrounding countryside came either under Israeli security and Palestinian civil administration (Area B) or complete Israeli civil administration (Area C). Israel has built additional highways to allow Israelis to traverse the area without entering Palestinian cities in Area A. The initial areas under Palestinian Authority control are diverse and non-contiguous. The areas have changed over time by subsequent negotiations, including Oslo II, Wye River and Sharm el-Sheik. According to Palestinians, the separated areas make it impossible to create a viable nation and fails to address Palestinian security needs; Israel has expressed no agreement to withdrawal from some Areas B, resulting in no reduction in the division of the Palestinian areas, and the institution of a safe pass system, without Israeli checkpoints, between these parts.
Under the Oslo Accords, as a security measure, Israel has insisted on its control over all land, sea and air border crossings into the Palestinian territories, and the right to set import and export controls. This is to enable Israel to control the entry into the territories of materials of military significance and of potentially dangerous persons.
The PLO's objective for international recognition of the State of Palestine is considered by Israel as a provocative "unilateral" act that is inconsistent with the Oslo Accords.
Economic disputes and boycotts
In Gaza, the agricultural market suffers from economic boycotts and border closures and restrictions placed by Israel.[377] The PA's Minister of Agriculture estimates that around US$1.2 billion were lost in September 2006 because of these security measures. There has also been an economic embargo initiated by the west on Hamas-led Palestine, which has decreased the amount of imports and exports from Palestine.[citation needed] This embargo was brought on by Hamas' refusal to recognize Israel's right to statehood.[citation needed] As a result, the PA's 160,000 employees have not received their salaries in over one year.[378]
Actions toward stabilizing the conflict
In response to a weakening trend in Palestinian violence and growing economic and security cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, the Israeli military removed over 120 check points in 2010 and planned on disengaging from major Palestinian population areas. According to the IDF, terrorist activity in the West Bank decreased by 97% compared to violence in 2002.[379]
PA–Israel efforts in the West Bank have "significantly increased investor confidence", and the Palestinian economy grew 6.8% in 2009.[380][381][382][383]
Since the Second Intifada, Israel has banned Jewish Israelis from entering Palestinian cities. However, Israeli Arabs are allowed to enter West Bank cities on weekends.
The Palestinian Authority has petitioned the Israeli military to allow Jewish tourists to visit West Bank cities as "part of an effort" to improve the Palestinian economy. Israeli general Avi Mizrahi spoke with Palestinian security officers while touring malls and soccer fields in the West Bank. Mizrahi gave permission to allow Israeli tour guides into Bethlehem, a move intended to "contribute to the Palestinian and Israeli economies."[384]
Fatalities
 | This article needs to be updated. The reason given is: more deaths due to the war beginning in 2023. (February 2024) |
Studies provide aggregated casualty data for the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 13,000 Israelis and Palestinians were killed in the conflict between 1948-97.[387] Other estimates give 14,500 killed between 1948-2009.[387][388] During the 1982 Lebanon War, Israel killed an estimated 20,000 Palestinians and Lebanese, not including the 800-3500 Palestinians killed in the Sabra-Shatila Massacre.[389]
According to B'tselem, during the first intifada from 1987 until 2000, 1,551 Palestinians and 421 Israelis lost their lives.[390] According to the database of the UNOffice for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - occupied Palestinian territory (OCHAoPt), 6,407 Palestinians and 308 Israelis were killed in the conflict from 2008 to September 2023, before the Israel–Hamas war.[385][386]
Figures include both Israeli civilians and security forces casualties in West Bank, Gaza and Israel. All numbers refer to casualties of direct conflict between Israelis and Palestinians including in IDF military operations, artillery shelling, search and arrest campaigns, barrier demonstrations, targeted killings, settler violence etc. The figures do not include events indirectly related to the conflict such as casualties from unexploded ordnance, etc., or events when the circumstances remain unclear or are in dispute. The figures include all reported casualties of all ages and both genders.[391]
As reported by the Israeli human rights group B'Tselem, from 29 September 2000 to the year 2010, a total of 7,454 Palestinian and Israeli individuals were killed due to the conflict. According to the report, 1,317 of the 6,371 Palestinians were minors, and at least 2,996 did not participate in fighting at the time of death. Palestinians killed 1,083 Israelis, including 741 civilians, of whom 124 were minors.[392]
Criticism of casualty statistics
The Israeli-based International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) claimed that Israeli and Palestinian human rights groups overestimated the percentage of civilians killed since the IDF suspected many of those killed to be possible militants.[393][394]
Landmines and unexploded ordnance
A comprehensive collection mechanism to gather land mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualty data does not exist for the Palestinian territories.[395] In 2009, the United Nations Mine Action Centre reported that more than 2,500 mine and explosive remnants of war casualties occurred between 1967 and 1998, at least 794 casualties (127 killed, 654 injured and 13 unknown) occurred between 1999 and 2008 and that 12 people had been killed and 27 injured since the Gaza War.[395] The UN Mine Action Centre identified the main risks as coming from "ERW left behind by Israeli aerial and artillery weapon systems, or from militant caches targeted by the Israeli forces."[395] There are at least 15 confirmed minefields in the West Bank on the border with Jordan. The Palestinian National Security Forces do not have maps or records of the minefields.[395]
See also
- Palestinian genocide accusation
- Timeline of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict
- Outline of the 2023 Israel–Hamas war
- Bibliography of the Arab–Israeli conflict
- Israeli–Palestinian conflict in video games
- 2021 Israel–Palestine crisis
- Allon Plan, post-1967 peace plan
- Children in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict
- Allegations of war crimes against Israel
- Gaza–Israel conflict
- History of the State of Palestine
- International law and the Arab–Israeli conflict
- Israel–Palestine relations
- Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions
- Israeli–Lebanese conflict
- Israeli–Palestinian conflict in Hebron
- List of Middle East peace proposals
- List of modern conflicts in the Middle East
- OneVoice Movement
- Palestinian rocket attacks on Israel
- Pan-Arabism
- Peace Now
- Seeds of Peace
Notes
- ^ Three factors made Israel's territorial offer less forthcoming than it initially appeared. First, the 91 percent land offer was based on the Israeli definition of the West Bank, but this differs by approximately 5 percentage points from the Palestinian definition. Palestinians use a total area of 5,854 square kilometers. Israel, however, omits the area known as No Man's Land (50 km2 near Latrun), post-1967 East Jerusalem (71 km2), and the territorial waters of the Dead Sea (195 km2), which reduces the total to 5,538 km2
References
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- ^ Morris 2004, pp. 602–604.
- ^ Brown, Jeremy (2003). Six Days: How the 1967 War Shaped the Middle East. Simon & Schuster, 2012. ISBN 978-1-4711-1475-5.
UNRWA put the figure at 413000
- ^ Dumper, Michael (April 1997). The Politics of Jerusalem Since 1967. Columbia University Press. p. 67. ISBN 9780585388717.
- ^ Garfinkle, Adam M. (2000). Politics and Society in Modern Israel: Myths and Realities. M. E. Sharpe. p. 61. ISBN 978-0-7656-0514-6.
- ^ Laurens, Henry. La Question de Palestine [The Question of Palestine] (in French). p. 194.
- ^ Uri Ben-Eliezer, War over Peace: One Hundred Years of Israel's Militaristic Nationalism, University of California Press (2019)
- ^ Kober, Avi (2005). "From Blitzkrieg To Attrition: Israel's Attrition Strategy and Staying Power". Small Wars & Insurgencies. 16 (2): 216–240. doi:10.1080/09592310500080005.
- ^ Nasrallah, Nami (2013). "The First and Second Palestinian intifadas". In Newman, David; Peters, Joel (eds.). Routledge Handbook on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Routledge. pp. 56–68, p. 56. ISBN 978-0-415-77862-6.
- ^ Jump up to: a b "B'Tselem – Statistics – Fatalities". B'Tselem. Archived from the original on 1 July 2010.
- ^ "Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces in the Gaza Strip, before Operation "Cast Lead"".
- ^ Lappin, Yaakov (2009). "IDF releases Cast Lead casualty numbers". The Jerusalem Post. Retrieved 5 January 2024.
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- ^ Waxman, Dov (2019). The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 2. ISBN 978-0190625337.
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Currently, freedom of movement and access for Palestinians within the West Bank is the exception rather than the norm contrary to the commitments undertaken in a number of Agreements between GOI and the PA. In particular, both the Oslo Accords and the Road Map were based on the principle that normal Palestinian economic and social life would be unimpeded by restrictions
- ^ Jump up to: a b c d Morris, Benny (2008). 1948: A history of the first Arab–Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 1. ISBN 978-0-300-14524-3.
- ^ "The Roots of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: 1882–1914". Archived from the original on 23 August 2017. Retrieved 22 August 2017.
- ^ The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica (26 October 2020). "Balfour Declaration | History & Impact". Encyclopædia Britannica. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Archived from the original on 4 May 2015. Retrieved 28 May 2021.
- ^ Khalidi 2024, p. 108: "The repression of the revolt had an impact not only on the populace, but also on the Palestinians’ ability to fight thereafter, and on the already fractured capabilities of their national leadership. A high proportion of the Arab casualties included the most experienced military cadres and enterprising fighters.6 By the end of the revolt, most of the top Arab political leaders and thousands of other cadres, militants, and fighters were imprisoned, interned by the British in the Seychelles, in exile, or dead. The British also confiscated large quantities of arms and ammunition from the Arabs during the revolt, and continued to do so during later years.7 By the end of the revolt, existing political divisions within the Palestinian polity had become envenomed, leading to profound rifts between the majority supporting the revolt and a minority that had become alienated from the leadership: the consequence was assassinations, infighting, and further weakening of the Palestinian position. The impact of the revolt on the Palestinian economy was also severe, although some of that damage was self-inflicted, as a boycott of British and Jewish goods and of the mandatory government during the strike and the revolt simply opened up opportunities for the already larger Jewish-controlled sector of the economy of Palestine to expand further."
- ^ Khalidi 2020, p. 44
- ^ Pappé, Ilan (2007). The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine. Oneworld Publications. ISBN 978-1-78074-056-0.
- ^ Jump up to: a b c Morris 1999
- ^ Totten, S. (2017). Last Lectures on the Prevention and Intervention of Genocide. Routledge Studies in Genocide and Crimes against Humanity. Taylor & Francis. p. 64. ISBN 978-1-315-40976-4. Archived from the original on 31 March 2023. Retrieved 31 March 2023.
- ^ Eran, Oded. "Arab-Israel Peacemaking." The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. Ed. Avraham Sela. New York: Continuum, 2002, p. 121.
- ^ Chris Rice Archived 6 February 2016 at the Wayback Machine, quoted in Munayer Salim J, Loden Lisa, Through My Enemy's Eyes: Envisioning Reconciliation in Israel–Palestine, quote: "The Palestinian-Israeli divide may be the most intractable conflict of our time."
- ^ Virginia Page Fortna Archived 31 January 2016 at the Wayback Machine, Peace Time: Cease-fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace, page 67, "Britain's contradictory promises to Arabs and Jews during World War I sowed the seeds of what would become the international community's most intractable conflict later in the century."
- ^ Falk, Avner (17 February 2005). Fratricide in the Holy Land: A Psychoanalytic View of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Terrace Books. ISBN 978-0-299-20253-8.
- ^ Grinberg, Lev Luis (10 September 2009). Politics and Violence in Israel/Palestine: Democracy Versus Military Rule. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-27589-1.
- ^ Kurtzer, Daniel; Lasensky, Scott; Organization (2008). Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East. United States Institute of Peace Press. p. 79. ISBN 978-1-60127-030-6.
- ^ Jump up to: a b Dr. William Cubbison (2018). "Two States for Two People? A Long Decline in Support". The Israel Democracy Institute. Archived from the original on 1 August 2022. Retrieved 1 August 2022. Cite error: The named reference ":1" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
- ^ Lazaroff, Tovah (4 August 2021). "With only 40% support, Israelis still think 2 states best option - poll". The Jerusalem Post. Archived from the original on 1 August 2022. Retrieved 1 August 2022.
- ^ Jump up to: a b "Public Opinion Poll No (84)". pcpsr.org. Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. 6 July 2022. Archived from the original on 2 August 2022. Retrieved 2 August 2022.
- ^ Jump up to: a b "Young Palestinians in Gaza cannot find work and cannot leave". The Economist. ISSN 0013-0613. Archived from the original on 1 August 2022. Retrieved 1 August 2022.
- ^ "What does the Middle East offer America?". The Economist. ISSN 0013-0613. Archived from the original on 1 August 2022. Retrieved 1 August 2022.
- ^ Keller-Lynn, Carrie (20 June 2022). "Bennett announces coalition's demise, new elections: 'We did our utmost to continue'". The Times of Israel. Archived from the original on 28 September 2022. Retrieved 3 July 2022.
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- ^ Masalha, Nur (2012). "1". The Palestine Nakba. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84813-972-5.
- ^ Pappé 2022, The Arrival of Zionism
- ^ Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2006). Scars of War, Wounds of Peace. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-518158-6.
Probably the most appealing article in there commendation of the Commission was that about the 'forced transfer' of Arabs from the future Jewish state. To Ben-Gurion this was an 'unparalleled achievement'. It was 'the best of all solutions', according to Berl Katznelson. 'A distant neighbour', he said, 'is better than a close enemy.' Transfer was such an ideal solution that 'it must happen someday', he concluded. A strategy of phases, admittedly always vague and anything but an articulate plan of action, could only prevail if a solution could be found to the demographic problem. 'Transfer' was the magic formula. The idea of transfer for the Arabs had a long pedigree in Zionist thought.
- ^ Masalha, Nur (2012). The Palestine Nakba. Zed Books. p. 66. ISBN 978-1-84813-973-2.
Thus the wishful and rather naive belief in Zionism's early years that the Palestinians could be 'spirited across the border', in Herzl's words, or that they would simply 'fold their tents and slip away', to use Zangwill's formulation, soon gave way to more realistic assessments. Between 1937 and 1948 extensive secret discussions of transfer were held in the Zionist movement's highest bodies, including the Zionist Agency Executive, the Twentieth Zionist Congress, the World Convention of Ihud Po'alei Tzion (the top forum of the dominant Zionist world labour movement), and various official and semi-official transfer committees.
- ^ Slater 2020, p. 348: "After reviewing Zionism and its consequences, I examined the onset of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the 1917–47 period, and argued that because the Zionists wanted to ensure a large Jewish majority in the coming state of Israel, their leaders repeatedly discussed the means by which most of the Palestinians could be expelled or induced to flee; the euphemism they employed was "transfer." The scholarship on "transfer"—especially by Israeli historians—leaves no doubt about its importance in the thinking of every major Zionist leader before and after the creation of Israel.
- ^ Flapan, Simha (1979). Zionism and the Palestinians. Croom Helm. p. 259. ISBN 978-0-06-492104-6.
The concept of population transfer, as a facile solution to the twin problems of the Arab landless peasants and the creation of land reserves for Jewish settlement was for some time in the back of the minds of the 2ionist leadership. In fact, in private discussions with the British, the Zionist leadership put forward population transfer as a tentative suggestion but stopped short of formulating it into a proposal for action.
- ^ Finkelstein, Norman G. (2016). "'Born of War, Not By Design'". Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict. Verso Books. ISBN 978-1-78478-458-4.
'The idea of transfer had accompanied the Zionist movement from its very beginnings', Tom Segev reports.
- ^ Morris 2004, p. 60.
- ^ Gelvin, James (2014) [2002]. The Israel–Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War (3 ed.). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-85289-0. Archived from the original on 9 October 2023. Retrieved 9 November 2020.
- ^ Shlaim 2001, Prologue: The Zionist Foundation.
- ^ Khalidi 2020, Introduction: "Additionally, a separate Jewish-controlled sector of the economy was created through the exclusion of Arab labor from Jewish-owned firms under the slogan of “Avoda ivrit,” Hebrew labor, and the injection of truly massive amounts of capital from abroad."
- ^ Sela 2002, p. 361, "al-Husseini, Hajj (Muhammad) Amin"
He [Husseini] incited and headed anti-Jewish riots in April 1920. ... He promoted the Muslim character of Jerusalem and ... injected a religious character into the struggle against Zionism. This was the backdrop to his agitation concerning Jewish rights at the Western (Wailing) Wall that led to the bloody riots of August 1929...[H]e was the chief organizer of the riots of 1936 and the rebellion from 1937, as well as of the mounting internal terror against Arab opponents.
- ^ Jump up to: a b c d Sela 2002, pp. 58–121, "Arab-Israel Conflict"
- ^ Jump up to: a b c d "History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict" (PDF). PBS. December 2001. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2 December 2012. Retrieved 14 March 2013.
- ^ Khalidi 2020, Chapter 1: "Of all the services Britain provided to the Zionist movement before 1939, perhaps the most valuable was the armed suppression of Palestinian resistance in the form of the revolt. The bloody war waged against the country’s majority, which left 10 percent of the adult male Arab population killed, wounded, imprisoned, or exiled,55 was the best illustration of the unvarnished truths uttered by Jabotinsky about the necessity of the use of force for the Zionist project to succeed. To quash the uprising, the British Empire brought in two additional divisions of troops, squadrons of bombers, and all the paraphernalia of repression that it had perfected over many decades of colonial wars."
- ^ Khalidi 2020, Chapter 1: "IN SPITE OF the sacrifices made—which can be gauged from the very large numbers of Palestinians who were killed, wounded, jailed, or exiled—and the revolt’s momentary success, the consequences for the Palestinians were almost entirely negative. The savage British repression, the death and exile of so many leaders, and the conflict within their ranks left the Palestinians divided, without direction, and with their economy debilitated by the time the revolt was crushed in the summer of 1939. This put the Palestinians in a very weak position to confront the now invigorated Zionist movement, which had gone from strength to strength during the revolt, obtaining lavish amounts of arms and extensive training from the British to help them suppress the uprising."}}
- ^ Louis, William Roger (2006). Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization. I. B. Tauris. p. 391. ISBN 978-1-84511-347-6.
- ^ Morris, Benny (2009). One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict. Yale University Press. p. 66. ISBN 978-0-300-15604-1. Archived from the original on 9 October 2023. Retrieved 27 September 2020.
- ^ Morris 2004, p. 48.
- ^ Shlaim 2001, Prologue: The Zionist Foundation: "A white paper of 17 May 1939 abruptly reversed British support for Zionism and for a Jewish state."
- ^ Hughes, Matthew (2009a). "The Banality of Brutality: British Armed Forces and the Repression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–39" (PDF). English Historical Review. CXXIV (507): 314–354. doi:10.1093/ehr/cep002. ISSN 0013-8266. Archived from the original (PDF) on 21 February 2016.
- ^ A Survey of Palestine (PDF). Jerusalem: Government of Palestine. 1946. pp. 38–49.
- ^ Levenberg, Haim (1993). Military Preparations of the Arab Community in Palestine: 1945–1948. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-7146-3439-5.
- ^ "A/RES/181(II) of 29 November 1947". United Nations. Archived from the original on 24 May 2012. Retrieved 28 May 2013.
- ^ Jump up to: a b c Baum, Noa. "Historical Time Line for Israel/Palestine." Archived 19 December 2013 at the Wayback Machine UMass Amherst. 5 April 2005. 14 March 2013.
- ^ Morris 2008, pp. 63–64, "The Zionists and their supporters rejoiced; the Arab delegations walked out of the plenum after declaring the resolution invalid. The Arabs failed to understand why the international community was awarding the Jews any part of Palestine. Further, as one Palestinian historian later put it, they could not fathom why 37 percent of the population had been given 55 percent of the land (of which they owned only 7 percent). Moreover, the Jews had been given the best agricultural lands (the Coastal Plain and Jezreel and Jordan Valleys) while the Arabs had received the 'bare and hilly' parts, as one Palestinian politician, 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, told a Zionist agent.162 More generally, 'the Palestinians failed to see why they should be made to pay for the Holocaust. . . . [And] they failed to see why it was not fair for the Jews to be a minority in a unitary Palestinian state, while it was fair for almost half of the Palestinian population—the indigenous majority on its own ancestral soil—to be converted overnight into a minority under alien rule.'"
- ^ Morris 2008, p. 101, "... mainstream Zionist leaders, from the first, began to think of expanding the Jewish state beyond the 29 November partition resolution borders."
- ^ Morris 2008, p. 79.
- ^ Louwerse, Colter (16 April 2024). Stern-Weiner, Jamie (ed.). Deluge. OR Books. ISBN 978-1-68219-619-9.
During the June 1967 Arab-Israel War, Israel came into military occupation of the Palestinian West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip. (Israel also occupied the Egyptian Sinai, Syrian Golan Heights, and two islands in the Gulf of Aqaba.) Already by the mid-1970s, the international community converged on a framework for resolving the festering conflict. This framework comprised two elements rooted in fundamental principles of international law. The first called for Israel's full withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories in exchange for Palestinian-Arab recognition of Israel. The second called for establishing an independent State of Palestine on the Palestinian territories from which Israel would withdraw, i.e., the West Bank and Gaza, as well as a "just resolution" of the Palestinian refugee question.10 Land for peace and Palestinian self-determination secured through a two-state settlement: these principles for a reasonable if imperfect resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict were eventually endorsed by an overwhelming consensus at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the political organs of the United Nations (UN), and of respected human rights organizations.11
- ^ Erakat, Noura (2019). Justice for Some: Law and the Question of Palestine. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-1-5036-0883-2.
The 1973 War demonstrated that Arabs could work together when needed and that Israel was not as invincible as it had believed. The war left its scars on Israel, which suffered over 2,500 dead, US$4 billion in direct monetary losses, and deflated confidence. Although the Arabs technically lost the war, they won psychologically and diplomatically as the world once again focused on the ongoing conflict.156 In 1973, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 338, affirming the land-for-peace framework enshrined in Resolution 242 and setting into motion what was to become known as the Middle East peace process. Palestinian control of the PLO and the rise of guerilla warfare, together with the shift ushered in by the 1973 War, would lay the groundwork for the PLO's political agenda and aggressive legal strategy throughout the decade that followed.
- ^ Slater 2020, p. 216: "The disastrous defeat of the Arab states in the 1973 war also played a major role in convincing Arafat of the need for a compromise peace settlement.19 Arafat's decision to start peace negotiations with Israel led to the June 1974 PLO agreement to adopt a new strategy that called for a struggle for "every part of Palestine that is liberated" (emphasis added). Anziska writes that this constituted "an acceptance of a political solution on a limited piece of territory,"20 the first step, however vague, that opened the door for a Palestinian acceptance of a two-state solution...19.In a recent major work, historian Seth Anziska writes that the 1973 war "launched a new phase in the PLO's struggle, oriented toward partition and the acknowledgment of Israel's presence. In the aftermath of the October War, the PLO sought a place within the comprehensive diplomatic negotiations, which required political compromise and the eventual embrace of a state on far less territory than historic Palestine" (Anziska, Preventing Palestine, Kindle 25). Similarly, Bird writes: "By mid-1974 the PLO was rapidly moving away from a strategy of armed struggle and morphing into a political movement seeking international legitimacy" based on a two-state solution (Bird, The Good Spy, Kindle location 2560–75). For similar assessments of the importance of the 1974 PLO program, see Hart, Arafat, 10–11; Weinberger, "The Palestinian National Security Debate"; Nofal, "Yasir Arafat: A Mixed Legacy"; Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Kindle 483–84; and Elgindy, Blind Spot, Kindle 88.
- ^ Morris 1999, THE POLITICS OF WAR AND AFTEREFFECTS: "On the other hand, the war had given Israel a stinging slap in the face. The 1948, 1956, and 1967 wars had conditioned them to stunning victories over the Arabs and to Arab military (and political) incompetence; 1973 proved to be something else altogether. Many Israelis were now persuaded that the territories could not be held indefinitely by force and that continued occupation would necessarily lead to further bouts of painful warfare. At last, and for the first time since June 1967, most people were willing to contemplate giving up large chunks of land for peace."
- ^ Pappé 2022, pp. 287: "The 1973 war was a traumatic event that promoted the disintegration of Israeli politics and culture. The myth of Israeli invincibility was shattered, and while some saw this as a good reason to become more insistent in the search for peace, others turned to God, toughening their positions on peace and territorial compromise. What added to the confusion and the erosion of self-confidence was the high number of deaths, about 3,000, compared with the few hundred in the 1967 war. A general sense of grief fell on the country and affected the government’s prestige."
- ^ Khalidi 2013, THE FIRST MOMENT: BEGIN AND PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY IN 1982: "In addition to their central provision, for a peace treaty between the two countries, the Camp David Accords, agreed upon by Israel and Egypt under the aegis of the United States in 1978, called for negotiations for the establishment of a "Self-Governing Authority" (SGA) for the Arab population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Jerusalem was to be excluded from its provisions. The accords stipulated "full autonomy for the inhabitants," but crucially, this did not apply to the land, which was to remain under full Israeli control. A bilateral peace treaty based on these accords was signed between Israel and Egypt in 1979, and Israel thereafter began a withdrawal of its forces from the occupied Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, which was completed in the spring of 1982. However, the modalities of the Palestinian-autonomy accords were a continuing source of dispute between the three signatories to the Camp David Accords, as well as with the Palestinians and other Arabs, and in the end they were never implemented."
- ^ Shlaim 2015, The Camp David Accords "The Camp David Accords were signed in an impressive ceremony in the White House on 17 September 1978. The two accords were entitled "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East" and "A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt." The former stated in its preamble, "The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbours is UN Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts." The framework dealt with the West Bank and Gaza and envisaged nothing less than "the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects." Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the representatives of the Palestinian people were to participate in the negotiations, which were to proceed in three stages. In the first, the ground rules would be laid for electing a "self-governing authority" for the territories, and the powers of this authority would be defined. In the second stage, once the self-governing authority had been established, a transitional period would begin. Israel's military government and its civilian administration would be withdrawn; Israel's armed forces would also be withdrawn and the remaining forces redeployed into specified security locations. In the third stage, not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations would take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. These negotiations had to recognize "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements."
- ^ Morris 1999, The Lebanon War: "The aim of "Operation Litani" was to kill as many guerrillas as possible and to destroy the military infrastructure—camps, munitions dumps, artillery pieces. A secondary aim was to expand, and create continuity between, the existing Christian-held enclaves on the Lebanese side of the border. By March 21, the IDF had taken all of the area south of the Litani (except for Tyre and its environs)."
- ^ Kimmerling, Baruch (2003). Politicide. Verso Books.
The collaboration was solidified and made public during Begin's first term. Begin was impressed by the pleas and the aristocratic manner of the Maronite leaders and several times declared "Israel will not allow genocide [of the Maronites] in Lebanon." In March 1978, Israeli forces temporarily occupied southern Lebanon, in an attempt to neutralize Palestinian guerilla groups and enlarge the territory controlled by Major Haddad, in an undertaking called Operation Litani (the river that more or less marked the boundary of the Israeli influence).
- ^ Khalidi 2020, The Third Declaration of War: "Nevertheless, after all this and despite an Israeli incursion in 1978—the Litani Operation—which left a swath of south Lebanon under the control of its proxy, the South Lebanese Army, the PLO was still standing. Indeed, it remained the strongest force in large parts of Lebanon, those that were not in the hands of foreign armies or their proxies, including West Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, the Shouf Mountains, and much of the south. It would take one more military campaign to dislodge the PLO, and in 1982, American Secretary of State General Alexander Haig agreed to Ariel Sharon's plans for Israel to finish off the organization and with it Palestinian nationalism."
- ^ Cleveland, William L.; Bunton, Martin (2010). A History of the Modern Middle East. ReadHowYouWant.com, Limited. ISBN 978-1-4587-8155-0.
This was that belt the Israeli government wished to destroy. Its first concerted effort to do so occurred in 1978, when 25,000 Israeli troops invaded Lebanon as far north as the Litani River. The operation failed to dislodge the PLO from its strongholds, although it did cause large-scale demographic disruptions in southern Lebanon as thousands of villagers, mainly Shi'as, fled their homelands for the area of Beirut. Pressure from the United States and the UN eventually compelled Israel to withdraw its troops.
- ^ Hourani, Albert Habib (2002). A history of the Arab peoples. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-05819-4.
In 1982 the situation acquired a more dangerous dimension. The nationalist government in Israel, having secured its southern frontier by the peace treaty with Egypt, now tried to impose its own solution of the problem of the Palestinians. This involved an attempt to destroy both the military and the political power of the PLO in Lebanon, to install a friendly regime there, and then, freed from effective Palestinian resistance, to pursue its policy of settlement and annexation of occupied Palestine. With some degree of acquiescence from the USA, Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982. The invasion culminated in a long siege of the western part of Beirut, mainly inhabited by Muslims and dominated by the PLO. The siege ended with an agreement, negotiated through the US government, by which the PLO would evacuate west Beirut, with guarantees for the safety of Palestinian civilians given by the Lebanese and US governments. At the same time, a presidential election resulted in the military head of the Kata'ib, Bashir Jumayyil, becoming president; he was assassinated soon afterwards and his brother Amin was then elected. The assassination was taken by Israel as an opportunity to occupy west Beirut, and this allowed the Kata'ib to carry out a massacre of Palestinians on a large scale in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila.
- ^ Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2006). Scars of War, Wounds of Peace. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-518158-6.
Destroying the PLO's infrastructure in Lebanon as well as dismantling the last remaining Palestinian springboard in an Arab country for the military struggle against Israel, was the immediate operational objective of the war. But the architects of the invasion had far wider ambitions. They believed that the defeat of the Palestinians in Lebanon would trigger a mass exodus of Palestinians to the East Bank of the River Jordan, which in turn would bring about the collapse of the Hashemite dynasty and the Palestinisation of the kingdom in a way that would allow Israel a free hand to assert her rule in Judaea and Samaria. Israel also believed that her victory in Lebanon would create a new political order in that country with an undisputed Christian hegemony.
- ^ Shlaim 2001, The Lebanese Quagmire: "The real driving force behind Israel's invasion of Lebanon, however, was Ariel Sharon, whose aims were much more ambitious and far-reaching. From his first day at the Defense Ministry, Sharon started planning the invasion of Lebanon. He developed what came to be known as the "big plan" for using Israel's military power to establish political hegemony in the Middle East. The first aim of Sharon's plan was to destroy the PLO's military infrastructure in Lebanon and to undermine it as a political organization. The second aim was to establish a new political order in Lebanon by helping Israel's Maronite friends, headed by Bashir Gemayel, to form a government that would proceed to sign a peace treaty with Israel. For this to be possible, it was necessary, third, to expel the Syrian forces from Lebanon or at least to weaken seriously the Syrian presence there. In Sharon's big plan, the war in Lebanon was intended to transform the situation not only in Lebanon but in the whole Middle East. The destruction of the PLO would break the backbone of Palestinian nationalism and facilitate the absorption of the West Bank into Greater Israel. The resulting influx of Palestinians from Lebanon and the West Bank into Jordan would eventually sweep away the Hashemite monarchy and transform the East Bank into a Palestinian state. Sharon reasoned that Jordan's conversion into a Palestinian state would end international pressures on Israel to withdraw from the West Bank. Begin was not privy to all aspects of Sharon's ambitious geopolitical scenario, but the two men were united by their desire to act against the PLO in Lebanon.15"
- ^ Morris 1999: "On September 1 an IDF helicopter flew Gemayel to Nahariya, in northern Israel, where he met Begin, who had just been informed of the "Reagan Plan," the new American initiative for Israeli withdrawal from most of the occupied territories in exchange for Arab recognition and peace. By invading Lebanon, Begin had hoped to neutralize Palestinian nationalism and facilitate Israeli annexation, at least de facto, of the West Bank. But the invasion had brought home to the Americans the plight of the Palestinians and the imperative of resolving their problem, with Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank among the necessary preconditions. The Reagan initiative ruled out a final settlement that would involve either Israeli annexation of the territories or full-fledged Palestinian statehood.252"
- ^ Chomsky, Noam (1999). Fateful Triangle. Pluto Press. ISBN 978-0-89608-601-2.
was that "Operation Peace for Galilee"—the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982—was undertaken to protect the civilian population from Palestinian gunners, and that "the rocket and shelling attacks on Israel's northern border" were ended by the operation, though "If rockets again rain down on Israel's northern border after all that has been expended on Lebanon, the Israeli public will be outraged.19 This cannot be correct, given the history which is not challenged (even if unreported, for the most part). When it came to be recognized that the rockets still "rain down," the story was modified: "Israel's two military forays into Lebanon [1978, 1982] were military disasters that failed to provide long-term security for Israel's northern border."20 Security had indeed been at risk, as a result of Israel's unprovoked attacks from 1981, and to a large extent before. The phrase "military disaster" does not refer to the killing of some 20,000 Lebanese and Palestinians in 1982, overwhelmingly civilians, the destruction of much of southern Lebanon and the capital city of Beirut, or the terrible atrocities carried out by Israeli troops through the mid-1980s; rather, to Israel's failure to impose the "new order" it had proclaimed for Lebanon and its inability to maintain its occupation in full because of the casualties caused by unanticipated resistance ("terror"), forcing it back to its "security zone." The actual reasons for the 1982 invasion have never been concealed in Israel, though they are rated "X" here.21 A few weeks after the invasion began, Israel's leading academic specialist on the Palestinians, Yehoshua Porath, pointed out that the decision to invade "flowed from the very fact that the cease-fire had been observed" by the PLO, a "veritable catastrophe" for the Israeli government because it endangered the policy of evading a political settlement. The PLO was gaining respectability thanks to its preference for negotiations over terror. The Israeli government's hope, therefore, was to compel "the stricken PLO" to "return to its earlier terrorism," thus "undercutting the danger" of negotiations. As Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir later stated, Israel went to war because there was "a terrible danger... Not so much a military one as a political one." The invasion was intended to "undermine the position of the moderates within [the PLO] ranks" and thus to block "the PLO 'peace offensive"' and "to halt [the PLO's] rise to political respectability" (strategic analyst Avner Yaniv); it should be called "the war to safeguard the occupation of the West Bank," having been motivated by Begin's "fear of the momentum of the peace process," according to Israeli Arabist and former head of military intelligence General Yehoshaphat Harkabi. U.S. backing for Israel's aggression, including the vetoing of Security Council efforts to stop the slaughter, was presumably based on the same reasoning. After its failure to impose the intended "New Order" in Lebanon in 1982, Israel attempted to hold on to as much of Lebanon as possible, though it was forced to withdraw to its "security zone" as resistance caused too many Israeli casualties. Meanwhile Israel conducted violent terror operations, notably the "iron fist" operations of 1985 under the direction of Prime Minister Shimon Peres. These went on through the 1980s.2
- ^ Quigley, John B. (2005). The Case for Palestine. Duke University Press. ISBN 978-0-8223-3539-9.
As a result, the PLO did not attack Israel from mid-I98r to mid-I982.16 But in June 1982 Israel again invaded Lebanon, and it used aerial bombardment to destroy entire camps of Palestine Arab refugees.17 By these means Israel killed 20,000 persons, mostly civilians,18 and while it occupied southern Lebanon it incarcerated 15,000 persons, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross. The IDF continued north to Beirut, where it forced the PLO out of Lebanon. Israel claimed self-defense for its invasion, but the lack of PLO attacks into Israel during the previous year made that claim dubious. By invading Lebanon, Israel evidently sought to destroy the extensive Palestinian military and administrative infrastructure in Lebanon19 and, by removing the PLO, to convince the Arabs of the Gaza Strip and West Bank that they would get no help from the PLO.20 In the United States Harold Saunders, a former assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, said that Israel aimed,
- ^ Slater 2020, p. 354: "For just that reason, though, Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon worried that the growing PLO moderation would increase the pressure on Israel to accept the creation of a Palestinian state. To prevent that, in 1982 they seized upon a pretext to again invade Lebanon and attack the PLO, this time on a far larger scale than in previous conflicts. The attacks resulted in tens of thousands of Lebanese civilian casualties; however, the PLO forces in southern Lebanon, still led by Arafat, who escaped Israeli efforts to kill him, were soon reconstituted."
- ^ Jump up to: a b Levs, Josh (6 January 2009). "Is Gaza 'occupied' territory?". CNN. Archived from the original on 21 January 2009. Retrieved 30 May 2009.
- ^ "Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territories: The conflict in Gaza: A briefing on applicable law, investigations and accountability". Amnesty International. 19 January 2009. Archived from the original on 15 April 2015. Retrieved 5 June 2009.
- ^ "Human Rights Council Special Session on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, July 6, 2006". Human Rights Watch. 5 July 2006. Archived from the original on 4 January 2012. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
- ^ Erlanger, Steven (18 February 2006). "Hamas Leader Faults Israeli Sanction Plan". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on 5 March 2022. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
- ^ Oren, Michael B. (2007). Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present. W. W. Norton & Company. p. 607. ISBN 978-0-393-05826-0.
- ^ Bohn, Lauren E. "Hamas: Rockets will stop when Gaza borders are opened". USA Today. Associated Press. Archived from the original on 7 April 2022. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
- ^ "Abbas: No justification for Gaza rocket attacks". The Jerusalem Post. 2 November 2012. Archived from the original on 16 March 2013. Retrieved 14 March 2013.
- ^ "Gaza: Palestinian Rockets Unlawfully Targeted Israeli Civilians". Human Rights Watch. 24 December 2012. Archived from the original on 28 November 2018. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
- ^ "Seven Truths About Israel, Hamas and Violence". Bloomberg.com. 20 November 2012. Archived from the original on 7 May 2021. Retrieved 24 October 2022.
- ^ "Urban battle from past Gaza war offers glimpse of what an Israeli ground offensive might look like". AP News. 16 October 2023. Archived from the original on 2 December 2023. Retrieved 2 December 2023.
- ^ "Hamas planned Oct. 7 from before 2014, with final decision made by 5 leaders – report". timesofisrael.com.
- ^ "In Israel and the U.S., 'apartheid' is the elephant in the room". The Washington Post.
- ^ "Israel judicial reform explained: What is the crisis about?". BBC News. 27 March 2023.
- ^ "Israeli-Palestinian death toll highest since 2005: UN envoy". UN. 21 August 2023. Archived from the original on 23 August 2023. Retrieved 24 August 2023.
- ^ Mills, Andrew; Hassan, Ahmed Mohamed (15 November 2023). "Exclusive: Qatar seeking Israel-Hamas deal to free 50 hostages and 3-day truce". Reuters. Archived from the original on 17 November 2023. Retrieved 18 December 2023.
- ^ "What we know about the captives taken by Hamas". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 15 December 2023. Retrieved 15 December 2023.
- ^ "Gaza war inflicts catastrophic damage on infrastructure and economy". Reuters. 17 November 2023.
- ^ "Has Israel invaded Gaza? The military has been vague, even if its objectives are clear". Associated Press. 31 October 2023. Archived from the original on 1 November 2023. Retrieved 2 November 2023.
- ^ "United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - occupied Palestinian territory". UN OCHA. Retrieved 6 February 2024.
- ^ "Proceedings instituted by South Africa against the State of Israel on 29 December 2023" (PDF). International Court of Justice. 29 December 2023. Archived from the original on 5 January 2024. Retrieved 5 January 2024. ALT Link
- ^ "Israel-Hamas War: Update from Patrick Kingsley". The New York Times. 26 January 2024. Archived from the original on 26 January 2024. Retrieved 26 January 2024.
- ^ "Order respecting South Africa's request for provisional measures" (PDF). International Court of Justice. 26 January 2024.
- ^ Rajvanshi, Astha (26 January 2024). "U.N. Court Says Israel Must Prevent Genocidal Acts in Gaza, But Doesn't Order a Ceasefire". TIME. Archived from the original on 26 January 2024. Retrieved 26 January 2024.
- ^ "World Court stops short of Gaza ceasefire order for Israel". Reuters. 27 January 2024. Retrieved 27 January 2024.
- ^ "Netanyahu dismisses international pressure: 'Nothing will stop us' destroying Hamas". The Times of Israel. Archived from the original on 17 December 2023. Retrieved 18 December 2023.
- ^ Turak, Natasha (12 December 2023). "Can Hamas actually be eliminated? This is what military and security analysts think". CNBC. Archived from the original on 18 December 2023. Retrieved 18 December 2023.
- ^ "Netanyahu says IDF will control Gaza after war, rejects notion of international force". The Times of Israel. Archived from the original on 12 November 2023. Retrieved 18 December 2023.
- ^ "Three US troops killed in drone attack in Jordan, more than 30 injured". CNN. 28 January 2024.
- ^ Armstrong, Kathryn (6 February 2024). "Houthis claim new attacks on Red Sea shipping". BBC News.
- ^ "U.S. and U.K. launch new wave of strikes, this time targeting Houthis in Yemen". NBC News. 4 February 2024.
- ^ "What we know about US retaliatory strikes in Iraq and Syria". BBC News. 3 February 2024.
- ^ Jump up to: a b Baconi 2018, Politicide, Containment, and Pacification harvnb error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFBaconi2018 (help)
- ^ Shaul Mishal, Avraham Sela (2000). The Palestinian Hamas. Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-11674-9.
- ^ Yehuda Lukacs, ed., The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A documentary record, 1967–1990 (Cambridge: 1992), pp. 477–79.
- ^ Yaniv, Avner (1987). Dilemmas of Security. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-504122-4.
- ^ Shlaim 2015: "The real driving force behind Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, however, was Ariel Sharon, whose aims were much more ambitious and far-reaching. From his first day at the Defense Ministry, Sharon started planning the invasion of Lebanon. He developed what came to be known as the “big plan” for using Israel’s military power to establish political hegemony in the Middle East. The first aim of Sharon’s plan was to destroy the PLO’s military infrastructure in Lebanon and to undermine it as a political organization. The second aim was to establish a new political order in Lebanon by helping Israel’s Maronite friends, headed by Bashir Gemayel, to form a government that would proceed to sign a peace treaty with Israel. For this to be possible, it was necessary, third, to expel the Syrian forces from Lebanon or at least to weaken seriously the Syrian presence there. In Sharon’s big plan, the war in Lebanon was intended to transform the situation not only in Lebanon but in the whole Middle East. The destruction of the PLO would break the backbone of Palestinian nationalism and facilitate the absorption of the West Bank into Greater Israel. The resulting influx of Palestinians from Lebanon and the West Bank into Jordan would eventually sweep away the Hashemite monarchy and transform the East Bank into a Palestinian state. Sharon reasoned that Jordan’s conversion into a Palestinian state would end international pressures on Israel to withdraw from the West Bank. Begin was not privy to all aspects of Sharon’s ambitious geopolitical scenario, but the two men were united by their desire to act against the PLO in Lebanon.15"}}
- ^ Shlaim 2015: "The PLO followed the Algiers resolutions with a concerted attempt to project a more moderate image. It made a special effort to gain respectability by dissociating the PLO from terrorism. Arafat issued a series of statements on the subject, which failed to satisfy the United States, so in the end the State Department virtually dictated the text that Arafat read at the opening of his press conference in Geneva on 14 December. “I repeat for the record,” stated Arafat, “that we totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism, including individual, group and state terrorism. Between Geneva and Algiers we have made our position crystal clear.” The statement unconditionally accepted Resolutions 242 and 338 and clearly recognized Israel’s right to exist. All the conditions that Henry Kissinger had laid down in 1975 for dealing with the PLO had now been met. One of the last major foreign policy acts of the outgoing Reagan administration was to recognize the PLO and to open a substantive dialogue with it. This dialogue was conducted by the American ambassador in Tunis. President Reagan stated publicly that the special commitment of the United States to Israel’s security and well-being remained unshakable."}}
- ^ Shlaim 2015: "To Shamir it was crystal clear, once again, that the PLO had not abandoned the path of terror. For him the PLO had always been and would forever remain a terrorist organization. His response to the momentous changes taking place in the Palestinian camp was a reaffirmation of his previous position: no to withdrawal from the occupied territories, no to recognition of the PLO, no to negotiation with the PLO, no to a Palestinian state. Shamir called the U.S. decision to enter into a dialogue with the PLO a “grave error.” He saw it as a threat to the long-standing American-Israeli collaboration in support of the territorial status quo. “For the PLO,” explained Shamir, “a Palestinian state is a minimum. Therefore, anyone who engages in negotiations with it in effect accepts this principle. What else can one talk about with the PLO, if not about a Palestinian state?” Vice-Premier Peres described the opening of the U.S.-PLO dialogue as “a sad day for all of us.” But he felt that Israel had to come up with its own peace initiative, since it was impossible to preserve the status quo."}}
- ^ Jump up to: a b Pappé 2022.
- ^ Jump up to: a b c Quandt, William B. (2005). Peace Process. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 978-0-520-24631-7.
- ^ Jump up to: a b Khalidi 2020.
- ^ Slater 2020, Chapter 14: "On the contrary, in August 1996 the PLO honored its commitment to revoke its original charter, which had denied the legitimacy of Israel and called for the armed liberation of all of Palestine. As well, by 1996 the PA and its police forces had become increasingly successful in their efforts to end the terrorism of Hamas and other Islamic extremists, even cooperating with the Israeli forces. As a result, there were now far fewer terrorist attacks than in the preceding few years.."
- ^ Watson 2020, pp. 211–236: "The Palestinian side has repeatedly run afoul of its obligation to refrain from incitement and hostile propaganda."
- ^ Watson 2020, pp. 211–236: "the Palestinian record of compliance with these obligations is at best mixed...the PA’s record on security cooperation has been mixed... The PA has a mixed record on fighting terror group"
- ^ Shlaim 2001, Chapter 12.
- ^ Jump up to: a b c Christison, Kathleen (2000). Perceptions of Palestine. University of California Press. p. 290. ISBN 978-0-520-21718-8.
- ^ Cleveland, William L.; Bunton, Martin (2010). A History of the Modern Middle East. ReadHowYouWant.com, Limited. ISBN 978-1-4587-8155-0.
- ^ Slater 2020
- ^ Jump up to: a b Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2007). Scars of War, Wounds of Peace. Oxford University Press. p. 241. ISBN 978-0-19-532542-3.
- ^ Jump up to: a b c Chomsky, Noam (1999). Fateful Triangle. Pluto Press. pp. Chapter 10. ISBN 978-0-7453-1530-0.
- ^ Jump up to: a b c Finkelstein, Norman G. (2018). Gaza. University of California Press. pp. Chapter 2. ISBN 978-0-520-29571-1.
- ^ Kimmerling, Baruch (2003). Politicide. Verso Books. pp. The Road to Sharonism. ISBN 978-1-85984-517-2.
- ^ Jump up to: a b Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2022). Prophets Without Honor. Oxford University Press. pp. e-book section 38. ISBN 978-0-19-006047-3.
Camp David failed because of the two sides' conflicting interpretations of the terms of reference of the peace process. The Israelis came to the negotiations with the conviction inherent in the letter of the Oslo Accords that this was an open-ended process where no preconceived solutions existed and where every one of the core issues would be open to negotiation so that a reasonable point of equilibrium between the needs of the parties could be found. The Palestinians saw the negotiations as a step in a journey where they would get their rights as if this were a clear-cut process of decolonization based on "international legitimacy" and "all UN relevant resolutions."
- ^ Finkelstein 2007, pp. 352.
- ^ Finkelstein 2007, pp. 352 "In a letter to President Clinton, who presided over the proceedings, Palestinian representatives stated that their aim was implementation of U.N. Resolution 242 and that "[w]e are willing to accept adjustments of the border between the two countries, on condition that they be equivalent in value and importance." Repeatedly the Palestinian negotiators asked: "Will you accept the June 4border [as the basis of discussion]? Will you accept the principle of the exchange of territories?" The Israeli position was that "[w]e can’t accept the demand for a return to the borders of June 1967as a pre-condition for the negotiation," while Clinton "literally yells," in response to the Palestinian view that "international legitimacy means Israeli retreat to the border of June 4,1967," that "[t]his isn’t the Security Council here. This isn't the U.N. General Assembly.""
- ^ Pressman 2003, pp. 16–17.
- ^ Jump up to: a b Karsh, Efraim (2003). Arafat's War: The Man and His Battle for Israeli Conquest. New York: Grove Press. p. 168.
Arafat rejected the proposal
- ^ Morris, Benny. "Camp David and After: An Exchange (1. An Interview with Ehud Barak)". New York Review of Books. ISSN 0028-7504. Archived from the original on 5 March 2022. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
- ^ Pressman 2003, pp. 7, 15–19.
- ^ Malley, Robert; Agha, Hussein (9 August 2001). "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors". New York Review of Books. 48 (13). Archived from the original on 6 September 2018. Retrieved 5 September 2018.
- ^ Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2022). Prophets Without Honor. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-006047-3.
I myself am on record as having said, "If I were a Palestinian, I would have rejected what was offered at the Camp David Summit." This book stands by this assertion.
- ^ Jump up to: a b c d e Pressman, Jeremy (Fall 2003). "Visions in Collision – What Happened at Camp David and Taba" (PDF). International Security. 28 (2): 6. doi:10.1162/016228803322761955. S2CID 57564925. Archived from the original (PDF) on 4 March 2016.
- ^ Slater 2020: "After Camp David, a new mythology emerged perpetrated by Barak and his foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, with the support of Dennis Ross, Clinton’s secretary of state Madeleine Albright, and to a considerable extent Clinton himself. The mythology holds that at Camp David, Barak made a generous and unprecedented offer to the Palestinians, only to be met by a shocking if not perverse rejection by Arafat who then ordered a violent uprising at just the moment when the chances for peace had never been greater.For example, shortly after the conclusion of Camp David, Ben-Ami gave a long interview with Haaretz, claiming that Arafat did not go to Camp David to reach a compromise settlement but rather treated the negotiations as "a huge camouflage net behind which he sought to undermine the very idea of two states for two nations. . . . Camp David collapsed over the fact that [the Palestinians] refused to get in the game. They refused to make a counterproposal . . . and didn’t succeed in conveying . . . that at some point the demands would have an end."49The implied premise of Barak and Ben-Ami was that Arafat thought the Palestinians held all the cards, so that if he held out long enough, he would eventually reach his goal: the destruction of Israel in stages and the takeover of all of historic Palestine. This view became widely accepted in US and Israeli public opinion...This and other Camp David mythologies have been rejected, both at the time and in retrospect, by nearly all scholars and knowledgeable journalists and by most Israeli and US officials who participated in the negotiations. In particular, they were challenged in interviews and memoirs by the leading Israeli negotiators, among them Ron Pundak, Yossi Beilin, Oden Era, Shaul Arieli, Yossi Ginosser, Moshe Amirav, and General Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, chief of staff of the IDF in 1995–1998. As well, the mythologies were strongly—and subsequently, publicly—rejected by Israel’s leading military intelligence officials, including Ami Ayalon, the 2000 head of Shin Bet, and Matti Steinberg, his chief advisor—and by Amos Malka, head of the IDF’s military intelligence bureau, and his second in command, Ephraim Lavie."
- ^ "Clinton: Arafat changed mind on peace deal". The Washington Times. Archived from the original on 5 March 2022. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
- ^ Altman, Alex (22 January 2009). "Middle East Envoy George Mitchell". Time. Archived from the original on 8 December 2015. Retrieved 3 December 2015.
- ^ "Excerpts: State Dept; Spokesman on Mideast Peace Prospects (Both sides accept Clinton's parameters with reservations)". Embassy of the United States, Israel. Archived from the original on 21 July 2011. Retrieved 3 June 2012.
- ^ Wren, Christopher (3 January 2001). "Renewed Hope for Peace Talks as Arafat Returns to Mideast". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 20 September 2012. Retrieved 3 June 2012.
- ^ Levinson, Chaim (9 November 2015). "Israel moves to green light 2,200 new settlement units, recognizes outposts". Haaretz. Archived from the original on 30 November 2015. Retrieved 3 December 2015.
- ^ "UN: Israeli-Palestinian violence nears 'catastrophe'". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 8 December 2015. Retrieved 3 December 2015.
- ^ "Mapping the dead in latest Israeli-Palestinian violence". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 29 November 2015. Retrieved 3 December 2015.
- ^ Benn, Aluf (14 November 2007). "Annapolis joint declaration to focus on goals of final status talks". Haaretz.
- ^ Joint Understanding Read by President Bush at Annapolis Conference Archived September 22, 2013, at the Wayback Machine. Memorial Hall, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland; 27 November 2007
- ^ Federman, Josef (19 November 2015). "Abbas admits he rejected 2008 peace offer from Olmert". Times of Israel.
- ^ "Saudi Prince al-Faisal tells Haaretz: Desire for peace exists both in Gaza and Ramallah – Israel Conference on Peace TLV". Haaretz. 12 November 2015. Archived from the original on 3 December 2015. Retrieved 3 December 2015.
- ^ "The Saudi Arabia peace initiative". Ynet News. 23 March 2009. Archived from the original on 5 March 2022. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
- ^ "Support for the Saudi Initiative". The New York Times. 28 February 2002. Archived from the original on 11 November 2016. Retrieved 24 June 2016.
- ^ Stern, Yoav (22 November 2008). "Abbas calls on Obama to enact Arab peace plan as soon as he takes office". Haaretz. Associated Press. Archived from the original on 25 December 2008.
- ^ "Hamas' al-Zahar: Arab peace initiative impractical". Ynet News. Associated Press. 1 June 2006. Archived from the original on 20 July 2008.
- ^ Time to Test the Arab Peace Offer. By Scott MacLeod. Time. January 8, 2009.
- ^ "Saudi former intel chief slams Palestinian's criticism of UAE-Israel deal". The Jerusalem Post. 6 October 2020. Archived from the original on 6 October 2020. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
- ^ "Arabs offer Israel peace plan". BBC News. 28 March 2002. Archived from the original on 14 December 2006. Retrieved 17 April 2013.
- ^ Hoffman, Gil (4 March 2002). "Sharon warns Saudi plan may be Arab plot". The Jerusalem Post. Archived from the original on 3 February 2004. Retrieved 1 October 2011.
- ^ "Olmert gives cautious welcome to Arab peace plan". TheGuardian.com. 30 March 2007. Archived from the original on 20 December 2016. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
- ^ "Netanyahu backs 'general idea' behind Arab Peace Initiative". Times of Israel. 28 May 2015. Archived from the original on 30 May 2015. Retrieved 30 May 2015.
- ^ "Netanyahu: Israel Will Never Accept Arab Peace Initiative as Basis for Talks With Palestinians". Haaretz. Archived from the original on 1 February 2023. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
- ^ Holmes, Oliver (27 April 2021). "Israel is committing the crime of apartheid, rights group says". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 2 February 2022.
- ^ Israel's Apartheid Against Palestinians: Cruel System of Domination and Crime Against Humanity (PDF) (Report). Amnesty International. January 2022. Archived (PDF) from the original on 1 February 2022. Retrieved 8 December 2022.
- ^ Sherwood, Harriet (18 January 2012). "EU report calls for action over Israeli settlement growth". The Guardian. London. Archived from the original on 4 September 2013. Retrieved 11 February 2012.
- ^ See the following:
- Keinon, Herb. "Critical EU paper draws fire from Israeli officials". The Jerusalem Post. Archived from the original on 6 October 2012. Retrieved 11 February 2012.
- Hass, Amira (1 December 2012). "EU report: Israel policy in West Bank endangers two-state solution". Haaretz. Archived from the original on 16 January 2012. Retrieved 11 February 2012.
- Macintyre, Donald (1 December 2012). "EU on verge of abandoning hope for a viable Palestinian state". The Independent. London. Archived from the original on 15 February 2012. Retrieved 11 February 2012.
- "Western powers angered as Israel agrees settler homes". BBC. 27 September 2012. Archived from the original on 19 January 2012. Retrieved 11 February 2012.
- ^ "Security Council members line up to criticize Israel". The Jerusalem Post. 20 December 2011. Archived from the original on 19 January 2012. Retrieved 12 February 2012.
- ^ "Israel condemned at UN over settlements". Al Jazeera. 22 December 2011. Archived from the original on 1 August 2018. Retrieved 12 February 2012.
- ^ "UN groupings criticise Israeli settlement activities". BBC News. 20 December 2011. Archived from the original on 30 March 2019. Retrieved 20 December 2012.
- ^ Blomfield, Adrian (5 April 2012). "Israeli architect of Oslo accords says Middle East peace process is over". The Daily Telegraph. Archived from the original on 11 January 2022. Retrieved 23 May 2012.
- ^ Ravid, Barak (14 May 2012). "EU: Israel's policies in the West Bank endanger two-state solution". Haaretz. Archived from the original on 8 April 2015. Retrieved 23 May 2012.
- ^ Ravid, Barack (11 April 2012). "Mideast Quartet criticizes Israeli settler violence, incitement in West Bank". Haaretz. Archived from the original on 17 May 2012. Retrieved 1 June 2012.
- ^ "PA welcomes South Africa settlements decision". Ma'an News Agency. 24 May 2012. Archived from the original on 21 October 2013. Retrieved 1 June 2012.
- ^ GISHA, What is the Separation Policy?
- ^ Roy 2016, De-development Completed. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFRoy2016 (help)
- ^ Baconi 2018 harvnb error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFBaconi2018 (help): "Sharon’s plan was the latest in a long series of measures Israel had taken to separate the Gaza Strip from the West Bank. Although policies of isolation reach back to the 1950s, more contemporary measures began with the “soft quarantining” of Gaza after the signing of the Oslo Accords, including the gradual tightening of border crossings and the construction of barriers to geographically sever the coastal enclave from Israel.9 Sharon’s initiative also reflected a continuation of his use of the pretext of security to unilaterally consolidate Israel’s grip on the territories while avoiding any form of political engagement with the Palestinians.10 This goal was explicitly articulated by Sharon’s top aide, Dov Weisglass, in an interview several months later. “The disengagement is actually formaldehyde,” Weisglass told the Israeli newspaper Haaretz. “It supplies the amount of formaldehyde that is necessary so that there will not be a political process with the Palestinians.”"
- ^ Roy 2016 harvnb error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFRoy2016 (help): "But complete control over the West Bank-the obvious goal of the settlement enterprise and the seperation barrier-cannot be achieved as long as Gaza remains a source of resistance and as along as the possiblity of a unified Palestinian state exists."
- ^ Jump up to: a b c Roy 2024.
- ^ Jump up to: a b Roy 2013.
- ^ Roy 2016. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFRoy2016 (help)
- ^ Валовой 2017 год .
- ^ Аль-Джазира. (2024). Каковы аргументы Международного Суда против незаконной оккупации Израилем Палестины? Аль Джазира. Получено с https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/19/whats-the-icj-case-against-israels-illegal-occupation-of-palestine.
- ^ Долг 2017 .
- ^ ГИША, Руководство по закрытию сектора Газа: собственными словами Израиля
- ^ Oxfam International, Прекращение отказа, стр. 7.
- ^ Цитируется в Roy 2016, ошибка harvnb: несколько целей (2×): CITEREFRoy2016 ( помощь ) «Эта ситуация существенно не изменилась: в конце 2012 года Всемирный банк сообщил, что «доступ в сектор Газа остается строго контролируемым, и только потребительские товары и строительство материалы для проектов, контролируемых донорами, разрешены. Товары из Газы на рынки Западного Берега и Израиля... запрещены. Только небольшие партии определенных сельскохозяйственных и промышленных товаров экспортируются на другие рынки через проекты, поддерживаемые донорами в Восточном Иерусалиме. считающийся очень прибыльным рынком, недосягаем». Фактический запрет на экспорт из сектора Газа не снят по сей день (август 2014 г.), Израиль заявил о соображениях безопасности, но поскольку запреты касались таких товаров, как мебель, предназначенная для школ штата Пенсильвания на Западном берегу, цитрусовые для бакалейщиков Западного берега. и текстиля израильским компаниям», трудно не прийти к выводу, что ограничения не имеют ничего общего с безопасностью. Вместо этого их цель явно состоит в том, чтобы сохранить разделение Газы и Западного Берега. Действительно, сами израильские сотрудники службы безопасности. объяснил запрет на экспорт «политическим решением отделить сектор Газа от Западного берега». Правительство называет эту политику необходимостью «политической безопасности».*° Примечательно, что «решения относительно продажи товаров из Газы на Западный Берег... могут приниматься только канцелярией премьер-министра». Частный сектор: немного статистики Среди последствий блокады (усугубленной жесткими экономическими ограничениями и продолжающимися военными нападениями) — крайняя деградация частного сектора и производственной базы Газы... Правительство Израиля официально оправдывает закрытие как меру безопасности, несмотря на то, что сами израильские службы безопасности заявили, что закрытие имеет ограниченную ценность против экстремистских нападений».
- ^ «Амнистия утверждает, что некоторые убийства Израиля на Западном Берегу могут быть военными преступлениями» . Рейтер . 27 февраля 2014 г. Архивировано из оригинала 7 апреля 2022 г. . Проверено 5 марта 2022 г.
- ^ «Израиль и оккупированные палестинские территории: спусковой крючок: применение Израилем чрезмерной силы на Западном Берегу» . Международная амнистия . 27 февраля 2014 г. Архивировано из оригинала 22 ноября 2018 г. Проверено 5 марта 2022 г.
- ^ Штатные авторы (18 июля 2011 г.). «Израильский министр говорит, что палестинцы проигрывают заявку в ООН» . Алмасри Алюм . Архивировано из оригинала 10 декабря 2012 года . Проверено 1 сентября 2011 г.
- ^ Равид, Барак (28 августа 2011 г.). "Посланник ООН Просор: У Израиля нет шансов остановить признание палестинского государства" . Гаарец . Архивировано из оригинала 31 августа 2011 года . Проверено 31 августа 2011 г.
- ^ Перейти обратно: а б Финкельштейн, Норман Г. (2012). Знать слишком много . Нью-Йорк: Лондон: OR Books. ISBN 978-1-935928-77-5 . OCLC 794273633 .
{{cite book}}: Неизвестный параметр|loc=игнорируется ( помогите ) - ^ Бенхорин, Ицхак (13 сентября 2011 г.). «США будут 'категорически возражать' против предложения ПА ООН» . Новости Инета . Архивировано из оригинала 15 ноября 2018 года . Проверено 15 сентября 2018 г.
- ^ Хорн, Джордана. «Обама в ООН заявляет, что «коротких путей» к миру нет» . «Джерузалем Пост» . Архивировано из оригинала 1 июня 2015 года . Проверено 24 июня 2014 г.
- ^ Медзини, Ронен (18 сентября 2011 г.). «Нетаньягу: попытка ПА стать постоянным членом ООН провалится» . Новости Инета . Архивировано из оригинала 23 сентября 2011 года . Проверено 18 сентября 2011 г.
- ^ МакГрил, Крис (23 сентября 2011 г.). «Аббас бросает вызов США, официально призывая к признанию Палестины со стороны ООН» . Хранитель . Лондон. Архивировано из оригинала 4 марта 2014 года . Проверено 23 сентября 2011 г.
- ^ «Совет Безопасности отверг резолюцию о палестинской государственности» . CNN . 31 декабря 2014 г. Архивировано из оригинала 15 ноября 2018 г. Проверено 14 ноября 2018 г.
- ^ «Палестинцы добиваются безоговорочного признания ООН суверенного государства» . Рейтер . 29 ноября 2012 года. Архивировано из оригинала 5 июня 2014 года . Проверено 29 ноября 2012 г.
- ^ Галаад Шер, Израильско-палестинские мирные переговоры, 1999–2001: В пределах досягаемости , Тейлор и Фрэнсис, 2006, стр. 19.
- ^ Перейти обратно: а б Продажи, Бен. «Некоторые эксперты подвергают сомнению масштабы палестинского подстрекательства» . Времена Израиля . Архивировано из оригинала 12 февраля 2014 года . Проверено 5 марта 2022 г.
- ^ Джеспер Свартвик, Якоб Вирен (ред.), Религиозные стереотипы и межрелигиозные отношения , Palgrave Macmillan 2013, стр. 12, 222–224.
- ^ Таня Рейнхарт , Израиль/Палестина: Как положить конец войне 1948 года , Seven Stories Press, 2011, стр. 107.
- ^ Шервуд, Харриет (6 августа 2011 г.). «Ученые утверждают, что израильские школьные учебники содержат предвзятость - Израиль» . Хранитель . Архивировано из оригинала 17 октября 2022 года . Проверено 13 июля 2022 г.
- ^ Перейти обратно: а б Отчет о палестинских учебниках. Архивировано 2 сентября 2022 г. в Институте Георга Эккерта Wayback Machine (2019–2021 гг.). Ошибка в цитировании: именованная ссылка «:2» была определена несколько раз с разным содержанием (см. страницу справки ).
- ^ «ЕС удерживает средства ПА после провала реформы антисемитских учебников» . «Джерузалем Пост» . Архивировано из оригинала 13 июля 2022 года . Проверено 7 мая 2022 г.
- ^ «ЕС движется к прекращению финансирования палестинских террористов, подстрекающих к учебникам» . «Джерузалем Пост» . Архивировано из оригинала 11 июля 2022 года . Проверено 8 мая 2022 г.
- ^ Альгемайнер, The. «Глава БАПОР сталкивается с вопросами в парламенте ЕС по поводу «разжигания ненависти и насилия» в палестинских учебниках» . Algemeiner.com . Архивировано из оригинала 28 августа 2022 года . Проверено 8 мая 2022 г.
- ^ Израильтянин Рафаэль (14 августа 2012 г.). Идея Осло: эйфория неудачи . Издатели транзакций. ISBN 978-1-4128-4653-0 .
- ^ "PA TV прославляет убийц семьи Фогель" . Иерусалим Пост . 30 января 2012 года. Архивировано из оригинала 1 марта 2012 года . Проверено 28 марта 2012 г.
- ^ «В Израиле ужасная волна захлестнула палестинцев» . Национальный . 25 апреля 2016 г. Архивировано из оригинала 19 мая 2016 г. . Проверено 14 мая 2016 г. .
- ^ Коэн, Гили (22 апреля 2016 г.). «Израильскому солдату предъявлено обвинение в стрельбе по раненому палестинскому нападавшему, освобожденному на Песах» . Гаарец . Архивировано из оригинала 18 мая 2016 года . Проверено 14 мая 2016 г. .
- ^ «Когда израильтяне учат своих детей ненавидеть» . Форвард . 8 мая 2014 г. Архивировано из оригинала 2 мая 2016 г. . Проверено 14 мая 2016 г. .
- ^ «Детсадовцы Газы хотят «взорвать сионистов» » . Новости Инета . Архивировано из оригинала 13 июля 2012 года . Проверено 17 июня 2012 г.
- ^ Стерн-Вайнер, Джейми (ноябрь 2017 г.). Момент истины . ISBN 978-1-68219-114-9 .
{{cite book}}: Неизвестный параметр|loc=игнорируется ( помогите ) - ^ Авинери, Шломо (2017). Становление современного сионизма . Основные книги . ISBN 978-0-465-09479-0 .
{{cite book}}: Неизвестный параметр|loc=игнорируется ( помогите ) - ^ Бен-Ами, Шломо (2022). Пророки без чести . Издательство Оксфордского университета . ISBN 978-0-19-006047-3 .
Израильтяне пришли к переговорам с убежденностью, заложенной в букве Соглашений Осло, что это открытый процесс, в котором не существует никаких предвзятых решений и где каждый из основных вопросов будет открыт для переговоров, чтобы найти разумную точку равновесия. между потребностями сторон. Палестинцы рассматривали переговоры как шаг на пути к получению своих прав, как если бы это был четкий процесс деколонизации, основанный на «международной легитимности» и «всех соответствующих резолюциях ООН».
- ^ Финкельштейн, Норман Г. (2018). Газа . Издательство Калифорнийского университета . ISBN 978-0-520-29571-1 .
Я был министром юстиции. Я юрист», — заявила министр иностранных дел Ципи Ливни своим палестинским собеседникам во время критического раунда мирного процесса в 2007 году, — «но я против закона, в частности международного права.
{{cite book}}: Неизвестный параметр|loc=игнорируется ( помогите ) - ^ Перейти обратно: а б Лоуверс, Колтер. «3» . Потоп . ИЛИ Книги. ISBN 978-1-68219-619-9 .
- ^ Перейти обратно: а б Рой, Сара М. (2016). Сектор Газа, расширенное 3-е издание . Институт палестинских исследований. ISBN 978-0-88728-260-7 .
{{cite book}}: Неизвестный параметр|loc=игнорируется ( помогите ) - ^ Бакони 2018 . ошибка sfn: несколько целей (2×): CITEREFBaconi2018 ( справка )
- ^ Кливленд, Уильям Л.; Бантон, Мартин (2010). История современного Ближнего Востока . ReadHowYouWant.com, Limited. ISBN 978-1-4587-8155-0 .
- ^ Шейндлин (ноябрь 2017 г.). «Сокращение округа двух штатов». Момент истины . ИЛИ Книги. ISBN 978-1-68219-114-9 .
- ^ Бен-Ами, Шломо (2022). «Признаки постоянства профессии» . Пророки без чести . Издательство Оксфордского университета . ISBN 978-0-19-006047-3 .
Но униженное подчинение палестинцев и постоянно углубляющаяся система оккупации и дискриминации на территориях являются единственной и исключительной ответственностью Израиля. Как блестяще объяснил Майкл Сфард, эта система построена на трех столпах: оружии, поселениях и законе, который формализует сеть колонизации.1 Под прикрытием требований безопасности еврейское государство создало на палестинских территориях Это один из самых эффективных оккупационных режимов в истории, что, кроме того, является экономически эффективным, поскольку именно донорские деньги международного сообщества Палестинской администрации избавляют оккупанта от бремени необходимости прямого управления территориями. Это дает Израилю возможность удовлетворять свои ненасытные потребности в безопасности с помощью драконовских мер, таких как ограничение свободы передвижения палестинцев, возведение стен, разделяющих общины, усеивание дорог контрольно-пропускными пунктами, где подвергаются насилию невинные люди, активация сложных разведывательных механизмов, которые контролируют жизнь палестинцев. постоянно растущее число подозреваемых, проведение внезапных обысков частных домов посреди ночи и произвольные административные задержания. Если этого было недостаточно, то дружинники среди поселенцев, некоторые из которых известны как «Молодежь холмов», постоянно преследуют палестинские общины, уничтожают садовые деревья и произвольно назначают «цену» наказаний невинным гражданским лицам за любые террористические атаки, которые могли бы иметь место. было совершено палестинским отрядом. В основе этой очень серьезной проблемы непростительной порочности поселенческого экстремизма лежит еще более серьезная проблема, связанная с вовлечением всего политического организма Израиля в поддержание и постоянное расширение режима доминирования на территориях. Слишком долго мирный процесс служил занавесом, за которым процветала политика практической аннексии.
- ^ «Обзор конфликта между Израилем и палестинцами» . Основы новостей . Архивировано из оригинала 24 апреля 2012 года . Проверено 13 февраля 2012 г.
- ^ Скотт-Бауманн, 2023 : «Израильское правительство приступило к аннексии Восточного Иерусалима. Этот акт нарушил международное право, и Генеральная Ассамблея Организации Объединенных Наций осудила его ... Кроме того, Израиль конфисковал большой участок земли к востоку от города, который будет со временем образоват барьер из израильских поселений, окружающих город, тем самым отрезав палестинское население Иерусалима от внутренних территорий Западного Берега2».
- ^ Перейти обратно: а б с д Села 2002 , стр. 491–498, «Иерусалим».
- ^ Авраам Села (2002). Политическая энциклопедия Континуума Ближнего Востока . Академик Блумсбери. п. 495. ИСБН 978-0-8264-1413-7 .
Напряженность между арабами и евреями возникла из-за инцидентов на Храмовой горе и вокруг нее (аль-Харам аш-Шариф) и провокационных действий еврейских экстремистов против арабов. Особенно разочаровывающими с точки зрения палестинцев были постоянные попытки израильских властей расселить евреев в чисто арабских кварталах путем покупки арабской или церковной собственности или присвоить населенную арабскую собственность законным путем на том основании, что она изначально принадлежала евреям.
- ^ «Основной закон: Иерусалим, столица Израиля (неофициальный перевод)». Архивировано 5 сентября 2014 года в Wayback Machine . www.knesset.gov.il . Принят Кнессетом 17 ава 5740 г. (30 июля 1980 г.).
- ^ Даймонд, Джереми; Лаботт, Элиза (6 декабря 2017 г.). «Трамп признает Иерусалим столицей Израиля» . CNN . Архивировано из оригинала 26 января 2018 года . Проверено 7 декабря 2017 г.
- ^ Арен, Рафаэль (6 апреля 2017 г.). «Любопытно, что Россия признает Западный Иерусалим столицей Израиля» . Времена Израиля . Иерусалим. Архивировано из оригинала 22 сентября 2020 года . Проверено 7 декабря 2017 г.
- ^ «Резолюция 478 Совета Безопасности ООН» . unispal.un.org. Архивировано из оригинала 12 октября 2017 года . Проверено 23 августа 2017 г.
- ^ Лапидот, Руфь. «Иерусалим – Некоторые юридические вопросы» (PDF) . Иерусалимский институт израильских исследований. стр. 21–26. Архивировано из оригинала (PDF) 5 июня 2014 года . Проверено 7 апреля 2013 г. Перепечатано из: Рюдигера Вольфрума (ред.), Энциклопедия международного публичного права Макса Планка ( Oxford University Press , онлайн, 2008–, печать 2011).
- ^ Райтер, Ицхак (2017). Спорные святые места в Израиле и Палестине: разделение и разрешение конфликтов . Рутледж. п. xiii. ISBN 9781351998857 .
- ^ Брегер, Маршалл Дж.; Рейтер, Ицхак; Хаммер, Леонард (2010). «Регулирование святых мест на Западном Берегу и в секторе Газа». Святые места в израильско-палестинском конфликте: противостояние и сосуществование . Группа Тейлор и Фрэнсис. ISBN 9780203867457 .
- ^ Голд, Доре (2007). Борьба за Иерусалим: радикальный ислам, Запад и будущее Священного города . Вашингтон, округ Колумбия: Издательство Regnery. стр. 5–6.
- ^ Голден, Джонатан (2004). «Нацеливание на наследие: злоупотребление символическими местами в современных конфликтах» . В Роуэне, Йорк М.; Барам, Узи (ред.). Маркетинговое наследие: археология и потребление прошлого . Роуман Альтамира. стр. 183–202. ISBN 978-0-7591-0342-9 . Архивировано из оригинала 9 октября 2023 года . Проверено 29 октября 2015 г.
- ^ «Экстремисты – разговоры с еврейскими экстремистами | Следующая война Израиля?» . Линия фронта . ПБС . Архивировано из оригинала 12 октября 2017 года . Проверено 5 марта 2022 г.
- ^ Пелед, Алиса Рубин (2001). Дебаты об исламе в еврейском государстве: развитие политики в отношении исламских институтов в Израиле . Издательство Государственного университета Нью-Йорка . п. 96. OCLC 929622466 .
В целом, израильскую политику в отношении святых мест можно считать успешной с точки зрения ее основной цели: содействия принятию Израиля в международное сообщество наций. Однако неоднократная неспособность Департамента по делам мусульман выполнить свой мандат по защите мусульманских святынь в Израиле стала в значительной степени забытой главой в истории Израиля, которая заслуживает пересмотра.
- ^ «Секретный туннель под мечетью Аль-Акса раскрыт» . Аль Арабия на английском языке . 27 марта 2008 г. Архивировано из оригинала 9 августа 2020 г. . Проверено 5 марта 2022 г.
- ^ Перейти обратно: а б с Села 2002 , стр. 724–29, Эфрат, Моше. «Беженцы».
- ^ Перейти обратно: а б Питерс, Джоэл; Даджани Дауди, Мохаммед (2011). Параллельные дискурсы израильско-палестинского конфликта . Рутледж . стр. 26, 37. ISBN. 978-0-203-83939-3 . Архивировано из оригинала 9 октября 2023 года . Проверено 12 ноября 2020 г.
- ^ «Общий отчет о ходе работы и дополнительный отчет Согласительной комиссии Организации Объединенных Наций для Палестины, охватывающий период с 11 декабря 1949 года по 23 октября 1950 года» . Согласительная комиссия ООН по Палестине. 1950. Архивировано из оригинала 11 октября 2007 года . Проверено 20 ноября 2007 г.
- ^ Наций, ООН. «Беженцы» . Объединенные Нации .
- ^ «БАПОР» . Агентство ООН для помощи палестинским беженцам и организации работ . Архивировано из оригинала 7 января 2022 года . Проверено 5 марта 2022 г.
- ^ Халиди 2024 , Фатех, ООП и ПА: Палестинское парагосударство: «Тем временем за пределами Палестины проживают от 4 до 6 миллионов палестинцев (достоверные данные недоступны). Они существуют в ситуациях, варьирующихся от крайней нищеты ( с 1982 года) тех, кто находится в лагерях беженцев в Ливане2, в самых разных условиях, некоторые из которых весьма комфортны, в различных других арабских странах, Европе и Соединенных Штатах. Эти палестинцы «диаспоры» (аль-шатат в). арабские) имеют множество паспортов, пропусков и документов беженцев, к некоторым из которых некоторые государства относятся с большим подозрением, и в результате некоторые из них сталкиваются с жесткими ограничениями на свое передвижение. Самая большая группа палестинцев в мире. Диаспора, насчитывающая от 2 до 3 миллионов человек, имеет иорданские паспорта, и большинство из них живут в Иордании. Что объединяет подавляющее большинство этих 4-6 миллионов человек, так это то, что они или их родители, бабушки и дедушки были вынуждены покинуть свои дома и стать беженцами в Иордании. 1948 года или позже, и что им запрещено жить в любой части их прародины, Палестины».
- ^ Слейтер 2020 , с. 265: «Беженцы. Израиль согласился с тем, что проблема беженцев является достойной сожаления гуманитарной проблемой, заявил Барак, и признает право палестинцев вернуться в свое собственное государство, но что «никакое право на возвращение на израильскую территорию не будет иметь преимущественную силу». Он продолжил, что Израиль готов принимать несколько сотен беженцев ежегодно в течение десяти-пятнадцатилетнего периода в рамках программы воссоединения семей. В более позднем интервью Барак дал понять, что «программа воссоединения семей» не основана ни на чем. Права палестинцев: «Ни один премьер-министр Израиля не примет ни одного беженца на основании права на возвращение».
- ^ Скотт-Бауманн, 2023 .
- ^ Слейтер 2020 , с. 251: «Палестинская позиция. С 1948 года официальная или публичная позиция Арафата, ООП, преемника Арафата Махмуда Аббаса и Палестинской администрации заключалась — и, по крайней мере риторически, остается таковой — что палестинские беженцы, а также их потомки имеют право вернуться на свои земли, в дома и деревни. Арафат подтвердил это «требование» в Кэмп-Дэвиде, хотя он и другие палестинские лидеры неоднократно заверяли американцев и израильтян, что их настоящей целью было принятие Израилем только «принципа». возвращения беженцев, в отличие от реализации этого «права» на практике».
- ^ «Право на возвращение: палестинская мечта?» . 18 февраля 2003 г. Архивировано из оригинала 5 марта 2022 г. Проверено 5 марта 2022 г.
- ^ Флапан, Симха (лето 1987 г.). «Палестинский исход 1948 года». Журнал палестинских исследований . 16 (4): 3–26. дои : 10.2307/2536718 . JSTOR 2536718 .
- ^ Халиди, Рашид И. (зима 1992 г.). «Замечания о праве на возвращение». Журнал палестинских исследований . 21 (2): 29–40. дои : 10.2307/2537217 . JSTOR 2537217 .
- ^ Моррис, Бенни (2001). Праведные жертвы: история сионистско-арабского конфликта, 1881–2001 гг. (1-е изд. Vintage Books). Нью-Йорк: Винтажные книги . стр. 252–258 . ISBN 978-0-679-74475-7 .
- ^ Масалха, Нур (1992). Изгнание палестинцев: концепция «переноса» в сионистской политической мысли, 1882–1948 (4-е изд.). Вашингтон, округ Колумбия: Институт палестинских исследований . п. 175 . ISBN 978-0-88728-235-5 .
- ^ Майкл Манн (2005). Темная сторона демократии: объяснение этнической чистки . Издательство Кембриджского университета . стр. 109, 519. ISBN. 978-0-521-83130-7 .
- ^ Моррис, Бенни . «Арабо-израильская война» . Образовательный проект «Военные преступления». Архивировано из оригинала 29 января 2014 года . Проверено 14 марта 2014 г.
- ^ Эсбер, Розмари (2009). Под прикрытием войны: сионистское изгнание палестинцев . Арабский Книги и СМИ. п. 23. ISBN 978-0-9815131-3-3 .
- ^ Паппе, Илан (2007). Этническая чистка Палестины (Переизданная ред.). Оксфорд: Публикации Oneworld. стр. 2–3 . ISBN 978-1-85168-467-0 .
- ^ См., например, Масалха, Нур-Элдин (1988). «О недавних еврейских и израильских источниках об исходе палестинцев, 1947–49». Журнал палестинских исследований . 18 (1): 121–137. дои : 10.2307/2537599 . JSTOR 2537599 . И Чилдерс, Ирскин (12 мая 1961 г.). «Другой исход». Зритель . Лондон.
- ^ Хониг-Парнас, Тиква (2011). Лжепророки мира: либеральный сионизм и борьба за Палестину . Книги Хеймаркет . п. 5. ISBN 978-1-60846-130-1 .
Макдиси справедливо утверждает, что почти каждый закон южноафриканского апартеида имеет свой эквивалент в сегодняшнем Израиле. который определяет второсортное гражданство палестинцев, признается в качестве фундаментального принципа в Израиле и «возможно, даже является его смыслом существования как еврейского государства»19.
- ^ Шмидт, Ивонн (2008). Основы гражданских и политических прав в Израиле и на оккупированных территориях . ГРИН Верлаг оХГ. стр. 245–246. ISBN 978-3-638-94450-2 .
В любом случае Закон о возвращении 1950 года имеет дискриминационный эффект для палестинского арабского народа, поскольку он позволяет любому еврею иммигрировать в Израиль, и в то же время лишает всех коренных палестинских арабских беженцев, проживающих за пределами государства Израиль, их фундаментальное право вернуться в свои дома и деревни, из которых они были изгнаны или бежали в ходе войны 1948 года, разразившейся из-за создания Израиля.
- ^ Кассим, Анис Ф. (2002). Палестинский ежегодник международного права, 2001–2002 годы: Том. 11 . Брилл . п. 150. ИСБН 978-3-638-94450-2 .
В разделе «Дискриминация» Комитет назвал Закон Израиля о возвращении дискриминационным по отношению к палестинским беженцам из-за отказа Израиля принять их обратно. Комитет заявил: «Комитет с обеспокоенностью отмечает, что Закон о возвращении, который позволяет любому еврею из любой точки мира иммигрировать и тем самым практически автоматически наслаждаться видом на жительство и получать гражданство в Израиле, дискриминирует палестинцев в диаспоре, которых правительство Израиля ввел ограничительные требования, которые делают практически невозможным возвращение на родину».
- ^ «A/RES/181(II) от 29 ноября 1947 г.» . Объединенные Нации. Архивировано из оригинала 25 октября 2014 года . Проверено 19 октября 2014 г.
- ^ «A/RES/181(II) от 29 ноября 1947 г.» . Объединенные Нации. Архивировано из оригинала 20 октября 2014 года . Проверено 19 октября 2014 г.
- ^ Рэдли, К. Рене (1978). «Палестинские беженцы: право на возвращение в международном праве». Американский журнал международного права . 72 (3): 586–614. дои : 10.2307/2200460 . JSTOR 2200460 . S2CID 147111254 .
- ^ Моррис, Бенни (2001). Праведные жертвы: история сионистско-арабского конфликта, 1881–2001 гг. (1-е изд. Vintage Books). Нью-Йорк: Винтажные книги . стр. 252–258 . ISBN 978-0-679-74475-7 .
- ^ Перейти обратно: а б «Израиль и палестинцы» . Ирландские Таймс . 2 февраля 2008 г. Архивировано из оригинала 21 октября 2012 г. Проверено 5 августа 2012 г.
- ^ Шавит, Ари (8 января 2004 г.). «Выживает сильнейший» . Гаарец . Архивировано из оригинала 30 октября 2017 года . Проверено 7 января 2015 г.
- ^ Финкельштейн, Норман Г. (2012). Знать слишком много: почему роман американских евреев с Израилем подходит к концу . Нью-Йорк: ИЛИ Книги. стр. Глава 10. ISBN 978-1-935928-77-5 .
- ^ Бен-Ами, Шломо (2007). Шрамы войны, раны мира . Издательство Оксфордского университета . п. 50. ISBN 978-0-19-532542-3 .
Массовая репатриация палестинских беженцев непримиримо противоречила бы самому жизненно важному и фундаментальному идеалу нового Государства Израиль, более того, самому смыслу его существования, а именно консолидации еврейского государства посредством массовой иммиграции выживших после нацизма. Холокост в Европе, а также изгнанные и лишенные собственности евреи Северной Африки и арабского Ближнего Востока... Ни один израильский государственный деятель, ни в 1948, ни в 2005 году, не рассматривал бы мир, основанный на массовой репатриации палестинских беженцев, как предложение, которое еврейское государство могло бы сделать. принять и все же выжить. Этос сионизма был двояким; речь шла о демографии – сборе изгнанников в жизнеспособное еврейское государство с как можно меньшим арабским меньшинством – и о земле.
- ^ Куигли, Джон Б. (2005). Дело Палестины . Издательство Университета Дьюка . ISBN 978-0-8223-3539-9 .
Премьер-министр Израиля Биньямин Нетаньяху заявил, что возвращающиеся палестинцы могут стать пятой колонной и демографической угрозой для Израиля как еврейского государства.
- ^ Эрлангер, Стивен (31 марта 2007 г.). «Ольмерт отвергает право палестинцев на возвращение» . Нью-Йорк Таймс . ISSN 0362-4331 . Архивировано из оригинала 22 марта 2017 года . Проверено 5 марта 2022 г.
- ^ Хомский, Ноам (1999). Судьбоносный треугольник . Плутон Пресс . ISBN 978-0-89608-601-2 .
Очевидно, что у коренного населения тоже есть «проблема безопасности»; на самом деле, палестинцы уже пережили катастрофу, которой справедливо опасаются израильтяне.
- ^ Халиди 2013 , Введение: «Точно так же в этом лексиконе «безопасность» является абсолютным приоритетом Израиля, потребность в которой неизменно описывается как коренящаяся в подлинных, глубоко укоренившихся экзистенциальных страхах. Таким образом, «израильская безопасность» имеет приоритет над практически все остальное, включая международное право и права других людей. Это бесконечно обширная концепция, которая включает в себя удивительное множество вещей, например, можно ли ввозить в сектор Газа макароны или детали генераторов или могут ли быть несчастными палестинские жители деревни. разрешены цистерны с водой.1 Напротив, несмотря на шаткий характер своего положения, предполагается, что палестинцы не испытывают каких-либо серьезных опасений по поводу своей безопасности. Это действительно так, хотя почти половина палестинского населения на протяжении более двух поколений жила под властью. жестокая военная оккупация без самых элементарных человеческих, гражданских или политических прав, а остальные на протяжении многих десятилетий были изгнаны со своей исконной родины, многие из них живут под властью суровых, авторитарных арабских правительств».
- ^ Бен-Ами, Шломо (2022). Пророки без чести . Издательство Оксфордского университета . ISBN 978-0-19-006047-3 .
Таким образом, израильские дебаты по поводу оккупированных территорий – это не просто идеологический раскол между правыми и левыми; он также находится под сильным влиянием всеобъемлющей «сети безопасности», которая придает обоснование безопасности каждому политическому шагу.
{{cite book}}: Неизвестный параметр|loc=игнорируется ( помогите ) - ^ Слейтер 2020 , с. 221: «В любом случае, не было вообще никаких законных аргументов в пользу захвата Израилем арабского Восточного Иерусалима сразу после войны 1967 года и последующего расселения религиозных фанатиков на Западном Берегу. Реальные мотивирующие силы для большей части послевоенного израильского экспансионизма Во всяком случае, как отмечали в то время многие израильские эксперты по безопасности, «необходимость» защищать поселенцев была проблемой безопасности... Израильские правительства сделали это. долгое время называли «безопасность» причиной необходимости сохранения оккупации арабских территорий, но когда Израиль ушел с территории Ливана и Египта, нападения на него прекратились. Маловероятно, что уход Израиля с палестинских территорий имел бы другой результат. и если бы это произошло, мало что могло бы помешать Израилю повторно вторгнуться и оккупировать эти территории. Более того, в таких обстоятельствах подавление любого продолжающегося палестинского насилия будет иметь легитимность, которой ему сейчас не хватает. По этим причинам у Израиля есть проблемы безопасности с палестинцами точно так же, как у колониальных держав были «проблемы безопасности» с националистическими восстаниями, которые в конечном итоге вынудили их уйти».
- ^ Перейти обратно: а б «Жертвы палестинского насилия и терроризма с сентября 2000 года» . МВД Израиля . Архивировано из оригинала 3 апреля 2007 года . Проверено 10 апреля 2007 г.
- ^ «Палестинский закон о борьбе с терроризмом 2006 года». Архивировано 28 ноября 2007 года в Wayback Machine Глобальной сети юридической информации . 26 декабря 2006 г. 30 мая 2009 г.
- ^ Эракат, Нура (2019). Справедливость для некоторых . Издательство Стэнфордского университета . ISBN 978-1-5036-1357-7 .
{{cite book}}: Неизвестный параметр|loc=игнорируется ( помогите ) - ^ Куигли, Джон Б. (2005). Дело Палестины . Издательство Университета Дьюка . ISBN 978-0-8223-3539-9 .
- ^ «Анализ: атаки палестинских смертников» . Новости Би-би-си . 29 января 2007 г. Архивировано из оригинала 15 января 2010 г. Проверено 5 марта 2022 г.
- ↑ Baconi 2018 , Военное сопротивление сходит на нет. Ошибка harvnb: несколько целей (2×): CITEREFBaconi2018 ( справка ) : «25 февраля 1994 года американский еврейский поселенец по имени Барух Гольдштейн вошел в мечеть Ибрагими в городе Хеврон на Западном Берегу во время Во время молитвы, стоя за рядами стоящих перед ним на коленях, Гольдштейн открыл огонь. За считанные минуты двадцать девять верующих мусульман были убиты и около сотни получили ранения. Это злодеяние потрясло зарождающиеся израильско-палестинские двусторонние переговоры. Менее чем за шесть месяцев до нападения на Хеврон, в сентябре 1993 года, председатель ООП Ясир Арафат и премьер-министр Израиля Ицхак Рабин неловко пожали друг другу руки на широко разрекламированном мероприятии. на Южной лужайке Белого дома Лидеры собрались в американской столице, чтобы подписать Декларацию принципов временных мер по самоуправлению, широко известную как «Соглашения Осло», имея в виду столицу, где проходили секретные переговоры, приведшие к соглашению. имело место. После подписания были начаты переговоры между Израилем и ООП в форме «мирного процесса».1 Нападение Гольдштейна послужило напоминанием о кровавых проблемах, с которыми столкнулся этот процесс. Спустя сорок один день после стрельбы, когда время, отведенное для мусульманского ритуального траура, было соблюдено, член Хамаса подошел к автобусной остановке в Афуле, городе на севере Израиля. Стоя рядом с другими пассажирами, мужчина взорвал жилет смертника, убив семерых израильтян. Это было 6 апреля 1994 года, в день, ознаменовавший первый смертоносный теракт, совершенный Хамасом в Израиле».
- ^ «Барьер безопасности (забор)» . Генеральный военный прокурор ЦАХАЛа. Архивировано из оригинала 12 октября 2017 года . Проверено 5 октября 2014 г.
- ^ Скотт-Бауманн, 2023 : «Гораздо меньше израильтян было убито в результате палестинских террористов-смертников после строительства барьера (130 в 2003 году и менее 25 в 2005 году), что убедило большинство израильтян в том, что это спасло жизни соотечественников-израильтян и было необходимо для их Тем не менее, снижение числа бомбардировок также можно объяснить постоянным присутствием израильских войск внутри и вокруг палестинских городов, а также усилением сотрудничества в области безопасности между ЦАХАЛом и ПА, особенно после окончания Второй интифады в 2005 году».
- ^ Хурани, Альберт Хабиб (2010). История арабских народов . Издательство Гарвардского университета . ISBN 978-0-674-01017-8 .
В некоторых местах барьер отделял фермеров от их земель, даже детей от школ, в то же время не позволяя палестинцам путешествовать по Западному Берегу или искать работу в Израиле.
- ↑ Шлайм 2015 , Глава 19: «Заграждение проходило по маршруту, который почти полностью проходил через территорию, оккупированную Израилем в июне 1967 года»
- ^ Baconi 2018 , Глава 3. Ошибка harvnb: несколько целей (2×): CITEREFBaconi2018 ( помощь ) : «Однако вместо того, чтобы строить стену на израильской земле или вдоль границ 1967 года, структура протянулась через палестинские территории, в одностороннем порядке захватив более 10 Эта структура разделила целые палестинские деревни пополам и оказала немедленное влияние на свободу передвижения палестинцев на оккупированной территории. Еврейские поселенцы, незаконно проживающие на одной и той же территории, продолжали связываться с Израилем через эксклюзивные автомагистрали и объездные дороги, предназначенные только для евреев. 20 июля 2004 г. Международный Суд вынес консультативное заключение, согласно которому стена была незаконной. эффект.4 Благодаря запланированному уходу Израиля из сектора Газа и строительству развитой инфраструктуры «безопасности», Шарон активно реструктурировал рамки израильской оккупации».
- ^ Эракат, Нура (2019). Справедливость для некоторых: право и вопрос о Палестине . Издательство Стэнфордского университета . ISBN 978-1-5036-0883-2 .
В его решении 2004 года говорилось, что строительство стены на Западном Берегу, в отличие от стены вдоль линии перемирия 1949 года, нарушает право палестинцев на самоопределение, противоречит Четвертой Женевской конвенции и не может быть оправдано как мера самоопределения Израиля. -оборона. Он посоветовал Израилю «прекратить нарушения международного права; он обязан немедленно прекратить работы по строительству стены, возводимой на оккупированной палестинской территории, в том числе в Восточном Иерусалиме и вокруг него, чтобы немедленно демонтировать расположенное на ней сооружение». " Суд также отметил, что все государства обязаны «не признавать незаконную ситуацию, возникшую в результате строительства стены, и не оказывать помощь или помощь в поддержании ситуации, созданной таким строительством».
{{cite book}}: Неизвестный параметр|loc=игнорируется ( помогите ) - ^ Финкельштейн, Норман Г. (2012). Знать слишком много . Нью-Йорк: ИЛИ Книги. ISBN 978-1-935928-77-5 .
В своем консультативном заключении Международный Суд выразил обеспокоенность тем, что «строительство стены и связанный с ним режим создают на местах «свершившийся факт», который вполне может стать постоянным». не было «фактической основы» для принятия определенных выводов.116 Однако не только Международный Суд, но и многие уважаемые правозащитные организации выразили подобную обеспокоенность. «Бецелем» пришла к выводу, что «основной причиной» строительства стены было «установление фактов на местах, которые увековечили бы существование поселений и облегчили бы их будущую аннексию к Израилю». Аналогичным образом Хьюман Райтс Вотч пришла к выводу, что «существующий и планируемый маршрут строительства заграждения, судя по всему, предназначен главным образом для включения и примыкания к территории незаконных гражданских поселений Израиля». Аналогичным образом, Amnesty International пришла к выводу, что Израиль строил стену, чтобы «укрепить свой контроль над землей, которая используется для незаконных израильских поселений», и что «очень дорогая и сложная конструкция забора/стены указывает на то, что она, вероятно, предназначалась в качестве постоянное строение».117
{{cite book}}: Неизвестный параметр|loc=игнорируется ( помогите ) - ^ Харель, Амос (7 декабря 2007 г.). «Чиновники Минобороны обеспокоены модернизацией ХАМАС арсенала Кассам» . Гаарец . Проверено 30 марта 2009 г.
- ^ Эсвельд, Билл Ван (6 августа 2009 г.). Ракеты из Газы (Репортаж). Хьюман Райтс Вотч . Архивировано из оригинала 18 июня 2017 года . Проверено 15 ноября 2023 г.
- ^ «Вопросы и ответы: конфликт в секторе Газа» . Новости Би-би-си . 18 января 2009 года. Архивировано из оригинала 5 июля 2014 года . Проверено 5 марта 2022 г.
- ^ «Ракетная угроза Газы Израилю» . Новости Би-би-си . 21 января 2008 года. Архивировано из оригинала 23 сентября 2011 года . Проверено 5 марта 2022 г.
- ^ «Игра в кошки-мышки с ракетами Газы» . Новости Би-би-си . 28 февраля 2008 г. Архивировано из оригинала 6 марта 2008 г. Проверено 5 марта 2022 г.
- ^ Халиди 2020 , Глава 6: «Однако ни одна из ракет не имела боеголовки такого размера или поражающей способности, как более 49 000 танковых и артиллерийских снарядов, выпущенных Израилем в 2014 году. 122-мм ракета «Град» или «Катюша» советской разработки, обычно используемая ХАМАСом и ее союзники обычно имели боеголовку весом 44 или 66 фунтов (по сравнению с 96-фунтовыми 155-мм снарядами), хотя многие из них были оснащены боеголовками меньшего размера для увеличения дальности полета. Большинство использованных самодельных ракет «Кассам» имели боеголовки значительно меньшего размера. Вместе 4000 ракет «Касам», «Катюша», «Град» и других ракет, выпущенных из сектора Газа и достигших Израиля (многие из них были настолько неточными и плохо изготовленными, что не достигли цели и приземлились внутри сектора), вероятно, имели бы меньшую взрывоопасность. мощность в общей сложности, чем дюжина 2000-фунтовых бомб».
- ^ Тралл, Натан (14 октября 2010 г.). «Наш человек в Палестине» . Нью-Йоркское обозрение книг . Архивировано из оригинала 16 октября 2015 года . Проверено 30 сентября 2010 г.
- ^ «Израиль должен прекратить оккупацию Палестины, чтобы прекратить разжигание апартеида и систематические нарушения прав человека» . Международная амнистия . 19 февраля 2024 года. Архивировано из оригинала 18 июля 2024 года . Проверено 14 июля 2024 г.
- ^ «Правовые последствия, возникающие в результате политики и практики Израиля на оккупированной палестинской территории, включая Восточный Иерусалим: консультативное заключение», архивировано 23 июля 2024 г. в Wayback Machine Unispal, 19 июля 2023 г., стр. 6,73,79.
- ^ Гусун Бишарат, «Израиль всегда считал оккупацию законной. Теперь Международный суд их пугает». Архивировано 24 июля 2024 г. в журнале Wayback Machine +972, 23 июля 2024 г.
- ↑ Эяль Гросс, «Международный суд только что разрушил одно из ключевых защитных сооружений Израиля от оккупации», Архивировано 20 июля 2024 г. в Wayback Machine Haaretz 19 июля 2024 г.
- ^ Села 2002 , стр. 121–147, Эран, Одед. «Арабо-израильское миротворчество».
- ^ «Хамас представляет новую хартию, признающую Палестину на основе границ 1967 года» . Хранитель . Май 2017. Архивировано из оригинала 14 апреля 2019 года . Проверено 4 января 2023 г.
- ^ Села 2002 , стр. 335–342, «Хамас».
Согласие ООП поддержать участие палестинской делегации с Западного Берега и сектора Газа в Мадридских мирных конференциях в конце октября 1991 года еще больше усилило напряженность между Фатхом и ХАМАС, которые начали интенсивную кампанию против самой идеи территориального компромисса и миротворчество с евреями считалось религиозно запрещенным и политически немыслимым. (стр. 339)
- ^ Перейти обратно: а б «Палестино-израильский конфликт» (PDF) . azdema.gov . Департамент по чрезвычайным ситуациям и военным делам штата Аризона. Архивировано из оригинала (PDF) 28 марта 2016 года . Проверено 1 мая 2016 г.
- ^ «Израильский военный приказ направлен против «лазутчиков» на Западном Берегу » . ЭНЕРГЕТИЧЕСКИЙ ЯДЕРНЫЙ РЕАКТОР . Архивировано из оригинала 28 марта 2018 года . Проверено 5 марта 2022 г.
- ^ «Палата общин – Международное развитие – Второй отчет». Парламент Соединенного Королевства. 2004.
- ^ «Ближний Восток и безопасность в Европе». Архивировано 28 сентября 2007 года на сборке Wayback Machine WEU. 15 мая 2001 г.
- ^ Робертс, Адам (1990). «Длительная военная оккупация: территории, оккупированные Израилем с 1967 года» (PDF) . Американский журнал международного права . 84 (1): 85–86. дои : 10.2307/2203016 . ISSN 0002-9300 . JSTOR 2203016 . S2CID 145514740 . Архивировано из оригинала (PDF) 15 февраля 2020 года.
Международное сообщество критически оценило как депортации, так и поселения как противоречащие международному праву. Резолюции Генеральной Ассамблеи осуждают депортации, начиная с 1969 года, и в последние годы подавляющее большинство делало это. Аналогичным образом, они постоянно осуждали создание поселений, и подавляющее большинство делало это на протяжении всего периода (с конца 1976 года) быстрого увеличения их числа. Совет Безопасности также критиковал депортации и поселения; и другие органы рассматривают их как препятствие на пути к миру и незаконные согласно международному праву... Хотя Восточный Иерусалим и Голанские высоты были переданы непосредственно под израильское законодательство, в результате действий, которые равносильны аннексии, обе эти территории продолжают рассматриваться как международным сообществом как оккупированные, и их статус с точки зрения применимости международных правил во многом идентичен статусу Западного Берега и Газы.
- ^ Пертиле, Марко (2005). « Правовые последствия строительства стены на оккупированной палестинской территории»: упущенная возможность для международного гуманитарного права?». В Конфорти, Бенедетто; Браво, Луиджи (ред.). Итальянский ежегодник международного права . Том. 14. Издательство Мартинуса Нийхоффа. п. 141. ИСБН 978-90-04-15027-0 .
Создание израильских поселений на оккупированной палестинской территории признано международным сообществом и большинством ученых-юристов незаконным.
- ^ Барак-Эрез, Дафна (2006). «Израиль: Барьер безопасности — между международным правом, конституционным правом и внутренним судебным контролем» . Международный журнал конституционного права . 4 (3): 548. doi : 10.1093/icon/mol021 .
Настоящие разногласия, разгорающиеся вокруг всех судебных разбирательств по поводу барьера безопасности, касаются судьбы израильских поселений на оккупированных территориях. С 1967 года Израиль разрешал и даже поощрял своих граждан жить в новых поселениях, основанных на территориях, руководствуясь религиозными и национальными чувствами, связанными с историей еврейского народа на земле Израиля. Эта политика также была оправдана с точки зрения интересов безопасности, принимая во внимание опасное географическое положение Израиля до 1967 года (когда израильские районы на побережье Средиземного моря потенциально находились под угрозой со стороны иорданского контроля над хребтом Западного берега). Международное сообщество, со своей стороны, считает эту политику явно незаконной, основанной на положениях Четвертой Женевской конвенции, запрещающей перемещение населения на оккупированные территории или с них.
- ^ Дрю, Катриона (1997). «Самоопределение и переселение населения». В Боуэне, Стивен (ред.). Права человека, самоопределение и политические перемены на оккупированных палестинских территориях . Международные исследования в области прав человека. Том. 52. Издательство Мартинуса Нийхоффа. стр. 151–152. ISBN 978-90-411-0502-8 .
Таким образом, можно сделать очевидный вывод, что перемещение израильских поселенцев на оккупированные территории нарушает не только законы военной оккупации, но и право палестинцев на самоопределение в соответствии с международным правом. Однако остается вопрос, имеет ли это какое-либо практическое значение. Другими словами, учитывая мнение международного сообщества о том, что израильские поселения являются незаконными по закону, если это военная оккупация, какой цели служит установление того, что имело место дополнительное нарушение международного права?
- ^ Ошибка цитирования: именованная ссылка
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- ^ «Израиль запускает пробную программу для ускорения процесса экспорта ПА» . «Джерузалем Пост» . Архивировано из оригинала 5 марта 2022 года . Проверено 5 марта 2022 г.
- ^ «ЦАХАЛ рассматривает возможность проникновения в города Западного Берега израильтян-евреев» . «Джерузалем Пост» . 14 июля 2020 года. Архивировано из оригинала 5 марта 2022 года . Проверено 5 марта 2022 г.
- ^ Перейти обратно: а б «Данные о пострадавших» . Управление ООН по координации гуманитарных вопросов - оккупированная палестинская территория ( OCHAoPt ) . Объединенные Нации . Архивировано из оригинала 12 октября 2023 года . Проверено 12 октября 2023 г.
- ^ Перейти обратно: а б Альфонсека, Киара (11 октября 2023 г.). «Палестинские граждане страдают от перестрелок между Израилем и сектором Газа, поскольку число погибших растет» . Новости АВС . Архивировано из оригинала 12 октября 2023 года . Проверено 12 октября 2023 г.
примерно 6400 палестинцев и 300 израильтян
- ^ Перейти обратно: а б «Атлас двадцатого века – число погибших» . пользователи.erols.com . Архивировано из оригинала 19 июля 2017 года . Проверено 5 марта 2022 г.
- ^ «Все войны ХХ века, начиная с 1900 года | Полинациональный военный мемориал» . www.war-memorial.net . Архивировано из оригинала 20 декабря 2012 года . Проверено 5 марта 2022 г.
- ^ «Израильское вторжение в Ливан в 1982 году: жертвы». Раса и класс . 24 (4): 340–3. 1983. doi : 10.1177/030639688302400404 . S2CID 220910633 .
- ^ «Погибшие в первой интифаде» . Б’Целем . Архивировано из оригинала 29 апреля 2020 года . Проверено 5 марта 2022 г.
- ^ "Гуманитарный монитор". Архивировано 16 февраля 2008 года в Wayback Machine, Управление Организации Объединенных Наций по координации гуманитарных вопросов. Декабрь 2007 г. PDF. Таблицы на стр. 5 и 7, все цифры относятся к жертвам прямого конфликта, как они определены в них (стр. 23).
- ^ «Бецелем: С 2000 года убито 7454 израильтянина-палестинца» . «Джерузалем Пост» . Архивировано из оригинала 5 марта 2022 года . Проверено 5 марта 2022 г.
- ^ Мор, Ави и др. «Потери в операции «Литой свинец»: более пристальный взгляд». Архивировано 1 января 2011 года в междисциплинарном центре Wayback Machine в Герцлии. 2009. PDF.
- ^ «Бецелем: 773 палестинца, убитых в «Литом свинце», были гражданскими лицами» . Новости Инета . 9 сентября 2009 г. Архивировано из оригинала 5 марта 2022 г. Проверено 5 марта 2022 г.
- ^ Перейти обратно: а б с д «Обзоры страны – оккупированная палестинская территория» . Служба ООН по разминированию . 2009. Архивировано из оригинала 26 сентября 2010 года . Проверено 2 февраля 2010 г.
Библиография
- Бакони, Тарек (2018). ХАМАС сдержан . Издательство Стэнфордского университета . ISBN 978-0-8047-9741-2 .
- Финкельштейн, Норман Г. (2007). За пределами наглости . Издательство Калифорнийского университета . ISBN 978-0-520-24989-9 .
- Халиди, Рашид (2013). Посредники обмана: как США подорвали мир на Ближнем Востоке . Маяк Пресс . ISBN 978-0-8070-4475-9 .
- Халиди, Рашид (2020). Столетняя война с Палестиной: история поселенческого колониализма и сопротивления, 1917–2017 гг . Генри Холт и компания . ISBN 978-1-62779-854-9 .
- Халиди, Рашид (2024). Железная клетка: история палестинской борьбы за государственность . Саймон и Шустер . ISBN 978-0-86154-899-6 .
- Моррис, Бенни (1999). Праведные жертвы . Издательская группа Кнопфа Doubleday . ISBN 978-0-679-74475-7 .
- Моррис, Бенни (2004). Возобновление зарождения проблемы палестинских беженцев . Издательство Кембриджского университета . ISBN 978-0-521-00967-6 .
- Паппе, Илан (2022). История современной Палестины . Издательство Кембриджского университета . ISBN 978-1-108-24416-9 .
- Скотт-Бауманн, Майкл (2023). Кратчайшая история Израиля и Палестины: от сионизма до интифад и... ООО «Эксперимент». ISBN 978-1-61519-951-8 .
- Села, Авраам , изд. (2002). Политическая энциклопедия Континуума Ближнего Востока . Нью-Йорк: Континуум. ISBN 978-0-8264-1413-7 .
- Шлайм, Ави (2001). Железная стена . WW Нортон и компания . ISBN 978-0-393-32112-8 .
- Шлайм, Ави (2015). Железная стена: Израиль и арабский мир . Книги о пингвинах . ISBN 978-0-14-103322-8 .
- Слейтер, Джером (2020). Мифологии без конца . Издательство Оксфордского университета . ISBN 978-0-19-045908-6 .
- Уотсон, Джеффри (2020). Соглашения Осло: международное право и израильско-палестинские мирные соглашения . Издательство Оксфордского университета . ISBN 978-0198298915 .
- Рой, Сара (2016). Сектор Газа: политическая экономия деразвития (расширенное третье издание) . Институт палестинских исследований.
- Бакони, Тарек (2018). Хамас сдержан . Издательство Стэнфордского университета. ISBN 978-1-5036-0581-7 .
- Рой, Сара (2024). Стерн-Вайнер, Джейми (ред.). Потоп . ИЛИ Книги. ISBN 978-1-68219-619-9 .
- Рой, Сара (2013). ХАМАС и гражданское общество в секторе Газа . Издательство Принстонского университета. ISBN 978-1-4008-4894-2 .
- Баши, Сари (2017). Стерн-Вайнер, Джейми (ред.). Момент истины . ISBN 978-1-68219-114-9 .
- Гросс, А. (2017). Надпись на стене: переосмысление международного права оккупации . Издательство Кембриджского университета. ISBN 978-1-107-14596-2 . Проверено 6 августа 2024 г.
Внешние ссылки
Объединенные Нации
- Управление по координации гуманитарных вопросов – оккупированная палестинская территория
- Ближневосточное агентство ООН для помощи палестинским беженцам и организации работ
Академические, новостные и подобные сайты (за исключением израильских или палестинских источников)
- Попытки США заключить мир между Израилем и Палестиной из цифрового архива иностранных дел декана Питера Крога
- Газа\Сдерот: Жизнь вопреки всему – документальный веб-фильм, созданный arte.tv, в котором ежедневные видеохроники (по 2 минуты каждая) показывают жизнь 5 человек (мужчин, женщин, детей) в Газе и Сдероте , на обе стороны границы.
- Мировой политик – Ближневосточный отдел
- Совет по ближневосточной политике
- Aix Group – Совместная палестинско-израильско-международная экономическая рабочая группа .
- Ускоренный курс «Всемирная история 223: Конфликт в Израиле и Палестине ». Известный автор и преподаватель YouTube Джон Грин дает краткий исторический урок (13 минут) об этом конфликте.
- Израильско-палестинский конфликт — Обзор конфликта между Израилем и палестинцами с 1948 года по сегодняшний день. С сайта History Guy.
- The Media Line – некоммерческое информационное агентство, которое предоставляет достоверный, объективный контент, предысторию и контекст со всего Ближнего Востока.
Группы разрешения конфликтов
Правозащитные группы
- Хьюман Райтс Вотч: Израиль/Палестина
- Б'Целем – Израильский информационный центр по правам человека на оккупированных территориях
- Аль-Хак: Палестинская правозащитная группа. Архивировано 15 октября 2006 г. в Wayback Machine : филиал Международной комиссии юристов на Западном Берегу.
- Палестинский центр по правам человека PCHR : Филиал Международной комиссии юристов в секторе Газа
- Гуш-Шалом : Израильское движение за мир Гуш-Шалом
Еврейские и израильские академические, новостные и подобные сайты
- История Израиля, Палестины и арабо-израильского конфликта
- Иерусалимский центр по связям с общественностью
- Честная репортажная деятельность, мониторинг СМИ Ближнего Востока
- Истинный мир. Архивировано 17 марта 2019 года в Wayback Machine - Хабад-Любавич. сайт
- В чем суть борьбы в Израиле – The Media Line
Новостные и пропагандистские сайты еврейских и израильских «движений за мир»
- «Происхождение палестино-израильского конфликта» , опубликовано организацией «Евреи за справедливость на Ближнем Востоке»
Другие сайты
- Арабы и израильтяне оказались заложниками общего врага Салома. Сейчас! и METalks — две экспериментальные инициативы, целью которых было переписать сценарий израильско-палестинского конфликта. Однако такие популярные массовые действия находятся в заложниках у некоторых общих врагов: отчаяния, ненависти, антипатии и недоверия. (январь 2007 г.)
- Перестрелка Анат эль-Хашахар, израильтянин и основатель METalks, обсуждает арабо-израильский конфликт – от Осло до Ливана – с Халедом Диабом, египетским журналистом и писателем.
- Сайт с информацией (статьи, отчеты, карты, книги, ссылки и т.д.) по израильско-палестинскому конфликту.
- Карта лагерей палестинских беженцев, 1993 г. (БАПОР/ЦРУ/Техасский университет, Остин)
- Карта Израиля 2008 г. (ЦРУ/Техасский университет, Остин)
- Карта израильских поселений на Западном берегу, декабрь 1993 г. (ЦРУ/Техасский университет, Остин)
- Карта израильских поселений в секторе Газа, декабрь 1993 г. (ЦРУ/Техасский университет, Остин)
- Карта Иерусалима, март 1993 г. (ЦРУ/Техасский университет, Остин)
- Карта Иерихона и окрестностей, январь 1994 г. (ЦРУ/Техасский университет, Остин)
- Pew Global Research – общественное мнение во всем мире
- Политические публикации по израильско-палестинскому конфликту в Архиве еврейской политики Бермана
| Базы данных органов управления : Национальные |
|---|
- Израильско-палестинский конфликт
- Антиизраильские настроения
- Арабо-израильский конфликт
- Конфликты 20-го века
- Конфликты 21 века
- Споры, связанные с исламом
- Израильский ирредентизм
- Еврейский национализм
- Палестинский национализм
- Конфликты на Ближнем Востоке
- Гражданские войны на этнической почве
- Гражданские войны на религиозной почве
- Войны с участием Израиля
- сионизм