Кризис с заложниками в Иране

Эта статья об осаде американского посольства в Тегеране. Чтобы узнать об осаде иранского посольства в Лондоне, см. « Осада посольства Ирана» .

Кризис с заложниками в Иране
Часть консолидации иранской революции
Иранские студенты толпятся у посольства США в Тегеране (4 ноября 1979 г.)
Дата 4 ноября 1979 г. - 20 января 1981 г. (444 дня) Расположение Тегеран , Иран Result Hostages released by Algiers Accords Severance (and end) of Iran–United States relations Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and his cabinet resigned Sanctions imposed on Iran
Belligerents
Iran Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line People's Mujahedin	United States Canada
Commanders and leaders
Ruhollah Khomeini Mohammad Mousavi Khoeiniha Massoud Rajavi	Jimmy Carter Ronald Reagan James B. Vaught Joe Clark

Кризис с заложниками в Иране (персидский: تسخیر سفارت آمریکا) был дипломатическим противостоянием между Ираном и Соединенными Штатами . Пятьдесят три американских дипломата и гражданина были взяты в заложники в Иране после того, как группа вооруженных иранских студентов колледжей, принадлежащих к Мусульманским студентам-последователям линии Имама , которые поддерживали иранскую революцию , в том числе Хоссейн Дехган (будущий министр обороны Ирана), Мохаммед Али Джафари (будущий Революционной гвардии главнокомандующий ) и Мохаммад Багери (будущий начальник Генерального штаба иранской армии ), захватил посольство США в Тегеране и взял их в заложники. Заложников удерживали 444 дня, с 4 ноября 1979 года до их освобождения 20 января 1981 года. Кризис считается поворотным эпизодом в истории ирано-американских отношений .

Western media described the crisis as an "entanglement" of "vengeance and mutual incomprehension". U.S. President Jimmy Carter called the hostage-taking an act of "blackmail" and the hostages "victims of terrorism and anarchy". In Iran, it was widely seen as an act against the U.S. and its influence in Iran, including its perceived attempts to undermine the Iranian Revolution and its long-standing support of the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was overthrown in 1979. After Shah Pahlavi was overthrown, he was granted asylum and admitted to the U.S. for cancer treatment. The new Iranian regime demanded his return in order to stand trial for the crimes he was accused of committing against Iranians during his rule through his secret police. These demands were rejected, which Iran saw as U.S. complicity in those abuses. The U.S. saw the hostage-taking as an egregious violation of the principles of international law, such as the Vienna Convention, which granted diplomats immunity from arrest and made diplomatic compounds inviolable. Шах покинул США в декабре 1979 года и в конечном итоге получил убежище в Египте , где он умер от осложнений рака в возрасте 60 лет 27 июля 1980 года.

Six American diplomats who had evaded capture were rescued by a joint CIA–Canadian effort on January 27, 1980. The crisis reached a climax in early 1980 after diplomatic negotiations failed to win the release of the hostages. Carter ordered the U.S. military to attempt a rescue mission – Operation Eagle Claw – using warships that included USS Nimitz and USS Coral Sea, which were patrolling the waters near Iran. The failed attempt on April 24, 1980, resulted in the death of one Iranian civilian and the accidental deaths of eight American servicemen after one of the helicopters crashed into a transport aircraft. U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance resigned his position following the failure. In September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran, beginning the Iran–Iraq War. These events led the Iranian government to enter negotiations with the U.S., with Algeria acting as a mediator.

Political analysts cited the standoff as a major factor in the continuing downfall of Carter's presidency and his landslide loss in the 1980 presidential election. The hostages were formally released into United States custody the day after the signing of the Algiers Accords, just minutes after American President Ronald Reagan was sworn into office. In Iran, the crisis strengthened the prestige of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the political power of theocrats who opposed any normalization of relations with the West. The crisis also led to American economic sanctions against Iran, which further weakened ties between the two countries.

Background

1953 coup d'état

Further information: Operation Ajax and Iranian Revolution

During the Second World War, the British and the Soviet governments invaded and occupied Iran, forcing the first Pahlavi monarch, Reza Shah Pahlavi to abdicate in favor of his eldest son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The two nations claimed that they acted preemptively in order to stop Reza Shah from aligning his petroleum-rich country with Nazi Germany. However, the Shah's declaration of neutrality, and his refusal to allow Iranian territory to be used to train or supply Soviet troops, were probably the real reasons for the invasion of Iran.

The United States did not participate in the invasion but it secured Iran's independence after the war ended by applying intense diplomatic pressure on the Soviet Union which forced it to withdraw from Iran in 1946.

By the 1950s, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was engaged in a power struggle with Iran's prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, an immediate descendant of the preceding Qajar dynasty. Mosaddegh led a general strike, demanding an increased share of the nation's petroleum revenue from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company which was operating in Iran. The UK retaliated by reducing the amount of revenue which the Iranian government received. In 1953, the CIA and MI6 helped Iranian royalists depose Mosaddegh in a military coup d'état codenamed Operation Ajax, allowing the Shah to extend his power. For the next two decades the Shah reigned as an absolute monarch. "Disloyal" elements within the state were purged. The U.S. continued to support the Shah after the coup, with the CIA training the Iranian secret police. In the subsequent decades of the Cold War, various economic, cultural, and political issues united Iranian opposition against the Shah and led to his eventual overthrow.

Carter administration

Months before the Iranian Revolution, on New Year's Eve 1977, U.S. President Jimmy Carter further angered anti-Shah Iranians with a televised toast to Pahlavi, claiming that the Shah was "beloved" by his people. After the revolution commenced in February 1979 with the return of the Ayatollah Khomeini, the American Embassy was occupied, and its staff held hostage briefly. Rocks and bullets had broken so many of the embassy's front-facing windows that they were replaced with bulletproof glass. The embassy's staff was reduced to just over 60 from a high of nearly one thousand earlier in the decade.

Iran attempted to use the occupation to provide leverage in its demand for the return of the shah to stand trial in Iran

The Carter administration tried to mitigate anti-American feeling by promoting a new relationship with the de facto Iranian government and continuing military cooperation in hopes that the situation would stabilize. However, on October 22, 1979, the United States permitted the Shah, who had lymphoma, to enter New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center for medical treatment. The State Department had discouraged this decision, understanding the political delicacy. But in response to pressure from influential figures including former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Council on Foreign Relations Chairman David Rockefeller, the Carter administration decided to grant it.

The Shah's admission to the United States intensified Iranian revolutionaries' anti-Americanism and spawned rumors of another U.S.–backed coup that would re-install him. Khomeini, who had been exiled by the shah for 15 years, heightened the rhetoric against the "Great Satan", as he called the U.S, talking of "evidence of American plotting." In addition to ending what they believed was American sabotage of the revolution, the hostage takers hoped to depose the provisional revolutionary government of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, which they believed was plotting to normalize relations with the U.S. and extinguish Islamic revolutionary order in Iran. The occupation of the embassy on November 4, 1979, was also intended as leverage to demand the return of the Shah to stand trial in Iran in exchange for the hostages.

A later study claimed that there had been no American plots to overthrow the revolutionaries, and that a CIA intelligence-gathering mission at the embassy had been "notably ineffectual, gathering little information and hampered by the fact that none of the three officers spoke the local language, Persian." Its work, the study said, was "routine, prudent espionage conducted at diplomatic missions everywhere."

Prelude

First attempt

Further information: Kenneth Kraus

On the morning of February 14, 1979, the Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took a Marine named Kenneth Kraus hostage. Ambassador William H. Sullivan surrendered the embassy to save lives, and with the assistance of Iranian Foreign Minister Ebrahim Yazdi, returned the embassy to U.S. hands within three hours. Kraus was injured in the attack, kidnapped by the militants, tortured, tried, and convicted of murder. He was to be executed, but President Carter and Sullivan secured his release within six days. This incident became known as the Valentine's Day Open House.

Anticipating the takeover of the embassy, the Americans tried to destroy classified documents in a furnace. The furnace malfunctioned and the staff was forced to use cheap paper shredders. Skilled carpet weavers were later employed to reconstruct the documents.

Second attempt

The next attempt to seize the American Embassy was planned for September 1979 by Ebrahim Asgharzadeh, a student at the time. He consulted with the heads of the Islamic associations of Tehran's main universities, including the University of Tehran, Sharif University of Technology, Amirkabir University of Technology (Polytechnic of Tehran), and Iran University of Science and Technology. They named their group Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line.

Asgharzadeh later said there were five students at the first meeting, two of whom wanted to target the Soviet Embassy because the USSR was "a Marxist and anti-God regime". Two others, Mohsen Mirdamadi and Habibolah Bitaraf, supported Asgharzadeh's chosen target, the United States. "Our aim was to object against the American government by going to their embassy and occupying it for several hours," Asgharzadeh said. "Announcing our objections from within the occupied compound would carry our message to the world in a much more firm and effective way." Mirdamadi told an interviewer, "We intended to detain the diplomats for a few days, maybe one week, but no more." Masoumeh Ebtekar, the spokeswoman for the Iranian students during the crisis, said that those who rejected Asgharzadeh's plan did not participate in the subsequent events.

The students observed the procedures of the Marine Security Guards from nearby rooftops overlooking the embassy. They also drew on their experiences from the recent revolution, during which the U.S. Embassy grounds were briefly occupied. They enlisted the support of police officers in charge of guarding the embassy and of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards.

According to the group and other sources, Ayatollah Khomeini did not know of the plan beforehand. The students had wanted to inform him, but according to the author Mark Bowden, Ayatollah Mohammad Mousavi Khoeiniha persuaded them not to do so. Khoeiniha feared that the government would use the police to expel the students as they had the occupiers in February. The provisional government had been appointed by Khomeini, so Khomeini was likely to go along with the government's request to restore order. On the other hand, Khoeiniha knew that if Khomeini first saw that the occupiers were faithful supporters of him (unlike the leftists in the first occupation) and that large numbers of pious Muslims had gathered outside the embassy to show their support for the takeover, it would be "very hard, perhaps even impossible," for him to oppose the takeover, and this would paralyze the Bazargan administration, which Khoeiniha and the students wanted to eliminate.

Supporters of the takeover stated that their motivation was fear of another American-backed coup against their popular revolution.

Takeover

Two American hostages during the siege of the U.S. Embassy.

On November 4, 1979, one of the demonstrations organized by Iranian student unions loyal to Khomeini erupted into an all-out conflict right outside the walled compound housing the U.S. Embassy.

At about 6:30 a.m., the ringleaders gathered between three hundred and five hundred selected students and briefed them on the battle plan. A female student was given a pair of metal cutters to break the chains locking the embassy's gates and hid them beneath her chador.

At first, the students planned a symbolic occupation, in which they would release statements to the press and leave when government security forces came to restore order. This was reflected in placards saying: "Don't be afraid. We just want to sit in." When the embassy guards brandished firearms, the protesters retreated, with one telling the Americans, "We don't mean any harm." But as it became clear that the guards would not use deadly force and that a large, angry crowd had gathered outside the compound to cheer the occupiers and jeer the hostages, the plan changed. According to one embassy staff member, buses full of demonstrators began to appear outside the embassy shortly after the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line broke through the gates.

As Khomeini's followers had hoped, Khomeini supported the takeover. According to Foreign Minister Yazdi, when he went to Qom to tell Khomeini about it, Khomeini told him to "go and kick them out." But later that evening, back in Tehran, Yazdi heard on the radio that Khomeini had issued a statement supporting the seizure, calling it "the second revolution" and the embassy an "American spy den in Tehran."

Duration: 2 minutes and 1 second.2:01

A two-minute clip from a newsreel regarding the hostage crisis (1980)

The Marines and embassy staff were blindfolded by the occupiers and then paraded in front of assembled photographers. In the first couple of days, many of the embassy workers who had sneaked out of the compound or had not been there at the time of the takeover were rounded up by Islamists and returned as hostages. Six American diplomats managed to avoid capture and took refuge in the British Embassy before being transferred to the Canadian Embassy. In a joint covert operation known as the Canadian caper, the Canadian government and the CIA managed to smuggle them out of Iran on January 28, 1980, using Canadian passports and a cover story that identified them as a film crew. Others went to the Swedish Embassy in Tehran for three months.

A State Department diplomatic cable of November 8, 1979, details "A Tentative, Incomplete List of U.S. Personnel Being Held in the Embassy Compound."

Motivations

The Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line demanded that Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi return to Iran for trial and execution. The U.S. maintained that the Shah – who was to die less than a year later, in July 1980 – had come to America for medical attention. The group's other demands included that the U.S. government apologize for its interference in the internal affairs of Iran, including the overthrow of Prime Minister Mosaddegh in 1953, and that Iran's frozen assets in the United States be released.

Barry Rosen, the embassy's press attaché, was among the hostages. The man on the right holding the briefcase is alleged by some former hostages to be future President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, although he, Iran's government, and the CIA deny this.

The initial plan was to hold the embassy for only a short time, but this changed after it became apparent how popular the takeover was and that Khomeini had given it his full support. Some attributed the decision not to release the hostages quickly to President Carter's failure to immediately deliver an ultimatum to Iran. His initial response was to appeal for the release of the hostages on humanitarian grounds and to share his hopes for a strategic anti-communist alliance with the Ayatollah. As some of the student leaders had hoped, Iran's moderate prime minister, Bazargan, and his cabinet resigned under pressure just days after the takeover.

The duration of the hostages' captivity has also been attributed to internal Iranian revolutionary politics. As Ayatollah Khomeini told Iran's president:

This has united our people. Our opponents do not dare act against us. We can put the constitution to the people's vote without difficulty, and carry out presidential and parliamentary elections.

Various leftist student groups also supported the taking of hostages at the US embassy. The embassy take-over was aimed at strengthening the new regime against liberal elements in the government, portraying the regime as a "revolutionary force" while winning over the major following that the People's Mojahedin of Iran had amongst students in Iran. According to scholar Daniel Pipes, writing in 1980, the Marxist-leaning leftists and the Islamists shared a common antipathy toward market-based reforms under the late Shah, and both subsumed individualism, including the unique identity of women, under conservative, though contrasting, visions of collectivism. Accordingly, both groups favored the Soviet Union over the United States in the early months of the Iranian Revolution. The Soviets, and possibly their allies Cuba, Libya, and East Germany, were suspected of providing indirect assistance to the participants in the takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. The PLO under Yasser Arafat provided personnel, intelligence liaisons, funding, and training for Khomeini's forces before and after the revolution and was suspected of playing a role in the embassy crisis. Fidel Castro reportedly praised Khomeini as a revolutionary anti-imperialist who could find common cause between revolutionary leftists and anti-American Islamists. Both expressed disdain for modern capitalism and a preference for authoritarian collectivism. Cuba and its socialist ally Venezuela, under Hugo Chávez, would later form ALBA in alliance with the Islamic Republic as a counter to neoliberal American influence.

Revolutionary teams displayed secret documents purportedly taken from the embassy, sometimes painstakingly reconstructed after shredding, to buttress their claim that the U.S. was trying to destabilize the new regime.

By embracing the hostage-taking under the slogan "America can't do a thing," Khomeini rallied support and deflected criticism of his controversial theocratic constitution, which was scheduled for a referendum vote in less than one month. The referendum was successful, and after the vote, both leftists and theocrats continued to use allegations of pro-Americanism to suppress their opponents: relatively moderate political forces that included the Iranian Freedom Movement, the National Front, Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari, and later President Abolhassan Banisadr. In particular, carefully selected diplomatic dispatches and reports discovered at the embassy and released by the hostage-takers led to the disempowerment and resignation of moderate figures such as Bazargan. The failed rescue attempt and the political danger of any move seen as accommodating America delayed a negotiated release of the hostages. After the crisis ended, leftists and theocrats turned on each other, with the stronger theocratic group annihilating the left.

An anti-Iranian protest in Washington, D.C., in 1979. The front of the sign reads "Deport all Iranians" and "Get the hell out of my country", and the back reads "Release all Americans now".

Documents discovered inside the American embassy

Supporters of the takeover claimed that in 1953, the American Embassy had been used as a "den of spies" from which the coup was organized. Later, documents which suggested that some of the members of the embassy's staff had been working with the Central Intelligence Agency were found inside the embassy. Afterwards, the CIA confirmed its role and that of MI6 in Operation Ajax. After the Shah entered the United States, Ayatollah Khomeini called for street demonstrations.

Revolutionary teams displayed secret documents purportedly taken from the embassy, sometimes painstakingly reconstructed after shredding, in order to buttress their claim that "the Great Satan" (the U.S.) was trying to destabilize the new regime with the assistance of Iranian moderates who were in league with the U.S. The documents – including telegrams, correspondence, and reports from the U.S. State Department and the CIA – were published in a series of books which were titled Documents from the U.S. Espionage Den (Persian: اسناد لانه جاسوسی امریكا). According to a 1997 Federation of American Scientists bulletin, by 1995, 77 volumes of Documents from the U.S. Espionage Den had been published. Many of these volumes are now available online.

The 444-day crisis

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the Iranian hostage crisis.

Living conditions of the hostages

The hostage-takers, declaring their solidarity with other "oppressed minorities" and declaring their respect for "the special place of women in Islam," released one woman and two African Americans on November 19. Before release, these hostages were required by their captors to hold a press conference in which Kathy Gross and William Quarles praised the revolution's aims, but four further women and six African-Americans were released the following day. According to the then United States Ambassador to Lebanon, John Gunther Dean, the 13 hostages were released with the assistance of the Palestine Liberation Organization, after Yassir Arafat and Abu Jihad personally traveled to Tehran to secure a concession. The only African-American hostage not released that month was Charles A. Jones, Jr. One more hostage, a white man named Richard Queen, was released in July 1980 after he became seriously ill with what was later diagnosed as multiple sclerosis. The remaining 52 hostages were held until January 1981, up to 444 days of captivity.

The hostages were initially held at the embassy, but after the takers took the cue from the failed rescue mission, the detainees were scattered around Iran in order to make a single rescue attempt impossible. Three high-level officials – Bruce Laingen, Victor L. Tomseth, and Mike Howland – were at the Foreign Ministry at the time of the takeover. They stayed there for several months, sleeping in the ministry's formal dining room and washing their socks and underwear in the bathroom. At first, they were treated as diplomats, but after the provisional government fell, the treatment of them deteriorated. By March, the doors to their living space were kept "chained and padlocked."

By midsummer 1980, the Iranians had moved the hostages to prisons in Tehran to prevent escapes or rescue attempts and to improve the logistics of guard shifts and food deliveries. The final holding area, from November 1980 until their release, was the Teymur Bakhtiar mansion in Tehran, where the hostages were finally given tubs, showers, and hot and cold running water. Several foreign diplomats and ambassadors – including the former Canadian ambassador Ken Taylor – visited the hostages over the course of the crisis and relayed information back to the U.S. government, including dispatches from Laingen.

A headline in an Islamic Republican newspaper on November 5, 1979, read "Revolutionary occupation of U.S. embassy".

Iranian propaganda stated that the hostages were "guests" and it also stated that they were being treated with respect. Asgharzadeh, the leader of the students, described the original plan as a nonviolent and symbolic action in which the students would use their "gentle and respectful treatment" of the hostages to dramatize the offended sovereignty and dignity of Iran to the entire world. In America, an Iranian chargé d'affaires, Ali Agha, stormed out of a meeting with an American official, exclaiming: "We are not mistreating the hostages. They are being very well taken care of in Tehran. They are our guests."

The actual treatment of the hostages was far different. They described beatings, theft, and fear of bodily harm. Two of them, William Belk and Kathryn Koob, recalled being paraded blindfolded before an angry, chanting crowd outside the embassy. Others reported having their hands bound "day and night" for days or even weeks, long periods of solitary confinement, and months of being forbidden to speak to one another or to stand, walk, or leave their space unless they were going to the bathroom. All of the hostages "were threatened repeatedly with execution, and took it seriously." The hostage-takers played Russian roulette with their victims.

One hostage, Michael Metrinko, was kept in solitary confinement for several months. On two occasions, when he expressed his opinion of Ayatollah Khomeini, he was severely punished. The first time, he was kept in handcuffs for two weeks, and the second time, he was beaten and kept alone in a freezing cell for two weeks.

Another hostage, U.S. Army medic Donald Hohman, went on a hunger strike for several weeks, and two hostages attempted suicide. Steve Lauterbach broke a water glass and slashed his wrists after being locked in a dark basement room with his hands tightly bound. He was found and rushed to the hospital by guards. Jerry Miele, a CIA communications technician, smashed his head into the corner of a door, knocking himself unconscious and cutting a deep gash. "Naturally withdrawn" and looking "ill, old, tired, and vulnerable," Miele had become the butt of his guards' jokes, and they had rigged up a mock electric chair to emphasize the fate that awaited him. His fellow hostages applied first aid and raised the alarm, and he was taken to a hospital after a long delay which was caused by the guards.

Other hostages described threats to boil their feet in oil (Alan B. Golacinski), cut their eyes out (Rick Kupke), or kidnap and kill a disabled son in America and "start sending pieces of him to your wife" (David Roeder).

Four hostages tried to escape, and all of them were punished with stretches of solitary confinement when their escape attempts were discovered.

A group photograph of the fifty-two hostages in a Wiesbaden hospital where they spent a few days after their release.

Queen, the hostage who was sent home because of his multiple sclerosis, first developed dizziness and numbness in his left arm six months before his release. At first, the Iranians misdiagnosed his symptoms as a reaction to drafts of cold air. When warmer confinement did not help, he was told that it was "nothing" because the symptoms would disappear soon. Over the months, the numbness spread to his right side, and the dizziness worsened until he "was literally flat on his back, unable to move without growing dizzy and throwing up."

The cruelty of the Iranian prison guards became "a form of slow torture." The guards often withheld mail – telling one hostage, Charles W. Scott, "I don't see anything for you, Mr. Scott. Are you sure your wife has not found another man?" – and the hostages' possessions went missing.

As the hostages were taken to the aircraft that would fly them out of Tehran, they were led through a gauntlet of students forming parallel lines and shouting, "Marg bar Amrika" ("death to America"). When the pilot announced that they were out of Iran, the "freed hostages went wild with happiness. Shouting, cheering, crying, clapping, falling into one another's arms."

Impact in the United States

A heckler in Washington, D.C., leans across a police line toward a demonstration of Iranians in August 1980.

In the United States, the hostage crisis created "a surge of patriotism" and left "the American people more united than they have been on any issue in two decades." The hostage-taking was seen "not just as a diplomatic affront," but as a "declaration of war on diplomacy itself." Television news gave daily updates. In January 1980, the CBS Evening News anchor Walter Cronkite began ending each show by saying how many days the hostages had been captive. President Carter applied economic and diplomatic pressure: Oil imports from Iran were ended on November 12, 1979, and with Executive Order 12170, around US$8 billion of Iranian assets in the United States were frozen by the Office of Foreign Assets Control on November 14.

During the weeks leading up to Christmas in 1979, high school students made cards that were delivered to the hostages. Community groups across the country did the same, resulting in bales of Christmas cards. The National Christmas Tree was left dark except for the top star.

At the time, two Trenton, N.J., newspapers – The Trenton Times and The Trentonian and perhaps others around the country – printed full-page color American flags in their newspapers for readers to cut out and place in the front windows of their homes as support for the hostages until they were brought home safely.

A severe backlash against Iranians in the United States developed. One Iranian American later complained, "I had to hide my Iranian identity not to get beaten up, even at university."

According to Bowden, a pattern emerged in President Carter's attempts to negotiate the hostages' release: "Carter would latch on to a deal proffered by a top Iranian official and grant minor but humiliating concessions, only to have it scotched at the last minute by Khomeini."

Canadian rescue of hostages

Main article: Canadian Caper

Americans expressed gratitude for Canadian efforts to rescue American diplomats during the hostage crisis.

On the day the hostages were seized, six American diplomats evaded capture and remained in hiding at the home of the Canadian diplomat John Sheardown, under the protection of the Canadian ambassador, Ken Taylor. In late 1979, the government of Prime Minister Joe Clark secretly issued an Order in Council allowing Canadian passports to be issued to some American citizens so that they could escape. In cooperation with the CIA, which used the cover story of a film project, two CIA agents and the six American diplomats boarded a Swissair flight to Zürich, Switzerland, on January 28, 1980. Their rescue from Iran, known as the Canadian Caper, was fictionalized in the 1981 film Escape from Iran: The Canadian Caper and the 2012 film Argo.

Negotiations for release

Main article: Iran hostage crisis negotiations

Rescue attempts

Further information: Operation Eagle Claw

First rescue attempt

Cyrus Vance, the United States Secretary of State, had argued against the push by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor, for a military solution to the crisis. Vance, struggling with gout, went to Florida on Thursday, April 10, 1980, for a long weekend. On Friday Brzezinski held a newly scheduled meeting of the National Security Council where the president authorized Operation Eagle Claw, a military expedition into Tehran to rescue the hostages. Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher, who attended the meeting in Vance's place, did not inform Vance. Furious, Vance handed in his resignation on principle, calling Brzezinski "evil."

Late in the afternoon of April 24, 1980, eight RH‑53D helicopters flew from the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz to a remote road serving as an airstrip in the Great Salt Desert of Eastern Iran, near Tabas. They encountered severe dust storms that disabled two of the helicopters, which were traveling in complete radio silence. Early the next morning, the remaining six helicopters met up with several waiting Lockheed C-130 Hercules transport aircraft at a landing site and refueling area designated "Desert One".

At this point, a third helicopter was found to be unserviceable, bringing the total below the six deemed vital for the mission. The commander of the operation, Col. Charles Alvin Beckwith, recommended that the mission be aborted, and his recommendation was approved by President Carter. As the helicopters repositioned themselves for refueling, one ran into a C‑130 tanker aircraft and crashed, killing eight U.S. servicemen and injuring several more.

Two hours into the flight, the crew of helicopter No. 6 saw a warning light indicating that a main rotor might be cracked. They landed in the desert, confirmed visually that a crack had started to develop, and stopped flying in accordance with normal operating procedure. Helicopter No. 8 landed to pick up the crew of No. 6, and abandoned No. 6 in the desert without destroying it. The report by Holloway's group pointed out that a cracked helicopter blade could have been used to continue the mission and that its likelihood of catastrophic failure would have been low for many hours, especially at lower flying speeds. The report found that the pilot of No. 6 would have continued the mission if instructed to do so.

When the helicopters encountered two dust storms along the way to the refueling point, the second more severe than the first, the pilot of No. 5 turned back because the mine-laying helicopters were not equipped with terrain-following radar. The report found that the pilot could have continued to the refueling point if he had been told that better weather awaited him there, but because of the command for radio silence, he did not ask about the conditions ahead. The report also concluded that "there were ways to pass the information" between the refueling station and the helicopter force "that would have small likelihood of compromising the mission" – in other words, that the ban on communication had not been necessary at this stage.

Helicopter No. 2 experienced a partial hydraulic system failure but was able to fly on for four hours to the refueling location. There, an inspection showed that a hydraulic fluid leak had damaged a pump and that the helicopter could not be flown safely, nor repaired in time to continue the mission. Six helicopters were thought to be the absolute minimum required for the rescue mission, so with the force reduced to five, the local commander radioed his intention to abort. This request was passed through military channels to President Carter, who agreed.

In May 1980, the Joint Chiefs of Staff commissioned a Special Operations review group of six senior military officers, led by Adm. James L. Holloway III, to thoroughly examine all aspects of the rescue attempt. The group identified 23 issues that were significant in the failure of the mission, 11 of which it deemed major. The overriding issue was operational security – that is, keeping the mission secret so that the arrival of the rescue team at the embassy would be a complete surprise. This severed the usual relationship between pilots and weather forecasters; the pilots were not informed about the local dust storms. Another security requirement was that the helicopter pilots come from the same unit. The unit picked for the mission was a U.S. Navy mine-laying unit flying CH-53D Sea Stallions; these helicopters were considered the best suited for the mission because of their long range, large capacity, and compatibility with shipboard operations.

After the mission and its failure were made known publicly, Khomeini credited divine intervention on behalf of Islam, and his prestige skyrocketed in Iran. Iranian officials who favored release of the hostages, such as President Bani Sadr, were weakened. In America, President Carter's political popularity and prospects for being re-elected in 1980 were further damaged after a television address on April 25 in which he explained the rescue operation and accepted responsibility for its failure.

Planned second attempt

Main article: Operation Credible Sport

A second rescue attempt, planned but never carried out, would have used highly modified YMC-130H Hercules aircraft. Three aircraft, outfitted with rocket thrusters to allow an extremely short landing and takeoff in the Shahid Shiroudi football stadium near the embassy, were modified under a rushed, top-secret program known as Operation Credible Sport. One crashed during a demonstration at Eglin Air Force Base on October 29, 1980, when its braking rockets were fired too soon. The misfire caused a hard touchdown that tore off the starboard wing and started a fire, but all on board survived. After Carter lost the presidential election in November, the project was abandoned.

The failed rescue attempt led to the creation of the 160th SOAR, a helicopter aviation Special Operations group.

Vice President George H. W. Bush and other VIPs wait to welcome the hostages home.

The hostages disembark Freedom One, an Air Force Boeing C-137 Stratoliner aircraft, upon their return.

Release

See also: First inauguration of Ronald Reagan

With the completion of negotiations signified by the signing of the Algiers Accords on January 19, 1981, the hostages were released on January 20, 1981. That day, minutes after Ronald Reagan was sworn in as president and while he was giving his inaugural address, the 52 American hostages were released to U.S. personnel. There are theories and conspiracy theories regarding why Iran postponed the release until that moment.

The hostages were flown on an Air Algeria Boeing 727-200 commercial airliner (registration 7T-VEM) from Tehran, Iran to Algiers, Algeria, where they were formally transferred to Warren M. Christopher, the representative of the United States, as a symbolic gesture of appreciation for the Algerian government's help in resolving the crisis. The flight continued to Rhein-Main Air Base in West Germany and on to an Air Force hospital in Wiesbaden, where former President Carter, acting as emissary, received them. After medical check-ups and debriefings, the hostages made a second flight to a refueling stop in Shannon, Ireland, where they were greeted by a large crowd. The released hostages were then flown to Stewart Air National Guard Base in Newburgh, New York. From Newburgh, they traveled by bus to the United States Military Academy at West Point and stayed at the Thayer Hotel for three days, receiving a heroes' welcome all along the route. Ten days after their release, they were given a ticker tape parade through the Canyon of Heroes in New York City.

Aftermath

Iran–Iraq War

The Iraqi invasion of Iran occurred less than a year after the embassy employees were taken hostage. The journalist Stephen Kinzer argues that the dramatic change in American–Iranian relations, from allies to enemies, helped embolden the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, and that the United States' anger with Iran led it to aid the Iraqis after the war turned against them. The United States supplied Iraq with, among other things, "helicopters and satellite intelligence that was used in selecting bombing targets." This assistance "deepened and widened anti-American feeling in Iran."

Consequences for Iran

Акция протеста в Тегеране 4 ноября 2015 г. против США, Израиля и Саудовской Аравии.

Протест в Тегеране в ноябре 2015 года.

Захват заложников считается в целом безуспешным для Ирана, поскольку урегулирование, достигнутое путем переговоров с США, не отвечало ни одному из первоначальных требований Ирана. Иран потерял международную поддержку своей войны против Ирака. However, anti-Americanism intensified, and the crisis served to benefit those Iranians who had supported it. Politicians such as Khoeiniha and Behzad Nabavi остались в более сильной позиции, в то время как те, кто был связан с США или обвинен в связях с ними, были удалены из политической картины. Биограф Хомейни Бакер Мойн описал кризис как «переломный момент в жизни Хомейни», который превратил его из «осторожного, прагматичного политика» в «современного революционера, целеустремленного следования догме». В заявлениях Хомейни империализм и либерализм были «негативными словами», а революция «стала священным словом, иногда более важным, чем ислам ».

Правительство Ирана ежегодно отмечает это событие демонстрацией у посольства и сжиганием американского флага . Однако 4 ноября 2009 г. демократические протестующие и реформисты провели демонстрацию на улицах Тегерана. Когда власти призвали их скандировать «Смерть Америке», протестующие вместо этого скандировали «Смерть диктатору» (имея в виду верховного лидера Ирана аятоллу Али Хаменеи ) и другие антиправительственные лозунги.

Последствия для Соединенных Штатов

Моделирование первого дня мероприятия, 3 ноября 2016 г., Тегеран.

Подарки, в том числе пожизненные пропуска на любой низшей лиги или высшей бейсбольной лиги , матч были осыпаны заложниками по их возвращению в США.

В 2000 году заложники и их семьи безуспешно пытались подать в суд на Иран в соответствии с Законом о борьбе с терроризмом 1996 года. Первоначально они выиграли дело, когда Иран не смог обеспечить защиту, но затем Государственный департамент попытался прекратить иск. опасаясь, что это осложнит международные отношения. В результате федеральный судья постановил, что заложникам не может быть присуждена никакая компенсация за ущерб из-за соглашения, заключенного Соединенными Штатами при освобождении заложников.

Бывшее здание посольства США сейчас используется правительством Ирана и связанными с ним группами. С 2001 года он служит музеем революции. За дверью с одной стороны стоит бронзовая модель по мотивам Статуи Свободы , а с другой — статуя, изображающая одного из заложников.

В 2006 году газета Guardian сообщила, что группа под названием «Комитет памяти мучеников Глобальной исламской кампании» использовала посольство для вербовки «искателей мученичества»: добровольцев для проведения операций против западных и израильских объектов. Мохаммад Самади, представитель группы, за несколько дней набрал несколько сотен добровольцев.

Мемориал о кризисе с заложниками в Иране

Дипломатические отношения

Соединенные Штаты и Иран разорвали официальные дипломатические отношения из-за кризиса с заложниками. Иран выбрал Алжир в качестве своей защитной державы в Соединенных Штатах, передав мандат Пакистану в 1992 году. Соединенные Штаты выбрали Швейцарию в качестве своей защитной державы в Иране. Отношения поддерживаются через Секцию интересов Ирана посольства Пакистана и Секцию интересов США посольства Швейцарии.

Остатки операции «Орлиный коготь» в бывшем посольстве

Заложники

Первоначальных пленников было 66: 63 из них были взяты в посольстве, а трое из них были схвачены и удерживались в офисах МИД. Трое заложников были сотрудниками ЦРУ. Один из них был студентом-химиком УРИ .

Тринадцать заложников были освобождены 19–20 ноября 1979 г., один заложник — 11 июля 1980 г.

Дипломаты, избежавшие ареста

• Роберт Андерс - сотрудник консульства
• Марк Дж. Лиек, 29 лет - сотрудник консульства.
• Кора А. Лиек, 25 лет - помощник консульства
• Генри Л. Шац, 31 год - атташе по сельскому хозяйству.
• Джозеф Д. Стаффорд, 29 лет - сотрудник консульства
• Кэтлин Ф. Стаффорд, 28 лет - помощник консульства

Заложники, освобожденные 19 ноября 1979 г.

• Кэти Гросс, 22 года - секретарь
• Сержант Ладелл Мейплс, морская пехота США, 23 года - охранник посольства морской пехоты.
• Сержант Уильям Куорлз, морская пехота США, 23 года - охранник посольства морской пехоты.

Заложники, освобожденные 20 ноября 1979 г.

• Сержант Джеймс Хьюз, ВВС США, 30 лет – административный менеджер ВВС.
• Лилиан Джонсон, 32 года - секретарь
• Элизабет Монтань, – секретарь
• Ллойд Роллинз - административный сотрудник
• Капитан Нил (Терри) Робинсон, ВВС США, - офицер военной разведки ВВС.
• Терри Тедфорд, 24 года - секретарь
• Магистр Джозеф Винсент, ВВС США, – административный менеджер ВВС
• Сержант Дэвид Уокер, морская пехота США, 25 лет - охранник посольства морской пехоты.
• Джоан Уолш, 33 года - секретарь
• Капрал Уэсли Уильямс, морская пехота США, 24 года - охранник посольства морской пехоты.

Заложник, освобожденный в июле 1980 года.

• Ричард Куин , 28 лет – вице-консул

Заложники, освобожденные в январе 1981 года.

52 заложника, освобожденные в январе 1981 года, на фото в журнале State Magazine.

• Томас Л. Ахерн-младший - офицер по контролю за наркотиками
• Клер Кортленд Барнс, – специалист по связям с общественностью
• Уильям Э. Белк - офицер по связям с общественностью и учету
• Роберт О. Блюкер - специалист по экономике
• Дональд Дж. Кук - вице-консул
• Уильям Дж. Догерти – третий секретарь миссии США (офицер ЦРУ). )
• LCDR Роберт Энгельманн, USN, - атташе ВМФ
• Сержант Уильям Гальегос, морская пехота США, - охранник морской пехоты
• Брюс В. Герман - сотрудник по бюджету
• IS1 Дуэйн Л. Джилетт - специалист по связи и разведке ВМФ
• Алан Б. Голацински - начальник службы безопасности посольства, офицер региональной безопасности.
• Джон Э. Грейвс - сотрудник по связям с общественностью
• CW3 Джозеф М. Холл, США, – армейский атташе
• Сержант Кевин Дж. Херменинг, морская пехота США, - охранник морской пехоты
• SFC Дональд Р. Хохман, США, – армейский медик.
• Полковник Леланд Дж. Холланд, США, – военный атташе
• Майкл Хауленд - помощник регионального сотрудника службы безопасности
• Чарльз А. Джонс-младший - специалист по связям с общественностью, оператор телетайпа
• Малкольм К. Калп, коммерческий директор
• Мурхед К. Кеннеди младший - экономический и коммерческий директор
• Уильям Ф. Кио-младший - директор американской школы в Исламабаде.
• Капрал Стивен В. Киртли, морская пехота США - охранник морской пехоты
• Кэтрин Л. Кооб, сотрудник по культуре посольства
• Фредерик Ли Купке – офицер связи и специалист по электронике
• Л. Брюс Лейнген , – поверенный в делах
• Стивен Лаутербах – административный сотрудник
• Гэри Э. Ли, – административный сотрудник
• Сержант Пол Эдвард Льюис, морская пехота США, - охранник морской пехоты
• Джон В. Лимберт-младший - политический деятель
• Сержант Джеймс М. Лопес, морская пехота США, - охранник морской пехоты
• Сержант Джон Д. МакКил-младший, морская пехота США, - охранник морской пехоты.
• Майкл Дж. Метринко, - политический деятель
• Джерри Дж. Миле, – офицер по связям с общественностью
• Сержант Майкл Э. Мёллер, морская пехота США, - начальник подразделения охраны морской пехоты.
• Берт С. Мур - советник по административным вопросам
• Ричард Морфилд – генеральный консул
• Капитан Пол М. Нидэм-младший, ВВС США, - офицер штаба по логистике ВВС.
• Роберт К. Оде - офицер дипломатической службы в отставке, временно находящийся в Тегеране.
• Сержант Грегори А. Персингер, морская пехота США, - охранник морской пехоты.
• Джерри Плоткин - гражданский бизнесмен, посетивший Тегеран.
• MSG Реджис Рэган, США, – солдат армии, офис военного атташе.
• Подполковник Дэвид М. Редер, ВВС США, – заместитель атташе ВВС
• Барри М. Розен , – пресс-атташе
• Уильям Б. Ройер-младший - заместитель директора Ирано-американского общества
• Полковник Томас Э. Шефер, ВВС США, - атташе ВВС
• Полковник Чарльз В. Скотт, США, – армейский атташе.
• CDR Дональд А. Шарер, ВМС США, - военно-морской атташе
• Сержант Родни В. (Рокки) Сикманн, морская пехота США, - охранник морской пехоты
• SSG Джозеф Субик-младший, США, - военная полиция, армия, офис военного атташе.
• Элизабет Энн Свифт, – заместитель руководителя политического отдела
• Виктор Л. Томсет - советник по политическим вопросам
• Филип Р. Уорд - офицер по связям с общественностью ЦРУ

Гражданские заложники

В тот же период в Иране было захвачено небольшое количество заложников, не захваченных в посольстве. Все они были выпущены к концу 1982 года.

• Джерри Плоткин - американский бизнесмен, освобожденный в январе 1981 года.
• Мохи Собхани – американский инженер иранского происхождения и член Веры Бахаи . Выпущен 4 февраля 1981 года.
• Зия Насри – американец афганского происхождения. Выпущен в ноябре 1982 года.
• Синтия Дуайер – американский репортер, арестована 5 мая 1980 года, обвинена в шпионаже и освобождена 10 февраля 1981 года.
• Пол Чиаппароне и Билл Гейлорд - сотрудники Electronic Data Systems (EDS), спасенные командой под руководством отставного спецназа армии США полковника «Быка» Саймонса , финансируемой владельцем EDS Россом Перо , в 1979 году.
• Четыре британских миссионера, включая Джона Коулмана; его жена Одри Коулман; и Джин Уодделл; выпущен в конце 1981 года

Заложники, которых удостоили чести

Все сотрудники Госдепартамента и ЦРУ, попавшие в заложники, получили награду Госдепартамента за доблесть . Политический офицер Майкл Дж. Метринко получил две награды: одну за то, что он был заложником, а другую за смелое спасение американцев, которые были заключены в тюрьму в Тебризе за несколько месяцев до захвата посольства.

Позже американские военные наградили 20 военнослужащих, оказавшихся в заложниках, медалью «За заслуги перед обороной» . Единственным военнослужащим-заложником, которому не была вручена медаль, был штаб-сержант Джозеф Субик-младший, который «не вел себя в условиях стресса так, как ожидается от унтер-офицеров». – то есть, по словам других заложников, он сотрудничал с захватчиками заложников.

Медалью за гуманитарную службу были награждены военнослужащие Объединенной оперативной группы 1–79, орган планирования операции «Рисовая чаша / Орлиный коготь», принимавшие участие в спасательной операции.

Компонент миссии специальных операций ВВС был удостоен награды «Выдающееся подразделение ВВС» за безупречное выполнение своей части миссии, включая эвакуацию с заправочной станции Desert One в экстремальных условиях.

Компенсационные выплаты

Заложники в Тегеране после освобождения получали по 50 долларов за каждый день пребывания в плену. Это было оплачено правительством США. Соглашение, которое освободило их, достигнутое между Соединенными Штатами и Ираном при посредничестве Алжира в январе 1981 года, не позволило заложникам требовать какой-либо реституции со стороны Ирана из-за иностранного суверенного иммунитета и исполнительного соглашения, известного как Алжирские соглашения , которое запрещало такие иски. После неудачи в судах бывшие заложники обратились в Конгресс и получили поддержку как демократов, так и республиканцев, в результате чего в декабре 2015 года Конгресс принял законопроект (Закон США о жертвах государственного терроризма [USVSST] 2015 года), который предоставлял заложникам компенсацию от фонд, который будет финансироваться за счет штрафов, налагаемых на компании, признанные виновными в нарушении американских санкций против Ирана. Законопроект предусматривал выплату 10 000 долларов США за каждый день пребывания в плену (за каждого заложника), а также единовременную выплату в размере 600 000 долларов США в качестве компенсации каждому из супругов и детей иранских заложников. Это означало, что каждому заложнику будет выплачено до 4,4 миллиона долларов США. Первые средства на трастовый счет, с которого будет выплачена компенсация, поступили из части штрафа в размере 9 миллиардов долларов, уплаченного парижским банком BNP Paribas за нарушение санкций против Ирана, Кубы и Судана.

Некоторые из бывших заложников и их семьи получили выплаты, но затем юристы Министерства юстиции интерпретировали закон так, чтобы позволить членам семей жертв 11 сентября также получить судебное решение против Ирана и подать заявку в фонд USVSST. Позже жертвы взрывов в Бейруте в 1983 году также предъявили иски фонду USVSST. Из-за исчерпания фонда к февралю 2019 года освобожденным заложникам и их близким семьям было выплачено лишь 17,8% от законодательно установленной суммы.

Известные захватчики заложников, охранники и следователи

Бывшее посольство США, известное иранцами после кризиса как «шпионское логово», «шпионское логово» и «шпионское гнездо».

• Аббас Абди – реформатор, журналист, социолог-самоучка и общественный деятель.
• Хамид Обалеби – бывший посол Ирана в ООН.
• Эбрагим Асгарзаде – тогда студент; позже иранский политический деятель и политик, член парламента (1989–1993) и председатель городского совета Тегерана (1999–2003).
• Мохсен Мирдамади – член парламента (2000–2004), глава Исламского фронта участия Ирана .
• Масуме Эбтекар – переводчик и представитель студенческой группы, оккупировавшей посольство; позже ученый, журналист, первая женщина -вице-президент Ирана и глава Организации по охране окружающей среды Ирана.
• Мохаммад Мусави Хойниха – духовный лидер захватчиков заложников.
• Хосейн Шейхолеслам – тогда студент; позже член парламента и посол Ирана в Сирии умер во время вспышки COVID-19 в 2020 году.

Теория октябрьского сюрприза

Основная статья: Теория октябрьского сюрприза 1980 г.

Время освобождения заложников породило обвинения в том, что представители президентской кампании Рейгана вступили в сговор с Ираном, чтобы отложить освобождение до окончания президентских выборов в США 1980 года, чтобы помешать Картеру устроить « октябрьский сюрприз ». В 1992 году Гэри Сик , бывший советник Форда и Картера по национальной безопасности, представил самые веские обвинения в редакционной статье, появившейся в The New York Times , а другие, в том числе бывший президент Ирана Аболхасан Банисадр , повторили и дополнили их. Этот предполагаемый заговор с целью повлиять на исход президентских выборов в США 1980 года между Картером и Рейганом стал известен как теория октябрьского сюрприза 1980 года.

После двенадцати лет различного внимания средств массовой информации обе палаты Конгресса США провели отдельные расследования и пришли к выводу, что достоверные доказательства, подтверждающие это обвинение, отсутствуют или недостаточны.

В мае 2023 года Сик, бывший главный советник администрации Картера по внутренней политике Стюарт Э. Эйзенштат , писатель Кай Берд и журналист Джонатан Альтер статью, опубликовали в The New Republic в которой излагаются различные обвинения и косвенные доказательства (включая обвинения Барнса в The New York Times). ), которые появились в течение десятилетий после более ранних исследований, заявив, что достоверность теории «почти решена». В статье 2024 года цитируется Аболхасан Бани-Садр. который также утверждает, что существовала координация с кампанией Рейгана, и утверждает, что эта тактика используется, чтобы склонить президентские выборы в США 2024 года в пользу Трампа.

В популярной культуре

Было выпущено более 80 песен, посвященных кризису с заложниками в Иране или содержащих отсылки к нему.

• Лори Андерсон, Неожиданный хит занявший второе место в Великобритании в 1982 году, " O Superman " стал ответом на кризис и, в частности, на операцию "Орлиный коготь " .
• Международный хит 1982 года « I Ran (So Far Away) » группы A Flock of Seagulls на самом деле не имеет отношения к кризису, но, как Дэйв Томпсон , для американских слушателей эта песня была «иронично политической». отметил

Голливудский фильм 2012 года «Арго» , получивший премию «Оскар» за лучший фильм, был основан на спасении канадского Каперса .

В 2022 году канал HBO выпустил документальный сериал из 4 частей под названием «Заложники» .

См. также

• Роберт Уитни Имбри – первый дипломат США, убитый в Персии
• 1979 г. Горит посольство США в Исламабаде.
• Нападение на посольство Великобритании в Иране в 2011 г.
• Нападение на дипломатические миссии Саудовской Аравии в Иране в 2016 г.
• Нападение на посольство США в Багдаде
• Аллея флагов , парк в городе Эрмитаж в округе Мерсер , штат Пенсильвания , США, возведенный во время кризиса в честь американских дипломатов, находившихся в заложниках в Тегеране , Иран .
• Дело, касающееся дипломатического и консульского персонала США в Тегеране
• Кризис с заложниками в Ливане
• Список иностранных граждан, задержанных в Иране
• Список кризисов с заложниками
• Nightline : Эта программа ABC News под названием «Иранский кризис: Америка в заложниках» возникла как метод информирования зрителей о последних событиях во время кризиса. Премьера нынешнего названия состоялась 24 марта 1980 года с Тедом Коппелом в качестве ведущего.
• Резолюции Совета Безопасности ООН 457 и 461 (1979 г.) о кризисе с заложниками.

Цитируемые источники

• Бахаш, Шауль (1984). Правление аятолл: Иран и Исламская революция . Основные книги. ISBN  0-465-06887-1 .
• Боуден, Марк (2006). Гости аятоллы: Иранский кризис с заложниками: первая битва в войне Америки с воинствующим исламом . Нью-Йорк: Гроув Пресс. ISBN  0-87113-925-1 .
• Фарбер, Дэвид (1979). Взят в заложники . Издательство Принстонского университета. ISBN  1-4008-2620-9 .
• Холлоуэй, JL III ; Группа обзора специальных операций (1980). «Отчет о миссии по спасению [иранских заложников]» . Объединенный комитет начальников штабов США. Архивировано из оригинала 2 мая 2013 года . Проверено 12 декабря 2013 г.
• Мойн, Бакер (2000). Хомейни: Жизнь аятоллы . Книги Томаса Данна. ISBN  978-1-85043-128-2 .
• Вайнгартен, Рид Х. (19 ноября 1992 г.). Обвинения в «октябрьском сюрпризе» и обстоятельства освобождения американских заложников, удерживаемых в Иране . Вашингтон, округ Колумбия: Типография правительства США. ISBN  0-16-039795-2 . ОСЛК   28306929 . С. Рпт. № 102-125.

Дальнейшее чтение

• Амманн, Дэниел (2009). Король нефти: Тайная жизнь Марка Рича . Нью-Йорк: Пресса Святого Мартина . ISBN  978-0-312-57074-3 .
• Эбтекар, Массуме; Рид, Фред (2000). Захват власти в Тегеране: внутренняя история захвата посольства США в 1979 году . Бернаби, Британская Колумбия: Talonbooks. ISBN   0889224439 .
• Харрис, Лес (1997). 444 дня до свободы: что на самом деле произошло в Иране . DVD СКП 033909253390
• Стюарт, Джеймс (1983). Партнеры : информация о самых влиятельных юридических фирмах Америки . Нью-Йорк: Саймон и Шустер . ISBN  0-671-42023-2 .
• Энгельмайер , Шелдон Д. (1981). Заложник: хроника 444 дней в Иране . Нью-Йорк: Издательство Кэролайн Хаус. ISBN  0-89803-084-6 .
• Больной, Гэри (1991). Октябрьский сюрприз: американские заложники в Иране и выборы Рональда Рейгана . Нью-Йорк: Рэндом Хаус.

Внешние ссылки

• Недавно опубликованные фотографии с мероприятия tarikhirani.ir
• В «Дыре памяти» находится галерея фотографий, сделанных в посольстве США во время кризиса.
• Список заложников и жертв
• Иранские заложники: попытки получить компенсацию Исследовательская служба Конгресса
• Короткометражный фильм «Отчет о заложниках» (1981) доступен для бесплатного просмотра и скачивания в Интернет-архиве .

Рассекреченные документы

Соединенные Штаты

• Страница «Кризис с заложниками в Иране» на сайте Управления министра обороны (OSD) и Объединенного штаба . FOIA Центра

Великобритания

Отчеты канцелярии премьер-министра, корреспонденция и документы; 1979–97 на сайте Discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk: ИРАН. Внутренняя ситуация в Иране; Нападение на британское посольство; Захват заложников в посольстве США; Замораживание иранских активов; Миссия США по освобождению заложников; Отношения с США и Великобританией после захвата заложников в посольстве США.

• Часть 1
• Часть 2
• Часть 3
• Часть 4
• Часть 5
• Часть 6
• Часть 7

СМИ, связанные с кризисом с заложниками в Иране , на Викискладе?